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Though critical international theories have challenged mainstream International 
Relations (IR) on epistemological, ontological, and methodological grounds, they 
remain largely focused on the `West'. I contend that the parochial character of IR can 
be effectively challenged by a postcolonial IR theory based on conversations between 
critical international theories and the postcolonial theoretical enterprise. This approach 
provides new insights into themes of representation and identity. Here, I analyse the 
general theme of Western representations of the non-West and the specific issue of 
exoticised Western representations of Tibet (Exotica Tibet). I seek to theorise one 
crucial element of the Tibet question - Western cultural representations of Tibet and 
their constitutive (both enabling and constraining) and performative role in Tibetan 
identity discourses. Exotica Tibet is interrogated in terms of its poetics (how Tibet is 
represented) and its politics (what impact these representational regimes have on the 
identity discourses of the represented). 
After a general study of the treatment of representation in international, cultural, and 
postcolonial studies, Exotica Tibet is framed as an Orientalist construct that shares 
with other `Orients' various rhetorical strategies of cultural representation. The 
theoretical claims are substantiated with an empirical analysis of Western 
representations in various cultural sites during the twentieth century. This sets the 
stage for analysing the politics of Exotica Tibet. By examining Tibetan identity 
discourse ('Tibetanness') in the cultural and political spheres, I not only consider the 
productive effect of representations, but more importantly, provide new ways of 
theorising identity through postcolonialism-inspired symbolic geography and a 
discursive approach. Thus, the poetics and politics of Exotica Tibet mark a new way 
of enculturing political analysis and politicising cultural criticism. Postcolonial 
analysis contributes to the changing of IR into a discourse of empowering criticality. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
`I am not erudite enough to be interdisciplinary, but I can break rules' 
(Spivak 1999: xiii) 
Mainstream International Relations discipline (IR) remains preoccupied with the `big' 
issues of war and order, power and security. In the process it ignores, marginalises and 
trivialises issues that affect the everyday lives of a majority of the world's population 
living mostly, though not exclusively, in the so-called `third world'. This has status 
quoist implications. In the spirit of the Western Enlightenment, IR's parochialism 
takes on the garb of universalistic pretensions. However, thanks to the various critical 
international theories, it is no longer possible to speak with confidence of a single 
discipline called IR. Voices of authority are now continuously engaged by the voices 
of dissent. While various strands of the `third debate' (see Lapid 1989) have critiqued 
the conventional theories and widened the self-definition of IR, it still remains mainly 
`Western' in orientation. Parochialism in the guise of universalism remains strong. 
Reconceptualising IR away from its moorings in realist and liberal paradigms involves 
questioning its ontological, epistemological and methodological concerns while at the 
same time combating conspicuous elements of its geographical parochialism. This can 
be done through adoption of postcoloniality (a postcolonial critical attitude) which 
involves inter- as well as anti-disciplinarity. Postcoloniality, therefore, offers means to 
talk about world politics without `political evacuation and disciplinary incorporation' 
(Weber 1999: 435). 
The question of Tibet has been neglected in the theory and praxis of international 
relations. Within the wider argument for a postcolonial approach to IR, I seek to 
theorise one crucial element of the `Tibet question" - Western cultural representations 
of Tibet and their constitutive (both enabling and constraining) and performative roles 
in Tibetan identity discourses. If we are to redefine IR as a discourse of world politics 
that appreciates the importance of issues of power in a post-colonial2 world, we have 
II use the term `Tibet question' to refer to Tibet as an issue in world politics. By using the 
interrogative word, I foreground the Tibetan issue as a `problem', in line with the `Palestine 
question' or the `Irish question'. It is more than `the conflict over the political status of Tibet 
vis-ä-vis China' (Melvyn Goldstein in Goldstein and Kapstein 1998: 14; see also Heberer 
1995). Crucially, it includes an examination of the very categories of `Tibet' and `Tibetans'. 
2 As I will explain in chapter 2, I use hyphenated form of `post-colonial' in its usual temporal 
sense (for post-decolonisation era) and unhyphenated `postcolonial' as representing a critical 
way of thinking and writing. 
to take on board concerns such as the ones expressed here. After all, Tibetanness is a 
typical postcolonial/post-colonial narrative of identity politics combining processes of 
migration with the human desire for fixity. 
In order to go `beyond the dominant rituals of International Relations theory and 
practice' (George 1996: 70) and understand IR as `a philosophical anthropology of 
everyday life on a global scale' (Campbell 1996: 24; emphasis in original), we must 
foreground political concerns from `beyond' the West. Since modern theories of IR 
can be read as `a crucial site in which attempts to think otherwise about political 
possibilities are constrained by categories and assumptions that contemporary political 
analysis is encouraged to take for granted' (Walker 1993: 5), thinking differently 
demands a challenging of the policing of legitimate and illegitimate course of enquiry. 
This thesis contributes to this challenging and agrees with Roland Bleiker's call to 
`forget IR theory' since 
By articulating critique in relation to arguments advanced by orthodox IR 
theory, the impact of critical voices remains confined within the larger 
discursive boundaries that were established through the initial framing of 
debates. In view of these restraints... [we have to explore] ... ways through 
which genealogical critique can be supplemented with a process of forgetting 
the object of critique, of theorizing world politics without being constrained 
by the agendas, issues, and terminologies that are presented by orthodox 
debates (1997: 58; emphasis in original). 
Postcoloniality offers a way of combining critique with affirmation of agency. Rob 
Walker suggests, `theoretical discourse about international politics could benefit 
substantially from an increased sensitivity to its own cultural horizons and ideological 
functions' (1984: 19). 
As Geeta Chowdhry and Sheila Nair put it, `the postcolonial has relevance for the 
study of IR because it provides insight into the ways in which the imperial juncture is 
implicated in the construction of contemporary relations of power, hierarchy, and 
domination' (2002: 11-12). Postcolonial international theories are useful for 
addressing eurocentrism in IR. But the task is not only about looking at concerns and 
issues affecting people in the non-Western world. It also involves examining old 
themes of state, power, war, and peace from new and different perspectives. For 
example, within the rubric of conventional IR Tibet is mostly seen in terms of its role 
in Sino-Western relations or Sino-Indian border disputes, thus effectively denying 
subjectivity to the Tibetans themselves. This resonates with the early twentieth century 
British preoccupation with Tibet's role in the `Great Game' - the imperialist rivalry 
between the British and the Russians in Asia. The analysis of the Tibet question using 
postcolonial IR theory entails scrutinising the vocabulary afforded by conventional IR 
and considering hitherto undertheorised issues such as imperialism, history, diaspora, 
representation, and identity. 
This thesis contends that the parochial character of IR can be effectively challenged by 
a postcolonial criticality (critical attitude), or postcoloniality. Postcoloniality can be 
based on conversations between critical international theories and the postcolonial 
theoretical enterprise. Such an approach provides new insights into themes of 
representation and identity - it politicises culture and encultures politics. Here, the 
case for a postcolonial IR is made by looking at the general theme of representation 
(and its productive relation with identity) and the specific issue of Western 
representations and Tibetan identity discourses. What Roxanne Doty writes about 
representation of the South (the third world) by the North (the West) reflects my use of 
the term `representation' here: 
By representation I mean the ways in which the South as been discursively 
represented by policy makers, scholars, journalists, and others in the North. 
This does not refer to the `truth' and `knowledge' that the North has 
discovered and accumulated about the South, but rather to the ways in which 
regimes of `truth' and `knowledge' have been produced. The contexts within 
which specific encounters have taken place and the issues relevant to these 
contexts have been occasions for the proliferation and circulation of various 
representations (1996b: 2). 
I do not see categories such as the `West' and `Tibet' as natural and pre-given but as 
`non-foundational and constantly reproduced in relational terms' (Krishna 1999: xxi). 
My endeavour is inspired by the practice of what Michael Shapiro terms 
`insurrectional textuality' (1989a: 13) and what Bleiker calls `disruptive writing', a 
process of tackling an issue not by way of well-rehearsed debates, but through an 
alternative set of texts and narratives. In line with this, `International relations, then, is 
to be treated primarily as a broadly sketched theme of inquiry, rather than a 
disciplinary set of rules that determine where to locate and how to study global 
politics' (Bleiker 2000: 19). 
1A. The Tibet question3 
3 The discussion on the Tibet question appears in greater detail in my contribution `A story to 
be told: IR, postcolonialism, and the discourse of Tibetan (trans)national identity' (Anand 
2002b). I thank Routledge for giving me the permission to use it. 
3 
Even though the issues raised by the Tibet question are international in scope and 
there is an increasing recognition that it remains one of the unsolved problems in 
world politics, Tibet (see Fig. I) hardly figures in the international politics literature. 
When it does come up, it is either as a footnote to the Cold War4 or as a pawn in Sino- 
Western (see Sautman 1999; Xu Guangui 1997) or Sino-Indian relations (see Ghosh 
1977; Ginsburgs 1960; Mehra 1980). This neglect reflects a web of strategic interests 
of major Western and regional powers, IR's focus on relations between states and, 
finally, its ethnocentrism. 5 All this was evident after 1959, when China acquired 
complete control over Tibet, giving up the uneasy accommodation with the Dalai 
Lama-led Tibetan government that had lasted for almost eight years (1951 to 1959). 
Despite the international condemnation of Chinese action in both strongly worded 
statements such as those of the International Commission of Jurists and feeble 
statements in the United Nations General Assembly, 6 the states of the world accepted 
the Tibet question as an `internal' Chinese matter. 
Realist and liberal strands of IR theory seem incapable of engaging with the 
complexity of the Tibet question, though the emergence of critical schools within the 
field suggests the potential for a better understanding. The Tibetan issue can be 
studied in terms of themes such as sovereignty/suzerainty, imperialism, human rights, 
representation, identity, nationalism, diaspora, and trarisnationalism. An approach 
which highlights the interlinkages between these themes, and also emphasises the need 
for some sort of dialogue between critical IR and postcolonialism better addresses the 
complexity surrounding it. Critical international theories provide sophisticated 
investigations of some of these themes, notably sovereignty, representation, and 
4 For an analysis of CIA operations in Tibet during the early years of cold war, see Conboy and 
Morrison 2002; Knaus 1999; Laird 2002; The shadow circus (2001); Shakya 1999. 
5 One other reason for this could be, what Stephen Chan argues is, IR's paucity in 
understanding matters of religions and religious values contributing to the fact that it `has 
nothing to say about the contest between China and Tibet to ordain and maintain Lamas' 
(2000: 566). The most famous of these contests is over the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama, 
usually considered as second in religious hierarchy within Tibetan Buddhism (at least within 
the dominant Gelukpa sect), next only to the Dalai Lama. 
6 The International Commission of Jurists (http: //www. ici. org) in Geneva brought out two early 
reports on Tibet -- `The question of Tibet and the rule of law' (1959) and `Tibet and the 
Chinese People's Republic' (1960) - and continues to do so. The UN General Assembly has 
passed three resolutions on Tibet: 1353 (XIV) 1959; 1723 (XVI) 1961; 2079 (XX) 1965. For 
details on these as well as other international resolutions on Tibet, see Department of 
Information and International Relations (1997). 
4 
nationalism. But themes of imperialism, diaspora, Western representational practices, 
and transnational identity require insights from postcolonial theory. 
The later chapters will discuss in more detail the aspects of the Tibet question 
concerning identity and representation. To provide a flavour of things to come, here I 
provide a brief outline of the Tibet question, focusing on the historical status of Tibet 
vis-a-vis China and on Tibetan (trans)nationalism within the diasporic population. The 
debate over the historical status is not dealt with in detail in the thesis. However, 
Tibetan diasporic (trans)nationalism will be discussed in greater detail in chapters 6 
and 7 in order to highlight the power of representational regimes in constituting and 
containing the discourses through which modern collective identity is expressed. In 
these discourses Tibetanness can be seen as a typical postcolonial/post-colonial 
narrative of identity politics as it is constituted and contested by dominant and 
resistant categories of nationalism, culture, gender, class, race, and religion. 
IA. i. Historical status 
The status of Tibet vis-a-vis China has been articulated in terms of various concepts, 
including sovereignty, suzerainty, independence, autonomy, vassalage, protectorate, 
overlordship, and colony (for a range of views, see Chiu and Dreyer 1989; 
Government of Tibet n. d.; Norbu 1990; Shakabpa 1984; Smith 1996; Van Praag 1987; 
Wang Jiawei and Nyima Gyaincain 1997; Wang Lixiong 2002). However, for the 
most part, it is sovereignty that is asserted and contested. On the one hand, the Chinese 
state marshals arguments buttressing its historical claim of sovereignty over Tibet; on 
the other, Tibetan exiles and their supporters make counter claims and assert that Tibet 
was for all practical purposes independent from China. Though both sides mobilise 
history to make their claims, the concept of sovereignty is often left unproblematised. 7 
Crucially, the revolutionary communist regime that took over China in 1949 had no 
qualms over staking claims in Tibet based on a debatable imperial legacy, which it 
denounced in other spheres. The Chinese, who during the nineteenth century rejected 
7 This is not surprising as sovereignty is an `essentially uncontested concept' (Walker 1990: 
159). Though state sovereignty is the primary constitutive principle of modern political life, its 
treatment as an obvious `fact' tells us `especially about the limits within which that 
contestability is constrained, ritualized, and fixed through a historically specific account of the 
possibilities of political community and human identity' (Ibid. ). For different perspectives on 
sovereignty, see Bartelson 1995; Biersteker and Weber 1996; Hannum 1990; Hinsley 1986; 
5 
the Western mode of international relations as alien, exerted their control over Tibet 
after 1950 using the absolutist modem European conception of sovereignty. 
Importantly, in the process it also ignored the different worldviews within which the 
Mongol and Manchu emperors interacted with Tibet (see Klieger 1994; Norbu 1990; 
Shakya 1999). Unlike the British, who used `suzerainty' and `autonomy' to designate 
Sino-Tibetan relations, since 1905, the Chinese have consistently argued that its 
position is that of a sovereign and not a suzerain. At the beginning of the twenty-first 
century, even though there is no space for `suzerainty' within international law and 
politics and all the states recognise the Chinese claim of `sovereignty' over Tibet, the 
pro-Tibet lobby contests this assertion of sovereignty by highlighting the difference 
between suzerainty and sovereignty within international law. As Lassa Oppenheim 
argued: `Suzerainty is by no means sovereignty. It is a kind of international 
guardianship, since the vassal State is either absolutely or mainly represented 
internationally by the suzerain State' (quoted in Van Praag 1987: 107). 
The genealogy of the modern idea of sovereignty also reveals its close nexus with 
European imperialism. Until the first half of the twentieth century, the international 
community of states was based on a double standard. While the `civilised' world (read 
as Europe, and later the United States and Japan) had a right to sovereign statehood, 
the rest of the world was open to various forms of imperial control. The `[d]egree of 
civilisation necessary to maintain international relations was considered as one of the 
conditions for statehood' (Hannum 1990: 16). The Tibetan example is typical of how 
imperial efforts throughout the non-European world were empowered by Western 
understandings of the non-Western states. Not only did imperial powers actively 
delegitimise non-Western modes of sovereignty, they refused to recognise the 
intricacies of non-Western inter-state relations (see Strang 1996). Within this context, 
at the turn of the twentieth century, the traditional Sino-Tibetan relationship was 
considered by the British to be `irrational' and lacking legitimacy because it did not 
conform to the modern European ideas of diplomacy. For a large part of the nineteenth 
century, to the British in India, Tibet was a `forbidden land' ruled by `strange lamas' 
under some form of Chinese control. While some, including George Bogle, named this 
control `sovereignty' (Markham 1876: 195), most used the term `overlordship' or 
`suzerainty'. This was based on the presence of Chinese amban ('resident') in Lhasa, 
Hoffman 1998; James 1986; Krasner 1999; Weber 1995. 
6 
the claims of the Manchu emperor, and the refusal of the Tibetans to clarify the 
situation. Due to their own familiarity with feudalism and with the Chinese 
international system of tributary relations, it is not surprising that the British 
interpreted the Sino-Tibetan relations in terms of suzerainty and a protectorate system. 
British policy towards Tibet was shaped by conflicting dynamics including the 
infeasibility of direct colonisation, its strategic location as a buffer state in Central 
Asia, British commercial interests in the Chinese Empire, and the like (see Norbu 
1990). These conflicting interests dictated the ambiguous policy in which Tibet's 
relation with the Chinese Empire was seen in terms of Chinese suzerainty and Tibetan 
autonomy. In a memorandum of 17 August 1912, the British government clarified its 
stance: `while recognising the Chinese suzerainty, they were not prepared to admit the 
right of China to interfere in the internal administration of Tibet... ' (Foreign Office 
1920: 41). Thus, `Outer Tibet would become an autonomous state under Chinese 
suzerainty and British protectorate' (Ibid.: 43). The failure of the British to understand 
the complex relation had as much to do with their heady faith in the superiority of 
European norms as with their conflicting interests in the region. 
Traditionally, political actors interpreted and understood their inter-state relations in 
vocabularies familiar to them. Sino-Tibetan relations were no exception. The same 
relations could have been understood by the Chinese imperial officials in terms of 
Confucian tributary relations, and by the Tibetans as Buddhist mchod-yon. 8 This does 
not validate the primacy of either worldview, but reveals the complexity of the issue 
involved. Grounding the relation in some universally accepted terms was unnecessary 
within the Chinese as well as the Tibetan worldview. Personal, moral and spiritual 
overtones were a significant part of the relations; brutal take-over was not. Influence 
of the amban varied according to many factors, including the strength of the 
incumbent Dalai Lama. Even when China had `the upper hand' (Bataille 1992: 33), 
Tibet `enjoyed local autonomy over domestic matters' (Grunfeld 1987: 57), and more 
8 While some have argued that rnchod-yon, `patron-priest relations', was the main 
characteristic of Sino-Tibetan world (see Klieger 1994), others have clarified that this was 
more about personal relationships between rulers and not about statehood (see Barnett 1998). 
Tsering Shakya points out that the concept indicates that the Tibetans viewed the Chinese 
emperor only as a secular institution which is far from the case. Manchu emperors, for 
instance, were often referred to as Jampeyang Gongma, the incarnation of Manjushri, defining 
them not merely as secular patrons but as occupying a space within a Buddhist pantheon 
exercising some measure of secular authority in Tibet (1999: xxiii). 
7 
significantly, on the basis of simple experienced reality, Tibetans considered 
themselves not to be a part of China (Barnett 1998). However, this traditional 
relationship became problematic when the socio-cultural and political environment 
was altered. This occurred first with the arrival of Western colonial powers in Asia, 
and second, with the transformation of the traditional Confucian-dominated Chinese 
polity towards a more occidental political system, which produced Republican China 
and the growth of Chinese nationalism (Shakya 1999: xxiii). Since the early twentieth 
century, as the Chinese learnt the modem European diplomatic language, they began 
to assert their relationship in terms of sovereignty. Tibetans, on the other hand, were 
late in adjusting to the modem world and refused to comply with any treaties between 
British India and China concerning Tibet. Thus, it was a `forceful interpretation of 
Sino-Tibetan relations in terms of European international law and praxis of (British) 
imperialism' (Norbu 1990: 67; emphasis in original) that lies at the genesis of Tibet 
question, not some intractable nationalist and historical conflict between the Chinese 
and the Tibetans. The Westernisation of international relations made it inevitable that 
when China gained control over Tibet in 1951, it was no more the traditional symbolic 
relationship, but an absolute rule. For the first time in its history, through the 
`Seventeen Point Agreement', 9 Tibet acknowledged Chinese sovereignty in writing, 
leaving no space for an ambiguous term like suzerainty. The internationalisation of the 
Westphalian international order based on sovereign statehood had a differential effect 
on Tibet and China - it allowed the regional hegemon (China) to assert and exercise 
control over Tibet. 
Thus, the extrapolation of Western ideas in a situation where people operated on a 
totally different worldview has facilitated the victimisation of communities like the 
Tibetans. Developments during the era of imperialism have serious ramifications in 
many parts of the contemporary world. Conventional IR has sought to ignore the 
history and politics of imperialism (by considering it to be a legitimate area of inquiry 
primarily for imperial history) and is therefore not well suited to provide a contextual 
understanding of several international problems like the Tibet question. If one had to 
go into a detailed analysis of the debate over historical status of Tibet, critical 
international theories would contribute to the historicisation of the concept of 
9 Formally known as `The Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local 
Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet', this was signed in 
Beijing on 23 May 1951. 
8 
sovereignty, while postcolonialism would help bare its linkage with imperialism. I do 
not undertake this task here. Instead, in this thesis, I focus on highlighting the 
centrality of the poetics and the politics of Western representations of the non-Western 
identity as a step toward deparochialising IR. 
IA. ii. Western representations 
The power of representation and discourse is also critical for understanding the Tibet 
question and Tibetanness (Tibetan identity). As postcolonial works drawing upon 
Foucauldian ideas have argued, this power not only constrains and contains, but is also 
productive (see Said 1978). The very idea of `Tibet' and what it means to be `Tibetan' 
is constructed and contested within a matrix of identity and representation discourses, 
thus making it an integral part of the Tibet question. Representations have productive 
influence over the discourses of Tibetanness since the Tibetans, especially those living 
in diaspora, 10 self-reflexively appropriate these images as a part of their own identity. 
When studying the issue of representation and identity in the specific context of 
Tibetans, we may make an important distinction between the poetics and the politics 
of representations of Tibet. These distinctions relate closely to two streams within 
social constructionism - semiotic and discursive approaches to representation (see 
Hall 1997a). A semiotic approach is concerned with how language produces meaning, 
the poetics. On the other hand, a discursive approach is concerned with the effects and 
consequences of representation, its politics. A semiotic approach entails examining 
how Tibet is imagined within the Western world or in China by looking at popular as 
well as statist discourses. On the other hand, a discursive approach involves studying 
the effects of these representations on the identity of the represented (the Tibetans) and 
the representer (the West). In this thesis, my focus is on Western representations and 
its impact on Tibetan identity. This is done as an opening gesture without denying the 
importance of other aspects, including the Chinese representations. 
The importance of Chinese representational regimes for the Tibet question is to warn 
against reducing postcolonial critique to turning `all people from non-Western cultures 
10 The emphasis on Tibetans living in exile does not deny the fact that Tibetans living within 
Tibet too have to negotiate with Western and Chinese representations (see Adams 1996,1998; 
Barnett and Akiner 1996; Goldstein and Kapstein 1998; Schwartzl996). 
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into a generalized "subaltern" that is then used to flog an equally generalized "West! "' 
(Chow 1993: 13). Knowledge production about Tibet, especially since the mid- 
twentieth century when the Chinese communists consolidated their political control, is 
no longer the preserve of Europeans. Very much in the tradition of Orientalist 
scholarship and British imperialist writings, the manufacturing of scholarly truths 
about Tibet within the Chinese academies is implicated in the service of the political 
regime. Chinese representations of Tibetans as essentially backward, primitive, and 
barbaric are witnessed not only at the popular level, but more dangerously within state 
discourse too (see Kolas 1998; Shakya 2002; Wei Jingsheng 1998; for Han Chinese 
representations of minorities, see Blum 2000; Dikotter 1992; Gladney 1994). Analysis 
of the Chinese representations of TibetlI shows how Tibetans, like most of the non- 
Han Chinese, are seen as an exotic but backward people requiring Chinese leadership 
to help them progress. 12 Apart from the claim of historical sovereignty, Chinese 
communist nationalism has also justified its control over Tibet in terms of its 
modernising role, its overthrow of the `feudalism' existing in pre-1959 Tibet, and its 
liberation of serfs and women (see Kolas 1998; Makley 1997,1999). The debate about 
the validity of these class13 and gender analyses of `Old Tibet' is not my concern here. 
It is sufficient to underline that these representational practices have serious 
implications for Chinese policy toward Tibet. For instance, in the name of liberating 
Tibetan women from the clutches of tradition, not only has the state attacked religious 
practices and structures, but it has also forced women to undergo modern `family 
planning' (see Kikhang 1997: 110-16). 
11 To muddle the picture, an examination of the Chinese representations of Tibet cannot be 
separated from Western Sinology, and its constituent `Red China' image that prevailed during 
the Cold War. 
12 The notion of Tibet's lack of development due to `cultural backwardness' is very strong in 
Chinese state policies ever since the 1951 Seventeen Point Agreement. Development as a 
rationale for Chinese control is also found in the writings of those sympathetic to the 
Communist regime (see Han Suyin 1977) as well as many Chinese dissidents (see Xu Mingxu 
2000). Unfortunately this has resonance with the self-justificatory tone of the civilising mission 
within Western imperialism. This patronising tone is also evident in Wang Lixiong who in the 
name of recognising Tibetan agency tends to erase it by tracing the roots of `intense religiosity' 
of the Tibetans to `the terrors of their natural environment' (2002: 91). For more on this 
`environmental determinism', see B. viii in chapter 4. 
13 Tashi Tsering's autobiography provides a nuanced critique of the rigid class structure of 
traditional society as well as his disillusionment with the Chinese rhetoric of a `free' Tibet. 
Instead of seeking to provide simplistic answers, through both his experience of growing up as 
a `serf in `Old Tibet' and as a revolutionary in `New Tibet', Tsering argues that the question is 
far more complex (see Goldstein et al. 1997). 
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The thematic and the structural content of Chinese representations resonate with the 
Western representations of Tibet. Exotica Tibet (henceforth used as a shorthand for the 
exoticised - both positive and negative - Western representation of Tibet) requires a 
detailed treatment which will be offered in chapters 4 and 5. I can only sketch a very 
brief outline here. Geographically and culturally, Tibet's peripheral place gave 
permission for many Europeans and Americans to use it as an imaginative escape, as a 
sort of time out, a relaxation from rigid rational censorship of their own society. This 
explains the unease of many Westerners with the `modernisation' of Tibet under the 
aegis of the Chinese state. Hence writings about Tibet are sometimes conservative 
protests against modernism and the changing world order and at other times part of 
counter-cultural trends resisting the globalising gesture of modernisation. The 
presence of opposites and contradictions within Western imaginings of Tibet is not 
new. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, such imaginings have been 
characterised by `a play of opposites: the pristine and the polluted, the authentic and 
the derivative, the holy and the demonic, the good and the bad' (Lopez 1998: 10). 
While some held disparaging views about Tibet, others extolled it. The strategies of 
essentialism, reductionism, exoticism and stereotyping are common to positive as well 
as negative representations. Debasement and exoticisation are part of the same 
representational regime (I discuss rhetorical tropes common to Western 
representations of the non-West in chapter 4; see also Spurr 1993). Both sides flatten 
Tibet's complexities and competing histories into stereotypes, which operate through 
adjectives. 
This Exotica Tibet was not confined to the cultural sphere. It influenced and was in 
turn influenced by political processes. Accounts by British Indian officials like 
Charles Bell and Hugh Richardson show that their `more prosaic view did not destroy 
this exotic representation but tacitly encouraged it' (McKay 1997: 207). The 
importance of Exotica Tibet in my understanding of the Tibet question lies in the 
impact it has on the very construction and contestation of the categories of `Tibet' and 
`Tibetans' - the politics of representation. For, the language of stereotype about 
Tibet 
`not only creates knowledge about Tibet, in many ways it creates "Tibet", a "Tibet" 
that Tibetans in exile have come to appropriate and deploy in an effort to gain both 
standing in exile and independence for their country' (Lopez 1998: 10). Interaction 
with a Western audience is a very important dynamic shaping Tibetan 
identity/Tibetanness in the diaspora. This is an area that has received substantial 
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attention from scholars only in the last decade of the twentieth century (see Harris 
1999; Klieger 1994; Korom 1997a, 1997b). 
An examination of the politics of representation informed by the discursive approach 
locates expositions on Tibet in the context of imperialism, neo-colonialism, 
nationalism, Orientalism, and development. It also focuses on the implication of such 
exercises in image making on those who are subjected to it - the Tibetans. There is no 
doubt that initially at least the Tibetans had little control over the way they were 
represented in the outside world and thus had to negotiate within the representational 
regimes already in place. For instance, since for the Western `Tibetophiles' the 
practice of Tibetan Buddhism is the only cultural expression though which exiles can 
perpetuate the dream of their lost paradise, Tibetans often have to make their case in 
terms of the threatened extinction of a unique culture (Harris 1999: 38). But rather 
than painting Tibetans as mere victims, we have to recognise that they have been 
active in the appropriation and internalisation of Western representations, and in the 
creation and presentation of their own cultural, political and religious identity. 
Soliciting international support has been one of the main strategies of the Tibetan 
diaspora elite. Support in the form of `Free Tibet' movements is often based on the 
image of `Tibet as defenceless underdog, a spiritual society that was minding its own 
business only to get crushed under the jackboot of an aggressive, materialist overlord' 
(Schell 2000: 206). Though the Tibetan global publicity campaign consciously 
portrays Tibetans as victims of Chinese oppression, this does not deny them their 
subjectivity. Even the cultivation of this victimisation paradigm reflects the agency of 
Tibetans. They have made conscious and extensive use of Western discourses, such as 
psychology, philosophy, physics, personal growth, and holistic health, in their 
attempts both to communicate with the Westerners and to reconstitute themselves in 
conditions of exile (Bishop 1997: 67). Tibetans have also colluded with, as well as 
contested, various Western images of Tibet. 
Thus, representations have played a constitutive and performative role in identity 
discourses among Tibetans. This is true in the arena not only of cultural identity but 
also of political identity, especially in the diaspora. While recognising the 
asymmetrical power relations involved, we may look at Tibetanness as a product of 
creative negotiations of diasporic Tibetans with dominant representational regimes, as 
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a process of resistant appropriation of dominant identity concepts including 
transnationalism, sovereignty, indigeneity, universal human rights, and diaspora. 
Therefore, the West is an important constituent in the Tibetan issue - as a political 
actor and as a cultural construct. Instead of understanding the role of the West as one 
of an interpreter/observer, it should be considered a crucial actor in framing various 
aspects of the Tibet question. While internal dynamics of the wider Tibetan society 
and the China factor play a very important role in any discussion of the Tibet question, 
`the West' too, both at the level of theory and of praxis, acts as a factor not only in the 
shaping of the question but also in creating a vocabulary for possible answers. This is 
evident when the Tibetan issue is framed either in terms of sovereignty or in terms of 
international human rights, when the Tibetans have to reinvent their tradition in order 
to make it compatible with the principles of nationalism and transnationalism. In all 
these acts, the most important audience is the international community, itself often a 
euphemism for Western states. This thesis foregrounds the crucial constitutive role of 
the West in the Tibet question. 
1B. Chapter outline 
Though critical international theories have challenged mainstream IR on 
epistemological, ontological, and methodological grounds, they remain largely 
focused on the West. The main thrust of my thesis is to take a step towards 
deparochialising IR. In the next chapter, I contend that drawing upon postcolonial 
theory can rectify the geographical parochialism of the discipline of IR. Although 
conventional IR theory and postcolonial theory are worlds apart, a contingent ground 
for conversation is afforded by the developments within IR since the `third debate'. 
The theme in chapter 3 is the representation of the non-West by the West within 
critical IR, cultural and postcolonial theory. After examining the treatment of 
representation within critical IR, I highlight its limitations. The limitations, I argue, 
can be overcome if we take developments within cultural and postcolonial studies 
more seriously. The focus here will be on the `Orientalism critique' initiated by 
Edward Said (1978). Exotica Tibet is presented as an Orientalist construct. 
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In chapter 4, within the wider `Orientalism critique', I will critically examine Western 
practices of representing the non-West during and after the period of European 
colonialism. These are not epiphenomenal. While my discussion is mainly about 
Western colonial representational discourse, it must be remembered that these tropes 
are central to the production and reproduction of neocolonial relations even in the 
contemporary period. In this chapter, I look at rhetorical tropes in terms of three 
general modes (and possible ways of challenging them) that underlie all Western 
representations of the non-West and then discuss some important strategies that are 
deployed to operationalise Orientalist constructs such as Exotica Tibet. The three 
significant modes of representation are essentialism, stereotyping, and exoticism. The 
strategies will be studied under the headings of archive, gaze, differentiation- 
classification, debasement-idealisation, eroticisation-moralisation, chronopolitics, 
infantilisation-gerontification, naturalisation, and self-affirmation-self-criticism. 
In chapter 5I apply the theoretical framework developed in the previous two chapters 
to some specific and prominent cultural sites within which Exotica Tibet has operated 
in the twentieth century. This includes films, novels, and travelogues. The idea is not 
to provide an exhaustive list of the cultural sites that have contributed to the creation 
of the imagin-o-scape of Exotica Tibet, but to lay bare the representational strategies 
operating within them. This is an elaboration of the poetics of Exotica Tibet - how 
Tibet has been represented throughout the twentieth century. 
After this encounter with poetics, in the next two chapters, I shift attention to the 
politics14 of Exotica Tibet - examining the impact on cultural and political identities 
of people who are subjects of, and thus subjected to, the representational regime. Just 
as exoticism has had an ambiguous effect on the attitudes of Western states and people 
towards the Tibet question, it has a very significant effect on identity discourses 
among the Tibetans. The very category of `Tibetan' gets constructed within the 
matrices of these representational regimes. Tibetanness is not some essence of Tibetan 
life but is the politicised articulation of themes of identity and difference, of 
commonality and distinctiveness. And indeed the representational regimes, even 
though productive, tend to restrict and contain the options available for self- 
14 It should be noted that I use `politics' in a wider sense of the term incorporating not only a 
study of political, but also cultural identity. This is in the spirit of `enculturing politics' and 
`politicising culture', which is one of the driving forces behind this thesis. 
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expression. This productive-cum-restrictive impact of Western representations on 
Tibetan identity reflects a trait of modern representational regimes in general. 
In chapters 6 and 7, the specific case of Tibetanness (Tibetan national identity) as 
articulated in the diaspora will be taken up to highlight the politics of representation 
and thus support the case for a postcolonial critical approach to world politics. As I 
will argue, Exotica Tibet is an important, but not an exhaustive, determining factor of 
Tibetanness. I will examine the articulations of Tibetanness in political (chapter 6) and 
cultural (chapter 7) spheres, argue for new ways of theorising these identities, and 
interrogate the constitutive role played by Western representations in these identity 
discourses. In chapter 6, I highlight various dynamics of political Tibetanness and 
foreground the crucial role played by the poetics of Exotica Tibet. In chapter 7, I offer 
new ways of theorising cultural facets of Tibetanness through an innovative 
postcolonial analysis of the symbolic geography of `Dharamsala' (the seat of the Dalai 
Lama-led Tibetan government-in-exile). This retheorisation exemplifies ways in 
which postcoloniality can challenge conventional disciplinary endeavours and offer 
new ways of doing IR. In this sense, my endeavour is as much anti-disciplinary as it is 
inter-disciplinary. While looking at cultural and political identities separately, both 
chapters emphasise the intermeshing between both, thus highlighting the need for 
enculturing political analysis (cf. Hay 2002) and politicising cultural analysis. 
The conclusion sums up the arguments made in the different chapters and underlines 
that postcolonial JR offers an effective means to appreciate the political and 
productive effect of Western representational practices, especially on non-Western 
people. The poetics and politics of Western representations are legitimate areas of 
enquiry for IR not only because these support particular foreign policy regimes (as 
highlighted by critical IR), but also because they have a productive effect on the 
identities of political actors. Postcolonial IR appreciates the importance of popular 
culture for our understanding of world politics. A social constructionist theory of 
representation inspired primarily, though not exclusively, by Michel Foucault's 
discursive approach along with Said's Orientalism critique allows us to consider the 
poetics and the politics of Western representational practices and contributes toward 
debates within IR that seek to deparochialise it. In the spirit enunciated by the first 
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collection of poststructuralist writings15 in IR, I write a thesis `that is theoretical (but 
not methodological), that is empirical (but not empiricist), that problematizes (but does 
not problem-solve) world politics' (Der Derian and Shapiro 1989: xi). 
15 Though there is significant disagreement over the use of terms such as `postmodernism' or 
`poststructuralism', in this thesis I use them interchangeably. 
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Chapter 2: Deparochialising IR: the case for a postcolonial IR 
theory 
`Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with 
very different means) the naturalisation of its own arbitrariness' (Bourdieu 
1977: 164). 
Non-Western peoples, and sometimes even states, have been ridden roughshod over 
both literally and figuratively in IR. One such people are the Tibetans. It is surprising 
that even as several critical theories have challenged the dominant paradigms on 
ontological, epistemological and methodological grounds in the last two decades, 
geographical parochialism has continued relatively unabated. My contention is that a 
postcolonial critical attitude, postcoloniality, that draws significantly from 
postcolonialism (also called Postcolonial theory or Postcolonial Studies, PS) may 
rectify it. My later chapters do not always explicitly engage with postcolonial theory, 
but adopt postcoloniality. Similarly, IR, for me, is a wider intellectual endeavour that 
should deal with various facets of world politics. The focus in this chapter will be on 
introducing postcolonial theory and arguing that although conventional IR theoryl and 
postcolonial theory are worlds apart, a contingent ground for conversation is afforded 
by the developments within IR since the so-called third debate. The rejection of 
positivism (see Ashley and Walker 1990; Campbell 1998a, 1998b; Campbell and 
Dillon 1993; DerDerian and Shapiro 1989; George 1989; Lapid 1989; Shapiro 1988; 
Sjolander and Cox 1994; Smith et al. 1996; Walker 1993) and a reengagement with 
culture within IR (see Chay 1990; Lapid and Kratochwil 1996; Shapiro and Alker 
1996; Weldes et al. 1999) has opened up space for a postcolonial IR endeavour. 
The case for doing IR theory informed by postcolonialism, or postcolonial 
international relations, has remained largely unexplored. 2 In this chapter, I argue that 
in the figurative thinking space cleared by the postpositivist challenges to conventional 
II should clarify here that when within conventional or mainstream IR, I mainly include 
variants of realism and liberalism. I recognise that some of my criticisms of this IR do not hold 
true for Marxism-inspired world system theory and/or the dependency school - the third strand 
in the `Inter-paradigm debate' of the 1970s. However, their influence on mainstream IR should 
not be over-emphasised. Even though some Marxism-inspired IR theories share positivist 
epistemology with realism and liberalism, they are largely seen as an `alternative' (see Kegley 
and Wittkopf 2001) to the mainstream. 
2 For exceptions see Chowdhry and Nair 2002; Darby 1997,1998; Darby and Paolini 1995; 
Krishna 1993,1999; Ling 2002; Paolini 1999; Ramakrishnan 1999. 
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IR, postcolonial international theory too has a role to play. The primary emphasis here 
is to adopt a postcolonial theoretical position within IR, engaging the discipline while 
at the same time challenging it. This engagement is partly an attempt to estrange the 
basics of IR, partly a call for dialogue and bridge-building with critical discourses of 
IR, partly a critical review of existing critical discourses in (or at the edge of) IR, 
partly a call for appropriating the discursive space of IR for the play of hitherto 
silenced and marginalised voices, and partly to undo IR. It is through an interaction 
with non-Western context, material and agents of knowledge, that the dominant 
`Occidental' theories of interpretation can be challenged and redrawn (Spivak 1990: 
8), and IR is no exception. This involves not only dealing with what has been spoken 
in IR, but more importantly with what has not been said. For as Rob Walker points 
out, power is often most persuasive and effective amidst the silences of received 
wisdom (1993: 13). 
In this chapter, I first allude to the neglect and marginalisation of issues affecting the 
lives of people in the third world within IR3 and highlight IR's eurocentrism. 4 I then 
situate my stance on postcolonial theory, highlighting some of its many features, and 
argue for a shift in the concerns of postcolonial theory away from its often-exclusive 
focus on dialogue between the third world and the West. In the third part, I examine 
the difference between conventional IR and PS as disciplinary/intellectual formations. 
In the fourth part, the existing literature covering postcolonialism and IR is introduced. 
Finally I look at the space cleared by the third debate into which a postcolonial IR 
approach can place itself. 
2A. Third world issues and IR 
3 What Karena Shaw argues about the neglect of indigenous people in IR holds true for my 
purpose too: `we need to understand how the active marginalisation of indigenous peoples has 
been necessary for international relations to appear and function' (2002: 68; emphasis added). 
4 Some argue that since IR as a discipline is closely linked with the rise of United States (US) 
as a `superpower' and because of intellectual predisposition, political circumstances and 
institutional opportunities, it is mainly an `American social science' (Hoffman 1977; see also 
Crawford and Jarvis 2000; Smith 2000). Hence a better term might be `Americentrism'. 
However, eurocentrism's main feature has been the explaining away of parochialism 
(European Enlightenment thinking) as superior, progressive and hence universal. 
Americentrism does not challenge this. Instead, it reinforces the powerful myth that the West is 
the best. 
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`Whoever studies contemporary international relations cannot but hear, 
behind the clash of interests and ideologies, a kind of permanent dialogue 
between Rousseau and Kant' (Hoffman 1965: 86). 
This quote, which reduces IR to a debate between two white, privileged, European 
males, neatly reflects the parochial character of IR. The project of deparochialising IR 
thus entails recognition of its eurocentrism and the poverty of IR when it comes to 
matters concerning the majority of the worlds' people who live in areas formerly 
under direct or indirect colonial rule of Western European states. These people(s) and 
places have been variously named `the third world', `the South', `the East', 5 `the 
developing world', and so on. I use the terms interchangeably. It is interesting to note 
how the non-West undergoes worlding in various Western discourses. 6 Here I use 
worlding, in a Spivakian sense (see Spivak 1988,1990,1993) to denote the giving of a 
`proper name to a generalized margin' (Spivak 1997: 199), to refer to the way 
colonised space is brought into the world, that is, made to exist as part of a world 
essentially constructed by eurocentrism. 7 The self-image of the West is often 
implicated in and produced by the process of naming - for instance, posing the non- 
5 This term formerly reserved for communist-ruled Eastern Europe and the USSR is often used 
interchangeably for the South since the end of communist regimes there. This goes back to an 
older distinction usually made in European thought between the West and the East. For an 
interesting analysis of the use of the `East' as the Other in the European identity formation, see 
Neumann (1999). 
6 For instance, in the discourse of `West-East', the Easterners are seen as irrational, backward, 
and feminine as opposed to the rational, progressive, masculine Westerners (I shall discuss this 
further in next two chapters). The rhetoric of development which renders most of the world as 
`developing' or `under-developed' puts all the countries of the world in a hierarchical scale 
where the (post) industrialised Western states are most developed and at the pinnacle, while the 
rest are at various points on the scale. The rhetoric exhorts the `developing' countries to 
`modernise' and strive to reach the pinnacle, ignoring the historical and structural forces that 
have impoverished them. 
7 The naturalisation of eurocentrism as common sense is endemic in IR, as in many other 
disciplines. The hold of eurocentrism on modern knowledges is pernicious. `History is assumed 
to be European history, everything else being reduced to what historian Hugh Trevor-Roper (in 
1965! ) patronizingly called the "unrewarding gyrations of barbarous tribes in picturesque but 
irrelevant corners of the globe"' (Shohat and Stam 1994: 1). As Dipesh Chakrabarty writes: 
for generations now, philosophers and thinkers shaping the nature of social science 
have produced theories embracing the entirety of humanity; as we well know, these 
statements have been produced in relative, and sometimes absolute, ignorance of the 
majority of the humankind i. e., those living in non-Western cultures (1992: 3). 
Eurocentrism is not only a characteristic of conventional disciplines, but often of critical 
thinking too, including feminism (see Mohanty 1988; Mohanty et al. 1991), poststructuralism 
(see Spivak 1988), Marxism (see Gandhi 1998: 23-30; Prakash 1990), and World system 
theory (see Frank and Gills 1993). See also Frank 1998. Within Western thought, as Stephen 
Chan puts it: `There being no critical theoretical or postmodern agenda for the Third World, 
nothing in thought or praxis that centralises the majority of the humanity, that escapes the elite 
vantage point of text and technology, there has been instead an array of fireworks that 
illuminate, briefly, a way' (1993: 424). 
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West as `developing' makes the West the `developed' and hence superior. This does 
not mean that non-Westerners have only been victims, lacking any agency. In fact, 
often the non-Westerners have catachrestically8 appropriated the Western (politics of) 
naming. 
A cursory look at the literature of IR shows that there are relatively few works on 
issues facing the third world. For instance, Roxanne Doty's survey of some leading 
journals for the period of 1945-1993 revealed only one article with the word `race' in 
the title, four with the term `minorities' and thirteen with the term `ethnicity' (1993: 
445). This shows that at the peak of decolonisation when the terms reflected important 
developments in the third world, IR's concerns lay elsewhere. In general, there is also 
a lack of third world sources and argumentation within IR. In 1985 Kal J. Hoisti writes 
that hierarchy seems `to be a hallmark of international politics and theory' and since 
the domination of the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) is 
overwhelming, IR is `a British-American intellectual condominium' (1985: 102-3). 9 
Fifteen years on, Barry Buzan and Richard Little point out, `there is no doubt that IR 
has been studied from a very Eurocentric perspective with a concomitant failure to 
come to terms with how non-European "others" understood international relations or 
organized their world' (2000: 21). 
This would not be a problem had IR recognised its own parochial character and not 
claimed to have universal applicability. '0 International Studies Quarterly, one of the 
most prestigious journals in the field of JR claims to publish `the best work being done 
in the variety of intellectual traditions included under the rubric of international 
studies' (2002), and yet articles challenging the mainstream and addressing the 
concerns of third world peoples are rare. Mainstream IR theories are Western, not 
8 Where catachresis is the application of a term to a thing that it does not properly denote. This 
is often used in the sense of a tactical appropriation. 
9 Often disciplinary developments in continental Europe are ignored. Knud Erik Jorgensen 
(2000), while discussing continental IR theory, points out that common attitude about it can be 
characterised as either NST-doctrine (there is `No Such Thing') or CCF-doctrine (they are 
Clones, Copies or Franchise of Anglo-American endeavour). 
to Samir Amin rightly argues that though eurocentrism is anti-universalist, `it does present 
itself as universalist, for it claims that imitation of the Western model by all peoples is the only 
solution to the challenges of our time' (1988: vii). 
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international, in terms of their origin, inspiration, priorities, and political biases. " 
Mainstream IR, especially neorealism 
derives from one branch of Western political philosophy rooted in the experiences and 
perspectives of one group of people who happen to be white, propertied, and male. Nevertheless, it claims to apply across all time and space, eradicating in the process 
any [conscious] mediation of world politics by race, gender, class, or other kinds of historical/cultural difference (Ling 2002: 16). 
Even when various `global' voices and dialogue are sought to be promoted (as in 
James Rosenau 1993), the third world is either ignored12 or spoken for by some 
Westerner, 13 revealing the will to universalise within IR's parochial thinking. When 
IR scholars speak of the Cold War as a period of `long peace' (Gaddis 1987) and give 
reasons for `why we will soon miss the cold war' (Mearsheimer 1990), they 
completely ignore that `[f]or the overwhelming majority of the world's peoples, global 
politics since World War II has been anything but peaceful' (Klein 1994: 15). My 
argument is not simply about `adding-on' non-Western concerns to come up with a 
universal theory. Rather, it is to challenge IR's supposed universalism and emphasise 
the need to be aware of one's own ethnocentrism. 
II Not surprising then that Chris Brown et al. (2002) in International relations in political 
thought focus exclusively on Western canon. The excuse they offer is weak and symptomatic 
of IR in general. For instance, they argue that the relevant criteria for canon can change on the 
basis of `current fashions' (such as the current criticism that canon usually consists of white 
male Europeans), but this should not deny the `fact' that some `thinkers clearly have produced 
more significant work than others' (3) (not surprisingly, these are same as the canonical 
thinkers). This seems to be a dismissive gesture of relegating those who challenge eurocentrism 
and misogyny of Western canon as `current fashion'. 
Brown et al. Go on to argue that the `modern global international order developed out of the 
European states-system, which emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth century CE from the 
wreckage of the medieval order which was constructed on the ruins of the Roman empire, in 
turn the product of the Roman republic and the inheritor of the thought of classical Greece' 
(14). This buys into the dominant autobiography of modern Western thinking. It misses the 
crucial constitutive role of the `Rest of the world' in the change from medieval to modern 
period. Ironically, the editors stop at the gate of classical Greeks - once again, ignoring the 
question of where did the Greeks come from? In such stories, classical Greeks seem to have 
descended from `heaven', without `impure' influences of nearby cultures, especially the 
Egyptians (cf. Bernal 1987,1991). My argument is not against compilation of writings of 
Western political thinkers, but passing it off as global/international thought. 
12 The justification Rosenau provides for ignoring `Third world analysts' is `space limitations'. 
Ironically, this does not lead him to title the book as Western voices instead of Global voices. 
On the other hand, Ole Waever (1998) is conscious of his non-investigation of non-Western 
cases and does not conflate `American and European developments in international relations' 
with wider global developments. 
13 In Rosenau (1993), Christine Sylvester includes not only a `Western feminist (Westfem)', 
but also ventriloquises for `Her Third World Alter Ego/Identity (Tsitsi)'. 
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Even when IR scholars write about the third world in `prestigious' IR journals, they 
usually do so from the vantage point of the West. West (particularly the US)14 and its 
security concerns seem to dominate the IR literature. Various powerful countries see 
the non-West mainly as a playground for their `power politics'. The realist paradigm is 
entrenched within works dealing with the third world and the `[c]onventional IR with 
its focus on great power politics and security, read narrowly, naturalizes ... global 
hierarchies and thus reproduces the status quo' (Chowdhry and Nair 2002: 1). IR has, 
in general, not encouraged an intimate knowledge of non-Western countries. Issues 
central to the lives of common people in the third world have been largely 
marginalised and silenced in IR. `As a result, the representations of "international 
reality" and "international existence" have remained grounded in Western institutional 
and discursive practices so as to reflect and affirm parochial structures of power, 
interest, and identity' (Grovogui 2002: 33). 
Discourses like those of development and globalisation that have made inroads into 
International Political Economy (IPE), a corollary of IR, do examine the third world. 
But these too look from a Western vantage point. In contrast, as we shall see in the 
following sections, postcolonial theory claims to speak from the margins. 15 Unlike 
development (see Escobar 1995; Rahnema and Bawtree 1997; Sachs 1992) and 
globalisation (see Slater 1994,1998) discourses that largely adopt an uncritical 
attitude towards modernity, postcolonialism can be interpreted as a third worldist 
discourse about modernity critically received (Paolini 1999: 7). In contradistinction to 
IR's unquestioned acceptance of modernity, postcolonialism seeks to combine 
participation in a progressive agential politics of identity with a metacritique of 
modernism for its parochial ideas and exclusionary practices disguised as 
universalism. The primary focus in PS is on issues affecting people living in the third 
world as well as minorities living in the West. Before going into the distinctness and 
distinctiveness of postcolonialism vis-a-vis IR, a few introductory observations on the 
postcolonial enterprise are necessary. 
2B. The postcolonial enterprise 
14 As David Gibbs argues, the mainstream IR journals, especially in the US, `overwhelmingly 
publish on themes that flatter the US foreign policy establishment, while they omit facts that 
the establishment finds distasteful (2001: 424). 
15 This does not mean that postcolonialists do not recognise the problems of `speaking for' the 
unprivileged (Spivak 1988; for a different perspective see Loomba 1998: 231-45). 
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Though there is a significant debate over the definition of the term `postcolonial', in a 
general sense it is used to refer to the critical study of the interactions between 
Western nations and the societies they had colonised in the modern period. 
Postcolonial theory is an area of literary and cultural study that has come into being as 
a part of the decentring tendency of post-1960s thought in the West with the explicit 
aim of challenging Western thought as progressive and superior. An important 
landmark was the publication of Edward Said's influential critique of Western 
constructions of the Orient in his Orientalism (1978). Initially, the favoured 
terminologies were `world literatures in english', `new literatures', and in the sphere 
of theory, `colonial discourse'. The term 'postcolonial'16 gained currency in the 
academia after the publication of Empire Writes Back (Ashcroft et al. 1989), which 
was followed by a number of encyclopaedias and readers on postcolonial literature 
and studies (Ashcroft et al. 1995; Barker et al. 1994; Mongia 1996; Thieme 1996; 
Williams and Chrisman 1993; Williams and Childs 1997). Although the academic 
recognition of postcolonialism is a recent phenomenon, its subject matter has a longer 
ancestry going back to the oppositional writings during the period of formal 
colonialism. Under the rubric of PS, following Bart Moore-Gilbert (1997, and Moore- 
Gilbert et al. 1997), we may include colonial discourse analysis, postcolonial theory, 
postcolonial criticisms, and postcolonial literatures. Often postcolonial theory is used 
as a generic label for all these and I will follow this practice. PS is a fluid discipline 
with little agreement among either exponents or critics over its subject matter, its 
temporal and spatial dimensions, the meaning, and even the spelling of the main term. 
It is somewhat anti-disciplinary, at most an `episteme-in-formation' (Hall 1996). 
Though it remains undisciplined, marked mostly by textual and political radicalism, it 
is not devoid of problems. 
The `postcolonial' is often seen as a temporal marker demarcating the colonial era 
from the period of formal political independence. However, this conception of 
postcolonial is problematic and lacks a critical edge since it focuses solely on 
16 People differ in the ways they use the term. Some use hyphenated forms, while others don't. 
Some writers make clear distinction between the hyphenated and un-hyphenated forms of the 
term (Mishra and Hodge 1993). My preference is to distinguish between `post-colonial' as a 
temporal marker (the period after formal decolonisation) and `postcolonial' as the analytic 
concept of greater range and ambition which questions the totalising gestures implied in the 
project of colonialism and modernity. 
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acquisition of `formal' sovereignty, often ignoring economic, cultural and even 
political structural dependence. The term, with its prefix `post', may carry with it the 
implication that colonialism is a matter of past, undermining colonialism's economic, 
political, and cultural traces in present international political and economic life (see 
Shohat 1992). The former metropolis (the imperial states) have become the first world, 
better known as the developed world, while the former colonies have become the third 
world, the developing world. The theatre of neo-colonialist international relations as 
well as the evolving world economy is a stark reminder to the formally independent 
peoples/states about their place under the sun - in the corners, at the margins. The 
structure of UN Security Council, except for the presence of China (though ironically 
in a certain sense it vindicates its presence by having its own colony in the form of 
Tibet), reflects how little has changed since pre-second world war times. 17 But as 
Stuart Hall as points out, 
`After' means in the moment which follows that moment (the colonial) in which the 
colonial relation was dominant. It does not mean.. . that what we 
have called the `after- 
effects' of colonial rule have somehow been suspended. It certainly does not mean 
that we have passed from a regime of power-knowledge into some powerless and 
conflict-free time zone (1996a: 254). 
Given that the focus of postcolonialism is predominantly on West-non-West 
relations, where does Tibet fit in? It was never a European colony, though it was for 
some time under British influence. Ironically, it was `colonised' by post-colonial 
China at a time when the rest of the world was witnessing sweeping movements for 
political decolonisation. Tibet complicates the picture and warns against any naive 
assumptions about postcolonialism. 18 However, if we take the postcolonial as 
indicative of a different approach to studying knowledge formations, things change 
dramatically. And this is the manner in which the emerging discipline of the PS adopts 
the term postcolonialism and I do the same with my use of postcoloniality (a 
postcolonial critical attitude). Rather than debating whether Tibet is a `post-colonial' 
entity or not, the attention shifts to analysing the Tibet question from a postcolonial 
theoretical perspective. 
17 Brysk et al. (2002) argue that the policies of former colonial powers toward their former 
colonies, often under the euphemism of `special relationships', is marked by continuity and 
inequality. 
18 As Tsering Shakya points out, `Tibet has remained outside the scrutiny of postcolonialist 
discourse', while in Tibetan studies, `questions drawn from critical studies on the postcolonial 
discourse have never been raised' (2001: 183). 
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Taking the lead from Jean-Francois Lyotard when he discusses the relation of 
postmodern to the modern - `I have said and will say again that `post-modernism' 
signifies not the end of modernism, but another relation to modernism' (in Van Reijen 
and Veerman 1988) - one may accept that postcolonial is not something that is merely 
after the colonial; rather, it must be formulated such that there is a necessary exposure 
of the prevalent power relations. I use `postcolonial' to signify a position against 
imperialism and eurocentrism. `A postcolonial approach ... 
foregrounds the erasures 
surrounding race and representation, resistance and agency' (Chowdhry and Nair 
2002: 10). Western ways of knowledge production and dissemination in the past and 
present then become objects of study for those seeking alternative means of 
expression. Postcolonialism does not signal a closing off of that which it contains 
(colonialism), or even a rejection (which would not be possible in any case), but rather 
an opening of a field of inquiry and understanding following a period of relative 
closure. It is a distinctive form of theorisation and analysis whose central defining 
theme is the `investigation of the mutually constitutive role played by colonizer and 
colonized, centre and periphery, the metropolitan and the "native", in forming, in part, 
the identities of both the dominant power and the subalterns involved in the imperial 
and colonial projects of the West' (Rattansi 1997: 481), while recognising the context 
of fundamental asymmetry of power. Postcolonial theory emerged to challenge the 
knowledge production in the West about non-Western peoples. It entails responding to 
the influential `master' discourses of the West such as history, philosophy and 
linguistics (see Ashcroft et al. 1989,1995) that have sought to universalise European 
thinking as progress. It involves engaging with issues and experiences that have 
influenced significantly the lives of peoples in the third world. These experiences are 
of various kinds: migration, slavery, impoverishment, resistance, representation, 
identity, difference, gender, sexuality, place, race, violence, and so on. As Deepika 
Bahri (1996) points out 
Despite the reservations and debates, research in Postcolonial Studies is growing 
because postcolonial critique allows for a wide-ranging investigation into power 
relations in various contexts. The formation of empire, the impact of colonization on 
postcolonial history, economy, science, and culture, the cultural productions of 
colonized societies, feminism and postcolonialism, agency for marginalized people, 
and the state of the postcolony in contemporary economic and cultural contexts are 
some broad topics in the field. 
The focus within PS is on micropolitical concerns, on the politics of everyday life, as 
it is here that the real effects of knowledge regimes are felt. While postcolonialism 
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foregoes the idea of some grand emancipation, it remains an empowering discourse for 
gendered and racialised subjectivities, hitherto marginalised by the dominant 
discourses. The postcolonialist attitude towards the modem state as an institution 
ranges from hope for appropriation for critical purposes to ignorance, from ambiguity 
to outright hostility (for a range of views, see Chatterjee 1993; Memmi 1968; Parry 
1987; Said 1989). Universal ideas such as nationalism, and their unproblematic 
implementation globally are eschewed. As Partha Chatterjee argues, `the universality 
- the sovereign, tyrannical universality - of Reason remains unscathed. Nationalist 
thought has not emerged as the antagonist of universal Reason in the arena of world 
history' (1986: 168). 19 Thus, postcolonial theory seeks to go beyond formal political 
decolonisation to a decolonisation of mind, decolonisation of discourses through 
which the world is categorised. 
However, such a retheorisation of politics does not necessarily imply the jettisoning of 
macropolitical questions. Though the specificity of `big' political questions is 
negotiated and resisted at an individual and local level, they often have a containing 
and constraining influence. One such macropolitical question is related to the issue of 
self-determination. While scepticism of nation and state building projects is 
understandable, 20 it cannot be denied that there are many groups who seek to define 
their collective identity in terms of nation and collective aspirations in terms of state. 
For the Indian diaspora it might be comfortable to talk about the failings of their 
nation-state, but for the Tibetan diaspora, it is a luxury they can hardly afford. The 
inter-national character of world politics circumscribes means of collective political 
self-expression. 
Postcolonial works often focus on, and question, the ways in which the West continues 
to spin a web of knowledge-power regimes about the non-Western world. Postcolonial 
theory contributes substantially to our understanding, especially on themes such as 
imperialism, representation, identity, diaspora, and resistance. But not much when it 
comes to nationalism, 21 sovereignty, self-determination, and domination by post- 
19 In the context of women writing in India, Susie Tharu and K. Lalita write that `the interests 
of empire and of nation are not always in contradiction' (1991: 11). In fact imperialism and 
nationalism shared assumptions about issues of gender, class and sexuality. 
20 Gyan Prakash (1990) takes to task nationalist, Marxist and Orientalist historiography for 
furthering the project of an universalist modernity and engendering certain erasures. 
21 Here, we find earlier anti-colonial thinkers like Mahatma Gandhi, Frantz Fanon, Albert 
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colonial states (largely because of its scepticism of macropolitical ideas). While it is 
true that it is the application of Western ideas that has allowed powerful states to assert 
their dominance regionally, it is not enough to leave the analysis at this point. 
Interrogations of Western ideas have to be accompanied by particular dynamics of 
power exercised by regional hegemons (like China in Tibet, India in Kashmir and 
Indonesia in East Timor). While the postcolonialists have contributed substantially by 
studying resistance to state building projects from the perspectives of gender and 
indigeneity, there is also a need to take into account resistance coming from those 
identifying themselves as distinct nations, or as distinct ethnic groups. The discrediting 
of nationalism as a liberating ideology does not mean that all those who mobilise 
themselves in the name of nationalism now are operating under some sort of `false 
consciousness', for often it is done strategically. For instance, Tibetans adopt different 
vocabularies keeping in mind the audience, ranging from the rhetoric of human rights 
to the right of self-determination, from autonomy to secession. Postcolonial theory 
needs to take such issues into account to be more meaningful to many people living 
within the third world. As David Scott has argued, the thrust of the argument now 
should be to move away from postcoloniality's politics of theory to a new theory of 
politics where `the accent is on political rather than cultural criticism' (1999: 19; 
emphasis in original). 
Postcolonialism necessitates an interrogation of historical, geopolitical, and cultural 
contextualisation at the outset of any enquiry. More generically, we may use the term 
`postcolonial' to lay bare the complicity of knowledge production concerning the 
cultural Others and representational regimes within the dominant power structures. 
This entails a shift in focus from dialogue with the metropolitan to transnational 
dialogue with other third world discourses too (Williams and Chrisman 1993: 16-7). 
For knowledge about Tibet is not only produced in the West, but also in China, India 
and Nepal. Tibetans thus have to negotiate their identity discourses at different levels, 
depending upon the kind of representational regime in which they are operating. 22 
Memmi, and others, more helpful. Often, they sought to separate nation from state and deploy 
it in service of other, more inclusive, forms of political community (Gandhi 1998: 121). 
22 An important point of clarification here. My focus in the thesis is predominantly on West- 
Tibet interaction and thus I reproduce postcolonial theory's emphasis on West-nonWest 
relations at the expense of nonWest-nonWest relations for which I criticise it here. A detailed 
treatment of Chinese, Indian, and other discourses about Tibet is excluded here for economy of 
space. Given my criticism of Rosenau (1993) for this (see footnote 12), my own justification 
may sound ironic. But where I differ is in not conflating Western representations with global 
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Differences within the postcolonial enterprise allow the field to be construed as a site 
for voices of dissent, voices of criticality. Western ways of knowledge production and 
dissemination in the past and present then become objects of study for those seeking 
an alternative means of expression. The enterprise of IR theory is one such Western 
knowledge formation that should be put under erasure from a postcolonial perspective. 
Since critical theories going under the name of feminism, poststructuralism and 
constructivism have already challenged the dominance of conventional IR theories, a 
postcolonial IR becomes a real possibility. This possibility itself shows how far IR has 
changed in the last two decades since the disciplinary/intellectual histories of IR and 
PS have been very distinct. 
2C. IR and PS: divided skies, divided horizons? 
A brief comparison of IR, an established discipline-in-crisis and PS, an anti-discipline 
gives us an idea of how these two diverge. Here I begin with mainstream IR theory, 23 
especially its realist and liberal strands, before moving onto critical IR in the next 
section. IR emerged as a discipline in its own right in the Anglo-American world at a 
time when the authority of Western imperialism was more or less secure. 24 The 
proponents concerned themselves with the `big' issues of war and peace that affected 
the relations between `civilised' nation-states. The name `international relations' was 
somewhat a misnomer, as from the very beginning, the main unit of analysis in 
international theory was the state. Theoretical antecedents were traced to thinkers and 
statesmen of the Western world. While Thucydides' and Machiavelli's works were 
being invented as antecedents of Realism, works from non-Western history such as 
Kautilya's Arthashastra (a treatise on statecraft written, allegedly, by a Pundit in 
ancient India) were ignored. Due to their focus on narrowly-defined big questions, the 
debate between idealists and realists conveniently ignored the issues that were central 
to the everyday lives of people of the colonising countries as an `internal' matter and 
representations and using terms such as `global' when I concentrate mainly on the Western. 
23 Though within IR theory significant debates have taken place, including the third debate 
between `rationalism' and `reflectivism', as Steve Smith points out, the wider discipline of IR 
`is far more realist, far more state-centric and far more unquestioning of the dominance of 
realism and positivism that is the case within IR theory' (2000: 379). 
24 Although the story of IR as a distinct discipline usually starts with the formation of the first 
department of the discipline at Aberystwyth in 1919, Brian Schmidt (1998) has argued that the 
subject of IR was studied even before the First World War. 
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by the very same logic refused to see any link between the international system and 
colonised places. Exclusive concentration on state-as-actor meant no attention was 
given to the people under colonial rule. The imperial powers ensured that their 
relationships with their colonies remained an internal matter (Darby and Paolini 1994: 
384), outside the purview of IR. The distinction between international relations and 
imperial relations was identified and asserted. 
IR remained confined to theorising how statesmen conduct relationships among 
`civilised' states. Denial of Wilsonian principle of self-determination to places outside 
Europe after the First World War illustrated the double standards of Western powers. 
They conferred the badge of civilisation only on the European countries, the United 
States, and later on Japan - revealing that the label was related more to the political 
influence of the state than anything else. Given the close links between the emerging 
IR discipline and foreign policy making bodies of government, it would not be wrong 
to state that IR as a knowledge formation was complicit with existing power structures 
from its inception. The close linkage between IR and policy making authorities 
continues today, especially in the United States (see Hoffman 1977; Smith 2000). This 
close association with decision making process coupled with the theoretical 
underpinnings of positivism, empiricism and the search for `objectivity' ensured IR's 
status as a status quoist discourse par excellence. 
This inherent conservativeness of IR ensured that even with formal decolonisation 
after the Second World War there was no major shake-up in the theoretical 
underpinnings of the discipline. Significantly, when decolonisation was at its peak in 
the 1960s and the third world was asserting itself through the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM), IR was self-referentially engaged in its own debate over methodological 
issues - the `second debate' between traditionalism and 
behaviourism. Even now 
`there were no sustained attempts to explore the workings of nineteenth-century 
imperialism, which might have led to a rethinking of the international politics of the 
third world or to a recognition of the significance of cultural factors in world politics' 
(Darby and Paolini 1994: 379-80). Any serious analysis of imperialism was eschewed 
as it breached the neat and artificial distinction between the external and the internal - 
something central to the IR enterprise (see Walker 1993). The concepts remained 
unchanged. They remained rooted in `Western notions of self and sovereignty 
[that] 
have been grounded in claims of superiority, a higher knowledge of civil institutions, 
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and a mission to elevate the other' (Grovogui 1996: x). Ontologically, decolonisation 
was looked upon merely as an expansion of international system/society from its 
original home in Europe to the rest of the world, as the addition of new members into 
the international community. Epistemologically too, there was little change as 
scientistic and positivistic assumptions were held to have universal application. State- 
as-actor remained the focus of analysis; sovereignty, power, national interest and state 
rivalry was seen to define international relations. While at a theoretical level all states 
were considered to be sovereign and thus legally equal, the hierarchical character of 
this relationship was often implicitly recognised25 as most of the works in IR 
concentrated on East-West relations and the Cold War. Though at a pedagogical level 
IR acquired a global audience, its theoretical parsimony continued unabated. 
The newly independent states, now worlded as the `third world' or `developing 
countries' were the subject of analyses in IR primarily in two ways. First, as a 
playground for the rivalry of the superpowers as in Afghanistan. Second, when they 
defied the logical authority of the powerful states (and also the theoretical authority of 
IR by acting `irrationally') as was the case with Iran (see Chan and Williams 1994). 26 
What went earlier under the name of imperial relations now became a subject matter 
for imperial history. Instead of studying developments in the third world in the wider 
historical context of a long period of brutal colonisation and a structurally truncated 
form of decolonisation, imperialism was seen as a thing of the past. This general 
neglect of history (or often an adoption of a reified view of history) should not come 
as a surprise for IR always had tendencies towards taking ahistoricised positions. 27 
25 At an institutional level, the unequal relations are exemplified in almost every international 
body. One of the best examples, of course, is the UN Security Council and its five permanent 
members with veto powers. Siba Grovogui highlights two paradoxes of decolonisation. First, 
only the rights sanctioned by the former colonialists were accorded to the colonised, regardless 
of the needs and demands of the latter. Second, `the rules and procedures of decolonization 
were determined and controlled by the former colonial powers to effect specific outcomes' 
(1996: 6) 
26 Some writers put the blame of US interventions in third world on third world itself. For 
instance, Robert Snyder (1999), in his analysis of US relations with Cuba, Iran, Nicaragua, and 
Zimbawe, argues that it is their provocation that leads to a US reaction. It reflects the 
phenomenon of blaming the victims and absolving the victimiser (for interesting views on this 
phenomenon as witnessed in the case of Palestinian question, see Said and Hitchen 1988). 
Ironically, Snyder justifies this by saying `the time has come to give agency to Third World 
states in understanding their foreign policies' (2001: 436). He ignores that the subalterns do not 
need his paternalism to acquire agency; at best he can recognise the agency that they already 
possess. 
27 Buzan and Little (2001) rightly point out that IR has failed as an intellectual project due to 
its insulation from other social sciences and histor-ý,. 
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Regarding present day concerns of the non-Western world, third worldist discursive 
approaches such as development and modernisation do influence International 
Political Economy, a field closely intertwined with IR. However, these approaches 
too, like IR, take a top-down view. For instance, the important issue of poverty is 
sanitised as a structural problem requiring medicines prescribed by the West- 
dominated financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. Within 
realist and liberal JR that accounts for a bulk of the discipline, there is hardly any 
recognition or analysis of the legacies of colonialism and neocolonialism. The absence 
of any consideration, be it crude or sophisticated, of neocolonialism in mainstream IR 
is conspicuous. 
Also conspicuous is the lack of any serious effort to deal with themes such as culture, 
identity, and representation. Mainstream IR has ignored that world politics is a product 
of wider processes of identity construction in which the Self and the Other are 
constituted. 28 Phillip Darby points out that the story of IR `[tells] of how power was 
exercised, not of how it was experienced' (1997: 23). This has led to a depersonalising 
and dehumanising of the discipline. Wars are studied in terms of strategy and rarely in 
terms of human consequences. 29 Western commentators and leaders speak, in a 
somewhat celebratory tone, of the changing character of war since the Gulf War with 
the use of new weaponry like `smart bombs'. Mistakes are blamed on `errant bombs' 
absolving the people dropping it from any moral responsibility. There are fewer works 
dealing with the human and environmental impact of the so-called `clean' wars on the 
people at the receiving end (for the human impact of modern wars, see Hidden wars 
2000). 
Mainstream IR's theoretical and empirical closure and lack of self-reflexivity stands in 
a stark contrast to PS, which remains largely undisciplined. While drawing theoretical 
inspirations from critical thinkers of both Western and non-Western traditions, the 
proponents derive their political inspirations from anti-(neo)colonial narratives. A 
conscious oppositional stance is adopted vis-a-vis dominant discursive systems in 
28 Identity presumes an Other and is constituted through differences with this Other. Any 
identity, be it individual or collective, is always `established in relation to a series of 
differences that have become socially recognized. These differences are essential to its being' 
(Connolly 1991: 64). 
29 Darby points out how reading imaginative literature might act as corrective to this tendency 
of IR (1998). 
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place. A deliberate counter-discursive approach is taken to tackle hegemonic 
knowledge formations. Thus, a reflexive criticality is the hallmark of postcoloniality. 
Imperialism and its impact on peoples and cultures is given a due importance (see 
Bhabha 1994; Chaturvedi 2000; Chrisman 1990; McClintock 1995; Richards 1993; 
Sharpe 1992; Suleri 1992). While problematising categories such as third world, the 
voices of third world peoples are promoted, their agency and subjectivity asserted (see 
Spivak 1988; see also Mohanty et al. 1991). Contemporary problems are historicised, 
while at the same time even `history' as it has come to be commonly understood is put 
under interrogation (see Chakravarty 2000; Guha and Spivak 1988; Prakash 1995b). 
Diversity of theoretical input 30 gels with a wide range of issues brought under the 
label 'postcolonial'. PS is certainly multi/trans/interdisciplinary. In fact, it is anti- 
disciplinary. 
As pointed out earlier, rather than being confined to `big' issues, PS concentrates on 
the politics of everyday life. Universal ideas and their unproblematic implementation 
globally are eschewed. While acknowledging the relationship of complicity between 
the production of explanations and the violence and injustices associated with the 
structures of imperialism and capitalism, a deconstructive scenario of the kind 
emphasised by postcolonial theorists like Gayatri Spivak involves paying attention to 
critics' complicity with the object of critique, a `disclosure of complicity' (1988: 180). 
Elsewhere, Spivak suggests two methods to confront the situation - overtly marking 
one's positionality as an investigating subject and laying bare one's inescapable 
institutional interests (1993: 56). This kind of self-reflexivity is absent from 
mainstream IR. 
Darby surmises that the contrast between the mobile and variegated nature of the 
postcolonial discourse and the conservative character of mainstream IR reflects a 
general situation, which exists between established disciplines and the new formations 
of knowledge (1997: 13). I find this contentious. While there is little doubt that new 
disciplines informed by feminism, cultural and postcolonial theories are more radical, 
30 One interesting divide within the discipline is between those who draw upon 
poststructuralist thought, represented by the `holy trinity' of postcolonial theory - Edward 
Said, Homi Bhabha and Gayatri Spivak - (Moore-Gilbert 1997) and those who consider 
poststructuralism to be a retrogressive move that ignores the material deprivation of the peoples 
in the third world (see Ahmad 1994; Dirlik 1996; Goss 1996; Parry 1996; Shohat 1992). For a 
range of view on the relationship between postcolonialism and poststructuralism, see Adam 
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the surmise seems to suggest that it is only a matter of time before the disciplinary 
establishment would blunt their critical edge. As a corollary, one may also take the 
implication that when IR was a new formation of knowledge it was radical. Certainly 
this does not seem to be the case. 
A basic difference exists between the established knowledges and some of the new 
ones, a difference that cannot be accounted for by temporal factors only. It is not a 
question of academic incorporation or assimilation, but of metatheoretical differences. 
Self-reflexivity regarding theoretical stances and empirical agendas was not a 
prominent feature of older disciplines even when they were new. 31 Nor did they ever 
seek to place themselves in a position critical of the established authorities. Claims 
were generally not made on behalf of the unprivileged. Justification for disciplinary 
endeavours was given in the name of methodological correctness. Right from its 
inception, IR has, on the whole, been a status quoist discipline. On the other hand, 
many new hybridised disciplines have adopted critical and oppositional stance vis-a- 
vis the established discursive and material structures. Not only do they involve a 
critiquing of the existing norms and structures, but they also promote a constant 
questioning of their own shifting positionalities. While the older disciplines like IR 
were informed by a heady confidence in the Enlightenment ideas of Progress, Reason 
and Emancipation, the new knowledge formations' attitude to these ideas vary from 
scepticism to outright rejection. The latter argue that the Enlightenment ideas have 
sought to universalise particularistic, ethnocentric, and masculinist notions. Unlike 
older disciplines, which emerged to carve out an exclusive niche for themselves, the 
new ones seek to challenge disciplinary compartmentalisation, circumvent it, and are 
often anti-disciplinary. While IR emerged as a corollary to the study of politics, PS's 
emergence within humanities and social sciences has come as a challenge to various 
disciplinary boundaries. Its challenging nature offers opportunities for adoption of a 
postcolonial approach to world politics, in alliance with critical IR. 
2D. The possibility for postcolonial IR theory 
and Tiffin 1991. 
31 This is not to deny that there were significant disagreements between various theories. For 
instance, the dominant autobiography of IR traces its beginning to the `first debate' between 
`idealism' and `realism'. Idealism purported to challenge the existing system of international 
relations. But both these theories shared significant epistemological and ontological 
assumptions. 
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Given the potential critical edge in the discourse of postcolonialism, it is surprising 
that even the more radical endeavours in the field of IR have generally ignored it. 32 
For instance, in the pioneering postmodern work - International/Intertextual Relations 
(Der Derian and Shapiro 1989) - the long bibliography does not include works that 
move beyond the confines of the 'West'. Even when the term postcolonialism is used 
in IR, for instance in Christopher Clapham's work on Africa and the international 
system (1996), it is devoid of postcoloniality (that is, a postcolonial criticality) and is 
used in the simplistic periodising sense of post-colonial times. `[E]ven works 
embarking from professedly critical postmodern and poststructural perspectives often 
replicate the Eurocentric ecumene of "world politics"' (Krishna 1999: xxix). 
Why this lack of engagement of critical international theories with a potential ally 
(postcolonial theory)? Sankaran Krishna brought attention to this as early as 1993 
when he highlighted the fact that some postmodern theorists commence from a 
remarkably self-contained and self-referential view of the West and are often oblivious 
to `the intimate dialogue between "Western" and "non-Western" economies, societies, 
and philosophies that underwrite the disenchantment with modernity that characterizes 
the present epoch' (Krishna 1993: 388). `[T]he story of "how the west was one" (Klein 
1994) has always been inextricable from the story of how the rest were rendered both 
multiple and voiceless' (Krishna 1999: xxi) - this has often been neglected by critical 
interventions in IR debates. Cautioning against a blanket critique of subjectivity and 
agency, 33 which he alleges to be a feature of some postmodernist works, Krishna 
prefers a postcolonial perspective that entails sensitivity to hierarchical relations 
between races, genders, and classes while also challenging the ethnocentricity of IR. 
He defines what he calls a `politics of postcolonial engagement' as 
the simultaneous task of deconstructing, historicizing, and denaturalizing identities 
(national, ethnic, linguistic, religious), as well as envisioning and struggling for a 
future that does not seek to transcend or escape identity politics so much as fight for 
justice and fairness in the worlds we do inhabit. A critical and engaged approach to 
international relations is indispensable in such a struggle that is simultaneously 
32 The feminist writings are an exception to this as challenge to geographical parochialism is 
taken seriously here. For instance, see Jabri and O'Gorman 1999. 
33 This criticism reflects concerns raised in wider debates over the `political' value of 
postmodernism/poststructuralism. Though poststructuralist writings often foreground 
counterscripts to `identities scripted by dominant statist institutions' (Shapiro 1996: 259; see 
also Doty 2001), they are accused of a relative `evisceration of agency, class, power and 
political economy ... a neglect of 
intentionality and agency brought about by the retreat from 
"material" causes' (0' Tuathail 1996a: 651). 
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deconstructive and oriented toward the achievement of specific political goals and 
visions (Ibid.: xviii; emphasis in original). 
While I agree that the critical insurgencies in general and postmodern/poststructuralist 
writing in particular have tended to ignore the concerns of the non-West, I do not 
accept Krishna's caricature of postmodern writings in IR as depoliticising. For not 
only do these endeavours create space for imagining alternatives (a fact Krishna 
recognises), but they also accept the need to formulate ironic, provisional, and yet 
politically enabling essentialising of subjectivity (something which Krishna accuses 
them of ignoring). What critical theories like critical social constructivism, feminism, 
postmodernism, and poststructuralism have exposed is `International Relations as a 
discursive process: a process by which identities are formed, meaning is given, and 
status and privilege are accorded; a process by which threats to identity and its 
meaning are both disciplined and punished; a process of knowledge as power' 
(George 1996: 69-70; emphasis in original). 
On the other hand, Darby proceeds to criticise not only postmodernism's lack of 
interest in the non-West, but also the postmodernist incursions in postcolonial theory 
for he believes them to have had a depersonalising and decontextualising influence. 
He claims that both postmodern and conventional IR share a sense of remoteness from 
the phenomena under analysis, both look on at an essentially de-peopled landscape 
where ethics and intentions do not rate highly (admittedly from very different 
perspectives), and do not pursue consequences in human terms (Darby 1997: 15-17). 
This comparison, I would argue, seems to be misplaced and does an injustice to 
politicising potentialities of postmodern IR. 34 He critiques `strategic essentialism' for 
lacking a cutting edge and for inscribing the secondary status of the third world in the 
thinking of the first world. In contrast, he argues that we need to give much more 
weight to the problems of the third world, rather than continuing to tailor our approach 
34 That the accusation of postmodernism as politically disabling is incorrect can be seen in 
several postmodernist IR works. David Campbell, in his analysis of United States foreign 
policy, retheorises F(/f)oreign P(/p)olicy as one of the boundary producing practices central to 
the production and re-production of the identity in whose name it operates (States) (1998b). 
Walker offers a poststructuralist analysis of the inside/outside question and advocates a politics 
of becoming (rather than a politics of being) which challenges the modern framing of others as 
Other, reproduced and legitimised by the very distinction between International Relations and 
Political Theory (1993: 183). In a similar vein, William Connolly explores the politics of 
identity and the way in which it is linked with the politics of difference (1991). 
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to the issues in hand in line with the requirements of an often resistant body of theory 
(Darby 1997: 15-17). These arguments not only repeat the positivist fallacy of making 
a distinction between theory and practice but they also contrast material structures 
with discursive practices as if they do not perform a mutually constitutive role. Darby 
ignores the fact that the constitutive paradox of essentialism and anti-essentialism is 
irreducible. Spivakian strategic essentialism - `a strategic use of positivist 
essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest' (1996: 214) 35 - still seems to 
be the best way forward for it enables while at the same time humbling (a 
characteristic noticeably absent from the often arrogant pronouncements of 
conventional IR). 
If there is a strand of critical international theory that has taken on board postcolonial 
concerns most seriously, it is feminist IR. At a general level, feminists have made an 
immense contribution to IR through a reworking of the central concerns of the 
discipline in ways that encourage us to think about each of these areas in radically 
different ways (see Enloe 2000, Parpart and Zalewski 1998; Peterson and Runyan 
1999; Steans 1998; Sylvester 2002; Tickner 1992). Feminist scholarship, for instance, 
has raised important questions about the processes of inclusion and exclusion involved 
in the construction of theory. At a more specific level, many feminist practitioners of 
IR have taken very seriously Chandra Mohanty's (1988) accusation that Western 
feminist writings often suffer from an inherent methodological universalism and 
simplistic dichotomies, thereby colonising the heterogeneity of lives of women in third 
world to produce `third world women' carrying the authorising signatures of Western 
humanist discourse. They now read discourses of gender, race, and sexuality as 
intertextual. For instance, Jane Parpart argues that the idea that IR is a `man's affair' 
presupposes a single, biologically based, largely Anglo-American vision of 
masculinity (1998: 203), while Jan Jindy Pettman (1996) points out that the sexual 
politics of colonialism and race politics of gender need also to be taken into account. 36 
35 Feminists have taken lead over others in their expositions on negotiating between 
essentialisms and anti-essential isms. One recalls here Judith Butler's `contingent foundations' 
(1992), Kathy Ferguson's `mobile subjectivities' (1993), and Diane Fuss' strategy of 
`deploying essentialism' (1989). 
36 When it comes to nationalism, Kate Manzo (1996) has shown how race figures in the 
construction of nation, while Nira Yuval-Davis 1997 has drawn attention to its gendered base. 
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IR's third debate, of which feminist theories are a part, has seriously charged the 
discipline of status quoism and a lack of self-consciousness and reflexivity. Fresh 
ideas from the fields of social, political and cultural theories have inspired iconoclastic 
attacks on the historically identified and discursively constituted edifice of the 
discipline. The `truths' of IR have been revealed as effects of regimes of truth, 
knowledge as complicit with power, pursuit of objectivity as a chimera, hitherto 
universal concepts as ethnocentric and particularistic. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, with respect to the questions of identity and representation, constructivist and 
discursive views have gained currency. 
As the new century has begun, critical voices are becoming increasingly vocal. IR is 
divided over subject matter, methodology and the epistemological structure of theories 
and has joined the ranks of introspective academic disciplines. In an optimistic vein, 
Yosef Lapid claims that IR may now be seen as a divided discipline with multiple 
theoretical inlets (Lapid and Kratochwil 1996: 11). The sovereignty of the discipline 
has been compromised. However, one needs to be careful when examining the impact 
of these philosophical insurgencies on JR. These exciting developments within as well 
as at the margins of the discipline should not lead to any complacence on part of the 
challengers. The mainstream, though shaken, remains in place. While some have 
grasped the significance of these criticisms and have sought to redefine their agenda, 
others have taken a more rigid position. The best examples of the first trend would be 
the recently acquired vibrancy in the English school. 37 On the other hand, one comes 
across many advocates of a more narrowly defined, purist version of realism in IR (for 
instance, Legro and Moravcsik 1999). Liberals or pluralists scavenge for new ideas 
more adaptable to the mainstream, including that of liberal feminism. 38 Those who 
manage to resist incorporation remain on the margins, often setting their own agendas. 
Cynthia Weber (1999), for instance, makes a convincing case for not critiquing the 
traditional truths of IR while urging the challengers to carry on writing differently 
seductive accounts of international political concepts and activities. 
37 However, one should note that the proponents of the school had from the very beginning 
been sceptical of hard core realism and opted for `Rationalism'. A discussion on critical 
possibilities in the English School/ International Society approach can be found, for instance, 
in Dunne 1998. For a reformulated, more historicised, (re)working of realism, see Buzan and 
Little 1993. 
38 For an example of this see Keohane 1991. For an effective critique of this, see Weber 1994. 
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As many feminist and poststructuralist writings have shown, all hope is not lost as far 
as appropriating IR for more critical purposes (or as Sylvester puts, homesteading39 it) 
is concerned. `International theory progresses when voices of authority are engaged by 
voices that go against the grain' (Der Derian 1995: 9). I personally prefer approaches 
that seek strategically to engage dominant discourses without losing their critical edge, 
something that has been at the heart of the postcolonial project. Such dilemmas have 
been basic to postcolonial identity where mimicry intermingles with counter- 
discourse, resistance with ambivalence. Challenging hegemony requires persistent 
critique, abrogation and appropriation, and bundling together several, often 
contradictory, strategies and tactics. One may do so by taking up the `margin' as a 
favoured enunciatory position40 and exile as an ado(/a)pted metaphorical position (see 
Ashley and Walker 1990a). Many postmodernists, feminists and postcolonial 
theoretical-practitioners have done so. It does not indicate acquiring a distant vantage 
point making objective observations more possible. Instead, a conscious acquisition of 
marginality in the sphere of ideas bares the arbitrariness of the sovereignty of 
discourses as well as that of discourses of sovereignty. As Peter Hansen writes, by 
emphasising the marginality of the subaltern rather than its `irremediable 
subordination or inability to speak', postcolonialism and other `borderlands' 
perspectives `offer the possibility of exploring the dynamic power relations between 
subalterns and elites, without reinforcing the dichotomy between them' (2000: 310). 41 
Margins also act as `contact zones' (see Pratt 1992) providing a conducive atmosphere 
for inter-/multi-/trans- disciplinary endeavours. 
Let me then recapitulate some of the commonalities that can provide a contingent 
ground for conversations between existing critical international theories and 
postcolonialism in order to come up with a postcolonial IR that seeks to deparochialise 
the discipline of IR. Both endeavours seek to provide a critique of dominant 
discourses for being the typical products of Western modernity. They reveal the 
silences of the disciplines by exposing philosophical closures and the underlying 
power-knowledge nexus. Both are marked by constitutive paradoxes. Challenge to the 
39 Sylvester defines her strategy of homesteading as a process, relying on the principle of 
empathetic cooperation, `that reconfigure (s) `known' subject statuses ... 
in ways that open up 
rather than fence in terrains of meaning, identity and place' (1994: 2). 
40 One needs to make a distinction between such theoretical position and materially and 
discursively marginalised positions: the former is a strategic move, while the latter is imposed. 
41 For a cautious reflection of `marginality' as offering institutional validation and certification 
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sovereignty of subjectivity goes along with an assertion of subjectivity. Resurgence of 
identity accompanies the deconstruction of identification process as constructed and 
processual. The universalistic pretensions of the mainstream are revealed as 
particularistic and ethnocentric. Emphasis on the local and particular go hand in hand 
with attempts at more inclusive understandings. The strategy involved includes 
rereading42 and rewriting the canonical texts, as well as constructing an alternative 
and different archive. 43 
IR should no longer be seen as the study of particular kinds of political relations only; 
it should also involve intercultural relations and intersubjective relations. A 
postcolonial international theory based on conversations of critical IR with anti- 
disciplinary intellectual endeavours like PS would make this possible. In contrast to an 
`economic model' of interdisciplinary engagement, in which disciplines retain their 
sovereignty, this will follow the `model of interdisciplinarity as conversation, as 
dialogical, in which the disciplinary subject is at least potentially liable to be 
transformed through the encounter with the other' (Weldes et al. 1999: 21-25; 24). 
How exactly such conversation take place would differ according to different themes 
and contexts. I do not provide a blueprint for such a dialogue; focusing instead on the 
themes of representation and identity, especially those involving the West-nonWest 
dynamics. 
2E. Conclusion: a call for a new beginning 
Once again it should be emphasised that an understanding of the ways in which non- 
Western Others were represented within the colonial and Oriental discourse helps in 
understanding contemporary world politics for the same processes often continue 
today. Though informal neocolonial structures have replaced formal structures of 
imperial domination, stereotypical44 images of non-Western peoples continue to 
within Western `academy', see Spivak 1997. 
42 Here one may point out Said's method of contrapuntal reading which involves a way of 
reading texts (of literature) so as to reveal their deep implication in dominant systems 
(imperialism and colonial process). Examples are found in Said 1993. 
43 A good example of such multidisciplinary endeavour is Albert Paolini's Navigating 
modernity (1999) that outlines a reflexive postmodern approach to international relations 
drawing upon the discourses of postcolonialism and globalisation with specific references to 
Africa. 
44 As I will discuss in chapter 4, stereotyping is a common representational strategy in 
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circulate, often buttressing the power relations already in place. The representations of 
the non-West in academic as well as popular Western discourses are still enmeshed in 
asymmetrical power relations. Before thinking of alternative representational regimes, 
the critical endeavours in IR need to reveal the way representational practices lie at the 
heart of international theory and praxis. The first step is to unpack the concept of 
representation. 
situations of unequal access to resources. `Stereotyping reduces, essentialises, naturalises and 
fixes "difference"' (Hall 1997b: 257-8). For an interesting discussion of similar 
representational such strategies, see chapter 5 and also Spurr 1993. 
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Chapter 3: The theme of representation in international, 
cultural, and postcolonial studies 
`Representations do not imitate reality but are practices through which things 
take on meaning and value; to the extent that a representation is regarded as 
realistic, it is because it is so familiar that it operates transparently' (Shapiro 
1988: xi). 
Taking up the challenge of combating IR's parochialism, in this section, I argue that a 
postcolonial IR approach, based on a dialogue between critical international theories 
and postcolonialism would look at Exotica Tibet as integral to the framing and 
operationalising of the Tibet question within world politics. In the first chapter of the 
section, after providing a general theoretical background for considering 
representation and identity, I look at the ways in which IR and postcolonialism studies 
Western representations of the non-Western world. ' 
First, I offer a general discussion of representation that takes place in international 
studies, cultural and postcolonial theory. This is followed by a study of Orientalism. 
Drawing upon a critical appropriation of Edward Said's (1978) Orientalism critique, 
Exotica Tibet is set up as an Orientalist construct with modes and discursive strategies 
generic to other sites of Western representations of the non-West. This sets up the 
stage for the next chapter where I discuss the general modes and strategies 
characterising these representational practices highlighting the particularities of 
Exotica Tibet. 
Before proceeding further, it should be clarified that a concentration on Western 
representations does not deny the fact that representational practices are prevalent in 
non-Western societies too. In fact, historically, all cultures and civilisations have had 
their own particular representational practices for perceiving those they considered as 
Other. 2 But - and this is a crucial qualification - it was only with modern European 
1A critical engagement with `Exotica Tibet and world politics' presents its own problems in 
disciplinary terms. IR has not dealt with postcolonialism and the Tibet question; postcolonial 
studies has ignored IR as well as Tibet; and, although Tibetan studies has some encounter with 
postcolonial theory, it has had little contact with IR theory. So, in borrowing from IR, 
postcolonial theory, and Tibetan studies, I move beyond all three to set up a theoretical 
framework within which to understand the poetics and politics of Exotica Tibet. Not only does 
this framework entail recognising the cultural underpinnings of world politics, but it also 
politicises our understandings of culture. 
2 But there is a crucial difference in terms of implication and impact. Discussing the difference 
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imperialism that the capacity to convert these representations into truth on a 
systematic and mass scale emerged. Creation of an archive of knowledge about the 
Other has been integral to post-Enlightenment Europe and its imperial expansion 
abroad. This archive acts as a `regime of truth' (in the sense used by Foucault, 1980: 
133) with disciplinary effects, which that limits and channels perception in terms of 
fixed tropes. These tropes are not fixed ahistorically as their content and meanings are 
the products of historical specificity. However, they often remain stable for substantial 
periods of time. What makes such representational practices distinctly modern is their 
productive capacity. Production of knowledge about the Other goes hand in hand with 
the construction, articulation, and affirmation of differences between the Self and 
Other, which in turn feeds into the politics of identification. 
Social and cultural identities by their very nature have always been discursively 
constructed. What is new and peculiar to modernity is the desire and ability to 
construct a bounded identity based on a fixed and autonomous idea of self. This has 
been paralleled by the power of representations to construct identity and by highly 
unequal access to discursive and representational resources at a global level. 
Representational practices feed the dominant knowledge regimes and structures and 
shape the very identities they seek to represent. The best known example of this is the 
ideational construct of Orientalism, which reflects the close connection between 
particular modes of cultural representations, anthropology, and European imperialism 
(see Said 1978). In the process it also creates the categories of `Oriental' and 
`Occidental' people. 
Within international studies, it is important to look at Western cultural representations 
of non-Western people. This is so for two reasons. First, representations populate the 
between representing whiteness in the black imagination and representing blackness is white 
imagination, bell hooks argues that this asymmetry is highlighted in James Baldwin's 
experience (Notes of a Native Son 1955). 
Writing about being the first black person to visit a Swiss village with only white 
inhabitants, who had yearly ritual of painting individuals black who were then 
positioned as slaves and bought, so that the villagers could celebrate their concern 
with converting the souls of the `natives', Baldwin responded: '... [T]here is a great 
difference between being the first white man to be seen by Africans and being the first 
black man to be seen by whites. The white man takes the astonishment as tribute, for 
he arrives to conquer and to convert the natives, whose inferiority in relation to 
himself is not even to be questioned... [t]he astonishment with which I might have 
greeted them, should they have stumbled into my African village a few hundred years 
ago, might have rejoiced their hearts. But the astonishment with which they greet me 
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world with specific subject positions within which concretised individuals are then 
interpellated (see Weldes 1999). Identity claims of various non-Western communities 
thus operate within power relations put in place by the West. This does not deny non- 
Westerners their agency, for there is always space for resistance and accommodation. 
But it emphasises differential access to the creation and moulding of discursive (both 
material and non-material) resources. Recognition of the productive dimension of 
representation implies that the very basis of world politics - identity - is challenged. 
The basic concepts of world politics such as power, national interest, state sovereignty, 
security, nationalism - all are up for grabs. No longer sacrosanct, these concepts can 
then be interrogated from a postcolonial perspective. Second, the recognition of the 
salience of Western representations of the non-West in world politics also questions 
the conventional view of international studies as a social `science' which has little to 
do with culture, morality, society, and the like. It underlines the importance of culture 
as a factor in moulding, sustaining, and questioning political practices. It recognises 
world politics as a process of cultural interactions in which the identities of actors 
(including their values and visions) is not given prior to or apart from these 
interactions. Instead, they are shaped and constituted in the complexes of social 
practices that make up world politics. Rather than denying the importance of actors in 
enacting and reshaping the social practices in which they are embedded, it focuses our 
attention also on the social construction of actors. Thus, representation is an inherent 
and important aspect of global political life and therefore a critical and legitimate area 
of enquiry. 
3A. Representation, identity, and IR 
`[C]ulture [, representation] and identity offer unmatched opportunities to 
sensitize the IR scholarly community to the research implications of the 
social construction of reality' (Lapid 1996: 11). 
`A whole range of analyses in IR have taken this [Said's] idea up and mapped the 
different ways in which the West constructs the non-western world' (Diken and 
Laustsen 2001: 768). This comment is surprising, inaccurate and unjustified in my 
view, given that IR, including critical IR, with few exceptions, 3 has more or less 
today can only poison mine (1992: 339). 
3 Hugh Gusterson (1999), in his article that challenges the boundary between IR and cultural 
anthropology, studies Western alarmism about nuclearisation of South Asia as `nuclear 
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ignored the questions raised by Orientalism critique. The question of representation 
has historically been excluded from the academic study of international relations and 
the `price that international relations scholarship pays for its inattention to the issue of 
representation is perpetuation of the dominant modes of making meaning and deferral 
of its responsibility and complicity in dominant representations' (Doty 1996b: 171). 
Representation is a crucial dynamic of international politics and this is increasingly 
being recognised within international studies. As Roland Bleiker writes, `[s]ome of the 
most significant theoretical and practical insight into world politics emerges not from 
endeavours that ignore representation, but from those that explore how representative 
practices themselves have to constitute and shape political practices' (2001: 510). 
International relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into 
circulation representations that are then taken as truth. The modes of representation 
abet the widely orchestrated form of domination by making it acceptable and coherent 
within the ethos that constructs selves and exotic/barbaric4 Others. 5 Not surprisingly 
Theodore Roosevelt could justify imperialist foreign policy as a fight against 
barbarism: `It is our duty toward the people living in barbarism to see that they are 
freed from their chains.. . and we can free them only by destroying barbarism itself 
(quoted in Cheyfitz 1997: 4). In more recent times, 
one does not have to search very far to find a continuing complicity with colonial 
representations that ranges from a politics of silence and neglect to constructions of 
terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, international drug trafficking, and Southern 
immigration to the North as new threats to global stability and peace (Doty 1996b: 
170). 
Serious consideration of representation would involve recognition by IR scholars of 
their own complicity with dominant regimes of power, something that goes against 
their claims to objectivity. This makes it even more important for critical enterprises to 
engage with the theme of representation, to bare the will to power that exists at every 
level of IR theory and praxis. 
orientalism'. See also Biswas (2001). 
4 As I shall discuss later, exotic/barbaric are different sides of same coin of representational 
practices. 
5 Roxanne Doty writes, 
Encounters between the North and the South were (and are) such that the North's 
representations of `reality' enabled practices of domination, exploitation, and 
brutality, practices that would have been considered unthinkable, reprehensible, and 
unjustifiable were an alternative `reality' taken seriously. Alternative representations 
did indeed exist, but they were either marginalized or systematically silenced (1996b: 
13). 
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Critical international theories no longer accept the unproblematic view of 
representation as merely the reflection of reality. A discursive approach that 
foregrounds the mutually constitutive relations between regimes of knowledge, 
representation, and truth is gaining wider currency. Discursive approaches tend to 
`illustrate how. 
. . textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to 
describe, in specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think 
and act in the contemporary world' (George 1994: 191). 6 The theoretical commitment 
to discourse productivity also makes it important to explain how a discourse produces 
this world - how it renders logical and proper certain policies by the authorities and, in 
the implementation of those policies, shapes and changes people's modes and 
conditions of living. 
Adopting a discursive approach, Doty argues that North-South relations are more than 
an area of theory and practice in which various policies have been enacted and 
theories formulated. They are also the realm of politics wherein the very identities of 
peoples, states and regions are constructed through representational practices drawing 
upon an `economy of abstract oppositions' (1996b: 2). Critical discursive approach 
denaturalises modes of representation that abet domination by `making it acceptable 
and coherent within the dominant ethos that constructs domestic selves and exotic 
Others' (Shapiro 1988: 122-3). Discursive approach also shows that representation `is 
a practice, one way of constructing world at the expense of others, which would attract 
other modes of abiding' (Ibid. ). This change in the disciplinary landscape is welcome 
as it highlights the important role played by dominant representations in sustaining 
particular policy frameworks. 
The focus within critical IR has been mainly on the constitutive function of 
representation in generating and sustaining particular policy regimes and on the 
identity politics of the representer. For instance, David Campbell (1998a) argues how 
the inscription of otherness was linked to the enframing of American identity. The 
work's theme is that the boundaries of a state's identity are secured by the 
representation of danger as being integral to foreign policy (Ibid.: 3). The Other, the 
non-West, lurks beneath this representation. Campbell's distinction between `foreign 
6 `Discourse analysis is thus a post-positivist project that is critically self-aware of the closures 
imposed by research programmes and the modes of analysis which scholars routinely use in 
their work and treat as unproblematic' (Milliken 1999: 227). 
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policy' and `Foreign Policy' recognises the role of the Other, the non-West, in the 
framing of Foreign Policy as an instrument of statecraft. `Foreign Policy serves to 
reproduce the constitution of identity made possible by "foreign policy" and to 
contain challenges to the identity that results' (Ibid.: 69). The Western self is 
constituted by estranging the non-Western Other; it is naturalised by pathologising the 
Other. 
At one time or another, European and American discourse has inscribed women, the 
working class, Eastern Europeans, Jews, blacks, criminals, coloreds, mulattos, 
Africans, drug addicts, Arabs, the insane, Asians, the Orient, the Third World, 
terrorists, and others through tropes that have written their identity as inferior, often in 
terms of their being a mob or horde (sometimes passive and sometimes threatening) 
that is without culture, devoid of morals, infected with disease, lacking in industry, 
incapable of achievement, prone to be unruly, inspired by emotion, given to passion, 
indebted to tradition, or ... whatever `we' are not (Ibid.: 89). 
Though in Writing security (1998a), written originally in 1992, Campbell does not 
concern himself with the impact of `foreign policy' on the Other, this changes slightly 
in his National deconstruction (1998b) in which, adopting a `deconstructive ethos', he 
argues that `Otherness, representation, violence, complicity, responsibility - these are 
some of the many provocations forced upon us by Bosnia' (Campbell 1998b: 11). The 
politics of representation played a crucial role here. Rather than being epiphenomenal, 
it was central to the way American and West European policy in Bosnia was scripted 
as comprising `ethnic hatred', `warring factions', `ancient animosities', and so on. 
Ethnicity here is a term that 
signifies relationships of power in the problematic of identity/difference rather than 
being a signifier for which there is a stable referent ... 
[it] is therefore better 
understood as a component of the representational politics of identity - particularly 
the identity of `others' - and attempts to naturalize ethnicity are best regarded as 
efforts to remove the question of identity/difference and its materialization from the 
realm of politics (Ibid.: 92). 
This `predominance of an ethnic register, with its associated historical assumptions 
and religious associations' (Ibid.: 55) has had `real' devastating consequences for the 
Bosnians involved. The consequences of deploying specific rhetorical tropes of 
representation on the identities of the represented is thus a theme that figures (though 
peripherally) in National deconstruction. 
Similarly, in Weldes (1999a and 1999b) and especially in Weldes et al. (1999), 
representation is analysed as a central concept of international relations and foreign 
policy. Speaking of culture and representation as integral to IR, Weldes et al use 
culture in the sense that representations are produced in and out of `the context within 
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which people give meanings to their actions and experiences and make sense of their 
lives' (John Tomlinson quoted). Jutta Weldes (1996,1999a, 1999b) looks at the ways 
in which identities are produced, reproduced and transformed. Discussing how 
representation plays a crucial role in social construction of national interests, she 
writes 
[d]rawing on a wide array of already available cultural and linguistic resources, state 
officials create representations which serve, first to populate the world with a variety 
of objects, including both the self (i. e. the state in question) and others ... [S]uch representations posit well-defined relations among these diverse objects... [and] in 
providing a vision of the world of international relations -- in populating that world 
with objects and in supplying quasi-causal or warranting arguments - these 
representations have already defined the national interest... Interests are entailed in 
these representations because they (seem to) follow from the specific identities of the 
objects represented and the relations posited to obtain among them. Once a situation 
has been described, that is, national interest has already been determined - it emerges 
out of the representations of identities and relationships constructed by state officials 
(1996: 282-3; emphasis in original). 
Like Campbell, it is the foreign policy regime sustained by particular representational 
practices and the identity of the representer (the United States) which is under 
investigation. 
Similarly, Iver Neumann studies the `use of "the East" as the other' (1999; emphasis 
added) as a general practice in the identity formation of Europe, Bradley Klein 
examines NATO `as a set of [representational] practice by which the West has 
constituted itself as a political and cultural identity' (1990: 313), and Simon Dalby 
(1988) analyses how the Soviet Union was constructed as a dangerous Other in order 
to produce an ideological rationale for the US national security state. In all these cases 
of Western representation of the Other, the focus is on either its rationalising role in 
some foreign policy regime or on its productive effect on dominant identity discourses 
within the West. William Connolly writes, `Identity requires difference in order to be, 
and it converts difference into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty' 
(1991: 64). The focus within critical IR has mainly been on the Self/the representer, 
not on the Other/the represented. This is disturbing as it has the potential of replicating 
one of the main criticisms of mainstream IR - that it is Western-centric and self- 
referential. After all, `the power politics of identity wield coercive threats of 
representational force to trap adversarial identities into acquiescence' (Mattern 2001: 
351). 
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Overall, thus, it is fair to say that not much attention has been paid to the impact of 
these Western representations on the represented. These works have not dealt with the 
poetics and politics of Western representations of the non-West from the vantage point 
of the latter. The focus has remained largely on a critique of Western practices, not on 
its productive and restrictive impact on the non-West. My emphasis is on the ways in 
which particular encounters between the West and the non-West have shaped the 
latter. Representations support not only particular politics of the representer toward the 
represented, but significantly, they construct the very identities of the actors involved, 
including the Other. Representations are productively linked with identity discourses 
of all kinds. The conventional idea that representation draws upon a pre-given identity 
is turned on its head, for it is identity that is fashioned out of particularised 
representations. In the case of Exotica Tibet, then, representational discourses are not 
the product of, but actually productive of, Tibetan identity. Within critical IR, the 
paucity of serious consideration of the `how', `why', and `what impact' questions of 
Western representations of/on non-Western communities shows that the task of 
provincialising the West has only just begun. Since postcolonialism is particularly 
robust when it comes to the issue of cultural representations, West - non-West 
interactions, and identity politics, the importance of postcoloniality as an antidote to 
IR's parochialism cannot be overemphasised. 
3B. Theorising representation 
If there is anything common among contemporary political, social, linguistic and 
cultural theories, it is the idea that any search for the true essence of a concept is futile. 
Meaning lies not in the object or word, but is constructed by signifying practices. In 
the space of this section, I provide my conceptualisation of representation (specifically 
as related to the production of knowledge about the Other), drawing upon relevant 
literature from social, cultural, and postcolonial theory.? The purpose is not to arrive at 
its essential meaning but to reveal various meanings and usage of the term 
`representation'. This is not an attempt at mapping the vast literature that already 
exists on the topic, but to tease out those aspects that are relevant for the discussion of 
Exotica Tibet in later chapters. 
7 It is important to point out here that the discussions of representation within political theory 
(for instance see Birch 1971; Marsh and Norris 1997; Phillips 1995; Pitkin 1967,1969) are not 
directly helpful for my purpose here. They have paid little attention to new ideas coming from 
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Following Stuart Hall and his discussion of the wider question of the relationship 
between language, meaning, and representation, we can identify three distinct theories 
of representation: reflective, 8 intentional9 and constructionist10 (1997a: 15-74). A 
detailed treatment of these theories is neither feasible nor desirable here. Here only 
social constructionist theory is discussed since it provides a robust understanding of 
representation. Constructionist theories are best suited for a contextualised 
understanding of social and political concepts like representation and identity. They do 
not argue that the material world does not exist, but that it acquires meaning only 
through the mediation of language and discursive systems. The constructionist theory 
of representation is that neither things in themselves nor the individual users of 
language can fix meaning in language. Instead, meanings are contextual - it is the 
particular symbolic code that fixes, or tries to fix, meaning at a particular time. This 
production of meaning through difference and the coding of it also imply that 
meanings can never be permanently fixed. The constitutive, relational and processual 
character of representation needs to be taken into account for any meaningful enquiry. 
Such a social constructionist approach studies culture as a constitutive process. The 
conception which underlines it is that of representation as entering into the very 
constitution of things. However, within the broad terrain of social constructionism, 
social and cultural theory. For an exception see Seitz 1995. 
8 Reflective/mimetic theory is based on the philosophy that meaning lies in the object or event 
in the real world, and language acts like a mirror merely reflecting pre-given meaning. The 
theory does not take into account the wider social, cultural and political context which inform 
and constitute all our enquiries and understandings. It leaves little room for interpretation. It 
pays little attention to the relationship between the represented and its representation. 
9 In contrast to reflective theory, an intentional theory of representation focuses on authorial 
intention as the key factor in the creation of meaning; words and language mean what the 
author intends them to mean. However, like reflective theory, this too ignores the social and 
political character of language, power relations existing between `author' and `audience', and 
role of interpretation. Both reflective and intentional theories tend to read representation 
transparently and decontextualise it. 
10 The term `constructionist' is used here generically for all kinds of approaches that recognise 
language, representation, and identity as the products of historical and social construction. It is 
to be noted that while within cultural studies the term constructivist is often used as a substitute 
for constructionist, within international studies, it has its own specific meaning. Within cultural 
studies, constructionism/constructivism is used as umbrella term, while within IR, 
constructivism is a specific school of thought. A note of caution is in place here - when we 
speak of social constructionist theory, it shouldn't mask the plethora of approaches which are 
subsumed under the label of `theory' for purposes of categorisation and rhetoric. Often, it is 
better to talk of social constructionist theories rather than theory to avoid imposing artificial 
unity. 
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there are diverse and often conflicting strands. II Along with Hall (Ibid.: 36-42), we 
may refer to two streams within social constructionism -a semiotic approach and a 
discursive approach to representation. The semiotic approach draws upon linguistics 
(particularly Ferdinand De Saussure's work) under the assumption that in so far as all 
cultural objects convey meaning and all cultural practices depend on meaning, they 
work like language works and therefore are amenable to semiotic analysis. This 
provides a method for analysing how iconic (visual, bearing resemblance in form to 
the object to which they refer) as well as indexical (written or spoken signs which 
have completely arbitrary relation with the signified element) representations convey 
meaning. Such an approach is best exemplified in Roland Barthes' writings, including 
his discussion of myth (1972). However, the preoccupation of semioticians with 
language often leads to neglect of the wider social context within which culture is 
played out (Hall 1997a: 36-42). It sanitises the muddy cultural politics of the 
contemporary world. Pervasive power relations are not given adequate attention. The 
lack of engagement with the role of power in representation is made even more 
conspicuous by the centralising role it plays within the second strand of the 
constructionist theory of representation - the discursive approach. 
In the discursive approach, the primary concern shifts from relations of meaning to 
relations of power. Though this approach characterises the work of many scholars, no 
one has been more prominent than Michel Foucault (1970,1972,1980,1984,1986) in 
shaping it. Foucault widens the meaning of discourse, which in linguistics meant 
passages of connected writing or speech, to imply `a group of statements which 
provide a language for talking about -a way of representing the knowledge about -a 
particular topic at a particular historical moment... ' (in Hall and Gieben 1992: 291). 
Unlike the semioticians, Foucault is concerned with the production of knowledge and 
meaning not through language but through discourse. Discursive practices have their 
own inclusionary and exclusionary aspects. 
Discursive practices are characterised by the delimitation of a field of objects, the 
definition of a legitimate perspective for the agent of knowledge, and the fixing of 
norms for the elaboration of concepts and theories. Thus, each discursive practice 
It Following Vivien Burr we may identify four features that may be considered as constituting 
social constructionism: a critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge; historical and 
cultural specificity; recognition that knowledge is sustained by social processes; and finally, 
knowledge and social action go together (1995: 3-5). In a similar vein, Weldes et al (1999) 
discuss how a commitment to `critical social constructivist' approach implies three interrelated 
analytic principles: affirmation of reality as socially constructed, exposing relations of power 
and locating agency, and denaturalising the taken-for-granted (13-21). 
50 
implies a play of prescriptions that designate its exclusions and choices (Foucault 
1986: 199). 
Foucault's reformulation of discourse also calls for recognition of the explicit linkage 
between knowledge, truth, and power. Identification of the knowledge-power 
(pouvoir/savoir) nexus reveals the linkage of truth claims with systems of power: 
(T)ruth isn't outside power, or lacking of power: contrary to a myth whose history and 
functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of 
protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating 
themselves. Truth is a thing of the world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple 
forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of power. Each society has its 
regime of truth, its `general politics' of truth: that is, the types of discourses which it 
accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one 
to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the 
techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of 
those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault 1980: 291). 
The recognition of the constructed character of truth facilitates a critical political 
positioning. Nothing is sacrosanct. However, this does not undermine the impact of 
truth claims on the lives of people. All knowledge, once applied in the `real' world, 
has real effects, and in that sense becomes true. 12 This Foucauldian identification and 
exploration of link between power, knowledge, and truth is radical in its implication. It 
shifts the terrain of inquiry from the question `what is truth? ' to the question `how do 
discursive practices constitute truth claims? '. In terms of representation, we may see 
the implication as a shift in the focus from some core reality beneath/behind 
representations to the modalities of their functioning. The question is no longer 
whether a representation is true or false, but what discursive practices operate to 
render it true or false. It is not only how representations reflect some subjects, but, 
more crucially, how subjectivity itself is constructed within discursive practices, how 
representational regimes are productive of subjectivity. Discourses then are `practices 
which form the objects of which they speak' (Foucault 1972: 49). Bleiker points out, 
`Representation is always an act of power. This power is at its peak if a form of 
representation is able to disguise its subjective origins and values' (2001: 515). 
Adopting this approach to Tibetanness, the pertinent question shifts from `how far do 
representations (both Western and self-) of Tibetans reflect their identity' to `how do 
12 This is linked to the frequent criticism of poststructuralism that it kills off the subject of 
knowledge and leaves no room for agency. As Gayatri Spivak clarifies, the poststructuralists 
`situate subjecting rather than kill the subject or pronounce it dead. To question ... 
[the 
conviction that the man is the master of an unexamined subjective agency] is not to "kill the 
subject"' (1999: 322). It is to recognise that `I am not outside the language that structures me, 
but neither am I determined by the language that makes this "I" possible' (Butler 1999: xxiv). 
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representational regimes affect the discursive production of Tibetanness'. This helps 
us look at Tibetanness as a politicised identification process, instead of some pre- 
given, essential object. 
Tibetans are subjects of - as well as subjected to - the discourse of Tibetanness, a 
notion well captured in Foucault's notion of subjection/subjectification. Foucault's 
work offers three modes in which humans are made subjects. The first is through 
`dividing practices' in which `the subject is objectified by a division either within 
himself (sic) or from others' and human beings are given both a personal and a social 
identity (Foucault 1984: 8). Second is the `scientific classification' arising from the 
modes of inquiry, which then try to give themselves the status of sciences. These two 
are more about domination, top-down flow, and social control. This is different from 
the third mode of 'subjectification', which is based on mediation of external authority 
with active processes of self-formation. It concerns the `way a human being turns him 
- or herself into a subject' (Ibid.: 11). 13 
Foucault proposes and analyses the double-sided character of 
subjection/subjectification - the subject is produced within the discourse and is thus 
subjected (Hall 1996: 16). For instance, the discourse of sexuality produces identity 
categories such as `straight' and `gay'; at the same time, the processes of exclusion 
and inclusion impose restrictions on those identifying with these categories. All 
discourses construct subject positions from which they make sense. The subject cannot 
be outside discourse because it must be subjected to discourse and also exists within 
the knowledge (which is produced by discourse), the discursive formation of a 
particular period and culture. This view has tremendous implications for the issue of 
representation. It shows how representation is not only a discourse that constructs an 
object and subject of physical or imaginary gaze, but is also constitutive of another 
subject, one who is imagining and remembering, that is, one who is representing (the 
representer). Thus the representer as well as the represented are both implied within 
discourses of representation. ' 4 
13 Later works of Foucault deal with this (see for example, 1990a, 1990b, 1992). 
14 Using a discursive approach, cultural theorists like Hall (1997b) have critically examined the 
play of forces within representations of groups characterised as the Other by the West. Rather 
than take the West as a pre-existing natural entity, it has been seen as an historical construct. 
`The West', as a concept, has itself functioned as a system of representation, provided a model 
of comparison and categorisation, and thus acted as a criterion of evaluation. The idea of `the 
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It is important for my analysis to underline the difference between the semiotic and 
discursive approaches (for a further elaboration, see Hall 1997a). The semiotic 
approach is concerned with the how of representation, with the internal articulation 
and production of meaning. This is the poetics of representation. The discursive 
approach is concerned with the production of social knowledge, with the question of 
institutional power, with the effects and consequences of representation. This is the 
politics of representation. Chapter 4, Sand 7 will discuss both the poetics and the 
politics of Western representations of Tibet (Exotica Tibet) The semiotic approach 
entails examining how Tibet is imagined within Western culture by looking at 
literature (both fiction and non-fiction), films, travel accounts, etc. For instance, it 
shows how in recent years Tibet is represented as a mystical, peaceful, paradisal land 
and lay bare the common rhetorical tropes used to produce an exoticised image of 
Tibet, the Exotica Tibet. On the other hand, an examination of the politics of 
representation informed by a discursive approach places expositions on Tibet in the 
context of power, neo-colonialism, (trans)nationalism, and Orientalism. It also focuses 
on the implications of such exercises in image making on those who are subjected to it 
- the Tibetans. 15 Thus, a discursive approach emphasises the historical specificity of a 
particular form or regime of representation. 
The adoption of a discursive approach helps us to see representation 16 and identity as 
texts that can be read and misread in several different ways. As texts, their 
West' did not reflect an already-established Western society; rather, it was essential to the very 
formation of that society. Hall, for instance, examines the ways in which `the Rest' symbolised 
difference and played a central part in the constitution of `the West' as an identity, and makes a 
persuasive argument for considering modernity as the story of `the West and the Rest' (1992). 
15 This is not to say that Westerners are untouched by these representations. The West's self- 
definition is often affirmed and/or questioned through such representations. This is particularly 
relevant here since a positive exoticisation of Tibet has as its corollary the idea of the 
materialist West as unhappy, decadent, and in need of help to regenerate. Though this aspect 
will be highlighted in various places, in the thesis the emphasis is mainly on the impact of the 
representation on the Tibetans. 
16 While discussing representation, Spivak makes a distinction between Vertretung and 
Darstellung. The former she defines as `stepping in someone's place; to tread in someone's 
shoes'. Representation in this sense is `political representation' or a speaking for the needs and 
desires of somebody or something. Darstellung on the other hand is representation as re- 
presentation, `placing there'. Representing in this sense is thus `proxy and portrait'. However, 
recognising the complexity of issue, she warns us to keep in mind the complicity between 
`speaking for' and `portraying' (Spivak 1996: 6). This is similar to Hanna Pitkin's discussion 
of vertreten and darstellen where the former has received the dominant share in political 
discourse. She points out that within political theory darstellen is not absent: both 
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understanding necessitates unprivileging authorial intention, interpretation, 
contextualisation, politicisation, and historicisation. Borrowing from Paul Ricoeur, 
James Clifford reveals the crucial process of textualisation involved in representation: 
`Textualisation is the process through which unwritten behaviour, speech, beliefs, oral 
tradition, and ritual come to be marked as corpus, a potentially meaningful ensemble 
separated out from an immediate discursive or performative situation' (1986: 38). The 
constitutive relation of identity and difference lies at the core of representation. The 
issue of the representation of the non-Western peoples by the West occupies a central 
position in postcolonial theory. 
3C. Postcolonialism and representation 
The enterprise of postcolonial theory has unpacked the whole notion of their being a 
neutral academic expertise and highlighted how Western knowledge and 
representations of the non-Western world are neither innocent nor based on some 
`reality', but implicated in the West's will to power, and its imperial adventures. The 
image of a scientific, apolitical, disinterested, knowledge-seeking `gentleman' braving 
all odds to study non-Western cultures has been shattered beyond repair. '? 
Postcolonialism `bears witness to the unequal and uneven forces of cultural 
representation involved in the contest for political and social within the modern world 
order' (Bhabha 1994: 171). 
Various forms of representing the non-West - visual (films, television, photographs, 
paintings, advertisements, and so on) as well as textual (such as fiction, travelogue, 
journalism, ethnography, and anthropology) - were and still are closely linked to the 
production of imperial as well as neocolonial encounters. Asymmetry of productive 
power is a common trait shared by these encounters. As pointed out earlier, it is not 
descriptive/microcosmic and symbolic representation derive from it. For a detailed discussion, 
see Pitkin 1967. 
17 Colin Mackenzie, the first surveyor general of Madras in India, was clear about his 
necessary complicity in the brute realities of colonial power. He conflated the role of the 
soldier and the scientist and wrote: 
That science may derive assistance, and knowledge be diffused, in the leisure 
moments of [military] camps and voyages, is no new discovery; but ... 
I am also 
desirous of proving that, in the vacant moments of an Indian sojourn and campaign in 
particular... such collected observations may be found useful, at least in directing the 
observation of those more highly gifted to matters of utility, if not to record facts of 
important to philosophy and science (quoted in Dirks 2001: 84). 
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only the represented (here the colonised, the third world, the South) who are subjects 
of and subjected to the process; even the representer (the coloniser, the first world, the 
West) is constructed by representational practices. This in no way implies similar 
experiences for the coloniser and the colonised (the representer and the represented). It 
only indicates that though everyone is subjected to representational practices, the 
impact differs according to the existing power relations. To illustrate this point, while 
both the West and Tibetans are subjects of Exotica Tibet, and the latter are not mere 
victims but exercise their agency through creative negotiations, the West does not 
have to construct its identity according to the perception of Tibetans. Westerners 
exoticise Tibet, and in turn, Tibetans exoticise the West. But while Western 
exoticisation has a productive impact on Tibetan identity discourse, the same cannot 
be said of Tibetan exoticisation. This reflects the asymmetry in their power relations. 
Since representation inevitably involves interpretation, it is also important to note who 
may be doing the interpreting. There is a constant need to question representations in 
popular as well as academic discourses, even while acknowledging that their boundary 
is problematic. This questioning is particularly important when the representation of 
the subaltern, the disadvantaged, is involved. As Ella Shohat argues (1995), not only 
do the marginalised groups have little power over representation, the representations 
of them are both flawed (based on selective and simplified generalisations) and few in 
number. While negative images are seen as only part of the `natural diversity' of 
dominant groups, particular images (often, but not always, negative) of the 
dispossessed tend to be taken, especially by mass media, as allegorical. A white 
person who commits a crime is seen as a criminal, while a black person who commits 
the same crime is seen as black as well as criminal, a black individual criminal is seen 
as allegorical of a criminalised black community. Since representations of the 
marginalised are relatively few, those available tend to be seen as representative, as 
typical, sometimes not only of members of a particular minority group, but of all 
minorities in general. It is assumed that any subaltern can stand in for any other 
subaltern. This collapsing of the image of the subaltern reflects not only ignorance but 
also a lack of respect for the diversity within marginalised communities. 
`Representation of an underrepresented group is necessarily within the hermeneutics 
of domination, overcharged with allegorical significance' (Shohat 1995: 170). 
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The point about the marginalised is valid for minorities within states as well as for the 
marginalised beyond. Motifs of inscrutable Orientals, violent Arabs, fanatic 
Muslims, 18 spiritual Tibetans, hungry Africans, mob-driven third world democracies, 
and so on, are commonly deployed in the Western media to describe non-Western 
Others. Shohat also suggests that representations in one sphere - the sphere of popular 
culture - affects the other spheres of representation, particularly the political one: `The 
denial of aesthetic representation to the subaltern has historically formed a corollary to 
the literal denial of economic, legal, and political representation. The struggle to 
"speak for oneself' cannot be separated from a history of being spoken for, from the 
struggle to speak and be heard' (1995: 173). To cite a recent example, the projection 
by Western governments and Western media of Afghani women living under the 
Taleban as faceless (literally, due to compulsory veiling, and metaphorically) and 
nameless victims go hand in hand with the failure to consider them as political actors. 
Movements like RAWA (Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan) 
that challenge the image of passive, mute women waiting for saviours from the West 
are usually not considered in political negotiations for a `post-Taleban' government. 
Cultural representations of veiled women as nameless, faceless, and powerless are 
used as justification for their further political marginalisation. 
The relation between representation and reality colours the discussions of 
representation in postcolonial studies. The word re(-)presentation contains the idea of 
presence as well as absence. It means making present something that is nevertheless 
literally absent. This paradox lies at the centre of any robust treatment of 
representation. Said, in his analysis of textual representations of the Orient, 
emphasises that representations can never be exactly realistic: 
In any instance of at least written language, there is no such thing as a delivered 
presence, but a re-presence, or a representation. The value, efficacy, strength, apparent 
veracity of a written statement about the Orient therefore relies very little, and cannot 
instrumentally depend, on the Orient as such. On the contrary, the written statement is 
a presence to the reader by virtue of its having excluded, displaced, made 
supererogatory any such real thing as `the Orient' ... 
(T)hat Orientalism makes sense 
at all depends more on the West than on the Orient, and this sense is directly indebted 
to various Western techniques of representation that make the Orient visible, clear, 
`there' in the discourse about it (1978: 21-22). 
18 This image as been reinforced by media especially since the terrorist attacks in the US on 
September 11 2001. A barrage of pictures from various parts of the so-called Islamic world is 
used to reinforce the notion of Islamic fundamentalism. 
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The negotiation between representation and reality is continuous and unresolvable. 
Therefore, the pursuit of a `true representation' is a non-starter. The task should be for 
`better' contextualised representations. 
Thus, it is clear that representations affect the ways in which actual individuals and 
groups are perceived. Representations may not reflect reality, but they do have `real 
effects' on the lives of people. For instance, the motif of violent Arabs and radical 
Islam ensures that the Palestinian resistance (even when unarmed) generates more 
alarm than sympathy in the West. The notion of representation as a harmless likeness 
should therefore be thrown away in the dustbin of history. 
The issue of representation lies at the very core of colonial, and by extension 
neocolonial, discourses. Various modes of representation have aided and abetted 
forms of domination by making them acceptable and coherent within the dominant 
ethos that constructed selves and exotic others. Even when Orientalist and kindred 
discourses were not aggressive, through exoticism or primitivism, they nevertheless 
became legislative, by privileging certain identities and stigmatising others as 
inauthentic (Thomas 1994: 26). Given the usual esteem within which the Self is 
constituted, even the (positive) exoticising of the Other almost invariably amounts to 
the constitution of that Other as a less-than-equal subject. This can be seen in the case 
of Tibetans who have been represented in excessively positive terms, especially in 
recent years. Instead of leading to greater appreciation of their agency, their identity is 
dehistoricised and depoliticised in a victimisation paradigm - as we shall see in 
chapters 6 and 7, Tibetans are seen mainly as victims, either of Chinese brutality or of 
Western exoticisation. 
Once again it should be emphasised that an understanding of the way the non-Western 
people were represented within the colonial and Orientalist discourse can help in 
understanding that the very same processes continue in the contemporary world. The 
representations of the non-West within Western discourses - both academic and 
popular - are still enmeshed in asymmetrical power relations. 
A conscious `desire to 
anthropologize the West' (Rabinow quoted in Maanen 1995: 15) and efforts at 
`provincializing Europe' (Chakrabarty 2000) do not deny the dominance of Western 
ideas and practices at the global level. They strive to reveal the tremendous power 
invested in the maintenance of this dominance and to clear a space for counter- 
57 
hegemonic ideas and practices. While focusing on hegemony, we must not ignore 
resistance to it. 19 I emphasise this in detail in the next section when I look at the merits 
and weaknesses of the Orientalism critique put forward by Said and argue for its 
critical appropriation. 
3D. Exotica Tibet as an Orientalist construct 
Regimes of truth and knowledge about the non-West are not products of neutral 
academic and other enquiry but accomplices in the West's will to power. Even though 
earlier anti-imperialist writing sometimes recognised this, it was Edward Said's 
Orientalism that single-handedly jolted the disciplines concerned with knowledge 
production about the West's Other. Publication of the book in 1978 `inaugurated the 
postcolonial field', says Homi Bhabha (Moore-Gilbert et al. 1997: 21-22), while 
Spivak considers it as a `source book' through which `marginality' itself has acquired 
the status of a discipline in the Anglo-American academy (Spivak 1993: 56). But the 
best comment on the work came from Partha Chatterjee: `For me, child of a successful 
anti-colonial struggle, Orientalism was a book which talked of things I felt I had 
known all along but had never found the language to formulate with clarity' (1993: 
19 `Self representation' may not be a complete possibility and is not always liberating. Yet it is 
still an important goal within the postcolonial world. This does not entail a complete halt to 
representations of the Other but calls for extreme caution, reflexivity, and recognition of the 
historical baggage involved. This issue is particularly important in anthropology and 
ethnography, which are in the business of producing knowledge mostly about other cultures. 
Postcolonial theoretical insights are particularly important here as we are witnessing more self- 
conscious endeavours and recognition of complicity with dominant political regimes (including 
imperialism) leading to more radical conception of others (see Bond and Gilliam 1994; 
Clifford 1986; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Fabian 1990; Maanen 1995). 
In `Can the Subaltern Speak', Spivak emphasises the difficulty (rather `impossibility' in one 
sense) of representation by subaltern individuals (1988). Rey Chow further explains this point 
by arguing that there is an `essential untranslatability from the subaltern discourse to 
imperialist discourse' (1993: 35). Indeed, increased self-representation or the inclusion of more 
individuals from marginalised groups will not necessarily alter the structural or institutional 
barriers that prevent equal participation for all in representation, yet it is far better than 
maintaining the status quo. We need to challenge representations of the status quo and the 
ideological work they do and present counter-hegemonic alternatives if possible. As Linda 
Hutcheon puts it: `Representation cannot be avoided, but it can be studied to show how it 
legitimates certain kinds of knowledge and, therefore, certain kinds of power' (1988: 230). 
Efforts will continue to be made to challenge the dominant force of representation for this force 
is not completely pervasive, and subversions are possible. Representation being a discursive 
practice, meaning can never be permanently fixed and hence changes and subversions are 
always possible. Where there is power, there is always resistance - as Foucault says, `there are 
no relations of power without resistances' (1980: 142). The Foucauldian conceptualisation of 
power offers hope that even in most extreme exploitation and deprivation, victims are never 
passive. 
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194). Though drawing heavily on Said's work, I am not oblivious to a number of 
problems with his thesis. 
Said's Orientalism (1978) attacked a number of cherished notions of the post- 
enlightenment Western world. Since then, Orientalism has lost the status of a 
sympathetic concept -a notion that it was a product of scholarly admiration for 
diverse and exotic cultures - and has come to be considered as the literary means of 
creating a stereotypical and mythic `East' through which European rule could be more 
easily asserted (MacKenzie 1995: xii). It inaugurated a serious questioning of the 
complicity of knowledge and culture with power and empire. My treatment of Exotica 
Tibet - the poetics and politics of Western representations of Tibet - subscribes to the 
Said-inspired Orientalism critique. 
Although some of the components of Said's arguments may have been formulated 
earlier, a great deal of power derives from his interdisciplinarity, his ability to bring 
previously disparate elements into what Walter Benjamin called a `constellation', a 
new and significant disposition of materials which open up the possibility for altered 
historical understanding (in Williams and Chrisman 1993: 128). Using the 
methodological techniques of strategic location and strategic formation, Said calls 
into question the underlying assumptions that form the foundation of Orientalist 
thinking. While strategic location is `a way of describing the author's position in a text 
with regard to the Oriental material he (sic) writes about', strategic formation is `the 
way in which groups of texts, types of texts, even textual genres, acquire mass, 
density, and referential power among themselves and thereafter in the culture at large' 
(Said 1978: 20). He elaborates strategic formation further: 
None of this takes place in the abstract. Every writer on the Orient (and this is true 
even of Homer) assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous knowledge of the 
Orient, to which he refers and on which he relies. Additionally, each work on the 
Orient affiliates itself with other works, with audiences, with institutions, with the 
Orient itself (Ibid. ). 
This device of strategic formation is very applicable in the case of Tibet too. Even the 
early modern Western travellers to Tibet (mostly missionaries) drew upon an 
`archive'20 of knowledge gathered in the form of `traveller's tale', legends, myths, and 
rumours. 
20 The role of an archive in representation would be dealt with in detail in the next chapter. 
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Orientalism, among other things, is a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, 
vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even bureaucracies and colonial styles. 
The Tibetan variant of Orientalism was directly connected to British imperial interests 
in India and China. `Experts' on Tibet were mostly in the direct service of the British 
Indian bureaucracy. Military expeditions like the British invasion of Tibet in 1903-04 
included botanists, bird collectors, cartographers, zoologists, and the like. British 
political interests not only dictated the production of knowledge about Tibet, but also 
its dissemination. Prestigious bodies like the Royal Geographical Society and 
newspapers like The Times colluded with political institutions in determining what 
counted as valid knowledge and what did not through selective emphasis and 
censorship (McKay 2001: 80-2). 
Orientalism is also a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction between `the Orient' and `the Occident'. It is a Western practice of 
dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient. In this sense, therefore, 
the Orient is an integral part of European material civilisation and culture (Said 1978: 
2-3). This has little to do with the corporeality of `the Orientals': it is true of negative, 
positive, as well as ambiguous depictions. As I discuss in more detail in chapter 5, this 
point can be illustrated through the theosophical movement and the myth of Shangri- 
la. Madame Helena Blavatsky and her theosophical movement's Tibetan `mahatmas' - 
the source of ancient occultic and mystical secrets of the universe, which outlined the 
future of human history - had nothing to do with the Tibetan people. Even her claim 
of having travelled to Tibet is highly dubious and `the Orientals' she met were Indians. 
Similarly, James Hilton's Shangri-la - the hidden valley in Lost horizon (1933), a 
secret repository of ancient Eastern wisdom and Western classical achievements - had 
Europeans as the elite and Tibetans as the subaltern. Though the myth of Shangri-la 
came to be associated with Tibet, it was a placeless utopia using Tibet and Tibetans 
merely as a backdrop for the adventures of Westerners. Tibet as a Shangri-la 
performed the role of a service society at a psychic level, existing for the West's self- 
gratification and self-criticism. 
As Said argues, Orientalism defines the West: the Occident as a category cannot exist 
without the Orient. Inversely, the Orient only exists from a Western vantage point. 
The relation between the two is frequently expressed in loaded terms: `The Orient is 
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irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike, "different"; thus the European is rational. 
virtuous, mature, "normal"' (1978: 40). 
`Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because the 
Orient was weaker than the West, which elided the Orient's difference with its 
weakness' (Ibid.: 204). The very presence of a `field' such as Orientalism, with no 
corresponding equivalent in the Orient itself suggests the relative strength of the actors 
concerned. The situation has not changed significantly even at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century. For instance, Europeans and Americans are experts on all areas 
of the world. But non-Westerners can at best hope to be `native' informers or experts 
in their own region. For a crisis in Afghanistan, we come across several Western as 
well as non-Western experts (the latter would invariably be from the region). But for 
the crisis in Northern Ireland, one hardly finds a non-European, non-American 
commentator. Let me clarify this through my personal experience. The following 
scenario is very typical of my experience in public gatherings like conferences. 
`So, what is your research on? T 
'Western cultural representations of Tibet and its relevance in world politics'. 
`Very interesting. Are you a Tibetan? T 
'No. I am an Indian'. 
`Are you then a Buddhist? T 
'No. I am an atheist'. 
Quizzical and perplexed expressions greet me. These seemingly innocent questions are 
power laden, something that is felt experientially by the recipient (in this case, me). 
These may apparently be based on ignorance, but they reflect unspoken assumptions 
about who has the legitimacy to study Western practices and critique them. It is 
unlikely that any Western person would have been asked these questions, especially 
the second one. In the disciplines studying political and cultural communities, it is 
common and acceptable for Western persons to study anyone, including both Western 
and non-Western societies. But a non-Western-looking person with expertise (or 
working toward an expertise) in Western practices is considered something out of the 
ordinary. If this is the case in 2001, it comes as no surprise that during the heyday of 
Orientalism (the nineteenth and early twentieth century), `the Orientals' were the 
objects of the gaze, of scholarship, and of expertise. They could gaze back at the West, 
but only in awe, envy, hatred, or anger. This gaze did not have the backing of the 
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enormous discursive and institutional structures that lay behind the gaze of an 
Orientalist. 
Said makes a distinction between manifest and latent Orientalism (1978: 201-26). 
Latent Orientalism is an unconscious certainty about what the Orient is. Discussing the 
works of nineteenth century European writers, he argues that latent Orientalism is 
characterised by `unanimity, stability, and durability' as `[e]very one of them [the 
writers] kept intact the separateness of the Orient, its eccentricity, its backwardness. its 
silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability' (Ibid.: 206). The 
Orient's progress and value are judged in terms of, and in comparison to, the West, so 
it is always the Other, the conquerable, and the inferior. Manifest Orientalism is what 
is spoken and acted upon - it is at this level that differences can be found. It includes 
information and changes in knowledge about the Orient as well as policy decisions 
founded in Orientalist thinking. It is the expression in words and actions of latent 
Orientalism. 
The idea of knowledge as power is present throughout Said's critique. By knowing the 
Orient, the West came to control it. The Orient became the studied, the seen, the 
observed, the object; Orientalist scholars were the students, the seers, the observers, 
and the subject. The Orient was passive; the West was active. Orientalism thus became 
a created body of theory and practice with material investment. It became and still is 
in the minds of many `a living tableau of queerness' (Ibid.: 103). Said further argues 
how media as well as policy makers in the USA still work within an Orientalist frame 
of mind and so the threat of Orientalism is as real today for non-Western people as it 
was in the colonial era. 21 A rejection of Orientalism entails a rejection of biological 
generalisations, cultural essentialisms, and racial and religious prejudices. Rejection of 
Orientalist thinking does not signify a denial of the differences between the West and 
the Orient, but rather an evaluation of such differences in a more critical fashion. It 
involves questioning the politics that fuels this exercise in differentiation and the 
meanings attached to the differences. It questions the very categories of the 
Occident/West and the Orient. 
21 For his scathing criticism of Western media depiction of Islam, see Said 1997 
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Adoption of an Orientalist critique does not imply taking on board all of Said's 
arguments. There are several problems, which caution against an unquestioning 
appropriation of the Saidian thesis. Interrogating Exotica Tibet then requires a critical 
appropriation of his critique. This makes it important for me to highlight some of his 
problematic arguments and assumptions22 and avoid replicating the same in my 
interrogation. A first reading of the book may leave one overwhelmingly impressed 
with Said's ability to expose the enterprise of Western knowledge of the East 
(Orientalism) as something inextricably linked with power. It was only after 
considerable reflection that I came across some significant lacuna. 
The first problem I had was with the scope of the book. Students of history come 
across many books which claim in the space of a few hundred pages to write the entire 
`History of Asia', `History of Europe', and even the `History of the World'. Such 
enterprises, replete with fantastic and sweeping generalisations, make one sceptical of 
any work claiming to study a phenomenon that has endured for almost two millennia. 
When Said writes that Orientalism characterises Western thinking about the East for 
such a long period of time, one is left to wonder why it persisted for so long. If he had 
confined his theses to the period since the expansion of European colonialism and 
imperialism, it would perhaps have been more acceptable. While fantastic notions 
about the foreign lands circulated within what came to be identified as the West since 
ancient times, the nexus between fantasy, knowledge production and political 
dominance -a crucial ingredient of Orientalism - is a product of modern times. 
Writing in exaggerated, exotic i sed/di sparaging terms about a different/foreign culture 
was not something confined to Western travellers and scholars only. This has been 
ignored by Said. For instance, Chinese, Arab, French, and British travellers all wrote 
in a similar way about India exoticising and debasing in different periods of time. 
What makes the British writings on India different from the others is the fact that 
British travel and scholarly accounts belong to a period when British imperialism was 
emerging in India. It is the constitutive relation with the process of imperialism that 
makes Orientalism a significant political force. Similarly, negative images of Tibetans 
were common in Chinese imperial and popular discourses even before the impact of 
22 For a sample of critiques ranging from sympathetic ones to those rejecting his thesis, see 
Ahmad 1992; Mani and Frankenberg 1985; Moore-Gilbert et al. 1997; Porter 1982; Sandar 
1999; Sprinker 1992. 
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Europeans. British officials, including Colonel Francis Younghusband, who led the 
Lhasa Mission of 1903-04, allude to Chinese contempt for `barbaric' Tibetans. In 
contemporary times, within Tibet, Chinese representations of Tibetans have more 
salience than Western representations, as it is China that has political control. Yet at 
the same time, nineteenth and early twentieth century Western representations are still 
important as they have been appropriated by the Chinese. The notion of Tibetan 
backwardness has been reinforced in official and popular Chinese discourses through a 
mix of traditional ethnocentrism with Western-inspired evolutionism (human 
communities as occupying different stages in progress toward civilisation), its 
civilising mission, its theory of development, and the teleology inherent in the Marxist 
notion of mode of production (see Heberer 2001; Kolas 1998; Sautman and Hairong 
2000; Wei Jingsheng 1998). Therefore while we may look at Exotica Tibet essentially 
as a Western construct, we must recognise that it competes with and complements the 
Chinese representations of Tibet. Chinese political control over Tibet means that its 
representations directly affect the lives of more Tibetans than does Exotica Tibet. 
However, an analysis of Exotica Tibet is still important, not only because of its 
overwhelming influence in the diaspora, but also because the current Chinese 
representations heavily draw upon the European colonialist and Orientalist repertoire 
of images, especially the negative ones. 
Said's Orientalism critique, also contains a major contradiction in the relationship 
between imperialism and Orientalism, and between power and knowledge. If 
Orientalism preceded the material practices and politics of imperialism, how did it 
become complicit with the latter? Was it incorporated and hence misused as the 
scholarly arm of the imperial process, which was in turn determined by dynamics of 
materialist production? Or was the nineteenth century incarnation of Orientalism a 
product of imperialism, as Said seems to imply in some places? Though these 
questions are important, power and knowledge relate to each other at several different 
levels and therefore instead of trying to search for some direct causal relation, we must 
emphasise complexity. 
Said recognises changes within the Orientalist discourse but underplays them in a way 
that leaves the book open to criticisms of essentialising and homogenising diverse 
historical phenomena as the phenomenon of Orientalism. That is, while providing a 
critique of the essentialisms inherent in the Orientalist discourse, Said himself falls 
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prey to it. Lisa Lowe (1991), in her critical study of French and British Orientalisms, 
challenges the assumption that Orientalism monolithically constructs the Orient as the 
Other of the Occident. On the one hand, Orientalism consists of an uneven matrix of 
Orientalist situations across different cultural and historical sites, and on the other, 
each of these Orientalisms is internally complex and unstable (Ibid.: 5). Orientalism is 
thus characterised as much by difference as by sameness. As my study of Exotica 
Tibet will show, Tibet as a site of Orientalist desires, representations, and practices, 
had its own peculiarities. Some of these include the overwhelming attention to and 
importance of religion; geographical and imaginative location at the edge of British 
empire; closed, mystical place resisting opening up (for most part of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries); celibate monks as the main custodian of culture (unlike 
women as in most other societies); the figure of the Grand Lama, the `god-king', and 
so on. Representations differed depending on the historical period in question, 
(British) imperial needs, and the personality, nationality, gender, and occupation of the 
representer. Tibet presented itself as a `true complexio oppositorum, a rich complexity 
of contradictions and oppositions' (Bishop 1989: 63). 23 Exotica Tibet itself is a 
convenient label for diverse and often contradictory Western representations of Tibet. 
It should therefore be considered a complex discursive construct characterised by the 
play of consistency, contradiction, and possibility. 
Another important issue that did not receive adequate attention from Said is the 
element of Occidentalism that underpinned Orientalism, as well as resistances to it. 
Often Orientalists started with a specific self-image, with particular assumptions about 
the Occident, the West, an idea that was in turn constructed by Orientalism. Those 
who characterised the West positively as the sole possessor of rationality and scientific 
temper (most colonialists and adventurers) held a pejorative view of Tibet for lacking 
the same, and thus affirmed the West's superiority. However, for those who 
considered the very lack of these characteristics in Tibetans to be positive and as 
providing space for mysticism (like the theosophists), it was the West that was 
degenerate and materialist. The same representations of Tibet were evaluated 
differently by different individuals and groups, depending on their self-image, their 
image of the West, and their interests. Tibet's spirituality defined the West's 
materialism; its dream-like nature defined the West's corporeality; its peripheral 
23 He borrows this term for `a complex mix of opposites' from Carl Gustav Jung (Bishop 
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location defined the West's centrality. This circular relation between Occidentalism 
and Orientalism continues even today, albeit in more sophisticated forms, so that the 
non-Western world is often seen as being what West is not. Poverty, lack of 
democracy, endemic violence is `out there' in the third world; the West is prosperous, 
democratic, and peaceful. While Occidentalism has been a characteristic of Western 
knowledge enterprises like anthropology (see Carrier 1995), there is no denying the 
fact that it has and is also practised by non-Westerners too, often with a vengeance. 
The West is often perceived as an undifferentiated unit by non-Westerners and 
invested with desires of all kind, though, as noted above, this has significantly less 
impact on the represented. 24. 
Said has been able to incorporate diverse scholarly writing over a long period of time 
within the framework of Orientalism through the use of his categories of latent and 
manifest Orientalisms. While the differences between individual accounts can be 
accounted for as manifest Orientalism, there is an underlying latent Orientalism, which 
makes them a part of an archive, an archive that is a partner in the West's subjugation 
of the East. Now, while Said argues how this very understanding/constitution of the 
East/West dichotomy is problematic and an essential trope of Orientalism project, he 
repeats the same binary logic in his formulation of latent and manifest Orientalisms. 25 
Orientalism certainly read the colonised as passive, feminine, irrational, and hence 
without agency in history. But the representations were full of ambiguity. Said 
recognises some contradictions within Orientalism, but does not pay adequate 
attention to them. His concentration on colonial discourse and the canonical texts 
within it leads him to ignore resistance literature and orature in the colonies as well as 
texts critical of Orientalism within the West. 26 
1999) 
24 For an interesting take on the deployment of specific images of the West inside China (both 
by the government and the dissidents), see Chen 1995. 
25 These contradictions are largely due to his attempt at synthesising Foucault's discourse 
theory approach with the Gramscian theory of hegemony. There is a `persistent hermeneutical 
short-circuit at the very centre of his thesis' as he fails to harmonise these distinct methods of 
cultural analysis, each with its own distinct epistemology, social values, and political 
assumptions (Clifford 1986: 260). Samuel Weber puts the theoretical problems in Orientalism 
succinctly: `a social and historical critique which does not consider the conflictual structure of 
its own discursive operations will only reproduce the constraints it is seeking to displace' 
(quoted in Young 1990: 129). 
26 He pays attention to this in Culture and Imperialism (Said 1994) where he points out that 
`[n]ever was it the case that the imperial encounter pitted an active Western intruder against a 
66 
Said recognises that to some extent the nature of colonial Orientalist discourse is 
gendered as a largely male institutional practice with a masculinist style. However his 
treatment of gender is inadequate. Orientalism was not only `male' in terms of 
institutional practice, but also operated with particularised notions of masculinity and 
femininity. Women were the producers of Orientalist discourse as much as the 
subjects of it. European women played a significant part in the reproduction of 
imperialism. The role was not, however, the exact replica of that of their male 
counterparts (see McClintock 1995; for a discussion of gender and imperialism, see 
Midgley 1998; Sharpe 1992). As Reina Lewis argues, gendered access to the 
positionalities of imperial discourse produced a gaze upon the Orient and the 
Orientalised Other that registered difference less pejoratively and less absolutely than 
was implied by Said's original formulation (1996: 4). Apart from gender, Said also 
ignored the question of sexuality in the Orientalist enterprise. A growing body of 
recent work such as Sara Suleri's Rhetoric of English India (1992) suggest that Said's 
unconscious masculinism is of a narrowly heterosexist kind. 
Exotica Tibet too is gendered, sometimes implicitly, at other times, quite explicitly. 
This shall be discussed in detail in the next chapter under `eroticisation' as a 
representational strategy. Here I would only like to make some preliminary points. 
Sociologically, most of the travellers to Tibet were men operating with specific 
notions of masculinity. As Said points out, in the writings of these travellers and 
Western novelists, 
women are usually the creatures of a male power-fantasy. They express unlimited 
sensuality, they are more or less stupid, and above all they are willing. . . The male 
conception of the world, in its effect upon the practicing Orientalist, tends to be static, 
frozen, fixed eternally. The very possibility of development, transformation, human 
movement - in the deepest sense of the word - is denied the Orient and the Oriental. 
As a known and ultimately an immobilized or unproductive quality, they come to be 
identified with a bad sort of eternality: hence, when the Orient is being approved, such 
phrases as `the wisdom of the East' (1978: 207-8). 
British officials explicitly discouraged female travellers who were seen as a threat to 
British prestige. Basil Gould, the political agent in Sikkim and later the head of 1936 
Lhasa Mission, decreed that women were not permitted to travel in Tibet without a 
male escort (McKay 1997: 172-3). The accounts of the few women travellers to Tibet 
supine or inert non-Western native; there was always some form of active resistance, and in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, the resistance finally won out' (xii). 
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differ from their male counterparts, showing a concern for personalities rather than 
using Tibet for action adventures or imperial issues (Bishop 2001). The sexualised 
metaphor of the veil was widely prevalent in describing Tibet as a closed entity 
resisting `opening up'. The metaphor was in common currency particularly during the 
Younghusband mission (1903-04). Edmund Candler (1905), a Daily Mail 
correspondent, wrote his account of the invasion as the `unveiling of Lhasa', while 
Lord Curzon wrote to the Norwegian explorer Sven Hedin regretting that the mission 
`destroyed the virginity of the bride to whom you aspired' (McKay 1997: 199). The 
`loss of virginity' did not end the mystique of Tibet/Lhasa as a `thick veil' descended 
immediately after the expedition (Peter Fleming's introduction to Harrer 1956: 7). The 
metaphor has entered the vocabulary of the Chinese state and intellectuals too. One of 
its `white papers' opens with the line `Once regarded as a mysterious region, Tibet has 
long thrown off its veil to reveal itself to the world' (Information Office 1992). 
Discussing the Western representations of Tibet as a `myth of the Western world', 
Wang Lixiong writes, `Tibet is like a veil that has not yet been fully lifted to the West, 
with the process of exploring the mysticism and idealism in the Western mind about 
China and other Oriental countries never having been finished' (1999). 
One can hardly disagree with Michael Sprinker's assessment of Said's Orientalism 
critique: `Specialists in these fields have often been critical of his interventions, but 
they have not on the whole been able to ignore or dismiss him out of hand' (1992: 2). 
The boundaries drawn by colonial and neo-colonial Western hegemony have been 
repeatedly dissolved by the debate that was inaugurated by Orientalism. It has led the 
critics of Orientalism (that is, those who agree with the thesis of Orientalism in some 
way or the other) to dislocate the centrality of the West often through `catachrestic 
appropriation of Western theory derived from cross-hatching of histories of 
knowledge and criticism' (Prakash 1995a: 206). 
Within Tibetan studies, reception of Orientalism has been mixed. While scholars such 
as Peter Bishop (1989,1997, and 1998), Donald Lopez (1998), Toni Huber (2001) and 
Heather Stoddard (2001) have drawn from Said's thesis, others have questioned its 
applicability in the Tibetan situation (see for instance, McKay 2001, Penderson 2001, 
Sperling 2001). The case for what can be termed `Tibetan exceptionalism' (the non- 
relevance of the Orientalism critique in the study of Exotica Tibet) is based on a 
number of factors - no European colonisation of Tibet, lack of internal consistency in 
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Western conceptions, willing participation of the Tibetans, and paternal rather than 
coercive power relationship between the British and the Tibetans. It is my contention 
that those who argue against the deployment of the Orientalist critique for 
interrogating Western representations of Tibet misunderstand Orientalism. Several 
examples are perhaps telling -I illustrate with arguments of Alex McKay (2001), Poul 
Penderson (2001) and Elliot Sperling (2001). 
Drawing upon Lionel Caplan's notion of the `pastoral mode' (discursive practice in 
which subordinate peoples in the imperial process are represented in approving terms), 
McKay argues that while the works of British officials concerned with Tibet (the 
`Tibet cadre') maintain a paternal perspective, they are not `primarily concerned with 
power in the sense usually associated with "Orientalism"'; instead of exoticisation of 
subjects, the relationship was based on mutual respect (2001: 84). This contention fails 
to appreciate the Foucauldian notion of power - Orientalism is not only about 
repressive power relations, but also productive ones. Paternalism is as much a part of 
imperialism and Orientalism as brute force. In any case, `the ideology of empire was 
hardly ever a brute jingoism, rather, it made subtle use of reason, and recruited science 
and history to serve its ends' (Kabbani 1986: 6). 
The Orientalist critique does not contend only with the negation of `the Orientals' but 
also with their idealisation and with the construction of the very category of `the 
Oriental'. While we can agree with Penderson that `the relationship between the East 
and the West was (and is) much more complex and politically ambiguous than Said 
suggests... [and that scholars] ... 
have paid too little attention to the way Orientals have 
appropriated the Orientalist discourse', the contention that `the theosophists provide a 
strong case against Edward Said's simplistic argument against Orientalism as a 
Western repressive mode of representation' (2001: 165) is hard to swallow. The 
theosophist notion of Tibet as an abode of benevolent brotherhood of mahatmas (wise 
men) was very much a part of imperialism and Orientalism. It was imperialism that 
gave theosophists the `permission' to conjure up a secret brotherhood in the unknown 
terrain of Tibet, at the edge of British India. Active participation of `the Orientals' 
themselves in the theosophist movement and similar counter-cultural movements 
(apparently based on recognition of the spirituality of the East) does not question 
Orientalism; rather, it emphasises the imaginative grip of Orientalism on everyone 
involved, even the represented. 
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In a similar vein, Sperling announces that `the critique of stereotypical images of Asia 
that has been sprawled by Orientalism is in many instances the product of a large scale 
decontextualisation: The non-Western precedents for these stereotypes - including 
those of Tibet itself - are wholly ignored' (2001: 322). He goes on to say that the 
[B]est-known whipping boy in this context, the Western notion of Tibet as shangri-la, 
is a good example, with antecedents going back to several centuries. In the thirteenth 
century already we find an Arabic description of Tibet that notes: `In the country of 
Tibet are special properties in respect of their air and water, their mountains and 
plains. A man there laughs and rejoices continually' (Sperling 2001: 329). 
This misses the crucial point - the critical endeavour is not only about stereotypes; 
rather, it is about stereotypes operating under the guise of objective knowledge 
production, backed by the force of imperialism. The tremendous inequality that 
underlies these representational practices cannot be ignored. Arabic exoticisation of 
Tibet, or for that matter Tibetan exoticisation of the West, does not have the same 
productive effect on the identity of the represented. The productive capacity of 
representational practices is directly connected to discursive and corporeal aspects of 
power. Does Occidentalism affect the identities of `Occidentals' as much as 
Orientalism affects `the Orientals'? Why do Tibetans have to negotiate within this 
framework? Why can they not construct their own without reference to Western ideas 
and concepts? It is hard not to realise how this is linked intimately to European 
imperialism. 
3E. Conclusion 
Therefore, a critical appropriation of the Orientalism critique is not only helpful but 
also crucial for understanding and interrogating Exotica Tibet which has been a 
product-in-construction of Western (neo)colonialism and (neo)Orientalism. Adopting 
a general social constructionist approach to representation and critically appropriating 
the Orientalism critique, we can look at Exotica Tibet as an Orientalist construct 
operating through three general modes and a few specific strategies of representation. 
The next chapter goes on to look at these modes and strategies of representation. 
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Chapter 4: Western representations of the Other: rhetorical 
modes and strategies 
`I would say that the West is very young, it's very corrupt. We're not very 
wise. And I think we're hopeful that there is a place that is ancient and wise 
and open and filled with light' (Richard Gere, Frontline 1998b). 
Within the context of imperialism, the issue of the representation of natives was often 
considered as belonging to the realm of either scientific objective ethnography, 
journalistic commentaries, or fiction. A clear boundary was said to exist between 
fiction and non-fiction writing. It was presumed that, unlike fiction, non-fiction 
writing such as literary and popular journalism, exploration writings, travel writings, 
memoirs of colonial officials, and so on are unmediated by the consciously aesthetic 
requirements of imaginative literature. Emphasis was on the recording of observed 
facts. However, as argued earlier, such views are no longer tenable. The mask of 
objectivity seeks to hide relations of inequality and domination. Even non-fiction 
writings are permeated with rhetorical tropes. They are not epiphenomenal. What 
Rana Kabbani points out about travel writing holds true for non-fictional writings in 
general: it ultimately produced `a communal image of the East', which `sustained a 
political structure and was sustained by it' (1986: 10). While my discussion is mainly 
about Western colonial discourse, these tropes remain central to the production and 
reproduction of neocolonial relations. 
In this chapter, I shall look at rhetorical tropes' in terms of three general modes (and 
possible ways of challenging them) that underlie all Western representations of the 
non-West and then discuss some important strategies that are deployed to 
operationalise Orientalist constructs such as Exotica Tibet. The three significant 
modes of representation are essentialism, stereotyping, and exoticism. The strategies 
of representation are similar to what Edward Said calls `the techniques of 
representation that make the Orient visible, clear, "there" in discourse about it' relying 
upon `institutions, traditions, conventions, agreed-upon codes of understanding for 
their effects, not upon a distant and amorphous Orient' (1978: 22). For the purpose of 
this study, many of these strategies will be twinned with their seemingly opposite 
I `Within colonialist discourse, metaphors, tropes, and allegorical motifs played a constitutive 
role in "figuring" European security. For Hayden White, troping is "the soul of discourse", the 
mechanism without which discourse "cannot do its work or achieve its ends"' (Shohat and 
Stam 1994: 137). 
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phenomena (such as debasement and idealisation). This is done to highlight that even 
though representational claims are made in the name of simplicity, essentiality, and 
clarity, it is complexity, oppositionality, and ambivalence that lie at the heart of 
Orientalist projects like Exotica Tibet. These will be studied under the headings of 
archive, gaze, differentiation-classification, debasement-idealisation, eroticisation- 
moralisation, chronopolitics, infantilisation-gerontifäcation, naturalisation, and self- 
affirmation-self- criticism. The theoretical framework set out in this chapter will help 
me to de-construct2 the text of Exotica Tibet as it relies heavily on the multiple 
meanings of words and phrases, on substitutions, on intertextuality, on exclusions and 
inclusions, on the play of meanings, on repetition, on generalisation. 
4A. Modes of representation 
4A. i. Essentialism 
2 Deconstruction is not about destruction as it is alleged by most of its detractors, including 
many within Tibetan studies. For instance, Jeffrey Hopkins says `... it is not sufficient to 
engage in destructive criticism, even if it clothed in highfalutin terms like 
"deconstructionism"... I do not want to become satisfied with image blasting, as if the exercise 
of criticism - meaning here fault-finding - is sufficient. It is not' (2001: 258). Yes, it is not 
enough to engage in destructive criticism, but this is a misleading picture of deconstruction as a 
strategy. Deconstruction is not only about faultfinding. For the detractors, I would like to quote 
Barbara Johnson's clarification of the term: 
Deconstruction is not synonymous with `destruction', however. It is in fact much 
closer to the original meaning of the word `analysis' itself, which etymologically 
means `to undo' -a virtual synonym for `to de-construct' ... 
If anything is destroyed 
in a deconstructive reading, it is not the text, but the claim to unequivocal domination 
of one mode of signifying over another. A deconstructive reading is a reading which 
analyses the specificity of a text's critical difference from itself (in Cuddon 1991: 
222). 
Deconstruction is certainly not a depoliticising mode that ignores contexts. As Jacques Derrida 
has observed, `one of the definitions of what is called deconstruction would be the effort to 
take this limit-less context [the "realhistory-of-the-world"] into account, to pay the sharpest and 
broadest attention possible to context, and thus to an incessant moment of recontextualisation' 
(quoted in Campbell 1998b: 21). A deconstructive approach involves `critically examining the 
discursive processes of materialization that produce settlements - such as the idea of pre-given 
subjects - upon which the criteria for judgement are based' (Ibid.: 30). Judith Butler has also 
argued that: `The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather, it 
establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated' (quoted in 
Campbell 1998a: 205). Deconstruction is particularly relevant for Tibet, which has been the 
victim of modernity offering limited possibility for emancipation. In contrast to modern, 
conventional methods, deconstruction is about `the opening of the future itself, a future which 
does not allow itself to be modalized or modified into the form of the present, which allows 
itself neither to be fore-seen nor pro-grammed; it is thus also the opening to freedom, 
responsibility, decision, ethics and politics... ' (Derrida 1992: 200). 
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`Essentialism: no one is quite sure what, in essence, it is, but it makes an 
excellent insult' (McKenzie Wark, in Uschanov 1996). 
Essentialism is one of the central modes of representation. Broadly speaking, it is the 
notion that some core meaning or identity is determinate and not subject to 
interpretation. Ronald Inden writes that essentialist ways of seeing tend to ignore the 
`intricacies of agency' pertinent to the flux and development of any social system 
(1990: 20). In the context of this discussion, it is seen in attempts to represent different 
cultures in terms of their essence - Arabs as essentially violent, Indians as essentially 
lazy, Tibetans as essentially religious, and so on. Ironically, most of the attempts to 
combat this reductionism too have involved a high degree of essentialism. The debate 
between essentialism and anti-essentialism is not new. It has become particularly 
intense in the last two decades, as identity politics has come into focus, in feminist 
theory and praxis, race and ethnic studies, queer studies, and other critical enterprises. 
While some entertain the possibility of a thorough anti-essentialism, others, like 
Martha Nussbaum, argue that legitimate criticisms still leave room for a certain kind 
of essentialism based on a historically sensitive account of the most basic human 
needs and functions (see 1992: 202-46). Anti-essentialists, informed by 
poststructuralist and postmodern theories, rightly implicate essentialism in the 
representation of the Other and the perpetuation of dominance. Instead of depending 
upon foundational categories, antiessentialist understandings reconceptualise identity 
`as simultaneously a practice and an effect that is always in the process of being 
constructed through signifying practices that expel the surplus meanings that would 
expose the failure of identity as such' (Doty 1996b: 168). 
The alternative offered to un-self-reflexive essentialism is a broadly constructionist 
approach which sees hitherto natural categories as social constructs and therefore 
subject to deconstruction and reconstruction. As I shall discuss, the arguments of 
theorists like Gayatri Spivak (in Landry and Maclean 1999) and Diane Fuss (1989) on 
the issue is more persuasive. Forms of essentialism are integral and unavoidable even 
for social constructionism, and therefore, the essentialist/constructionist binary is 
misleading. 
[Essentialism] is most commonly understood as a belief in the real, true essence of 
things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the `whatness' of a given 
entity ... 
Importantly, essentialism is typically defined in opposition to difference. The 
opposition is a helpful one in that it reminds us that a complex system of cultural, 
social, psychical, and historical differences, and not a set of pre-existent human 
essences, position and constitute the subject. However, the binary articulation of 
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essentialism and difference can also be restrictive, even obfuscating, in that it allows 
us to ignore or deny the differences within essentialism (Fuss 1989: xi-xii). 
We can deploy essentialism as a strategy with interventionary value by being self- 
reflexive about our construction of essence. This is different from the conventional use 
of essentialism that ascribes the essence to nature, objectivity, and facts - beyond the 
realm of interpretation. While challenging the notion of woman as essentially 
biological, we can continue to speak against gender discrimination by deploying the 
category of woman based on shared (and differing) experiences. Such an 
instrumentalist and activist view of essentialism is also taken by many within 
postcolonial studies. 
In colonial and post-colonial contexts, we find essentialism in the reduction of the 
indigenous people to an `essential' idea of what it means to be `native' - whether 
African, Chinese, Arabic, or Tibetan. As the earlier discussion of Orientalism pointed 
out, imperialism drew its strength from representations of natives as quintessentially 
lazy, ignorant, deceitful, incapable of self-governing, and the native rulers as corrupt 
and despotic. Therefore, we should not be surprised that the British officials involved 
during the 1903-04 invasion of Tibet saw it as something welcomed by `ordinary' 
Tibetans seeking deliverance from their Chinese and monastic overlords. Captain 
Cecil Rawling in a military report in 1905 wrote: `It seems to be the general wish of 
the inhabitants of that country (Tibet) that they should come under British 
administration' (quoted in Lamb 1960: 296). Not very different is Alistair Lamb's own 
assessment that `when dealing with the primitive peoples of Central Asia, the problem 
often was not how to expand one's power but how to prevent its indefinite expansion' 
(101). These familiar arguments put the onus of responsibility for imperial expansion 
on the victims themselves. This is made possible by their essentialist representations 
as requiring paternal imperialism -a mix of iron fist and velvet glove. 
Even the positive images of certain natives - for instance, Tibetans as spiritual and 
peaceful - feed upon similar dynamics of essentialism and reduction. Often, the 
oppositional movements have also been caught in the same trap of crude essentialism. 
What happens is that the nationalist and liberationist movements often `write back' 
and reduce the colonisers to an essence, simultaneously defining themselves in terms 
of an `authentic' essence which may deny or invert the values of the ascribed 
characteristics (Cliff 1996). Mahatma Gandhi and several other Indian nationalists 
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appropriated the Romanticist notions of the spirituality of ancient Indian ('Hindu') 
civilisation in order to affirm an essential Indianness. This not only involved 
caricaturing the West, as Gandhi did in his famous quip to a reporter's question about 
Western civilisation: `I think it would be a good idea' (quoted in Guha 1996). Even 
more dangerous is its facilitative role in defining (national) identity rigidly, often 
along majoritarian lines. For instance, in India it has facilitated Hindu nationalist 
rejection of Islam as `foreign' and Muslims as `outsiders'. Said has rightly argued 
against this inversion, suggesting that in post-colonial national states such essences 
have much to do with the native manipulators and the embattled imperial contexts out 
of which they came and in which they were felt to be necessary (1994: 16). 
While some postcolonial writers and theorists are right to point out the potential 
danger of locking oneself within a framework set in place by the colonisers, other 
writers insist that some subversive, empowering force can come from the employment 
of essentialist strategies (Cliff 1996). Moreover, as Donna Landry and Gerald Maclean 
put it, one `cannot simply assert, "I will be anti-essentialist" and make that stick, for 
you cannot not be an essentialist to some degree. The critique of essentialism is 
predicated upon essentialism' (1999: 7). Spivak's work (1987,1990,1993,1999) is 
important in this regard. Adopting and adapting deconstruction specifically for the 
postcolonial field, she advocates strategic essentialism - `a strategic use of positivist 
essentialism in a scrupulously visible political interest' (Landry and Maclean 1996: 
214). The goal of essentialist critique is not the exposure of error, but the interrogation 
of the essentialist terms. `In deconstructive critical practices, you have to be aware that 
you are going to essentialize anyway. So then strategically you can look at 
essentialisms, not as descriptions of the way things are, but as something that one must 
adopt to produce a critique of everything' (Spivak 1990: 51). At the same time she 
warns against the uncritical deployment of strategic essentialism. Often less 
scrupulous practitioners ignore the element of strategy and treat it as simply yet 
another justification for essentialism. The fact that there are bound to be disagreements 
over what is strategic and what is not, what is the right strategy and what is not, does 
not mean that one stops being constantly critical and reflexive. This awareness is in 
itself a continuous and important process in challenging essentialism that lies at the 
heart of practices such as stereotyping and exoticising. 
4A. ii. Stereotyping the Other 
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The term stereotype emerged in the late eighteenth century as a technical designation 
for the casting of multiple papier mache copies of printing type from a paper mache 
mould. In the early twentieth century social psychologists appropriated it to designate 
images through which we categorise the world. 3 Within cultural studies and 
postcolonial theory, stereotyping is considered a basic mode of representing the Other. 
Distinguishing between types and stereotypes, Richard Dyer argues that while the 
former are essential for the production of meaning, the latter are not unavoidable: 
while social types tend to be more open and flexible, stereotyping makes fast, firm and 
separate what is in reality extremely fluid (1993: 12,16). A stereotype is a one-sided 
description of a group/culture resulting from the collapsing of complex differences 
into a simple `cardboard cut-out'. What Seymour Gross writes about the images of the 
`Negro' in American literature holds true for stereotypes in general - they see people 
as `more of a formula than a human being' (1966: 2). John Griffin (1960) wrote of his 
initial experiences as a black man4: `Often times, it's whites not talking with us, but 
with the image of us' (quoted in Cooper 2001). It reduces people to a few, simple 
characteristics, which are then represented as fixed by nature. `Stereotyping reduces, 
essentialises, naturalises and fixes "difference"' (Hall 1997b: 257-8). It is about 
othering within the parameters of sameness, instead of recognising radical alterity. 5 
Stereotypes, however inaccurate, are one form of representation. Like fictions, they 
are created to serve as substitutions, standing in for real. They are there not to tell it 
like it is but to invite and encourage pretense. They are a fantasy, a projection onto 
Other that makes them less threatening. Stereotypes abound when there is distance. 
They are an invention, a pretense that one knows when the steps that would make real 
knowing possible cannot be taken - are not allowed (hooks 1992: 341). 
As Gilman argues, within stereotypes, the definition of the Other incorporates the 
basic categories (such as illness, sexuality, and race) by which the self is defined 
3 Walter Lippmann, who coined the term in its contemporary sense, viewed it as having four 
main functions - as an ordering process, as a `short cut', as a reference to the world, and lastly, 
as expression of our values and manner of thinking (1922). Cognitive theorisation of stereotype 
is dominant within social psychology (Miller 1982; Oakes et al 1994). For a critique of 
ignorance social, political and cultural context within social psychology literature, see for 
instance Sander Gilman (1985) where it is argued that stereotypes reflect certain basic 
perceptual categories, which are in turn projections of internalised, often repressed, models of 
the Self and the Other (20-25). 
4 He is the white author of Black like me who darkened his skin so as to experience being 
black. 
5 Emmanuel Levinas posits that radical alterity approaches the I (self) in the face of the Other, 
which as irreducible, ethical alterity, makes the I responsible for the Other (for critical 
discussion on Levinas and radical alterity, see Bernasconi and Critchley 1991). 
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(1985: 20-5). Stereotypes function as a marker between norm and deviancy, between 
in-group and those outside it, between `us' and `them'. It classifies people according 
to a norm and constructs the excluded as the Other. For instance, within the dominant 
version of multiculturalism discourse in the UK, ethnicising minority groups and 
`celebrating diversity' go hand in hand with stereotyping them, while leaving intact 
whiteness as the norm, the unquestioned, the invisible. 6 Here `ethnic' is a label for 
minorities as if the majority Anglo-Saxon culture is non-ethnic. Thus, stereotypes 
always carry within their very representation an implicit narrative, which is laden with 
relations of power. As a signifying practice, stereotyping implicates the subjects of 
power as well as those who are subjected to it (Hall 1997b: 257-8). As we shall see in 
the later discussion of chronopolitics as a strategy of representation, stereotyping is 
accompanied by radical detemporalising: Tibet came to be seen as a possible link to an 
ancient classical civilisation, to the medieval age, as well as to a future utopia - it is 
beyond the grid of time. 
Stereotyping played a performative part in Orientalism, as the discussion in the 
previous chapter hinted at. To the Orientalists, the Orient was and is a commodity to 
be possessed by the West. Therefore, it is seen as something to be studied, dominated, 
and `fixed'. Stereotypical images of the Orient's separateness - `its eccentricity, its 
backwardness, its silent indifference, its feminine penetrability, its supine malleability' 
and of `Oriental despotism, Oriental splendour, cruelty, sensuality ... promise, tenor, 
sublimity, idyllic pleasure, intense energy' - are articulated in the arts and other forms 
of discursive practice (Said 1978: 4,119-20; Williams and Chrisman 1993: 144). The 
notion of a timeless quality of the Orient has been a familiar trope; corollary to this is 
the idea of stagnation, (Oriental) despotism, and the need for an external force to pull 
the Orient toward progress. While discussing Guillaume Raynal's Histoire des deux 
Indes, Anthony Strugnell argues that in Orientalist works 
By caricaturing the Asiatic temperament, and settling on it a status of permanent 
inferiority through the immutable influence of climate, it has been pigeon-holed and 
set to one side. The other has been stereotyped and neutralised, so that the serious 
business of trade can be pursued, unaffected by an unsettling encounter with different, 
complex culture (1996: 176). 
6 Use of the word `colour' is significant. Those who are not-white are considered coloured as if 
white is not a colour! This invisibility of whiteness is `historically, socially, politically and 
culturally produced and ... 
linked to ... relations of 
domination' (Weis et al. 1997: 22). As 
Coco Fusco writes, `[t]o ignore white ethnicity is to redouble its hegemony by naturalizing it. 
Without specifically addressing white ethnicity, there can be no critical evaluation of the 
construction of the other' (quoted in hooks 1998: 343). 
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Imperialism was therefore a civilising mission, the `god-given' duty (and of course the 
natural right) of the `white man' to bring `progress' to the natives. Stereotyping 
flourished - the restless, honest, active, exploratory, masculine, enlightened, modern 
spirit of the `white man' stood in contrast to the laziness, deceit, passivity, fatalism. 
femininity, backwardness, and traditional spiritlessness of the natives. This was also 
true in places like Tibet that did not come under direct European colonialism. For 
instance, as Peter Hansen points out in his study of cinematic representations of Tibet 
in the early twentieth century, films such as Climbing Mount Everest (1922) and The 
Epic of Everest (1924) by Captain John Noel developed the `contrast between the 
extroverted, aggressive, and manly British climbers with the introverted, passive, and 
squalid but mystical Tibetans' (Hansen 2001: 92-3). 
Thus, stereotyping served imperialism at both representational and psychic levels - 
supporting the idea of paternal domination and acting as a kind of perceptual blinder 
protecting the colonisers from discomforting consciousness of either poverty or guilt 
(Lebow 1976: 22). 7 It allowed the participants in the massacre of Tibetans at Guru (31 
March 1904) that took place during the British invasion of Tibet to blame it on the 
`crass stupidity and childishness of the Tibetan general' (Mehra 1968: 223), 
malevolent monks, superstitious Tibetan soldiers - everyone except themselves. 
With almost monotonous regularity colonial natives have been described as indolent 
and complacent, cowardly but brazenly rash, violent, uncivilised and incapable of hard 
work. On the more complementary side, they possess a natural talent for song and 
dance, and frequently are curious, but with a limited attention span. In short, the image 
of simple creatures in need of paternal domination emerged very clearly (Lebow 1976: 
4). This sentiment can be seen in Colonel Francis Younghusband's account of his 
7Another strategy to soothe European conscience was to perceive dispossession and genocide 
as a result of `the inevitable march of Western progress'. Providing a `progressive' justification 
for mass slaughter of native Americans, American president Andrew Jackson said 
To follow to the tomb the last of his race and to tread on the graves of extinct nations 
excite melancholy reflections. But true philanthropy reconciles the mind to these 
vicissitudes as it does to the extinction of one generation to make room for another ... 
What good man would prefer a country covered with forests and ranged with a few 
thousand savages to our extensive Republic, studded with cities, towns, and 
prosperous farms [and] occupied by more than 12,000,000 happy people, and filled 
with all the blessings of liberty, civilization, and religion (quoted in Shohat and Stam 
1994: 86). 
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`expedition' to Lhasa where after criticising Tibetans for being crafty, immoral, over- 
religious, dirty, and lazy, he says `there are in them latent potentialities for good, 
which only await the right touch to bring them into being' (1910: 321). 
Such colonial stereotypes become self-fulfilling and self-justifying images. They have 
been part of `scientific' disciplinary endeavours like anthropology as well. 
(Traditional anthropology) depicted the colonized as members of a harmonious, 
internally homogeneous, unchanging culture. When so described, the culture appeared 
to `need' progress, or economic and moral uplifting. In addition, the `timeless 
traditional culture' served as a self-congratulatory reference point against which 
Western civilization could measure its own progressive historical evolution. The 
civilizing journey was conceived more as a rise than a fall, a process more of 
elevation than degradation (a long, arduous journey upward, culminating in `us').... It 
portrayed a `culture' sufficiently frozen to be an object of `scientific' knowledge. This 
genre of social description made itself, and the culture so described, into an artefact 
worthy of being housed in the collection of a major museum (Rosaldo 1989: 31). 
Even today, when formal structures of imperial domination have been replaced by an 
informal neocolonial one, stereotypical images of non-Western people continue to 
circulate, often buttressing the power relations in place. In the words of Emma 
Larocque: 
Stereotypes have an important function in the maintenance of racism. Between 1500 
and 1800 A. D., the stereotype of Indians [, that is native Americans, ] as savages 
served to justify the dispossession of Indian lands. The dispossession and its legacy 
have created a powerful-powerless relationship between white and Native peoples. In 
order to maintain this power structure, new stereotypes of Native peoples have been 
created, as the need has arisen (1989: 74). 
Though in everyday conversation we tend to use stereotype only for negative images, 
stereotyping always has within it dualism and ambivalence (more on this later). 
According to Peter Hulme there are the two key features of the stereotypical discourse 
of the Other: several characteristics are collapsed into one simplified figure which 
represents the essence of the people; it is then split into two halves- its `good' and 
`bad' sides (in Hall 1992: 275-332). Both images serve to buttress imperialist claims in 
their own ways. As Michael Hunt in his study of hierarchy of race and American 
foreign policy points out, the Americans created for `Orientals' two distinctly different 
images: `a positive one, appropriate for happy times when paternalism and 
benevolence were in season, and a negative one, suited to those tense periods when 
abuse or aggrandizement became the order of the day' (Hunt 1987: 
69). Chow also 
points out in a slightly different context: `Defilement and sanctification 
belong to the 
same symbolic order' (1993: 54). Dualism necessarily 
leaves scope for some 
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ambivalence. Therefore, the closure is never complete - stereotyping is not a singular 
act, but one that necessitates repetition in order to make sense. Homi Bhabha (1983), 
in his study of the dependence of colonial discourse on the concept of `fixity', rightly 
points out that stereotype is a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates 
between what is always in place and something that must be anxiously repeated. It is 
this process of ambivalence and its force that gives the colonial stereotype its 
currency; ensures its repeatability in changing historical and discursive junctures, 
produces the effect of probabilistic truth and predictability which, for the stereotype 
must always be in excess of what can be empirically proven. 
Stereotyping is not a simplification because it is a false representation of a given 
reality but because it is an arrested, fixated form of representation that denies the play 
of difference. Let me illustrate this with an example from the story of the first two men 
to reach Mount Everest - Tenzing Norgay and Edmund Hillary. Reaching the summit, 
Tenzing Norgay says he felt the warm presence of the mountain, buried an offering to 
the gods, and said as prayer: `I am grateful, Chomolungma'; Hillary took photographs 
to survey the area, urinated on the summit, and later told one of the other climbers 
George Lowe: `Well, George, we knocked the bastard off (Hansen 1998; Outside 
online 1999). This difference in attitude may be due to cultural factors. But to interpret 
humility as passivity and fix the identity of Tenzing Norgay (read as representative of 
sherpas and other natives) as essentially passive in contrast to adventurous, scientific 
Hillary (read as white man) leads to an arrested and fixated form of representation 
(excluding those who do not `fit' in the image - women for instance). Stereotyping is 
not about expressing cultural difference, but fixing it in a pre-given socio-cultural 
milieu with extreme power differentials. Hence, instead of considering the stereotype 
as a given, we should interrogate it as a process. 
There are various strategies to combat stereotyping. While most have concentrated 
their energy on challenging the stereotypes, reversing it, or reversing the evaluation of 
it, these attempts have failed to displace it. The more recent strategies informed by 
postmodern, poststructuralist and postcolonial sensibilities seem to engage with the 
issue more effectively. The emphasis is on working with the shifting, unstable nature 
of meaning, and entering into the struggle over representation, while acknowledging 
that since meaning can never be finally fixed, there can never be final victories (Hall 
1997b: 270-6). The study of Orientalist works will help us understand how the West 
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has perceived the Other, but we cannot stop there. The challenge is to deconstruct 
Orientalist ideas about otherness because `the very appropriation of the Other for the 
West's own purposes of self-criticism [will only continue the] propagation of racial 
and ethnic stereotypes' (Locke 1991). It should be seen as a part of wider need to 
decentre and deconstruct traditional foundations of thought regarding culture, 
language, and subjectivity. The goal of studying stereotypes, according to Gilman, is 
not to stop production of images of the Other, images that demean and by demeaning, 
control; `this would be the task of Sisyphus' (1985: 240). It is to engage with 
stereotypes - their operationality, their impact, and the values attached to them 
Such strategies do not belittle sincere attempts by minority groups to challenge their 
negative stereotypes and project a more positive image. All it warns against is being 
caught in the bind of stereotyping instead of attempting to displace it. This problem is 
particularly acute for those groups whose stereotypical image is a positive one. While 
it is difficult to combat negative stereotypes, it is more difficult to engage with 
positive ones. While in the short run, a positive stereotype may be politically and 
socially helpful for a group, in the long run it becomes reified, imprisoning the 
subjects in their own arrested image. This problem can be seen most clearly in the case 
of Tibetans who seem to be prisoners of their stereotyped images. Alluding to the real 
effects of the language of stereotype about Tibet, Donald Lopez points out that it `not 
only creates knowledge about Tibet, in many ways it creates Tibet, a Tibet that 
Tibetans in exile have come to appropriate and deploy in an effort to gain both 
standing in exile and independence for their country' (1998: 10). However, these 
stereotypes legitimise only certain goals and actions geared toward achieving them - 
the prevalent stereotypes paint Tibetans mainly as passive victims requiring outside 
help. And this outside support comes at a price. As Jamyang Norbu points out, `The 
national struggle for an independent Tibet has been replaced by a squishy agenda of 
environmental, pacifistic, spiritual, and "universal" concerns that has little or nothing 
to do with Tibet's real problems' (1998: 22). 
4A. iii. Exoticism as exoticising 
`Knowledge is incompatible with exoticism, but lack of knowledge is in turn 
irreconcilable with praise of others; yet praise without knowledge is precisely 
what exoticism aspires to be. This is its constitutive paradox' (Tzvetan 
Todorov 1993: 265). 
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exotic A. adj. i. Belonging to another country, foreign, alien; not indigenous; 
extrinsic (obsolete). ii. Of or pertaining to, or characteristic of a foreigner, or 
what is foreign (now rare); hence, outlandish, barbarous, strange, uncouth. 
Also, having attraction of the strange or foreign, glamorous; spec. of or 
pertaining to strip-tease. Orig. U. S. 
B. sb. i. A plant, formerly also an animal, of foreign attraction; in 
popular language, a foreign plant not acclimatized or naturalized. ii. A person 
of foreign origin; a foreigner (rare) 
exoticism [f. exotic a+ -ism] a. Tendency to adopt what is exotic or foreign. 
b. Exotic character; an instance of this, anything exotic. 
exotism [ad. Fr. Exotisme, f. exotique; see EXOTIC and -ISM] Resemblance 
to what is foreign; a foreign `air'. 
(OED 1989: 551-2) 
Tibetans are exoticised as positively different, and for the continued support from 
consumers of such images, they have to maintain, assert, and often create these 
differences. The `exotic' here becomes a prisoner of exoticism, which in turn seeks to 
commodify and depoliticise history, culture, and agency. Therefore, `to allow Tibet to 
circulate in a system of fantastic opposites (even when the Tibetans are the "good" 
Orientals) is to deny Tibet its history, to exclude it from a real world of which it has 
always been a part, and to deny Tibetans their agency in the creation of a contested 
quotidian reality' (Lopez 1998: 11). We can therefore appreciate Norbu's 
exasperation: `however hopeless their cause or marginal their survival, Tibetans are 
better off living their own reality than being typecast in ethereal roles in the fantasies 
of the West' (2001: 378). As the ensuing discussion clarifies, exoticism is no benign 
phenomenon. It has been an integral part of Orientalism as much as stereotyping and 
essentialism. Rather than taking exoticism as a substantive (noun), I prefer to look at it 
as a continuous process of exoticisation, as a verb. 
The definitions of exotic and exoticism are essentially posited on difference, what is 
`not me'. In Western tradition it was first applied specifically to flora and fauna that 
came from far away. The first recorded use of the word was in French by Francois 
Rabelais (1548) and in English by Ben Johnson (1599). It has always had to do with 
difference and strangeness. The concept of there being some exotic land/people is not 
peculiar to Western history. In fact, before modern times, European places were as 
exotic for India and China as the latter were for the former. Exoticism, then, was 
reversible. It would be reversible today also if the exotic relations were to be an 
encounter of strong differences in a non-centred place. But this is not the case. Even 
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though a general concept of the exotic exists in all cultures, these are very different 
from the representational strategy of exoticism. 
Charles Bell (1928) mentions a Tibetan book of geography written about the middle of 
the nineteenth century (dzam-ling Gye-she Me-long - `the mirror that shows the extent 
of the world') which has fanciful statements about other lands - of Corsica, it says that 
`the dogs of this country are so large that people can ride them'. Of Sicily, that `there 
is a high mountain; from among its rocks a big fire comes out. This goes to the ocean 
and returns to rocks. It does not burn grass or trees; but burns gold, silver, copper and 
human beings. And there is a certain kind of grass, which grows in no other place. If a 
man eats it, he dies of laughter'. Bell then concludes, `Tibetans like miraculous 
interpretations; it is a trait deep down in their nature' (1928: 8). But it is not different 
from Europeans writing fantastical tales about Tibet before and during the nineteenth 
century. Tibet was invested with all sorts of fantasies and absurdities not only by 
romanticists but also by `rationalists - it allowed suspension of Enlightenment 
rationalism and the possibility for anything goes. This sense of the absurd was 
revealed in a story of a 1888 border skirmish when British troops nervously fired a 
volley into a patch of giant rhubarb plants, mistaking them for Tibetan soldiers 
(Freshfield cited in Bishop 1989: 153). When natives engage in fantasies, it is because 
they are naturally predisposed to irrational superstition; if the colonialists do it, they 
are romantic ! 
In the mode of exoticism, the Other can only be perceived in a hierarchy. `Given the 
usual esteem within which the self is constituted, the exoticising of the Other almost 
invariably amounts to the constitution of that Other as a less-than-equal subject' 
(Shapiro 1988: 100). This idea has been put succinctly by Johannes Fabian: `(O)ur 
ways of making the Other are ways of making ourselves. The need to go there (to the 
exotic places, be they far away or around the corner) is really our desire to be here (to 
find or defend our position in the world)' (1990: 756). We can therefore see that in 
Western popular works, an image of the West is mirrored in the image of Tibet: for 
Arthur Conan Doyle. 8 Tibet's remoteness (absence) defines Europe's centrality and its 
8 Due to popular demand, Conan Doyle resurrected Sherlock Holmes (who had perished at the 
Reichenbach falls). In `The empty house (Return of Sherlock Holmes)', the great detective 
announces to his stunned companion Dr Watson: `I travelled 
for two years in Tibet, therefore, 
and amused myself by visiting Lhasa and spending some 
days with the head Lama. You may 
have read of the remarkable explorations of a Norwegian named Sigerson, but I am sure that it 
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familiarity; Rider Haggard's Tibet9 (place of promise and transcendence) underlines 
Western prosaicness; Walter Benjaminl0 evokes Tibet in a criticism of Western 
bourgeois disenchantment (enigmatic and imaginatively bold); Antonin Artaud's 
Tibet" (land of benevolent father) stands in contrast to the West's spiritual 
contamination, suffering, ignorance (Bishop 1993: 14-15). 12 
The genericness of exoticism evaporated and its theoretical reversibility ended 
gradually with European expansion and the consolidation of colonial rules. An 
exploring/conquering/cataloguing impulse converged with the material capacity of 
never occurred to you that you were receiving news of your friend' (Doyle 1974). Interestingly, 
in his original edition, Conan Doyle mis-spelt `Lama' as `Llama' (Booth 2000). During the 
turn of the nineteenth-twentieth century, it was common to substitute the `elusive' Dalai Lama 
for llama, a south American animal - showing how in the imperial imagination, specificity had 
very little role to play. On 4 April 1904, the Daily Illustrated Mirror had a cartoon of a lion 
and a llama with comments about how `silly' the llama is and how it will `greatly grieve the 
lion if the llama continue to harden its heart, for the lion does really not want to fight' 
(Carrington 1998: 19). In the same year, an issue of Punch showed the British lion with a 
Tibetan `llama': while the lion holds a copy of the Anglo-Tibetan Treaty and catches the llama 
by its tail, on the background is the Grand Lama's door with a sign `OUT Back in Three Years' 
(Llama Trivia n. d. ) (alluding to the Dalai Lama who fled Lhasa immediately before British 
arrival). The basic fact that the `one-1' lama is from Tibet while the `double-1' llama is from 
South America escaped the British writers and illustrators (For an interesting fictional narrative 
of Holmes' missing `two years', see Norbu 1999a). 
9 Rider Haggard achieved success with She (Haggard 1995) where Ayesha - `She-Who-Must- 
Be-Obeyed' - the `beautiful white woman' (17, emphasis in original) ruler/divinity of a lost 
civilisation in `darkest Africa', is kept alive for five hundred years by dips in the Fire of Life, 
but overdoses for the sake of her English lover and perishes. In the sequel Ayesha, the Return 
of She, he resurrects the figure at a monastery in Tibet where benighted natives once more 
worship her - this time the natives are Tibetans (Norbu 1998: 18). 
10 In the middle of his 1929 essay on surrealism, Walter Benjamin (an influential Marxist 
critic) briefly, but dramatically, tells of his encounter with some Tibetan lamas who were 
staying in the same hotel as him in Moscow and always left the doors ajar; he writes that `I 
found out that in these rooms lived members of a sect who had sworn never to occupy closed 
rooms' (quoted in Bishop 1993: 14). It marked a significant surreal moment for him, evoking 
an exotic Tibet still full of magical possibilities, still free from modern forces. 
11 Antonin Artuad, a famous French poet, actor, and director, wrote in his `Address to the Dalai 
Lama' in 1925: `We are your most faithful servants, 0 Grand Lama, give us, grace us with 
your illuminations in a language our contaminated European minds can understand, and if need 
be, transform our Mind, create for us a mind turned entirely toward those perfect summits 
where the Human Mind no longer suffers' (Artuad 1965: 64). Of course the address was for 
European audience and I have not come across any reference to any attempt made to deliver 
the `message' to the Dalai Lama. 
12 In his article on Lithuanian writer Jurga Ivanauskaite, Howard Jarvis points out how Tibet is 
seen as a possible `mirror of Lithuania': 
The subject of Tibet chimes well with both the Lithuanian character and the 
Lithuanian experience. The idea of a distant mountain kingdom relates to the romantic 
ideals of the Lithuanian character, while its fate of invasion and exile relates directly 
to Lithuanian memories of occupation and harsh, often religious, prosecution. 
Lithuania was the only former Soviet republic with a majority Catholic population, 
and priests were dealt with particularly severely (Jarvis 2000). 
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enact this impulse as Western imperialism became the hegemony. As Jean-Marc 
Moura points out, `From the end of the fifteenth to twentieth centuries... the exotic 
dream is profoundly influenced by the advances and the retreats of colonialism' 
(quoted in Ha 2000: 7). Exoticism, since then, became a mode in which strangeness 
has been translated for the West. Chris Bongie defines exoticism13 `as a discursive 
practice intent on recovering "elsewhere" values "lost" with the modernization of 
European society' (1991: 5, emphasis added). In modern times, it is only the West, 
which has the power to enact its representational strategies on the planetary level. 
Using exoticism as a critical tool rather than an object of study, Roger Celestin (1996) 
argues that the best way to understand it is in terms of a triangular relation between the 
(Western) Self and the (exotic) Other that is fluctuatingly tenuous or strong depending 
on the narrating subject's position vis-a-vis a point of departure (and return) - home, 
centre, and audience. Exoticisers (those who exoticise) do not opt for extremes of 
exemplification (completely effacing the exotic) or experimentation (disappearing 
from the home and going completely 'native'). Rather they use exoticism both to 
interrogate dominant discourses of home and to negotiate a tension between home and 
the exotic. As Docteur A. D'Arsonval says in his introduction to Alexandra David- 
Neel's With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet, she `has become a complete "Asiatic", a 
complete Tibetan, and yet has remained a Westerner, a disciple of Descartes... as she 
observed everything in Tibet in a free and impartial spirit' (David-Neel 1936: v-vi). 
The general rhetorical and poetic network of exoticism, which is always present but 
shifts according to the workings of a triangular relation at different historical and 
cultural moments, is formed by different figures and motifs. These figures and motifs, 
such as the Wise Persian, the Mysterious Orient, the Dark Continent, are protean in 
form, as our discussion later in this chapter and in the next chapter will show. 
Desire/nostalgia for a utopia (to come) or a (lost) paradise; yearning for a sort of 
prelinguistic peace (the origin of the noble savage); the need to affirm the same as the 
centre through the exoticising of an outside; the common past of humanity; the rite-of- 
13 Further he distinguishes between imperialist exoticism (directly serving colonisation) and 
exoticising exoticism (individual acts that did not explicitly serve imperial state interests): 
`whereas imperialist exoticism affirms the hegemony of modern civilization over less 
developed, savage territories, exoticizing exoticism privileges those very territories and their 
peoples, figuring them as a possible refuge from an overbearing modernity' (Bongie 1991: 17). 
85 
passage syndrome; striating the globe as antidote to existential anguish: all these can 
be added under the heading of causal properties to the figures and motifs of exoticism 
(Celestin 1996: 22). 
While some see Tibet as offering the possibility of a utopia in the future (see Redfield 
1999), others have invested in it their nostalgia for a simple past. The latter sentiment 
is pervasive in many travel writings. To give one example, F. Spencer Chapman in his 
account of Lhasa in the 1930s wrote: 
On the whole, the administration of Lhasa, though corrupt, is efficient... Tibet is in the 
position of European countries in the Middle Ages - in many ways a position which 
we are bound, nowadays, to envy. The country is run by the monasteries and by the 
noble families. If the son of a merchant or farmer is ambitious he enters a monastery, 
for only there can hope to rise to that position of importance to which he is entitled. 
But there is no unemployment, no underlying feeling of insecurity, and except for 
those who choose begging as a profession - no real poverty (1992: 92-3; emphasis 
added). 
The boundary of Tibet was seen as a threshold to a place set apart - both in time and 
space. The longing glimpse from the edge, a sacred revelation at the border, seems to 
belong to travel accounts about Tibet written by Westerners (Bishop 1997: 58). 
Crossing the border is seen as a rite of passage and the myth that crossing the 
boundary of Tibet would bring about a kind of spiritual transformation is widely 
prevalent (see McMillin 1999). This idea of entry into a different world, both in time 
and space, is an integral part of the exoticising process. 
The exotic, thus is not the complete Other; it is an acceptable, complementary, 
renewing Other. In this sense it is slightly different from the concept of `Other' (see 
Levinas 1987,1999), for this Other has a voice, a radical alterity. On the other hand, in 
a certain sense, `the Exotic is dumb because it is the Pseudo-Exotic' (Mason 1998: 6) 
as it is never actually encountered but produced inside the discourse of representation. 
Thus it is a mediating entity. 
Exoticism is less about the exotic and more about discursive practices and 
representational regimes within the exoticising culture. The exotic itself does not exist 
prior to its `discovery' but is produced through it. To illustrate using the Western 
exoticisation of Tibet, it made very little sense to speak of Tibet as an exotic land 
before the eighteenth century. It was only when the attention of adventurers, travellers, 
philosophers, and imperial officials shifted towards Tibet during the nineteenth 
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century that it emerged as exotic. Tibet was estranged as exotic only after some 
Westerners started to invest their desires and curiosity in the idea of `Tibet'. 
This approach lends itself to a questioning of the basis and workings of representation 
itself and its connection to power. Recognition of the exotic as a product of 
exoticisation calls for a `shift of attention from the geographic or cultural provenance 
of the exotic to the modalities by which the exotic is produced in the West' (Mason 
1998: 3). There is recognition of an ever-present audience in exoticism. `Isn't 
exoticism primarily a phenomenon of reception? ' says Jean-Pierre Leduc-Adine 
(quoted in Bohrer 1998: 354). This explains why those who never leave their home 
practise exoticism as a strategy too. Drawing upon an existing repertory of images, the 
`sociolect reservoir' (Mullen 1995), those engaged work within mythologies about the 
`alien' which they have inherited, and which they then modify and augment (Rousseau 
and Potter 1990: 9). It therefore comes as no surprise that James Hilton, the creator of 
the term `Shangri-la' (that has come to be inextricably associated with Tibet ever 
since) in his Lost horizon (1933) had never visited Tibet. 
The exotic therefore largely existed as a mode of self-definition for the Western 
writers and exoticisers. As a technology of representation, exoticism is self- 
empowering, self-referential even, insofar as the objects of its gaze are not supposed to 
look back (Root 1996: 45). Sometimes it functioned as a mode of escapism and at 
other times provided a fertile base for philosophical, religious, and literary 
speculation. The former can be seen in most of the travel writings and fictions about 
Tibet14 while the latter can be seen in works of theosophists, New Age gurus, as well 
as Buddhist scholars. 
There is an argument that there was nothing inherently imperialist and political about 
Western practices of exoticism. Louis Malleret reminds his readers that `while it may 
be hard to conceive of a colonial literature that is not "exotic", one has to recognize 
that now all literatures with an exotic impression have a colonial cachet' (quoted in Ha 
2000: 7). Often those who write of the exotic as otherness regard it as embodying 
idealised alternatives to the self. Talking about romanticism and India, Dorothy 
Figueira argues that though romanticists did `appropriate' rather than `understand' 
14 Amaury De Riencourt noted that escapism has been at the root of West's fascination with 
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India, their aims were often contestory rather than conservative, and the appropriation 
was a part of negotiating the polarities of self-consciousness: `The European either 
was genuinely trying to understand rather than repress cultural difference, or, in fact, 
attempted to do both' (1994: 10-11). Then the exotic becomes associated with desire, 
with a sense of the imperfect or the incomplete self. Exoticism served as a device for 
internal criticism. 
This, however, does not deny the fact that exoticism as a representational practice was 
very much implicated into the European will to power through imperialism. `The 
exoticist rhetoric of fetishised otherness and sympathetic identification masks the 
inequality of the power relations without which the discourse could not function' 
(Huggan 2001: 14). The differing, and even noble intentions of some of those who 
practised exoticism does not deny the fact that their impact on the exotic was often 
predictably the same -a prelude to control, dominance and exploitation. Escapism, 
critique of home society and speculation also provided legitimisation for European 
imperialism. The intention of practitioners does not undermine the criticism of 
exoticism as a practice closely linked with imperialism. Imperialism is a historically 
crucial process by which an Other is conceived as exotic is represented and 
subordinated for the purpose of strengthening the worldly place of a metropolitan 
nation-state. In the colonial period exoticism was the `aestheticizing means by which 
the pain of that expansion is converted to spectacle, to render culture in the service of 
empire, even as it may also act to change the originating national culture' (Arac and 
Ritvo 1991: 3). Exoticism functions in a variety of imperial contexts as a mechanism 
of aesthetic substitution which `replaces the impress of power with the blandishments 
of curiosity' (Said 1993: 159). 
Even today exoticism is very much alive and it is naive to believe that this is 
unmediated by relations of power. Yes, exoticism now has shifted to an increasingly 
global mode of mass-market consumption - `suitable for all markets and at the limits 
of its own semantic dispersion' (Gallini, quoted in Huggan 2001: 15). But inequalities 
persist. Continuities can be seen in terms of `aesthetics of decontextualisation', that is 
diversion of commodities from their original cultural nexus, and `commodity 
fetishism', that is the veiling of the material circumstances under which commodities 
Tibet (1950: 5-6). 
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are produced and consumed (Huggan 2001: 16-8). As our later discussion of the 
impact of Exotica Tibet on the Tibetan people will highlight, just like the exoticism of 
colonial times, New Age exoticism15 reifies cultures and treats them ahistorically. Far 
from being specimens of radical otherness, non-Western representation in museums, 
exhibitions, festivals, and the like are carefully filtered to fit Western needs and 
performance constraints. Tribal craftspeople often change their production, in colour, 
shape, design, and so on, to fulfil the demands of Western buyers. To cite an example 
from the Tibetan case, performances of the Tibetan devil dance (cham) traditionally 
took place for days at a stretch. But the cham performances by Tibetan artists in the 
Western countries now are shortened to around two hours so as to suit the audience's 
taste (Schrempf 1997). The change, in response to the demands of tourism industry, is 
seen both inside Tibet and in the refugee settlements. 
Pervasive here is the operation of power. The East is far from an equal. As Frederick 
Bohrer points out, many exoticist activities 
depend on an unreflexive ideal of authenticity, in which the signifiers within the given 
field are taken as homologous to their external referent. As considerable recent work 
in a number of fields has shown, the limpid, unmediated ideal required by mimesis to 
accept texts or artefacts as perfectly authentic or true to their subject, is far from a 
given, but rather is bound in the metaphysical (and geo-political) conceits of a unique 
historical moment. In particular, mimeticism's vaunted fidelity between sign and 
referent is the product of a certain hierarchical enforcement of appearance and 
evaluation as much as of any `natural' or instantaneous resemblance. To contextualize 
exoticism as representational process ... is to work toward two goals. First, it is to 
work toward restoring the temporalization of the process, to view further the work of 
agency and contexts in exoticist representation. Second, in a way that has been barely 
broached in exoticist and post-colonial studies, it is also to offer a broader perspective 
on the nature of exoticism, noting especially the central role of history in its 
representation (Bohrer 1996: 293-307). 
In the contemporary neo/post colonial world, while there is an increasing recognition 
of the complicity of Orientalism, exoticism, and other representational systems with 
imperialism and racism, exoticism continues in the form of new avatars. However, the 
avatar is not an exact replica. There are significant changes. Cultural and commercial 
commodification seems to be the driving force now. Another change is that the 
exoticised are not bereft of all agencies. Often, they deploy their exotic image to fulfil 
their economic and political interests. An example of the former is Indians in the UK 
opening restaurants with names evoking nostalgia for the British Raj. In the Tibetan 
15 Nicholas Thomas prefers to call it New Age Primitivism as according to him exoticism is an 
indicator of mere difference while primitivism is the mode of representing inversion in colonial 
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case, the situation is slightly different. At the micro level, individual Tibetans make 
their living by selling `authentic' Tibetan commodities. At a macro level, there is a 
conscious policy of the diaspora elite to gain political support from Westerners by 
imaging (and imagining) Tibetanness to suit the tastes of the audience, much of which 
still cherishes an exoticised image of Tibet as a land of peace, spirituality and 
harmony. 
Exotica Tibet as an Orientalist construct is a product of modes of representation 
including essentialism, stereotyping, and exoticising. Also involved are various 
specific techniques, or strategies, that are generic to other imaginative practices 
through which the West imposed its representations on its Others with real effects. I 
turn now to these strategies. 
4B. Strategies and techniques of representation 
Complexity, oppositionality, and ambivalence lie at the heart of Orientalist projects 
like Exotica Tibet. Imaginative practices through which the West came to represent 
the Other can be interrogated through the various representational strategies involved. 
Though there is always a will to reify the represented, this is undermined by the nature 
of representation - it is not a singular act, but one necessitating repetition. As the 
discussion in the previous chapter pointed out, since representation is the act of re- 
presenting - making something present that is literally absent - there is always 
ambiguity and ambivalence. This leaves room for contestation and alternative 
representations: `there are no relations of power without resistance' (Foucault 1980: 
142). `Orientals' are transparent and yet they are inscrutable; the Orient provokes 
desire and yet it is repugnant. There always is a paradox in the Western 
representations of other cultures - an unresolvable tension between transparency and 
inscrutability, desire and disavowal, difference and familiarity. Therefore Exotica 
Tibet is not a distinct phenomenon devoid of contrariety; rather, it is defined by a `true 
complexio oppositorum, a rich complexity of contradictions and oppositions' (Bishop 
1989: 63). Hugues Didier, when discussing the tibetophilie europeenne emerging 
before nineteenth century, points out that it is founded upon two poles: `On the one 
hand, Tibet is the least accessible, most mysterious, and most foreign country of Asia; 
times (1994: 4). 
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on the other hand, Tibet is paradoxically the only Asian culture with whom Europeans 
can identify so much that they seem surprisingly intimate and related - truly a sort of 
coincidentia oppositorum! ' (Kaschewsky 2001: 6-7). So near, yet so far! 
It is complexity and indeterminacy not simplicity and determinacy that characterise 
the amalgam of various representational strategies. To highlight this, I shall twin some 
of the seemingly opposite strategies and underline that the twins operate through 
imaginative practices, sometimes in contradictory ways. The strategies will be 
discussed under the headings archive, gaze, differentiation-identification, debasement- 
idealisation, eroticisation-moralisation, chronopolitics, infantilisation-gerontification, 
naturalisation, and self-affirmation-self-criticism. 
4B. i. Archive 
As Derrida says, 16 `[n]othing is less reliable, nothing is less clear today than the word 
"archive"' (quoted in Featherstone 2000: 162). Archive is commonly understood as a 
place or collection containing records, documents, photographs, film, or other 
materials of historical interest. But, `archives are as much products of historical 
struggle as they are primary sources for writing histories' (Lynch 1999: 67). `The 
archive contains primary sources, at the same time that it is always already a 
secondary trace of historical discourse' (Dirks 2001: 195). `Archive' can be taken to 
refer to a repository of stored memories or information. 17 `The archive is also a place 
of dreams' (Steedman 1998: 67). 18 
16 In his Archive fever, Jacques Derrida points out the multiplicity of ways in which the archive 
(the entire archive-complex including archive, archivisation, archivability, de-archivisation) is 
constructive of the very event that it allegedly `records': `the technical structure of the 
archiving archive also determines the structure of the archivable content even in its very 
coming into existence and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much 
as it records the event' (1995: 17). 
17 As Harriet Bradley writes, the `archive is the repository of memories: individual and 
collective, official and unofficial, licit and illicit, legitimating and subversive' (1999: 108). 
18 For Michel Foucault, `archive' is essential to any `archaeology of knowledge'. It is `the 
general system of the formation and transformation of statements' (1972: 130) existing at a 
given period within a particular society. This archive determines both the system of 
enunciability of a statement-event and its system of functioning in other words it constitutes the 
site of rules which define the limits and forms of (i) expressibility, (ii) conservation, (iii) 
memory, (iv) reactivation, (v) appropriation (Smart 1988: 48). Thus, Foucault stresses that 
archive is composed of multiple and varying discourses, it is not, a limiting or constraining 
91 
Representations of other cultures draw upon archives in both senses of the term. 
During the Victorian age the `archive was not a building nor even a collection of texts 
but the collectively imagined junction of all that was known or knowable, a fantastic 
representation of an epistemological master pattern, a virtual focal point for the 
heterogeneous local knowledges of metropole and empire' (Richards 1992: 104). 
What was knowable then was shaped by imperial prerogatives as well as pre-existing 
`knowledge'. This included those found in classical writings, religious and biblical 
sources, mythology, traveller's tales (which in any case made little distinction between 
description and legend), and fictional writings. These provided the cultural framework 
through which others were seen, described and represented. 
Let me briefly illustrate this with some comments on Christopher Columbus's 
encounter with the Native Americans/Amerindians. Instead of being an encounter with 
radical otherness, it drew upon an already existing archive of images, preconceptions, 
and representations. Columbus `did not discover a world as it existed in itself; nor 
could he have. He discovered a world of otherness, a world of promise and danger, 
utopian bliss and barbaric cruelty, innocence and corruption, simplicity and mystery, 
all filtered through a late medieval culture of perceptions, conceptions, aspirations, 
faiths, anxieties, and demands. His discovery was an encounter... ' (Connolly 1991: 
36). In a similar tone, Naeem Inayatullah and David Blaney write that Columbus `does 
not really see the Amerindians; instead, he engages them as merely a category of 
otherness as revealed in the authoritative texts with which he is familiar' (1996: 74). 
These authoritative texts included books like The book of Marco Polo, Pierre d'Ailly's 
Imago mundi, Pliny the Elder's Historia naturalis, and The travels of Sir John 
Mandeville, all of which masqueraded as travel adventures. Unsurprisingly then, 
Columbus had to meet the cannibals. Pliny and Mandeville had already forewarned 
him 
... 
Europe needed cannibals; and the little fact that not a single sighting of a 
cannibal in action had ever been made was not going to stand in its way. It invented 
them; and then used them as a justification for a range of purposes (Sardar 1992: 500- 
01). 
Often visions about one `Oriental' culture were unproblematically invested into 
another. Orientalism itself performed an archival function - generalisations abounded 
as the attitude was `pick an East, any East' (Sardar 1999: 66) and the story will be the 
same. As Said puts it: 
formation but an enabling system of rules which is never entirely complete and which is 
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In a sense Orientalism was a library or archive of information commonly and, in some 
of its aspects, unanimously held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven in various ways to be effective. These ideas 
explained the behavior of Orientals; they supplied Orientals with a mentality, a 
genealogy, an atmosphere; most important, they allowed Europeans to deal with and 
even to see Orientals as a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics (1978: 41-2). 
In situations where the culture was relatively unknown - like the Tibetan - hearsay. 
legends, and fantasies performed an ever more important archival function-19 
Representers of Tibet especially before the nineteenth century often drew upon these 
archives, supplementing the rare missionary and travellers' accounts. Hugh 
Richardson's argument that the early allusions of Westerners reveal little more than 
that the Tibetans had a reputation in neighbouring countries for `strange ways and rare 
magical powers' (1962: 61) holds true even for the twentieth century. 
The fantastic has always been a part of image/knowledge about Tibet: works have 
drawn upon an archive of pre-existing representations. First contact between British 
and Tibetans was made in the late eighteenth century. Letters and gifts from the 
Panchen Lama (referred to by contemporary writings as Teshoo or Tashi Lama) to 
Warren Hastings both before and after the first British mission to Tibet (under George 
Bogle)20 in 1774-75 did not fall into an imaginative vacuum. Indeed, they activated 
ancient rumours and vague fragments of knowledge that had been steadily 
accumulating over the centuries (Bishop 1989: 29). It seems that the ancient Greeks 
had heard rumours about Tibet too. In 1924, Charles Bell mentioned that Herodotus' 
account refers to a rumour about a race of enormous ants that delved for gold in a 
country north-west of India (Sharma and Sharma 1996: 83-4). Ptolemy spoke of the 
therefore open to change (McNay 1994: 67). 
19 Rumour and gossip also had direct political implications. For instance, British Viceroy in 
India, Lord Curzon's insistence on sending an expedition to Tibet was fuelled by bazaar gossip 
and rumours about activities of Buriyat monk Dorjieff (considered as Russian spy) and a Sino- 
Russian deal (on Tibet) around the summer of 1902. The Viceroy himself said: `I am myself a 
firm believer in the existence of a secret understanding, if not a secret treaty' (Mehra 1968: 
151). Interestingly, the scare of a Russian intrigue died out soon as there was no evidence of 
substantial Russian secret activities in Tibet. But it did play an important role in changing 
radically the political landscape in which Tibet operated as modern Western ideas of 
international relations made a forceful entry. 
20 Warren Hastings commissioned George Bogle to explore the prospect for trade, get some 
`curiosities', and gather more information. In addition, he provided Bogle with a historical 
memorandum (based on available sources) written by himself, where apart from other things, 
he mentions: `It is said that in Tibet it is very common for one lady to have several husbands. I 
should wish to know if this practice obtains in all ranks of society, and whether those husbands 
who all have intercourse with one woman have not likewise other women that are their wives, 
with whom likewise they hold an intercourse in common' (Bernstein 2000). 
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nation of the Dabasa, which may be a Roman transliteration of the modern province 
of U in central Tibet and also referred to ants that were gold diggers (Francke 1907: 
14-16). Franciscan Friar William in his Journeys to the Eastern Parts of the World 
during the mid thirteenth century was the first to make reference to `incarnate lamas' 
and all he said about the Tibetans was that they `were held an abomination among all 
nations' because of a habit they once had of eating their parents upon death 
(MacGregor 1970: 15). At the end of the thirteenth century Franciscan ascetic Odorico 
of Pordenone went East and wrote the following account about Tibet (it is doubtful if 
he even travelled across it): women have `a couple of tusks as long as those of wild 
boars', and to pay respect to his dead father, a son after rituals `takes his father's head, 
and straightaway cooks it and eats it' (Ibid.: 20). The legendary traveller Marco Polo 
(1958) too refers to `Tebet' (sic) in late thirteenth century. Apart from other things 
(such as cannibalising of human beings put to death by the authorities, `canes of 
immense size and girth', natives as idolators and `out-and-out bad' [79-80,142,144]), 
Marco Polo fetishises Asian promiscuity. He stresses on marriage custom where `no 
man would ever on any account take a virgin to wife' for `a woman is worthless unless 
she has had knowledge of many men', and therefore Tibetans offer their women to 
travellers to `lie with them' and thus make them fit for marriage (but once is marriage 
takes place, it is a `grave offence for any man to touch another's wife') (142-3). He 
jokes: `Obviously the country is a fine one to visit for a lad from sixteen to twenty- 
four' (144). 
While early missionaries' main interest in Tibet was to find traces of Christianity, by 
the seventeenth century there was a realisation that though there might be similarities 
between Tibetan religion and Catholicism, Tibetans were not Christians. Portuguese 
merchant Diogo d'Almeida was probably the first to mention the word `lama' in the 
Western vocabulary (Richardson 1988: 23). While some missionaries - for instance 
Jesuits Stephen Cacella and John Cabral in the early seventeenth century and Ippolito 
Desideri in the early eighteenth century - were more open-minded, others like Johann 
Grueber and Albert D'Orville in the early seventeenth century and the Capuchin 
missionaries (early eighteenth century) were less accommodating. Grueber and 
D'Orville, the first Europeans to visit Lhasa, declined to meet the Dalai Lama, 
describing him as `that devilish god the father who puts to death those who refuse to 
adore him' (Richardson 1988: 23). In 1762, Italian Capuchin Antonio Giorgi 
published Alphabetum Tibetanum Missionum Apostolicarum (a Latin-Tibetan 
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dictionary of 35,000 words) based on the works of Capuchin Father Francesco Orazio 
della Penna (who lived and studied in Tibet from 1716-1732). Here he collected 
`facts' and `myths' about Tibet and in his equation of some Tibetan gods with ancient 
Egyptian gods, one can see the beginning of a view, which later became an essential 
part of Exotica Tibet, of `Tibet as a secret abode of prolific syncretism' (Kaschewsky 
2001: 18). While George Bogle and Samuel Turner headed two British missions to 
Tibet toward the end of the eighteenth century, in 1811 Thomas Manning went to 
Lhasa in a personal capacity (Markham 1876). The only other foreigners to stay in 
Lhasa during the entire nineteenth century were French Lazarist missionaries Evariste 
Regis Huc and Joseph Gabet. The fact that Tibet was closed to foreigners led to 
Europeans investing even more fantasies in Tibet. It also led to a `race for Lhasa', 21 
competition among the explorers and adventurers to be the first into the `Forbidden 
City'. 
The paucity of first hand accounts until the beginning of the twentieth century did not 
mean the absence of Tibet (and its `Grand Lama') from the Western thought-scape. 
Rather, it allowed the investment of all sorts of fantasies and negative evaluation into 
the idea of Tibet. Honore de Balzac made an indirect reference in the novel Old Goriot 
(1835) when he talked of `a kind of involuntary, mechanical, and instinctive reverence 
for the Grand Lama of every Ministry' (Bishop 2001: 205, emphasis added by 
Bishop), using Grand Lama as a metaphor for absolute executive power. Earlier in 
1762 Jean-Jacques Rousseau had criticised Tibetan religion as the `religion of the 
priest' (Lopez 1998: 23). Johann Herder called Tibetans `a rough mountain people, 
whose religion is both inhumane and intransigent', while for Immanuel Kant Tibetan 
21 Who would count as competitors in this race was of course to be decided by the British. 
Native explorers and spies (known as pundits) like Sarat Chandra Das who managed to reach 
Lhasa and made geographical mapping of Tibet possible were ineligible, even though they too 
had to travel in disguise, either because native surveyors `become so engrossed with the details 
of their work that they forget to use their eyes and make those general observations on the 
people and the scenery about them which is a most important objective of their journeying' 
(Holdich 1906: 233) or because `suffering from the limitations of disguise and the need to 
move principally among the lower orders of society, [they] produced more valuable reports on 
topography and communications than on social, economic, and political conditions in Tibet' 
(Richardson 1962: 74) or simply because `it was easier for the Asiatics and therefore the race 
was among the Europeans' (Hopkirk 1983: 157). This comes as no surprise because in the 
imperialist imagination, exploration was a possession of civilised man. In his biography of 
Richard Francis Burton, Byron Farwell (1963) begins by stating that "`the explorer is always a 
civilized man; exploration is an advanced intellectual concept". Therefore, he argues, it is a 
concept unknown to primitive peoples, and one that remains incomprehensible to women' 
(Kabbani 1986: 86). 
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religion was the religion of mystics, pantheists, and fanatics (Rinpoche 2001: 381). 
Using Giorgi's Alphabetum Tibetanum, Kant (1795) does conjecture that if certain 
aspects of Greek mysticism grew from what he thought were similar Tibetan notions 
and posits, then there might have been an early traffic between Europe and China 
through Tibet. 22 
Thus, we see that evaluation of Tibet and its people was based on an archive that made 
very little distinction between myths, legends, hearsay, and facts. Western writers 
constructed `facts' not by referring to the place of Tibet but through repetition and 
cross-reference. There were only three European works on Tibetan Buddhism before 
1895 - Giorgi's Alphabetum Tibetanum (1762), C. F. Koppen's Die Lamaische 
Hierarchie und Kirche (1859) and Emil Schlagintweit's Buddhism in Tibet (1863) - 
all were compilations by authors who had never been in contact with Tibetans. In 1895 
L. Austine Waddell, who went on to become the `authority par excellence' on Tibet, 
published his Tibetan Buddhism (1972) based on known `facts' and interaction with 
some Tibetan Buddhists on the Indian border. The conclusion of his `scientific' study 
would come as a shock to a contemporary audience, which is used to seeing Tibetan 
Buddhism and the Dalai Lama in a positive light: 
[W]ith all their strivings and the costly services of their priests, the Tibetans never 
attain peace of mind. They have fallen under the double ban of menacing demons and 
despotic priests. So it will be a happy day, indeed, for Tibet when its sturdy 
overcredulous people are freed from the intolerable tyranny of the Lämas, and 
delivered from the devils whose ferocity and exacting worship weigh like a nightmare 
upon all (Waddell 1972: 573). 
Waddell was so much imbued with his own Aryan superiority that after visiting Tibet 
for the first time (he was the cultural `expert' during the 1903-04 Lhasa mission), he 
found nothing new to add to his book which, he remarks, `had never been superceded' 
(Stoddard 2001: 240). The examples of these writers show that despite the Western 
Enlightenment's claim to the sanctity of scientific observation, `authority' had more to 
do with imperialism and ethnocentrism. This construction of Tibet, of the `Orient', 
through self-referencing (where the self is the `West'), is well captured by Said's 
concept of `strategic formation' that we discussed earlier: `Every writer on the Orient 
22 Alluding to the possibility of Tibet's interaction with Europe in medieval ages, Lynne White 
points out that the appearance in Italy in the fifteenth century almost simultaneously of three 
items closely related to Tibetan mechanised prayer - the vertical axle windmill, the hot-air 
turbine, and the ball-and-chain governor - makes independent Italian invention improbable 
(1960: 520). 
96 
(and this is true even of Homer) assumes some Oriental precedent, some previous 
knowledge of the Orient, to which he (sic) refers and on which he relies' (Said 1978: 
20). 
In the academic study of Tibet and Tibetans the popular is never wholly absent. The 
fact that Tibet was never colonised by Europeans meant that there was `no factory for 
the production of official knowledge', leaving only unofficial knowledge, produced by 
travellers and enthusiasts, `gifted amateurs' ; `institutes, libraries, archives, and 
museums were not created, either in Tibet or in a European metropole' (Lopez 1998: 
157,161). This facilitated creation of a utopian archive best evident in Hilton's Lost 
Horizon (1933). Shangri-la for Hilton is a secret `archive state' hidden somewhere in 
the mountains of Central Asia (Neilson 95-7). The High Lama here has a strategic 
conception of a utopian archive (with the best of Western and Eastern worlds), a 
fortress as well as a museum, a survivalist archive: Shangri-la here `represented an 
archive achieved and maintained by the state (here, explicitly as a state) without 
recourse to military force' (Richards 1992: 124-5,128). The twinning of 
wisdom/archive/library with contemporary Tibet is also seen in the sentiments of 
many Western supporters of Tibet. For instance, Hollywood actor Richard Gere, 
probably the most famous supporter of the Tibetan cause, said in an interview: `Now 
the Tibetan situation right now is pretty amazing because they are the repository of all 
this extraordinary wisdom, at the time their libraries have been destroyed almost 
entirely by the Chinese. Bits and pieces of books come in from nomads and all over 
Asia, it's extraordinary to see these libraries come piece together' (Frontline 1998b). 
The role of the archive, in its more conventional sense of a collection of texts, is also 
relevant for our discussion here. Direct correlation between imperialism and the 
gathering of information can also be seen through the Tibet-related collection of the 
British Library - the majority of documents stem from central and southern 
Tibet, due 
to British political interests of the time. The volume of `acquisition' of Tibetan books 
mirrored political events - not surprisingly the first and the biggest wave of new 
acquisitions (later called the Waddell or Lhasa collection) of the India Office Library 
and British Museum's Oriental Collection reached Britain in 1905 and consisted of 
books collected during the Younghusband expedition (Pagel 1990). The close 
connection between imperialism and Orientalism, the assertion of political influence 
and information gathering, power and knowledge is exemplified in the Younghusband 
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expedition. It had `scientific' staff consisting of surveyors, naturalists, geologists, 
anthropologists (Younghusband, in the introduction to Hayden 1927: vii) - of course, 
their military and `scientific' roles overlapped. For instance, Waddell was an authority 
on Tibetan Buddhism, a medical officer, as well as a collector of texts, plants, 23 and 
birds. The encyclopedist Waddell and the imperialist Waddell were not separate, but 
inextricably linked. The Western self was constituted by imperialism and Orientalism, 
by power and knowledge 
By the end of the nineteenth century, Tibet, formerly a blank space on the map, 
became one of the most overcoded spaces in the British empire even though it was 
outside it (see Richards 1992: 109). The imaginative space of Tibet was coded through 
various representational strategies, some complementary, others contradictory. We 
shall now look at some other strategies that helped to construct Exotica Tibet. 
4B. ii. Gaze 
Surveillance is another strategy through which, under an over-powering gaze, the non- 
Western subject is rendered a knowable, visible object of disciplinary power. The gaze 
is not about innocent curiosity: `to gaze implies more than to look at - it signifies a 
psychological relationship of power, in which the gazer is superior to the object of the 
gaze' (Schroeder 1998: 208). Through observation, examination and interpretation 
objects are differentiated, categorised, and identified, and made ready to be acted 
23 Waddell, along with Captain Walton, is credited with `discovering' the Lhasa poppy 
(Fletcher 1975: xxi). Similarly the blue poppy's scientific name is Meconopsis baileyi, named 
after its `discoverer', Lieutenant-Colonel FM Bailey; the wild sheep argali and Tibet antelope 
chiru are Ovis ammon hodgsoni and Pantholops hodgsoni after Brian Hodgson, the British 
resident at the Nepalese court. This practice is reflective of the Orient as a passive object to be 
discovered and appropriated by the West. Tibetans (and maybe many non-Tibetans too) were 
familiar with the flower all along. But it required a Western `man' to name it, taxonomise it in 
a `universal' scheme of things, and thus become its discoverer. Interestingly, in the movie The 
Face of Fu Manchu (1965), the eponymous villain learns how to distil a vicious poison from 
the `Black Hill poppy' of Tibet thanks to the papers of the Younghusband expedition where the 
complete secret of the plant is meticulously laid down. In some instances scientific names are 
hybrid such as Ovis ammon dalailamae przevalskii (1888) (named after the Dalai Lama and a 
Russian explorer Nikolai Przhevalsky) for one variant of argali, the wild sheep. As for the 
ideology of discovery, it has no existence of its own. As Mary Pratt points out, 
It only gets `made' for real after the traveler (or other survivor) returns home, and 
brings it into being through texts: a name on a map, a report to the Royal 
Geographical Society, the Foreign Office, the London Mission Society, a diary, a 
lecture, a travel book. Here is language charged with making the world in the most 
singlehanded way, and with high stakes (1992: 204). 
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upon. Objectification (fixing its essence) of the gazed goes hand in hand with its 
subjectification - gaze and surveillance are productive of identity of the gazed. 
Statistical study shows that `those who are culturally defined by the West as weak - 
women, children, people of colour, the poor, the tribal rather than modern, those 
without technology - are more likely to face the camera' (Lutz and Collins 1994: 370). 
Surveillance as an Orientalist strategy of representing the Other and rendering it 
disciplined is characterised by the all-knowing gaze of a white `man', the colonial 
master, the West. It enables both the visual possession of the body of the gazed and an 
interposition of technique which safely conceals the body of the gazer (Spurr 1993: 
22). Observations then are presented as dispassionate, objective, facts. The gaze is 
disembodied - statements are made as if there is no seer behind the observations. As 
soon as we insist on `embodying the gaze' (Urry 2001) and emphasising the 
corporeality of the gazer, we become aware of the wider context in which she/he is 
operating. Observations can then be seen as stylised facts. 
This is not to say that non-Westerners are visually impaired, powerless to gaze back at 
the West. But, the authority of imperialism for a large part of the modem period 
ensured that mastery and control remained a possession of Western `man'. The 
`monarch of all I survey' rhetorical gesture remained peculiar to the West (see Pratt 
1992: 201). Establishment of mastery through surveillance, gaze, and observation 
were accompanied by establishment of some sort of dominance over the object of the 
gaze. Appropriation was done in the name of scientific curiosity, ethnographic 
material gathering, protection of simple masses from their own despotic rulers, or the 
spread of progress. 
By the early twentieth century, the notion of blunt, brutal imperialism was often given 
up in favour of the rhetoric of more `liberal and benevolent' imperialism (although this 
was more for domestic consumption as the colonised continued to suffer both physical 
and epistemic violence). This was reflected in the prominence of what Pratt calls `anti- 
conquest' - `the strategies of representation whereby European bourgeoisie subjects 
seek to secure their innocence in the same moment as they assert European hegemony' 
(1992: 7). British colonial and military officials who went inside Tibet often wrote 
their accounts as scientific exploration, or as exciting adventure (see Bailey 1957), or 
simply as `everyday' observation (see Gordon 1876: v). Behind the innocent sounding 
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descriptions of travel like the `narrative of a plant hunter's adventures and discoveries' 
(Ward 1934) lay the violence of imperialism. Though their gaze might be considered 
as one of adventurer or romantic in Europe, the effect was the same as some steely- 
eyed militarist - the establishment and institutionalisation of control through political 
rule and knowledge formation. To know is to possess, especially if there is a huge 
asymmetry of power. Such asymmetry led to situations where it was perfectly 
acceptable for a participant in the Lhasa mission of 1903-04 to say: `In fact the visible 
riches and treasures of Lhasa fairly made our mouths water. The Tibetans however 
would not sell, and to our honour be it said; although Lhasa was a fair object to loot, 
and lay in our power, not a farthings worth was forcibly [author adds this word in pen 
in a typed text] taken from it' (Iggulden n. d.: 6, emphasis added). 
Paradoxically, the project of rendering the Other knowable and the image of it as 
primitive and simple went had in hand with recognition that there are elements of 
inscrutability and mystery that eluded complete understanding of the Other. 24 While 
discussing his own failure to understand the unease of Phuntsog, a Tibetan who is no 
longer an `authentic' native as he has learnt the language of the imperialist, Candler 
calls him a `strange hybrid product of restless western energies, stirring and muddying 
the shallows of the Eastern mind. Or are they depths? Who knows? I know nothing, 
only that these men are inscrutable, and one cannot see into their hearts' (1905: 206). 
Frustrated with the inaccessibility, invisibility and inscrutability of `the Orientals', 
Western desire subjects it to a relentless investigation. Veil becomes a metaphor for all 
that invites, titillates, and yet resists Western knowing. Therefore, 
It is no surprise that there are countless accounts and representations of the veil and 
the veiled women in Western discourses, all made in an effort to reveal the hidden 
secrets of the Orient. . . 
The veil is one of those tropes through which Western fantasies 
of penetration into the mysteries of the Orient and access to the interiority of the other 
are fantasmatically achieved (Yegenoglu 1998: 39). 
Surveillance and gaze seek to render `subjects knowable, visible objects of 
disciplinary power' (Doty 1996b: 11). They facilitate other representational strategies 
that seek to fix the Orient, the Other, particularly those that seek to classify, 
differentiate and provide identity to the Other (and in turn to the self). 
24 The motif of inscrutability also affects critics of dominant representations. A black critic 
Benjamin Brawley (the author of The negro in literature and art [1918]), wrote in 1922, 
`Gentle as a child, he [the `negro'] has also the strength of Hercules. The more we think we 
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4Biii. Differentiation - classification 
Differentiation and Classification, two crucial factors in the formation of the modem 
subject (Foucault 1984: 7-11) are also evident in Western representations of the Other. 
The ideational differentiation between the West and the Rest underpins these 
representations. It also provides `identity' to other cultures. The need to articulate 
one's personal and collective self in terms of identity comes from an internalisation of 
this principle of differentiation. Classification occupies a central place in any account 
of non-Western people in the Western media25 of representation. It polices discourse, 
assigns positions, regulates groups, and enforces boundaries (Spurr 1993: 63). What 
Lobsang Rampa26 says about his own treatment in the West partially reflects the 
dominant Western attitude toward the exhibition of Oriental curiosities: 
`Unfortunately, western people looked upon me as a curio, as a specimen who should 
be put in a cage and shown off as a freak from the unknown. It made me wonder what 
would happen to my old friends, the Yetis, if the westerners got hold of them- as they 
are trying to do' (Rampa 1959: 9). Given the taxonomising predilection and conceit of 
Western imperialism, we can hardly disagree with Rampa's conjecture about the fate 
of the yetis: `(If) Western Man had his way, our poor old yetis would be captured, 
dissected, and preserved in spirit' (1956: 220). 
While some classifications may be essential for understanding, often the classification 
of non-Western peoples went hand in hand with the hierarchisation and racialisation27 
know him the more unfathomable he is' (quoted in Nelson 1926: 13; emphasis added). 
25 Media here is used for all sorts of institutions and practices that are involved in representing 
`other' cultures for the consumption in the West. 
26 I shall discuss his work in great detail in the next chapter. Here it is sufficient to point out 
that he claimed to be a Tibetan monk in an Englishman's body. Tibetan specialists considered 
him a fraud and revealed that he had never been to Tibet or even outside England when he 
wrote his first book in 1956 opening with: `I am a Tibetan. One of the few who have reached 
this strange Western world' (9). This revelation did not prevent his works from becoming best 
sellers and from reputable newspapers hailing his accounts as authentic. 
27 The nineteenth and twentieth century obsession with racialising culture can be seen in the 
case of Tibetans too where different commentators sought to identify characteristics of the 
Tibet `race'. A typical example was Graham Sandberg who was unflattering in his comments 
about the `Tibetan race as "a weak and cowardly people, their pusillanimity rendering them 
readily submissive"' (in Bonnington 2000: 9). The fact that racism has less to do with colour 
and more to do with power relations becomes evident in the British treatment of Irish as 
`coloured' during the nineteenth century. In 1880, Gustave de Molinari wrote that England's 
largest newspapers `allow no occasion to escape them of treating the Irish as an inferior race - 
as a kind of white negroes [sic]' (McClintock 1995: 52). The dominant English stereotype of 
the Irish (and other `white negroes' like the working class, the Jews, and prostitutes) as a 
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of cultures. At the top were the white Europeans and at the bottom were `primitive' 
Africans. Chinese, Arabs, Indians, and others occupied different positions in the 
hierarchical table (see for instance Hunt 1987). 
For Darwin, the map of the world is a great table which places the various peoples 
side by side, while his investigation of their functions and characters shows them to 
exist at different stages in a process of improvement whose end or highest point is 
represented by modem European civilization. The principle in natural history of 
internal organic structure is thus transferred to the classification of humanity in two 
ways, referring to moral or intellectual character in the human mind as well as to the 
social and political character of human society. These two subjects of valuation, 
moreover, remain intimately connected insofar as the higher orders of technology and 
government reflect greater capacity for reason and human feeling (Spurr 1993: 64). 
Often an economy of stereotyping is at work in the classificatory process, permitting a 
quick and easy image without the responsibility of specificity and accuracy (Doty 
1996b: 10). These systematic classifications of indigenous people according to their 
relative complexity of social organisation arose from the modes of inquiry which tried 
to give themselves the status of science and directly served the interests of 
colonialism. Science was used to `prove' Western superiority over `primitive' natives 
and within the Western eyes, justified the conquering of the Other. Classifying and 
hierarchising were often the rhetorical supplement to colonialism's divide and rule 
strategy. Filipinos were thus represented as `a jumble of savage tribes', allowing the 
U. S. colonisers to be represented as the `builders of nations and peoples rather than 
destroyers and exterminators' (Doty 1996b: 36). Evolutionism28 - the idea that 
biological as well as social and intellectual life develops in stages from simple and 
primitive to more complex and sophisticated forms - remains dominant in the mental 
landscape of the West as well as of the elite in several parts of the non-West. For 
instance, the state developmental practices in China and India ride roughshod over the 
rights and dignity of indigenous people in the name of progress - social groups are 
considered to occupy different hierarchical stages of social evolution with the urban 
simianized and degenerate race was based on what Anne McClintock calls the iconography of 
`domestic degeneracy' (Ibid.: 53, emphasis in original). Captain William Frederick O'Connor 
observation about Tibet is illustrative: `Common people are cheerful, happy-go-lucky 
creatures, absurdly like the Irish in their ways, and sometimes even in their features' (in 
Sharma and Sharma 1996: 191). On the other hand, French traveller Alexandra David-Neel 
finds that dobdobs, the Lhasa monk `police', looks like a `real negro' (1936: 105). 
28 As McClintock points out, in the nineteenth century, `With social Darwinism, the taxonomic 
project, first applied to nature, was now applied to cultural history. Time became a geography 
of social power, a map from which they read a global allegory of "natural" social difference' 
(1995: 37). Charles Darwin himself observes, `the varieties of man seem to act on each other in 
the same way as different species of animals - the stronger always expirating the weaker' 
(quoted in Spurr 1993: 161). 
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elite at the pinnacle. Differentiation, classification and identification, when combined 
with racialisation, evolutionism and hierarchisation lead to the debasement and 
negation of some and the idealisation of others. 
4Biv. Debasement - idealisation 
The seemingly opposite tropes of debasement (and its corollary negation) and 
idealisation (and its corollary affirmation) have similar rhetorical structures; all 
involve processes of decontextualisation and othering. In terms of Western 
representations of the non-West, the binary of the noble/ignoble savage has been a 
product of such discursive practices. 29 The ease with which writers and observers have 
switched between highly negative and eulogising appraisals of Tibetan culture is 
illustrative. Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Tibetans were seen as 
either `backward and barbaric or noble and charming' (Dodin and Rather 2001: 397). 
Natives have been debased and associated with filth and dirt countless times. `In 
colonial discourse every individual weakness has its political counterpart - uncivilized 
society, according to this logic, being little more than the uncivilized mind and body 
writ large' (Spurr 1993: 76). The discourse of contamination and disease was used to 
enforce colonial oppression and to inculcate a sense of inferiority in the colonised 
peoples. Even today the third world is symbolically constructed as a site of filth and 
contamination. This has particularly been the case with representations of Tibet and 
Lhasa. Manning, the first Englishman to visit Lhasa in 1811 wrote: 
There is nothing striking, nothing pleasing in its appearance. The inhabitants are 
begrimed with dirt and smut. The avenues are full of dogs, some growling and 
gnawing bits of hide which lie about in profusion and emit a charnel-house smell; 
others limping and looking livid; others ulcerated; others starved and dying, and 
pecked at by ravens; some dead and preyed upon. In short, everything seems mean 
and gloomy, and excites the idea of something unreal. Even the mirth and laughter of 
the inhabitants I thought dreamy and ghostly (quoted in Chapman 1992: 146-7). 
29 While for some, like Rousseau, the state of nature presented an age of innocence, for many 
of his contemporaries and later day commentators, nature is inferior to culture. For John Stuart 
Mill `The ways of Nature are to be conquered, not obeyed ... [the notion of 
innocence is] a mere 
fancy picture, contradicted by all the realities of savage life. Savages are always liars. They 
have not the faintest notion of truth as a virtue' (in Spun 1993: 159-60). Thus, both Rousseau 
and Mill agree on one thing - the essence of the native as being closely linked to nature. Where 
they differ is implication this essence has: while for Rousseau this implies a noble savage, for 
Mill it implies an ignoble one. 
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The British Foreign Office report in its section on `geography' felt under compulsion 
to allude to the poor sanitary conditions and the `gruesome custom' of the disposal of 
the dead by cutting them into pieces and leaving them to be devoured by vultures, 
dogs, and pigs (1920: 22). Japanese traveller Ekai Kawaguchi called Lhasa a 
`metropolis of filth' (Hopkirk 1983: 151). George Knight, the leader of the 1922-23 
British expedition to Tibet `affirms' the truth of various labels attached to Tibet: it is a 
land of mountains, monasteries and monks, land of women, dogs and dirt, country of 
the great unwashed (Knight 1930: 25). This presumption about a universal norm of 
cleanliness is evident even in recent years, as seen in Lee Feigon's comments that 
cleanliness and sanitation rank low on the Tibetan scale of priorities (1996: 11). 
Unequivocal condemnation of Tibetans for being `dirty' began to be changed from 
early in the twentieth century as some visitors starting re-evaluating the dominant 
Western stance. 30 F. Spencer Chapman amended his preconceived conclusions about 
Lhasa: `It is true that the common people do not wash, that their houses are, by our 
standards, filthy, and that they live in a state of serfdom - but what a delightful folk, 
nevertheless. What finer men are there in the world than the nomads of the Chang 
Tang? ' (1992: 146) 
Debasement of the natives often accompanied the strategy of negation by which 
Western writings conceive of the Other as absence, emptiness, nothingness, thus 
denying Other its agency, its history, and often, its language. Negation serves to erase 
what one sees in order to clear `a space for the expansion of the colonial imagination 
and for the pursuit of desire' (Spurr 1993: 92-3). This, in colonial times, led to ground 
clearing for the expansion of colonial rule. Use of the metaphor of `virgin' for most 
territories, despite the fact that they were home to many cultures and people, 
facilitated their appropriation by the colonisers. Within these `blank spaces the West 
may write such things as civilization, progress, modernization, and democracy. 
Imperial encounters become missions of deliverance and salvation rather than 
conquests and exploitations' (Doty 1996b: 11). 
Idealisation and affirmation often exist along with negation and debasement. As we 
shall discuss in more detail in the next chapter, idealisation and affirmation as 
30 British supermarket Tesco is advertising for `Tibet' range of haircare (with names such as 
`rebirth' and `balance'), promising `beauty through balance'. Indeed, `Tibet' has come a long 
way from being a `country of the great unwashed'. 
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rhetorical tropes went on overdrive in the case of Western representations of Tibet. To 
put it more accurately, Tibet provided an empty imaginative space over which all sorts 
of Western desires could play. Apart from idealisation and debasement, there was 
often a sense of sameness in Western writings about Tibet. Paradoxically, despite its 
difference, Tibet was often seen as the non-Western culture with which Europeans 
could identify. Didier, in his account of the Portuguese Jesuit Antonio de Andrade, 
points out that he looked at Tibet in terms of a `rediscovery of a lost friend or a lost 
brother' (Kaschewsky 2001: 7). It has been mentioned above that while early 
Christians sought traces of forgotten community of Christians here, theosophists 
looked for the lost brotherhood of wise hermits. In the mid-nineteenth century, Joseph 
Wolff popularised the idea of a long-lost population of Jews in the Himalayas (Feigon 
1996: 14-15). On the other hand, the Nazi SS sent an expedition in 1938-39 to 
ascertain whether Tibet was an abode of true Aryans or not. Thus, we can see that 
there are various ways in which often conflicting desires of the West got invested in 
Tibet. One such set of conflicting desires is eroticisation/ moralisation. 
4B. v. Eroticisation - moralisation 
Eroticisation and moralisation are another set of tropes prevalent in representations 
(both visual and textual) of the non-West. Reference to the licentiousness and 
voracious sexual appetite of Orientals/Arabs/Africans is conspicuous in many Western 
fiction and non-fiction writings, and in films. As Malek Alloula writes, 
[a]rrayed in the brilliant colors of exoticisms and exuding a full-blown yet uncertain 
sensuality, the Orient, where unfathomable mysteries dwell and cruel and barbaric 
scenes are staged, has fascinated and disturbed Europe for a long time.... Oriental ism, 
both pictorial and literary.... Has set the stage for the deployment of phantasms. There 
is no phantasm, though, without sex ... (1998: 317). 
The Orient becomes the `fertile' ground on which the sexual fantasies of Western 
`men' (mainly though not exclusively) is played out. The ideas of sexual innocence 
and experience, sexual domination and submissiveness play out a complex dance in 
the discourse of `the West and the Rest' (Hall 1992: 302). An image of the erotic is 
often combined with moralisation. 
One important reason for eroticisation, of course, has been to escape from 
conventional censorship in metropolitan societies. Association is made between the 
Orient and the `freedom of licentious sex' and `escapism of sexual fantasy' (Said 
1978: 190). Contemporary incarnations of such images can be seen in a whole range 
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of places, from sex tourism in Thai beaches to the standardisation of `Oriental' sex as 
a commodity in the `red light' districts of Europe. At the same time, the Orient also 
provides opportunities for the play of `forbidden' desires of same-sex love, especially 
male homosexuality and `sodomy', as evident in the works of William Beckford, Lord 
Byron, T. E. Lawrence - the `Lawrence of Arabia', Edward Carpenter, and E. M. 
Forster (see Parsons 1997), to name a few. Investment of these `forbidden' desires in 
the non-West may be a resistance to the hegemonic masculinity of metropolitan 
culture, but it does not challenge the unequal power relations between the Western 
representer and the non-Western represented. 
The very language of exploration has always been marked by strong gender 
distinctions and drew much of its subconscious force from sexual imagery. The 
famous engraving of Theodore Galle (1580) after drawing by Jan van de Straet (1575) 
America represents Amerigo Vespucci's `discovery of Americas' (see at Ideology of 
America n. d. ). It was seen literally as 'dis-covering' of the unknown land, un-covering 
of the naked, available, desirable and primitive female body of America by the 
clothed, civilised European man. The gendering of the process of colonial discovery is 
reflected in its representations. Therefore, we need to consider the 
writing subject's textualization of the body of the Other, neither as mere description 
nor as genuine encounter but rather as an act of symbolic violence, mastery, and self- 
empowerment; and the tendency of such discursive representation to assume a 
narrative form, to manifest itself as a `historied body' - in particular, as a mode of 
symbolic action whose agent is gendered masculine and whose object is gendered 
feminine (Montrose 1993: 182). 
The intent to subjugate indigenous people can be seen as the male's mastery of the 
female. 31 `To perceive the East as a sexual domain, and to perceive the East as a 
domain to be colonial, were complementary aspirations' (Kabbani 1986: 59). The 
feminisation of colonial space is an act of epistemic as well as corporeal violence. 
McClintock argues forcefully, 
(T)he feminizing of the land is both a poetics of ambivalence and a politics of 
violence. The `discoverers' - filthy, ravenous, unhealthy and evil-smelling as they 
most likely were, scavenging along the edges of their known world and beaching on 
the fatal shores of their `new' worlds, their limbs pocked with abscess and ulcers, their 
minds infested by fantasies of the unknown - had stepped far beyond any sanctioned 
guarantees. Their unsavory rages, their massacres and rapes, their atrocious rituals of 
31 Kabbani argues that the `European was led into the East by sexuality, by the embodiment of 
it in a woman or a young boy. He entered an imaginary harem when entering the metaphor of 
the Orient, weighed down by inexpressible longings. ' (1986: 67; emphasis added). 
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militarized masculinity sprang not only from the economic lust for spices, silver and 
gold, but also from the implacable rage of paranoia (McClintock 1995: 28). 32 
The feminised landscape titillated and provoked explorers and discovers to take 
control of her, to possess her - this was a common sentiment expressed in exploration 
literature from fifteenth century onwards. Illustrative is `Waiting to be Won', a 
cartoon in the Punch magazine on 5 June 1875. It had a pin-up of `the White Ladye of 
the Pole' (sic) and the verses overleaf celebrate how the white Witch-Maiden sitting 
above the Pole `Draws manly hearts with strange desire to lift her icy veil' (in 
Spufford 1996: 9, emphases added). The cartoon expresses a combination of the 
gendering, sexualisation and eroticisation of `unexplored' places. Edward William 
Lane's described his first sight of Egypt in 1825 thus, `As I approached the shore, I 
felt like an Eastern bridegroom, about to lift the veil of his bride, and to see, for the 
first time, the features that were to charm, or disappoint, or disgust him' (in Kabbani 
1986: 67). 
These erotics of imperial conquest evident in the evocation of feminised space were 
linked to the Enlightenment's pursuit of truth. After all, `study, understanding, 
knowledge, evaluation... are instruments of conquest' (Said 1978: 309). European 
consciousness is encoded as masculine and the object of knowledge as feminine. 
All too often, Enlightenment metaphysics presented knowledge as a relation of power 
between two gendered spaces, articulated by a journey and a technology of 
conversion: the male penetration and exposure of a veiled, female interior; and the 
aggressive conversion of its `secrets' into a visible, male science of the surface 
(McClintock 1995: 23). 
Writing about the Other and production of knowledge about other cultures is treated as 
an encounter within the Orientalist framework. 
The relation between Orientalist and Orient was essentially hermeneutical: standing 
before a distant, barely intelligible civilization or cultural monument, the Orientalist 
scholar reduced the obscurity by translating, sympathetically portraying, inwardly 
grasping the hard-to-reach object. Yet the Orientalist remained outside the Orient, 
32 Overt corporeal violence did not always accompany exploration. As Peter Bishop points out, 
in the case of Tibet, the curiosity was 
primarily visual -a fascination with appearances, with the display of the landscape, 
of the art, the architecture, the costumes, the colours and the light. . . In 
Tibet, 
colonization, conquest, domination, taming, destruction, rape, violation and arrogant 
civilizing were virtually absent and only hovered around the edges of Western 
fantasies (1989: 177). 
Due to `the imaginative potency of Lhasa itself and the very special place it occupied in 
Western fantasies' (Ibid. 178), the mystery of Lhasa evoked respect. `The very vulnerability of 
Lhasa and Tibet added to their femininity for these Western travellers... but the feminine was 
also a source of mystery and, although materially vulnerable, was psychologically and 
spiritually powerful' (Ibid. 279). 
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which, however much it was made to appear intelligible, remained beyond the 
Occident. This cultural, temporal, and geographical distance was expressed in 
metaphors of depth, secrecy, and sexual promise: phrases like `the veils of an Eastern 
bride' of `the inscrutable Orient' passed into the common language. (Said 1978: 222). 
The combination of knowledge and eroticisation is illustrated strongly in Bell's 
statement when he talks of Lhasa as practically `untouched by white men' - `Shut off 
from their outer world by their immense mountain barriers, Tibet still presented a 
virgin field of inquiry' (1928: viii). Fernand Grenard regrets Tibet's closure, her 
foiling of attempts by Europeans to pry her open: `In truth, the Tibetans are one of the 
nations that have changed the least in the course of the centuries and it is greatly to be 
regretted that they are so difficult to access and so obstinately opposed to enquiries' 
(1904: 373). This resonates with Said's analysis of the Middle East in Western 
imagination: `The Middle East is resistant, as any virgin would be, but the male 
scholar wins the prize by bursting open, penetrating through the Gordian knot despite 
the "taxing task"' (Said 1978: 309). Such statements provide us a convenient entry 
point into a discussion on eroticisation of places such as Tibet. 
Literature on Tibet exemplifies a `coherent hermeneutical strategy of feminization and 
eroticization' that makes `gendered difference' (Zamora quoted in Gallagher 1997) the 
dominant meaning of `exotic' places. Not surprisingly, after the British invasion of 
Lhasa in 1903-04, Lord Curzon wrote that `I am almost ashamed of having destroyed 
the virginity of the bride to whom you aspired, viz. Lhasa' in a letter addressed to 
Sven Hedin (a famous Swedish explorer) as the latter described the expedition as `the 
rape of Lhasa' (Schell 2000: 201). On his part, Hedin lost `the longing that had 
possessed [him] to penetrate the Holy City' (Bishop 1989: 176). These writers and 
commentators draw upon a long tradition of what McClintock calls `European porno- 
tropics' treating `male travel as an erotics of ravishment' in which uncertain places 
were figured as `libidinously eroticized' (1995: 22). 
The most prevalent metaphor for the British invasion of Tibet was that of 
4unveiling'. 33 The attitude of these travellers was `almost voyeuristic', the most 
commonly expressed aim being to `get a "peep" at Tibet, or at Lhasa' (Bishop 1989: 
177). Edmund Candler wrote an account of the `unveiling of Lhasa' (1905). P. 
33 For Tibetophiles such as Heinrich Hensoldt and Madame Helena Blavatsky (theosophists), 
the veil was an important metaphor too. But for them it was the Tibetans, especially the Dalai 
108 
Millington, who later wrote his book as `a man in the street', described going to Lhasa 
as `assisting in drawing aside a purdah' and departure as the `show was over' (1905: 
77,199). Writing about Lhasa, Waddell says that the enigma has been solved 
(virginity lost! ) for the 
fairy Prince of `Civilisation' has roused her from her slumbers, her closed doors are 
broken down, her dark veil of mystery is lifted up, and the long-sealed shrine, with its 
grotesque cults and its idolised Grand Lama, shorn of his sham nimbus, have yielded 
up their secrets, and lie disenchanted before our Western eyes. Thus, alas! Inevitably, 
do our cherished romances of old pagan world crumble at the touch of our modern 
hands! (1905: 2). 
This triumphalism (of civilisation over obstinacy) was mixed with regret and a sense 
of inevitability with a sense of betrayal. For `Shangri-la' is conceptualised as `a 
virginal state: once defiled by foreign invasion, modernization or internal political 
strife, it is as if some kind of betrayal has taken place' (Hutt 1996: 52). Candler 
expresses this mixed emotions when he says, `To-morrow, when we enter Lhasa, we 
will have unveiled the last mystery of the East. There are no more forbidden. Why 
could we have not left at least one city out of bounds? ' (in Sharma and Sharma 1996: 
119). 
Eroticisation was not the only representational strategy deployed by the West when 
gendering the Orient. Moralisation was an effective tool too. Morality was seen as a 
sign of progress. European bourgeois morality came to represent the pinnacle of 
civilisation. This was contrasted with a `lack' of morality amongst natives, `Orientals', 
working classes, and so on. The policing of morality primarily involved policing 
women's bodies. Hence, cultures (like that of Tibet) where this sort of policing was 
negligible were seen as immoral. A common idea amongst travellers and 
commentators was that Tibetans ranked low in terms of morality and the `freedom' 
accorded to women was both a cause and an effect of this low moral standard. A 
discourse of filth and contamination was attached to that on morality and the status of 
women. A member of the British expedition to Lhasa makes the observation: 
Tibetan morals are not of a very high order and there seems to be a good deal of 
promiscuousness in the relations of the lay population. I twice came across parties of 
men and women bathing together in a small stream behind the Potala, which struck 
me as most unusual as the majority of Tibetans are filthy and grimy to a degree 
(Iggulden n. d. 8). 
Lama, who lifted the veil, the other veil, the mystical veil of Isis (Bishop 1989: 182). 
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David Macdonald contended that in Tibet, women have much influence and compared 
with the West, morals are lax (1929: 133-4). Those who showed admiration for 
Tibetan society were not exempt from passing moral judgements about the Tibetans - 
Riencourt argued that Europeans and Americans can learn a lot from the Tibetans as 
amongst them women are `perfectly free' and equal; however, a laxity in sexual 
relations was a sore spot as it lead to rampant sexually transmitted diseases (1950: 
152-3). In contrast to European (and Japanese in the case of Kawaguchi) women, 
Tibetan women are unclean, disrespectful to their husbands, lack character, and hence 
are `objects more to be loved and pitied not respected and adored' (Kawaguchi in 
Sharma and Sharma 1996: 175). Thus, we see that eroticisation and moralisation often 
went hand in hand as representational tropes. 
4B. vi. Chronopolitics 
Chronopolitics, or the politics of time, has played an important role in Western 
representations of the non-Western Other. The Other has been imagined as socially 
and culturally backward (in time) - medieval (feudal like pre-Renaissance Europe), 
archaic (like ancient Egyptians or Mesopotamians), pre-historic (primitive), or simply 
beyond the matrix of time (timeless). The colonial journey and travels of 
contemporary Western commentators is figured as proceeding forward in geographical 
space but backward in historical time. The otherness of non-Western cultures is 
`accepted' as `earlier stages of the evolution of the self' Ashis Nandy quoted in 
Inayatullah and Blaney 1996: 77). This trope, similar to what McClintock calls `the 
invention of anachronistic space', renders non-dominant groups out of history. As she 
discusses, according to the trope of anachronistic space `colonized people - like 
women and the working class in the metropolis - do not inhabit history proper but 
exist in a permanently anterior time within the geographical space of the modern 
empire as anachronistic humans, atavistic, irrational, bereft of human agency - the 
living embodiment of the archaic "primitive" (McClintock 1995: 30). Chronopolitics 
allows generalisations such as `[c]ritical philosophy, the mother of modern 
psychology, is as foreign to the East as to the medieval Europe' (Evans-Wentz 1954: 
xxix). The Other is both a prisoner of time (frozen in certain stage of history) and an 
escapee (outside the time grid, timeless, outside history). The entire range of 
timeframe available under chronopolitics can be illustrated through European 
representations of Tibet and Tibetans during the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries. The world is divided into chronological reserves, and when we enter Tibet, 
we reach a different age, as if `tracts of past time persisted here and there which could 
be visited' (Spufford 1996: 212). 
The most prevalent representation of Tibet was that it was medieval. As a proof of 
Tibetan medieval mentality, Younghusband talks of the abbot from Shigatse: 
Whatever intellectual capacity he may have had was not very apparent to the casual 
observer, and he corrected me when I inadvertently let slip some observation implying 
that the earth was round, and assured me that when I had lived longer in Tibet, and 
had the time to study, I should find that it was not round, but flat, and not circular, but 
triangular, like the bone of a shoulder of mutton (1910: 128). 
Evaluations differed from repugnance to ambiguity to nostalgia, depending on 
perception of Europe's own medieval past. Typical, especially during the British 
invasion in 1903-04, was O'Connor's statement: `[s]triking feature is marked 
resemblance in many points between Tibet at the present time and Europe as it must 
have been during the Middle Ages or up to the time of Reformation. Absolute 
monarchy, feudalism and monasticism- suppressed lower orders as in Tibet' 
(O'Connor in Sharma and Sharma 1996: 90). Anti-Catholic sentiment was palpable. 
As Knight writes, `[a]ll the evils of medieval priestcraft are everywhere obvious in 
Tibet' (Knight 1930: 27). In contrast, some did not find the `medieval flavour' 
repugnant but disagreeable. Candler mused: `The Tibetans are not the savages they are 
depicted. They are civilized, if medieval' (1905: 246) and his feelings were 
`confirmed' as a result of the only incident in 1904 when a Tibetan monk attacked the 
soldiers of occupying British-Indian force. He described how a lama `ran amuck 
outside the camp with the coat of mail and huge paladin's sword concealed beneath 
his cloak, a medieval figure who thrashed the air with his brand like a flail in sheer lust 
of blood. He was hanged medievally the next day within sight of Lhasa' 34 (Ibid.: 265, 
emphases added). Tibet is medieval, and hence feudal and bad. 
However, we see more ambiguity as the twentieth century unfolds: `The political and 
social order of Tibet is several hundred years behind that which now holds in England. 
34 The monk was hanged in full public view to act as a deterrent to any other Tibetan 
contemplating resistance. It is ironic that British justified their own barbarity by blaming it on 
the medieval quality of their field of operation, by putting the responsibility on the victims. 
There are many such examples (for instance, the French barbarity in Algeria, British ferocity in 
Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion, the American mistreatment of Al Qaeeda captives) 
where violent response is justified in the name of inherent proclivities of the victims. 
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Tibetans have an instinct for orderliness and this helps them establish hierarchy on a 
firm basis which in turn aids in the maintenance of order' (Bell 1928: 141). Ambiguity 
is mixed with nostalgia in Chapman's account: `Tibet is in the position of European 
countries in the Middle Ages - in many ways a position which we are bound, 
nowadays, to envy' (1992: 93). The country is run by the monasteries and by the noble 
families. If the son of a merchant or farmer is ambitious he enters a monastery, for 
only there can hope to rise to that position of importance to which he is entitled. But 
there is no unemployment, no underlying feeling of insecurity, and except for those 
who choose begging as a profession - no real poverty' (Ibid.: 92-3) 
The practice of associating modem Tibet with Medieval Europe is common even 
today. A couple who lived and worked in Lhasa for a few months in the 1980s wrote, 
`there seemed less distance culturally between Shakespeare's England and twentieth- 
century Tibet, than between Shakespeare's England and its twentieth century 
counterpart' (Hadfield and Hadfield 1988: 101). Similarly, according to a 
contemporary historian, `Tibet was a medieval society that somehow survived into the 
second half of the 20th Century' (Grunfeld 1987: 31). 
Apart from medievalism, Tibet also was imagined as parallel to the ancient archaic 
world. Potala palace, for Perceval Landon, was `an image of that ancient and 
mysterious faith which has found its last and fullest expression beneath the golden 
canopies of Lhasa' (1905, Volume II: 262). As in writings of theosophists, Tibetan 
Buddhism began to be imagined as forming a direct connection with Ancient Egyptian 
religion. Egyptophilia began merging into Tibetophilia. `It was viewed as a late, and 
perhaps final, flowering of the world's archaic mystery religions' (Bishop 1989: 155). 
Western imagination of Tibet also flirted with the prehistoric and the primitive. During 
this period, primitive meant uncivilised form of human life, lower on the scale of 
social evolution. Hensoldt wrote: 
It would be folly to shut out eyes to the fact that the Thibetans occupy a very low 
position in the scale of human advancement... Their culture is inferior to that of the 
most semi-barbarous races, comparing unfavourable even with that of certain Indian 
tribes of the American continent, such as the Pueblos, Zunis, etc. (quoted in Bishop 
1989: 156). 
Grenard was reminded of `American Redskins' by some of the Tibetans (1904: 72), 
while Chapman wrote, `I sang an Eskimo folk-song and Norbhu [a Tibetan 
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companion] said it was exactly like Tibetan music -a doubtful compliment, but 
interesting, seeing that the Eskimos and Tibetans are, ethnologically speaking, fairly 
closely related' (Chapman 1992: 52). While Hensoldt considered some Tibetans to be 
lower on the human evolutionary scale than many Native Americans, Chapman found 
them 'higher'. However, for Chapman this was regrettable as 
in this country [Tibet] one cannot get to know the people. In Greenland one could 
wander off and be perfectly happy with the Eskimos as long as one could speak the 
language. There one passed as an equal and lived, hunted, and travelled just as they 
did. We did very well without servants. Here it is fundamentally different. In this 
feudal country one is a Sahib ... (1992: 290). 
Christian Meyers (1853) in Conversations-Lexicon writes: `According to the theories 
of many historians, the human race expanded from Tibet and its neighbouring lands, 
not from Asia proper' (Kaschewsky 2001: 19). One most potent emblem of Tibet's 
association with the prehistoric in the Western imagination is the figure of Yeti. 
Though Brian H. Hodgson made the first reference to a yeti-like creature (wild, big, 
hairy men) in the West in 1832, it was not until mid-twentieth century that the legend 
acquired wide circulation. 
Divested of any palaeolithic characteristics, the yeti would then be imagined as a 
remnant of a pre-human missing link, or an evolutionary dead end: it would become 
part of an entirely different imaginative context. [35] But for the late Victorians this 
creature merely emphasized the primevalness of Tibet, both in its fauna[36] and 
landscape and in the superstitions and customs of its people (Bishop 1989: 158). 
As mentioned earlier, primitiveness had different connotations for commentators at 
different point in West's encounter with Tibet. To recapitulate, for some it reflected 
the barbarity of Tibetans, for others it reflected their innocence and even their wisdom 
and vitality. 
Chronopolitics entails not only a fixing of cultures and groups of people in particular 
chronological reserve, but also detemporalising, escaping the imagination from 
confines of time and history. In Western representations, many things, such as the 
Potala Palace represent the timelessness of Tibetan life: `To me the Potala represents 
35 The imaginative potency of the yeti was best illustrated in Tintin in Tibet in which the 
`abominable snowman' (and a `levitating lama') was emblematic of Tibet. Similarly, yeti and 
Tibet also figure more recently in the popular video game of Lara Croft - Tomb raider H. 
36 In 1879, Russian explorer Prejevalsky discovered the `original' horse in the remoteness of 
Mongolian Central Asia, answering the riddle of the famous ponies of the Mongols. `They 
were the original, the archetypal source of vigour and life-energy uncorrupted by civilization. 
Bonvalot even reported that his small Tibetan horses were carnivorous, feeding "on raw flesh". 
What powerful metaphors of primal vitality for the horse-worshipping Victorians! ' (Bishop 
1989: 158). 
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the very essence of the Tibetan people. It has a certain untamed dignity in perfect 
harmony with the surrounding rugged country; a quality of stolid unchangeableness - 
it seems to say: "Here I have been for hundreds of years, and here I intend to stay for 
ever"' (Chapman 1992: 7). For others, timelessness is represented by the Lhasa city 
itself: `It is improbable that the City of Lhasa has altered at all during the past 19 
years, or for the matter of that, during the past few centuries' (Iggulden n. d.: 1). 
Almost all visitors and commentators note the lack of any appreciation of `time' in 
Tibetan culture. For some, Tibetan resistance to the European notion of time caused 
annoyance, 37 for others it is liberating. 38 Tibet is perceived as a `lost horizon', a kind 
of bardo (in-between) place, outside the grid of regulated time and space (Bishop 
1997: 56). 
Since the very beginning of the twentieth century, a strong feeling running through 
many writings is that time was running out for Tibet. In his letter to Younghusband, 
Landon expresses a touch of regret after the British (and hence his own) success in 
reaching Lhasa, as the city and the country represented `the last of the greater 
explorations possible on the earth', `last country to be discovered by the civilized 
world', though he was glad that it was the English, `faithful servant of restlessness of 
progress' who went in first (1905: x-xi). This conservative reaction of (often- 
aristocratic) explorers reflected their scepticism of mass tourism and paradoxical 
ambiguity about progress. Ironically, many Westerners celebrated Tibetan culture's 
apparent immunity to the machine and modern communication, while the Tibetans 
tried to adopt them during the 1930s and 1940s (Bishop 1997: 58-9). The idea of Tibet 
as primeval offered space for two mutually contradictory representations - Tibet as 
repository of wisdom and Tibet as irrational and child-like. 
4B. vii. Infantilisation - gerontification 
The Orient is the space for the `wisdom of the east' in some representations, while in 
others it is essentially irrational, emotional, uncivilised, child-like. As Ella Shohat and 
37 Chapman notes that though senior Tibetan officials had been sent a watch so as to appraise 
them of `our time', they arrived late: `As we had discovered on the journey up, time means 
very little in Tibet' (Chapman 1940: 73). 
38 In a description of his travel in the search of the `snow leopard', Matthiessen writes that as 
the final part of preparation for the travel, `I remove my watch, as the time is losing all 
significance' (1995: 57). 
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Robert Stam write, `Africa can be a child and Asia a shriveled old man, but Europe 
always maintains a relational advantage. Both Asia and Africa are seen as 
constitutively deficient, while Europe always keeps its place at the apex of a value- 
laden hierarchy' (1994: 139). This infantilisation is a crucial representational strategy 
through which the Other is rendered incapable of making decisions for itself. As 
Roxanne Doty points out, complementary to the childlike attributes attached to the 
Filipinos in the American counterinsurgency discourses were ineptitude and 
inefficiency (1993b: 313). Therefore, the `United States had to be patient and 
sympathetic, yet firm, in using its constructive and guiding influence on its former 
ward. The ostensibly nurturing relationship invoked by the parent/child opposition 
obscured and justified practices of domination' (Doty 1996b: 89). Infantilisation 
justifies guardianship, patronage by the adult, more enlightened, rational West. 39 The 
`in loco parentis ideology of paternalistic gradualism... [assumes]... the necessity of 
White trusteeship' (Shohat and Stam 1994: 140). The ordering of the world into 
various binary opposites such as civilised/uncivilised, modern/backward, 
developed/undeveloped, and so on, `is readily framed as a relation between adult and 
child, and the processes of colonialism and neocolonialism in which such binary 
taxonomies have been instantiated have involved both subtle and very unsubtle 
practices of infantilization' (Persaud and Walker 2001: 374-5). 
O'Connor describes Tibetans as great children, very ignorant, very simple, and devoid 
of all idea of moral responsibility (in Sharma and Sharma 1996: 192). During lengthy 
negotiations preceding and accompanying the British invasion of Tibet, it is common 
to come across Tibetans being compared to obstinate, illogical children. 
Younghusband found them `very much like big children' (Uncovered Editions 1999: 
105,148). While discussing the Tibetan attitude during the pre-Lhasa negotiations, 
Peter Fleming observes that `Logic was a concept wholly alien to the Tibetan mind', 
their `power of reasoning did not even extend to that of a child'; they did not evade 
issues, they simply declined to recognise their existence (Fleming 1961: 221). At the 
end of his two-year expedition, the image of the childlike Tibetans remained 
dominant. Younghusband says that the impression left on him was that the Tibetans, 
`though excessively childish, were very pleasant, cheery people, and individually, 
probably quite well disposed towards us' (Younghusband 1910: 124). Infantilisation 
39 Tibetans would prosper `under British auspices and assistance' (Sandberg 1904: 14) - such 
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also allowed passing judgements on Tibetan (lack of) sense of morality (as the quote 
by O'Connor above suggests). Landon qualifies this by saying that Tibetans have their 
own sense of morality in that they are industrious and capable of `extraordinary 
physical activity though `(i)t is true that this activity finds its vent rather in the muscles 
of the legs than in those of the fingers, but this is only to be expected' (Landon 
Volume 11 1905: 45). 
A good illustration of the effectiveness of infantilisation in clearing the conscience of 
European imperialists as aggressors, as perpetrators of violence, comes from the 
massacre of Tibetans at Guru. In his own words, Younghusband found `Tibetans 
huddled together like a flock of sheep' (1910: 177) and later put the blame on the 
`crass stupidity and childishness of the Tibetan general' `who had `completely lost his 
head' (Mehra 1968: 223) and on the Lhasa priest: `Ignorant and arrogant, this priest 
herded the superstitious peasantry to destruction' (Younghusband 1910: 178,179). 
The imagery of Tibetans as children, as dumb animal (sheep), allows British to 
visualise that if it had not been for some `selfish' elite (priests in the case of Tibetans), 
ordinary people would welcome European dominance. 
The Orient is not only a place where the mental development of people is arrested at 
the level of a child; it is also a place of sages, an old place. As Slavoj Zizek writes, 
What characterizes the European civilization is... its ex-centered character - the notion 
that the ultimate pillar of Wisdom, the secret agalma, the spiritual treasure, the lost 
object-cause of desire, which we in the West long ago betrayed, could be recuperated 
out there, in the forbidden exotic place. Colonization was never simply the imposition 
of Western values, the assimilation of the Oriental and other Others to the European 
Sameness; it was always also the search for the lost spiritual innocence of OUR OWN 
civilization (Zizek 2001b: 67-8; capitalisation in original). 
Association of the East with wisdom and spirituality, through the strategy that may be 
called gerontification, is well exemplified in the case of Tibet. It is often the place, not 
the people, which is rendered wise on account of its age. Though Blavatsky40 and 
Rudyard Kipling (through his lama figure in Kim) were instrumental in bringing 
together the idea of Tibet with the search for wisdom and spirituality, it is in the 
twentieth century that this association gathered a momentum of its own. After living 
sentiments were rife during the time. 
40 The Theosophists were heirs to ancient divine wisdom, which - long ago lost to ordinary 
people - had secretly been preserved by a benevolent brotherhood residing in Tibet 
(Blavatsky 1921 in Pederson 2001: 153). 
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the life of Tibetan mystic for few years, David-Neel felt that the natural edifices like 
mountains and valleys in the Himalayan region conveyed a mysterious message to her: 
`What I heard was the thousand-year old echo of thoughts which are re-thought over 
and over again in the East, and which, nowadays, appear to have fixed their stronghold 
in the majestic heights of Thibet' (1991: 24). Describing his escape from the Spanish 
prisoner camp to Tibet, Riencourt equated it `as an escape from the inferno of wars 
and concentration camps, searching for this forbidden land of mystery, the only place 
of earth where wisdom and happiness seemed to be a reality' (1950: 4). There are 
many who would agree with Robert Thurman and his extolling of the virtues of Tibet 
as a uniquely spiritual civilisation: 
While Western and Tibetan personalities share the complex of modernity of 
consciousness, they are diametrically opposed in outlook, one focused on matter and 
the other on mind ... While the American national purpose is ever greater material 
productivity, the Tibetan national purpose is ever greater spiritual productivity (1998: 
10-11). 41 
4B. viii. Naturalisation 
Naturalisation is another theme that operates within Western representational 
practices, as `natives' are often associated with nature. Here, nature is opposed to 
culture and civilisation: primitive people live in a state of nature and similarly, those 
who live close to the nature are primitive, uncivilised. Binaries such as 
rational/irrational, culture/nature, science/art, that lie at the heart of Western 
metaphysics are gendered and unequally valued. Women, natives - in short the Other 
- are associated with nature and irrationality as opposed to rational, scientific, cultured 
maleness. At the heart of the matter lies the Enlightenment distinction between `man' 
and nature, and the idea of progress as man's struggle for mastery over nature. 42 As 
lifestyles of various native cultures questioned this distinction, 43 through 
41 What a contrast to the lamentation of writers at the beginning of the twentieth century where 
Tibet was considered primarily as a hard and miserly land, `destined only to serve as a refuge 
for some race wanting in ordinary intelligence ... 
[and Tibetans were ridiculed for having] 
never achieved more than an indifferent culture, a pale reflection of the civilizations of China 
and Hindustan ... 
[no doubt Tibetans call their own land] kob yul or the barbarian land' 
(Grenard 1904: 221). 
42 This conception of human beings as separate from nature has been peculiar to Western 
civilisation. Most of the non-Western civilisations and cultures had imagined human beings as 
an integral part of nature. The contemporary environmental discourses that highlight the 
interdependence between humans and nature too often fail to break away from the 
human/nature distinction as the language of interdependence presumes autonomous identity. 
43 In many cultures human beings are seen as a part of nature, not something to be defined in 
opposition to it. The notion of `sacred' often challenges the Western will of acquiring mastery 
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presuppositions and statement of `facts' native people were reduced through the trope 
of naturalisation. This in the nineteenth and twentieth century allowed justification for 
the conquest of nature and of `children of nature' - the primitive peoples. Writing in 
the context of American representations of Filipinos, according to Doty 
representations endowed the natives with 
a particular kind of identity that moved in an unsteady fashion between two poles, 
both closer to nature than the rational adult. More benignly portrayed, Filipinos were 
childlike, lacking the rationality generally attributed to adults. They were impulsive, 
unreflective, imitative, and unaware of consequences. Less benignly portrayed, they 
were given an identity that was in many ways more animal than human (1996b: 39). 
Both representations rendered the natives `incapable of self-government and in need of 
guidance, tutoring, and uplifting' (Ibid. ). Thus, the idealisation of nature went hand in 
hand with the notion that many natives lived in a state of pure nature, lacked 
developed social organisation and civil society, and therefore needed the enlightened 
Western `man' to civilise them and to exploit the nature's bounty. `The passions of the 
warm countries are voluptuous, relating to love and tenderness. Nature dos so much 
for people that they have almost nothing to do. Provided that an Asiatic has women 
and repose, he is content' (Rousseau quoted in Spurr 1993: 157). This native then is a 
stereotypical object of contempt in the modern age. As David Spurr points out, `(t)hat 
natural abundance which Rousseau attributes to the southern climates turns out to be, 
even within the boundaries of his own discourse, a fateful lack when considered in the 
light of human progress' (1993: 158). 
Reducing people to nature and immediate environment is also seen in the case of 
Tibetans. The dominant physical feature of Tibetan landscape is mountains and hence 
Tibetan culture is seen as a response to this difficult terrain. The culture (and religion) 
of Tibetans is reduced to their natural environment. Many see Tibetan popular religion 
as based on `emotions of awe and insignificance caused by overwhelming grandeur of 
the Tibetan landscape and the harshness of its climate' (Kvaerne 2001: 49). In a 
similar vein, Riencourt contends that the `psychic knowledge of the lamas' is caused 
due to `awe-inspiring landscape, severity of the climate and remoteness of its valleys, 
the majestic silence and peace of the roof of the world' (1950: 263). 
4B. ix. Self-affirmation - self-criticism 
over the nature. This closeness to nature is ironically seen as a sign of primitiveness by the 
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All these strategies have been underpinned by a sense of affirmation; affirmation of 
narcissism in the name of moral superiority. The Orient is seen by the Europeans as `a 
pretext for self-dramatisation and differentness', a `malleable theatrical space in which 
can be played out the egocentric fantasies' thus affording `endless material for the 
imagination, and endless potential for the Occidental self (Kabbani 1986: 11). 
Authority and control was often justified by affirming inherently racist and self 
serving ideas like the `white man's burden'. Doty shows that during the debate over 
the annexation of Philippines by the United States affirmation of `American manhood' 
was a nodal point to which both opponents and proponents of annexation referred 
(1996b: 30). Further, the 
North is constituted vis-ä-vis the South as modern, efficient, competent. The South is 
constituted as its lack, its other. Imperial encounters have always contained the 
element of `modern man' confronting his `traditional' other, characterized 
alternatively as uncivilized, incompetent, childlike, and incapable of handling power 
and authority. The incapacity to exercise agency in the same manner as the Western 
`self' is repeatedly inscribed in the identity of the non-Western `other'. The 
civilization of the `other' requires intervention' (Ibid.: 160). 
While discussing various modes and strategies of representation we have already seen 
how Westerners sought to affirm their own identity and activities. Representation of 
the natives as irrational, immoral, inefficient, duplicitous affirms self-representation as 
rational, moral, efficient, honest. This narcissistic indulgence is exemplary in 
Columbus's encounter with the Native Americans: 
Either he conceives the Indians (though without using these words) as human beings 
altogether, having the same rights as himself; but then he sees them not only as equals 
but also as identical, and this behavior leads to assimilationism, the projection of his 
own values on the others. Or else he starts from the difference, but the latter is 
immediately translated into terms of superiority and inferiority (in his case, obviously, 
it is the Indians who are inferior). What is denied is the existence of a human 
substance truly other, something capable of being not merely an imperfect state of 
oneself. These two elementary figures of the experience of alterity are both grounded 
in egocentrism, in the identification of our own values with values in general, of our I 
with the universe - in the conviction that the world is one (Tzvetan Todorov quoted in 
Inayatullah and Blaney 1996: 75). 
The sense of affirmation can be seen not only in overtly imperialist writings, but also 
in those with more humanitarian and liberal content. For instance, John Nelson 
approvingly writes about the contributions of the `negro character in American 
literature', because of association with slavery 
they [the Americans] have themselves received much - something, no doubt, from his 
['negro's] carefree, irresponsible temper, his irrepressible good humor and musical 
dominant rhetoric of progress. 
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talent, his unconscious philosophy that the present moment is the all important 
moment;.... Gradually he has affected American civilization; gradually, too, he has himself changed from an uncouth savage to the more sophisticated and genial individual of today ... (1926: 14-5). This liberal approval of the `negro' is itself based on stereotyping of the black Other 
and an affirmation of the white Self as the true American. Similarly, though John 
Stuart Mill was liberal, he could say `The sacred duties which civilised nations owe to 
the independence and nationality of each other are not binding towards those to whom 
nationality an independence are certain evil, or at best a questionable good' (quoted in 
Said 1994: 80). 
Though affirmation of the Western Self was the ultimate force behind most 
representations, some also deployed specific representations to question the Self. That 
is, of representations of the non-Western Other has often been deployed in the service 
of self-criticism. As we shall see in greater detail in the next chapter, this has been 
particularly true in the case of Western representations of Tibet, especially since after 
the turn of the twentieth century. 44 `I delightedly forgot Western lands, that I belonged 
to them, and that they would probably take me again in the clutches of their sorrowful 
civilization', said David-Neel (1991: 61). Suggestive observations presented in the 
The Tibetan Book of the Dead are meant as an aid to 
awaken the Occident to the extreme dangers into which it has been led, in large 
measure by a medical science ignorant for the most part of the Art of Dying, they will 
have furthered the prayers of the lamas by helping to dissipate that Darkness of 
Ignorance which, as the Buddha realized, enshrouds the world (Evans-Wentz 1949: 
xii-xiii) 
Tibet becomes a service society for the West, offering resources by which the West 
can criticise itself, question its values. As Heinrich Harrer points out, Tibetans have `a 
heritage superior to ours... [they] might bring succour to the pessimism of the West' 
(1985: 52). Through his analysis of spaces resistant to globalisation, Brett Neilson 
highlights that `The Shangri-La myth [associated predominantly with Tibet] offers an 
important means of imagining an outside to globalisation, an outside that may be 
ultimately unrepresentable, that is to say a space that resists localisation and cannot be 
mapped within the dominant grids of cartographic projection' (2000: 110-11). 
44 This is not to deny that, with the exception of theosophists, self-criticism was entirely absent 
during the Victorian era. For instance, throughout his book, Landor makes sarcastic comments 
about the `foggy little islands' of England and the `unadventurous' English bourgeoisie 
(Landor 1905: 2). 
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4C. Conclusion 
Various strategies - archive, gaze, differentiation, identification, classification, 
debasement, negation, idealisation, eroticisation, moralisation, naturalisation, 
infantilisation, gerontification, self-criticism, and self-affirmation - as well as modes - 
essentialism, stereotyping, exoticism - that underlay Western representations of the 
Other, of alien cultures during the period of European imperialism, remain integral to 
Western representations of the Other even in this postcolonial world, albeit in different 
ways. An approach which sees representation as a process as well as a substantive is 
better placed to examine the ways in which the Western discovery and consciousness 
of the east went hand in hand with Western imperial rule over the east. How this 
played out in Tibet, a place that never came under formal European control, is a 
concern of the next chapter. 
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Chapter 5: Poetics of Exotica Tibet 
`I can never get used to the idea of a Tibetan driving a car' (Shakya 1992: 
15). ' 
The poetics of Exotica Tibet involves an analysis of Western representations of Tibet. 
It is a story of Western interactions with Tibet during various historical periods - it is 
about the production of images of Tibet within these interactions as well as about how 
the interactions were in turn framed under specific imaginative regimes. ' These 
interactions offered opportunities for new images and imaginations; yet, they in turn 
acquired their meaning through these imaginations. The `truth' about Tibet was not 
discovered, but produced out of specific processes of imageries and imaginaries. This 
constitutive relation between Western interactions and imaginations of Tibet is the 
subject of this chapter. Following Roxanne Doty, these Western interactions can be 
seen in terms of imperial encounters which conveys the `idea of asymmetrical 
encounters in which one entity has been able to construct "realities" that were taken 
seriously and acted upon and the other entity has been denied equal degrees or kinds 
of agency' (1996b: 3). 
Though Tibet was `always in the process of being created, always adjusting its 
contours in step with the changing requirements of the European fantasies', the place 
of Tibet also gave coherence to these fantasies (Bishop 1989: 12). Instead of looking 
at specific representational regimes that existed at various points in time, I shall draw 
out some dominant representational themes constituting Exotica Tibet during the 
twentieth century and explicate them by looking at specific sites of cultural production 
ranging from novels such as Rudyard Kipling's Kim (1901) to the Hollywood 
blockbuster Seven Years in Tibet (1997). These themes have held different currency 
throughout the century. The purpose is to enrich our understanding of Western 
practices of imagination of third world places like Tibet. We have much to gain from a 
critical and constructive engagement with the past and present of such imaginative 
' An academic colleague's comment to Tsering Shakya, a Tibetan scholar based in the School 
of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London. 
2 As Laurie Hovell (1993) argues, travel writing and Tibet are connected in more than one 
ways - travellers `wrote about' Tibet (came to imagine Tibet as having a describable reality 
distinct from themselves), Tibet was `written' (vision was created, often independent of the 
place), and Tibet was `written on' (as a place on which desires and fears were projected and 
constructed). 
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practices. The themes will draw upon the theoretical framework set up in the previous 
two chapters. 
Three qualifications need to be made here. First, I shall focus on those works that are 
available in English. This misses out the richness of representations of Tibet in several 
other European languages. 3 However, it does not take away much from the general 
nature of the arguments as in the first half of the twentieth century, most travellers and 
commentators shared a British-inspired `internationalism' assisted by similarities in 
class (aristocratic and upper middle) and gender (male) (Bishop 1989: 6). The scene 
was dominated by the British because of their presence as imperialists in India and in 
the Himalayan region. All the primary texts have been published in or translated into 
English. Moreover, the travellers and explorers formed a `fairly cohesive international 
community', one which shared interest and familiarity, if not friendship (Bishop 1989: 
viii). Imperialism and Orientalism provided a common frame of reference. The literary 
critic Paul Fussell notes `the Englishness of it all' (Spengen 2000). When speaking of 
Tibet in the Western imagination or Western representations of Tibet, we should be 
aware that the term `Western' is problematic, as Tibet has not been of much concern 
to most people in the West. Nevertheless `it has exerted a direct and compelling 
influence on a sizeable and influential minority' (Bishop 1993: 132; emphasis in 
original). 
Second, the task in this chapter is not to demystify Tibet and present a true picture of 
the `real' Tibet underlying the pile of representations. It does not indulge in any form 
of `revelatory device' espousing the idea that Tibet is a site of misrepresentation, that 
it is `not really a mystical or romantic place' (Barnett 2001: 294-5, emphasis added). 
Nor do I seek to chart a history of Western interactions with Tibet. Instead, the task is 
to present various contours of Exotica Tibet - commonalities, differences, and 
contradictions lying at the heart of Western representations of Tibet. It is an `attempt 
to plot the trajectories of a few of the flights of fancy and imagination that have been 
launched from "Tibet"' (Lopez 1998: 12). Without denying that the romantic Tibet is 
3 While discussing a series of books on Tibet written by Italian explorers between the 1930s 
and 1950s, Loredana Polezzi (1998) argues that by operating shifts in such narrative devices as 
authorial voice and tense structure, their English translations modified the relationships 
between narrator, reader and object of the narration, thus appropriating the texts and rewriting 
them in accordance with the conventions of the English travel writing tradition, the 
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also a `real place, an independent state under illegal, wrathful occupation' (Abbots 
1997: xiii), I argue that in the Western imagination, the `real Tibet' played only a 
subsidiary role. 4 
Third, my analysis of `texts' that constitute Exotica Tibet affirms Edward Said's 
digression from Foucault in Orientalism in terms of the role of individuals in discourse 
production. 
Unlike Michel Foucault, to whose work I am greatly indebted, I do believe in the 
determining imprint of individual writers upon the otherwise anonymous collective 
body of texts constituting a discursive formation like Orientalism. The unity of the 
large ensemble of texts I analyze is due in part to the fact that they frequently refer to 
each other: Orientalism is after all a system for citing works and authors ... 
Foucault 
believes that in general the individual text or author counts for very little; empirically, 
in the case of Orientalism (and perhaps nowhere else) I find this not to be so (1978: 
23). 
It considers texts as worldly as `to some degree they are events, and, even when they 
appear to deny it, they are nevertheless a part of social world, human life, and of 
course the historical moments in which they are located and interpreted' (Said 1983: 
4). 
The most significant characteristic of Exotica Tibet is its richness in terms of 
imageries and imaginaries. `Tibet is, in Foucault's terms, a heterotopia, a plurality of 
often contradictory, competing, and mutually exclusive places simultaneously 
positioned on a single geographical location' (Bishop 2001: 204). Representations of 
Tibet range from extremely pejorative ('feudal hell') to extremely idealistic (Shangri- 
la). Tibet for some is a blank spaces upon which they can write their desire; for others, 
it is an overcoded space juggling the fantastic with utter simplicity. This richness is 
partly possible because Tibet was never colonised by any European power that may 
have led to the establishment of knowledge-producing institutions and the consequent 
expectations of the British public, and the discourse of Empire (or, later, the post-colonial 
discourse of tourism). 
4 Said's take on Orientalism is that the West always sustains flexible positional superiority vis- 
ä-vis the `Orient'. However, according to Peter Bishop, `Tibet seemed always to have the 
ability slightly to elude the total embrace of Western Orientalism. It always sustained an 
independent Otherness, a sense of superiority, albeit limited. . The place of 
Tibet had a logic of 
its own, its genius loci. Tibet was not a silent Other', it was alive, substantial, and compelling' 
(1989: 145,251). 
5 One aspect of the story of `Tibet as a blank space' is the denial of any quintessential Tibetan 
civilisation. Many commentators commented that what passes as `Tibetan' is merely a mix of 
`great' neighbouring civilisations (Chinese and Indian). William W. Rockhill is typical: 
`Present advanced degree of civilization is entirely borrowed from China, India, and possibly 
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disillusionment with the fantasy. Because Tibet did not become a European colony, 
many of Europe's fantasies about India and China, dispelled by colonialism, made 
their way across the mountains to an idealised Tibet (Lopez 1998: 6). 
Till the beginning of the twentieth century it was seen as an absence on the map, the 
`last country to be discovered by the civilized world' (Landon 1905, Vol. I: xi). This 
was also because it `was never the actual place [of Tibet] that fired the imagination of 
romantic seekers: it was the idea of Tibet, far away, impenetrable, isolated in the 
higher spheres of the earth. To see the real thing was to destroy the illusion' (Buruma 
2001). Wholly pre-digested facts about Tibetans are often of the proverbial kind. Tibet 
is seen as the quintessential Asia of the Western imagination, the poor oppressed land 
with an ancient culture and spirit (Lee 1996: 22). Exotica Tibet is full of contrasts and 
superlatives. 
This richness of imaginal diversity also lends itself to ambivalence and contradiction. 
Typical is Frederick O'Connor's statement: `Every Tibetan, high or low, is a curiosity 
who ought to be in a museum. His salutations, gestures, clothing, and general tout 
ensemble, stamp him as something apart from the rest of the inhabitants of the globe. 
Yet with all this they are a highly civilized race' (in Sharma and Sharma 1996: 192). 
Exotica Tibet is a site of the play of opposites: the pristine and the polluted, the 
authentic and the derivative, the holy and the demonic, the good and the bad. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, colonialists saw lamas as `an incarnation of all vices and 
corruptions, instead of the souls of the departed Lamas... [a hundred years on, some 
argue that Tibetan] gross national product of enlightened persons must have been 
proportionately higher than any other country ever' (Ekai Kawaguchi and Robert 
Thurman quoted in in Lopez 1998: 9). Harrison Forman wrote in 1936, `in the heart of 
ageless Asia, brooding darkly in the shadow of the unknown, is to be found a veritable 
explorer's paradise - Tibet, the strange and fascinating, forbidden land of magic and 
mystery... where the opposites are kin and the extremes go hand in hand' (1936: vii). 
As Slavoj Zizek writes: 
Today Tibet increasingly plays the role of such a fantasmatic Thing (the fantasy 
formation to which we refer when we talk about Tibet), of a jewel which, when one 
approaches it too much turns into the excremental object. It is a commonplace to 
claim that the fascination exerted by Tibet on the Western imagination, especially on 
Turkestan, and Tibet has only contributed the simple arts of the tent-dwelling herdsmen' (1895: 
673). 
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the broad public in the USA, provides an exemplary case of the `colonization of the 
imaginary': it reduces the actual Tibet to a screen for the projection of Western 
ideological fantasies. The very inconsistency of this image of Tibet, with its direct 
coincidence of opposites seems to bear witness to its fantasmatic status. Tibetans are 
portrayed as people leading a simple life of spiritual satisfaction, fully accepting their 
fate, liberated from the excessive craving of the Western subject who is always 
searching for more, AND as a bunch of filthy, cheating, cruel, sexually promiscuous 
primitives... The social order is presented as a model of organic harmony, AND as the 
tyranny of the cruel corrupted theocracy keeping ordinary people ignorant. Tibetan 
Buddhism itself is simultaneously hailed as the most spiritual of all religions, the last 
shelter of the ancient wisdom, AND as the utmost primitive superstition, relying on 
prayer wheels and similar cheap magic tricks... This oscillation between jewel and 
shit is not the oscillation BETWEEN the idealized ethereal fantasy and the raw reality: 
in such an oscillation, BOTH extremes are fantasmatic, i. e. the fantasmatic space is 
the very space of this immediate passage from one extreme to the other. The first 
antidote against this topos of the raped jewel, of the isolated place of people who just 
wanted to be left alone, but were repeatedly penetrated by foreigners, is to remind 
ourselves that Tibet was already IN ITSELF an antagonistic, split society, not an 
organic Whole whose harmony was disturbed only by external intruders... [The 
second antidote is] to denounce the split nature of the Western image of Tibet as a 
`reflexive determination' of the split attitude of the West itself, combining violent 
penetration and respectful sacralization (Zizek 2001b: 64-6; capitalisation in original). 
Thus, as discussed earlier in Chapter 3 and 4, Tibet is represented as a `true complexio 
oppositorum, a rich complexity of contradictions and oppositions' (Bishop 1989: 63). 
5A. Imperialism 
`And there are in them [Tibetans] latent potentialities for good, which only 
await the right touch to bring them into being' (Younghusband 1910: 321). 
Contemporary newspaper reports about Tibet usually start off with the history of the 
`drastic opening' of Tibet in 1950 with the Chinese invasion. This reveals a practice of 
historical amnesia as they rarely mention the destabilising influence of Western 
imperialism in pre-1950s Tibet or the way in which Tibet was abandoned by the West 
at the time of the Chinese invasion. ' In the creation of Tibet's international profile, 
British imperialism played a formative part. The imagination of Tibet as a place and 
its historical status vis-a-vis China are linked through Western imaginative and 
6 An example of this can be seen in Lonely Planet's (2002) introduction to 
Tibet: 
Locked away in its Himalayan fortress, Tibet has long exercised a unique hold on the 
imagination of the West: `Shangri-La', `the Land of Snows', `the Rooftop of the 
World', Tibet is mysterious in a way that few other places are. Tibet's strategic 
importance, straddling the Himalaya between China and the Indian subcontinent, 
made it irresistible to China who invaded in 1950. 
No mention is made of the British attempts to `open' 
Tibet. 
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imperial practices. 7 This creation of Tibet was `always related to the growth of British 
imperialism, but it was never wholly determined by it... [for it] ... was also a 
mythological event' (Bishop 1989: 148). 
The beginning of the twentieth century saw British imperialism in its heyday, firmly 
established on the Indian subcontinent. However, Tibet remained tantalisingly outside 
the arena of European scrutiny for it was `closed' to `foreigners'. The best the British 
could do was to have a `peep' at the land that lay ahead across the Himalayas. As the 
British Empire consolidated in India throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries, the blurred boundary between India and Tibet increasingly acquired greater 
significance. Tibet began to be represented as a place set apart, a place where 
ambivalence ruled: the Dalai Lama was respected, yet the monasticism was suspected; 
the Tibetans were liked, but their dirt and their customs - such as polyandry - evoked 
distaste; the austerity of the landscape was considered inspirational, but its barrenness 
was abhorred. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Britain was attempting to 
communicate with Lhasa less in order to reach Peking (as during late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth century) and more to improve its own Himalayan trade and stabilise 
Himalayan politics (Bishop 1989: 86-94). However, all attempts by the British to 
establish some sort of communication with the Tibetan authority both directly and via 
the Chinese failed. It was with the Russian expansion in Central Asia and the 
perception of Lord Curzon (the British viceroy in India) of Russian intrigue in Tibet' 
that the British decided to ignore Chinese claims to suzerainty and undertake concrete 
`action' (a blending of negotiation and force) firmly to show Tibetans their place in 
the larger scheme of things - as secondary to British imperial interest. This was done 
through the mission led by Colonel Francis Younghusband in 1903-04. 
7 In his `Five point peace plan for Tibet' (in an address to the United States Congress in 1987), 
the Dalai Lama talks of Tibet's `strategic position in the heart of Asia' and `its natural role as a 
buffer state maintaining and promoting peace in Asia' (quoted in Barnett 1991: 286-7). This 
borrows heavily from the British imperial discourse in the Himalayan region where the concept 
of `buffer state' occupied an increasingly important place in the frontier imagination and 
policy. 
As Tatiana Shaumian points out, 
Russian authorities never contemplated direct military intervention in Tibet, nor did 
they nurture plans to conquer India, but skilfully and often successfully exploited the 
Tibetan question to exert pressure on Great Britain and thereby obtain concessions in 
other regions that were more germane to their military-strategic and other political 
interests (2000: viii). 
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During the turn of the last century, there were two phases in British India's policy 
towards Tibet, the watershed being Curzon's telegram of January 8,1903. In the first 
phase, Curzon tried a policy of direct approach, which failed. That `the Dalai Lama 
had the temerity, one had almost say the cheek, to return the Indian Grand Mughal's 
letters unopened was sufficient cause, in Curzon's eyes, for a march to Lhasa, if only 
to show the Tibetan barbarians some elementary rules of human behaviour, of a code 
of (international) conduct! ' (in Mehra 1968: 360). To rub salt into this wound, the 
British saw that the Dalai Lama had little hesitation in despatching missions to Russia. 
This was the time of the `Great Game', intense rivalry between British and Russians in 
Asia, and some `players' of this game such as Curzon pushed for a more active, 
confrontational policy. 
In his famous Jan 8,1903 despatch, Curzon mentions his two failed attempts (the third 
attempt was being made) to get in personal touch with the Dalai Lama; the failure of 
measures to `materially' improve British position on the border; persistent rumours 
about the Russo-Chinese deal; and his own conviction that `some sort of relations' 
existed between Russia and Tibet, changing the scenario: 
We regard the so-called suzerainty of China over Tibet as a constitutional fiction -a 
political affectation which has only been maintained because of its convenience to 
both parties. China is always ready to break down the barriers of ignorance and 
obstruction, to open Tibet to the civilizing influence of trade, but her pious wishes are 
defeated by the short-sighted stupidity of the Lamas. In the same way, Tibet is only 
too anxious to meet our advances, but she is prevented from doing so by the despotic 
veto of the suzerain. This solemn farce has been re-enacted with the frequency that 
seems never to deprive it of its attractions or its power to impose (Mehra 1968: 161). 
The second phase was thus marked by strong advocacy of an armed mission. It was 
then that the Tibet missions were formed and sent (there were two missions, one after 
another when attempts to negotiate at the border region failed). It resulted in what was 
benignly called an `expedition', but was in practice an `invasion' of Tibet. The 
culmination was a treaty signed in Lhasa in 1904 seeking to establish British India's 
relation with Tibet on a concrete basis. Though quite a few gains made here were soon 
given up by the British government in the name of international diplomacy (which 
also showed a disapproval of Younghusband for exceeding his briefs), this became a 
watershed event. Tibet was brought into the international arena, much against the 
wishes of its rulers. This forced opening had hugely significant geo-political impacts, 
the most important being increased Chinese awareness of vulnerability at its 
`backdoor'. Ironically, the Chinese central government sought to establish firm control 
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over Tibet (first during the immediate aftermath of British invasion, and then from 
1949 onward), ignoring its own history of a more loosely defined relationship with 
Tibet. The British mission also put Tibet firmly within the British imperial 
imagination. In terms of attitude towards Tibet, it was preceded and accompanied by a 
mix of abhorrence (with the `priest-ridden' system) and fascination (with the nature 
and simplicity of common people). This ambivalence remained integral to Exotica 
Tibet during the duration of British imperial rule on the Indian subcontinent. 
Commentators differed in their evaluation of Tibet, but they more or less shared a 
sense of paternalism towards it. 9 For Graham Sandberg, though there was no 
imperative of establishing relations with Tibet as a colony and Tibetans were 
`naturally peace-loving', `the development of the natural resources of the 
country... under British auspices and assistance would, besides, forge a clasp to the 
bond [between British India and Tibet] in the shape of self-interest' (1904: 4). Writing 
in the aftermath of the massacre at Guru during the Lhasa expedition (see chapter 4), 
Perceval Landon said, 
[o]ther things had no less weight in our favour; the resistance of the Tibetans had been 
blown away before us like leaves in autumn, and there was not a man in the country 
who did not realise that our care of the wounded afterwards, was as thorough as the 
punishment we inflicted at the moment. Trade and credit are proverbially plants of 
slow growth, and slower in the East than anywhere else (in Sharma and Sharma 1996: 
35). 
Edmund Candler, in the fashionable `Darwinist' argument used for conquering the less 
industrialised countries, argued: `They must come into line; it is the will of the most 
evolved' - the British - `lord of all these by virtue of his race, the most evolved... ' 
(quoted in Winnington 1957: 156). 
Accounts of Tibet proliferated in the aftermath of the British invasion. They include 
Landon's Lhasa, Candler's The Unveiling of Lhasa, L Austine Waddell's Lhasa and 
its mysteries, To Lhassa at last written under the pseudonym of Powell Millington, 
9 When analysing the Younghusband invasion, most contemporary writing adopts a patronising 
attitude towards Tibet, contrasting `ferocious' modern British Indian army with the peace- 
loving innocent Tibetans. It might be an endearing notion, but is one `that has the effect of 
politically castrating (sic) the Tibetan people by turning them into the helpless victims of 
(depending on your ideological view) monkish oppression or external aggression' (French 
1995: 219). For instance, as Dawa Norbu points, during negotiations, for Tibetans, 
`stonewalling seemed a fair way of expressing their policy of non-cooperation... moral refusal 
to communicate' (in French 1995: 225). Younghusband (Mehra 1968: 221-2) considered the 
same lama negotiators as `lowbred, insolent, rude and intensely hostile'. Imperial arrogance 
made the British exasperated with the Tibetan resistance through `foot-dragging'. 
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and Ottley's With Mounted Infantry in Tibet. Four years later, John Murray publishers 
brought out Younghusband's own account in India and Tibet. The British government 
brought out four official `Blue books'. Later Frederick O'Connor and the Reuters 
correspondent Henry Newman brought out accounts sympathetic to Younghusband 
(Hopkirk 1983: 196-7). Younghusband's book is typical of imperial literature10 
seeking to give an account of his journey to Tibet. I shall take India and Tibet as the 
first cultural site where Exotica Tibet reveals its interlinkages with British 
imperialism. Here modes of essentialism and stereotyping, as well as representational 
strategies of gaze, debasement, negation, moralisation, infantilisation, and self- 
affirmation are prominent. 
5A. i. Younghusband's `India and Tibet': an imperial descriptive account 
India and Tibet (1910) purports to provide a history of the relations which have 
existed between the India and Tibet from the time of Warren Hastings (late eighteenth 
century) to 1910, with a particular account of the 1904 mission to Lhasa. This history 
is different from a history of the exploration of Tibet: it is one of the British aiming 
towards the `the establishment of ordinary neighbourly intercourse with Tibet' (vii) 
and Tibetans refusal to oblige. William W. Rockhill's observation about Sino-Tibetan 
interaction seems to mirror Younghusband's own opinion: that `the Tibetans have no 
desire for total independence from China, but that their complaints have always been 
directed against the manner in which the local Chinese officials have performed their 
duties' (viii). Even after signing the treaty, he makes it clear that Chinese suzerainty 
was fully recognised in the Adhesion Agreement" and China was not included as a 
`foreign power' (286) 
Reflecting the attitude of a `pioneer' and `frontiersman', the account is full of 
resentment against bureaucratic and political control exercised by the imperial 
10 Though it seems that Younghusband was losing touch with political realities of British 
imperialism. He can be considered as the last of the major players in the Great Game who 
failed to understand `the Greater Game of twentieth-century European power politics. Tibet 
was a pawn to be manipulated according to the requirements of big power politics. The Game, 
a strategic one rather than a tactical one, was suddenly being played in the chanceries of 
Europe, not in the deserts of trans-Himalaya' (MacGregor 1970: 351). 
11 The Younghusband invasion culminated in Lhasa Convention being signed on 7 September 
1904. However, this was modified and the treaty was renegotiated. Britain persuaded China to 
sign an Adhesion agreement in 1906, accepting the renegotiated terms of the Convention. A 
year later in 1907, the status of Tibet was further clarified in the Anglo-Russian Convention. 
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government over its agents. Nostalgia is expressed for some golden era when the 
agents of imperialism were left free to pursue their `destiny' without interference. 
Sarcastic about the centralisation of power in London, he says that `the next mission to 
Lhasa will in all probability be led by a clerk from the Foreign Office in London' 
(103). Expressing an aristocratic disdain for `democracy', he says that `as long as what 
an officer in the heart of Asia may do is contingent on the "will" of "men in the street" 
of grimy manufacturing towns in the heart of England, so long as our action be slow, 
clumsy, and hesitating, when it ought to be sharp and decisive' (133). 
Younghusband is very conscious of the importance of credibility in maintaining 
imperial rule. For him, it was important to combat Russian intrigue in Tibet, as its loss 
would have been perceived by bordering Asiatic powers as a sign of British weakness 
and of Russian supremacy. Each member of the mission had to take with him his full- 
dress uniform as `ceremonial effect... is an item never to be lightly passed over in 
dealings with Asiatics' (98). When signing the treaty in Potala Palace, Younghusband 
ordered every one to dress in full regalia in order to impress the Tibetans: `... those 
who have lived among Asiatics know that the fact of signing the treaty in the Potala 
was of as much value as the Treaty itself (302). Troops lined up the road to the Potala 
and `a battery to fire salute or to bombard the Palace, as occasion might require, was 
stationed in a suitable position' (303). In a typical imperial fashion, Younghusband 
places the onus of responsibility for invasion on Tibetans themselves. British activist 
policy was in response to what he calls `the aggression of the Tibetans and their 
vassals that took place first' (92-3). 
The invasion was seen as an adventure: when Younghusband received the news that 
he was to go on the mission, he was elated - `Here, indeed, I felt was the chance of my 
life. I was once more alive. The thrill of adventure again ran through my veins' (96). 
When he left Darjeeling for Chumbi, he says, `To me there was nothing but the stir 
and thrill of an enterprise, which would ever live in history' (152). Reflecting a close 
relation between imperial adventures and scientific pursuits, he describes how at 
Khamba Jong, while some went out to shoot antelopes and Ovis ammon, others went 
`botanizing or geologizing'; later he went with `Mr Hayden to hunt for fossils, with 
Captain Walton to collect birds, and Colonel Prain to collect plants' (123). 
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Imperialists were flexible (opportunist? ) in their perception of natives. The latter were 
seen as inherently divided (as in the case of Indians, who were perceived as Hindus 
and Muslims, lacking any `Indian' identity) or inherently united depending on the 
requirement. When the deputation from Tashi Lama requested Younghusband to 
withdraw to Yatung or across the frontier, as they were being held responsible by the 
Lhasan authority, he made it clear that `we must regard Tibetans as all one people, and 
hold them responsible for the actions of each' (124). Contrary to the self-perception of 
Tibetans, the British imposed a pan-Tibetan identity. 
The mode of trivialising and infantilising natives is evident as Younghusband says that 
the impression left on him was that the Tibetans, `though excessively childish, were 
very pleasant, cheery people, and individually, probably quite well disposed towards 
us' (124). He says how he tried again and again to reason with the obstinate Tibetans 
who refused to recognise the might of the British: `... when I saw these people so 
steeped in ignorance of what opposing the might of the British Empire really meant, I 
felt it my duty to reason with them up to the last moment, to save them from the 
results of their ignorance' (163). At Guru, he mentions `Tibetans huddled together like 
a flock of sheep', and the Lhasa General as `simply childish' and as having 
`completely lost his head' (177-8). Like his other contemporaries, Younghusband 
considered the `ignorant', `arrogant', and `fanatical' priests as the root of all evil. He 
writes that the Tibetan general and soldiers had no antipathy, but a fanatical Lama 
from Lhasa forced them. `Ignorant and arrogant, this priest herded the superstitious 
peasantry to destruction' (179). 
It seems that the Tibetan delegates, who came to negotiate before the mission finally 
entered Lhasa, had a better understanding of imperialism. They argued that it was 
Tibetan custom to keep all the strangers out, otherwise following the British, other 
nations too would want to go to Lhasa, and establish their agents (as they did in 
China). In contrast, speaking from the lofty heights of an `internationalism' that was 
based on imperial arrogance, Younghusband 
reminded them that they lived apart from the rest of the world, and did not understand 
the customs of international discourse. To us the fact of their having kept the 
representative of a great Power waiting for a year to negotiate was a deep insult, 
which most Powers would resent by making war without giving any further chance for 
negotiation. But the British Government disliked making war if they could possibly 
help it (229). 
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Within Orientalist frame of thinking, expertise in cultures of the Other lies with the 
imperialists, not the natives of the culture. In this vein, Younghusband used Waddell's 
presence in his team to present to the Tibetans `an expert on Buddhism'. Of course, 
this expert found Tibetan practice to be a degenerate form of Buddhism and declined 
to revise his earlier work on Tibetan Buddhism (Waddell 1975/1895) as, according to 
him, his experiences merely served to reinforce his beliefs. 
In what became a tradition amongst later travellers to Lhasa, Younghusband describes 
the first sight of Potala Palace in a dramatic fashion: 
And then we saw, rising steeply on a rocky prominence in the midst of the valley, a 
fort-like dominating structure, with gilded roofs, which we knew could be none other 
than the Potala, the palace of the Dalai Lama of Lhasa. The goal of so many 
travellers' ambitions was actually in sight! The goal, to attain which we had endured 
and risked so much, and for which the best efforts of so many had been concentrated, 
had now been won. Every obstacle which Nature and man combined could heap in our 
way had been finally overcome, and the sacred city, hidden so far and deep behind the 
Himalayan ramparts, and so jealously guarded from strangers, was full before our 
eyes (250). 
Younghusband's general impression of Lhasa and its monk population, in contrast to 
ordinary Tibetans, is typical: 
they were dirty, degraded lot, and all of us remarked how distinctly inferior they were 
to the ordinary peasantry and townsmen we met. The monks, as a rule, looked 
thoroughly lazy and sensual and effete; the countrymen and the petty traders in the 
town were hardy, cheery people, and as we rode through the city really paid very little 
attention to us (266). 
He uses Ekai Kawaguchi's assessment of Tibetan monks to support his feeling that the 
lamas, both high and low, didn't leave a favourable impression - they were lazy, dirty, 
sexual deviants (312-3). By posing a contrast between the simple Tibetans and their 
hostile priestly overlords, the British could then pose themselves as the saviours of the 
masses. 
12 
Distinct from the later day idealisations of Tibetan Buddhism for its pacifist character, 
Younghusband agrees that `lamaism' had a pacifying effect, but has a different 
evaluation of this peace. 
12 This is similar to imperial interventions in other parts of the world. For instance, 
interventions in what was deemed as local `traditional' customs was seen as civilising mission. 
As Gayatri Spivak points out in the case of British discourse on the practice of sati ('widow 
burning'), these interventions can be seen as cases where `white men are saving brown women 
from brown men' (1988: 297). 
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But the peace that has been nurtured has been the quiescence of sloth and decadence. 
The Buddhist idea of repose and kindness all can appreciate... Yet the idea may have 
its danger and be as likely to lead downward as upward. It may lull to rest and render 
useless passions and energies which ought to be given play to. And the evil of 
Lamaism is that it has fostered lazy repose and self-suppression at the expense of 
useful activity and self-realization... Peace, instead of harmony, has been their ideal - 
peace for the emasculated individual instead of harmony for the united and full- 
blooded whole (314-5). 
The pacifism of Tibetans is contrasted unfavourably with the masculine, energetic, and 
outward looking character of the British imperial project. 
Reflecting ambivalence about the `natives' that has been a defining feature of Western 
representations, Younghusband says: 
Summarizing the characteristics of the Tibetans, we may say, then, that while they are 
affable outwardly and crafty within, as most dependent people have to be; while they 
are dirty and lazy; and while their religion is degraded, and they show no sign of 
either intellectual or spiritual progress, yet at heart they are not unkindly or unsociable 
people, and they have undoubtedly strong religious feelings. Immorality is not entirely 
unchecked ... (321). 
Carrying on and reinforcing the tradition of Western travellers to Tibet, 
Younghusband experienced an epiphany in Tibet. For a moment, a mystic 
Younghusband subsumed the imperialist Younghusband. At a camp outside Lhasa, he 
went off alone to the mountains and in his own words `gave myself up to all the 
emotions of this eventful time'. As he writes, from the city came the Lama's words of 
peace and not hatred and 
I was insensibly suffused with an almost intoxicating sense of elation and good-will. 
This exhilaration of the moment grew and grew till it thrilled through me with 
overpowering intensity. Never again could I think of evil, or ever again be enemy with 
any man. All nature and all humanity were bathed in a rosy glowing radiancy; and life 
for the future seemed nought but buoyancy and light... and that single hour on leaving 
Lhasa was worth all the rest of a lifetime (326-7). 
Tibet seems to have had a transformative effect on the hardened imperialist. 13 
Younghusband's account is critical of the home government for not pursuing Curzon's 
activist Tibetan policy and giving up many gains made in the Lhasa convention. His 
commitment to increased Anglo-Tibetan interaction, however, is not based on equality 
but on patronage, as is clear from this statement: 
13 In fact, after his Lhasa expedition Younghusband involved himself in non-conventional 
mystical activities. In an obituary to Younghusband, the New York Times merged the man who 
had led the British invasion with the Hollywood myth: `If as James Hilton strongly suggests in 
Lost Horizon, Shangri-La is somewhere in Tibet rather than merely somewhere - 
anywhere. . . then 
Sir Francis Younghusband probably came closer than anyone else to being 
Robert Conway' (French 1995: 202). 
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I favour forward policy, which simply recognises that great civilized Powers cannot by any possibility permanently ignore and disregard semi-civilized peoples on their borders, but must inevitably establish, and in time regularize, intercourse with them, 
and should therefore seize opportunities of humanizing that intercourse ... (428, emphases added). 
Thus India and Tibet reflects many characteristics that were typical of imperial 
literature on Tibet during the time. It shows Tibet as a land of contrasts (between the 
lamas and the common people) and a land of religion (if a degraded one). It indulges 
in modes of representation including stereotyping, essentialism, and exoticism as well 
as various representational strategies, particularly gaze, debasement, moralisation, 
infantilisation, and self-affirmation. Various themes of Exotica Tibet, such as those 
connected to religion, the lama figure, Potala, travel adventure, epiphany, and so on, 
are present. In contrast to later works that utilise Tibet as a site for self-criticism, 
Younghusband's account is mainly about self-affirmation, a defence of the British 
imperial project as ennobling for the British and as civilising for others. 
5B. Tibet: a land of religion 
`In Tibet religion always comes first, and God, says a Tibetan proverb, can 
only be approached through a lama' (Chapman 1992: 195). 
Tibet's association with religion can be traced back to the early modern age when the 
first Western travellers were mostly Christian missionaries. " The Western assessment 
of religion as the main, if not the sole, defining feature of Tibetan life and culture has 
differed over time. Western missionaries as well as many travellers, especially in the 
beginning of the twentieth century, considered it barbaric and degenerate. However, as 
14 Missionaries had their own romantic vision of Tibet, often emphasising the darker aspects of 
Tibetan culture in order to highlight the country's need for Christian enlightenment. Rijnharts 
(Petrus and Susie Rijnhart) mentioned the goal of their missionary travel as `perpetuating and 
deepening the widespread interest in the evangelization of Tibet' for `much has [been] written 
of the heathen in other countries.. . 
but the Tibetans with their monstrous butter Buddha occupy 
a unique place in the world's idolatry' (Rijnhart 1901: 1,119). After all, Lhasa is not `only a 
city of metaphysical mysteries and the mummery of idol-worship; it is a secret chamber of 
crime; its rock and its road, its silken flags and its scented altars, are all stained with blood' 
(Carey 1902: 58). Monastic rapacity and domination along with criticisms of Tibetan sexual 
morality were common themes in missionary writings. They saw themselves as `soldiers of 
Christ' and Tibet as a citadel under siege (Bray 2001: 28). However, by the late twentieth 
century, missionary accounts show much greater empathy and sometimes a deep cultural 
understanding. 
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the century progressed and self-doubts were raised regarding the merits of Christianity 
as well as secularism in the West, Tibetan Buddhism15 came to be idealised. 
A common feature of Western accounts of Tibet is the recognition and emphasis on 
the centrality of religion in Tibetan lives. As Marco Pallis wrote, the `defining feature 
of Tibet is that the Buddhist tradition is everything' (1974: 301). 16 This observation is 
common amongst contemporary commentators too; Melvyn Goldstein writes, `the 
commitment of Tibet as a religious state and to the universality of religion as the core 
metaphor of Tibetan national identity' is a major factor underlying Tibet's inability to 
adapt to changing circumstances (1989: 2). " Though a homogeneous force in Tibetan 
politics in one sense, religion has also had a fragmenting influence. 
For most Western commentators until the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
Tibetan `preoccupation' with religion was irrational, superstitious, and downright 
degenerate (at least when compared to classical Buddhism). This unfavourable 
comparison between Tibetan and classical Buddhism is not surprising: the latter is a 
hypostatised object, created by Europe, and controlled by it. It was against this 
classical Buddhism that all Buddhisms of modern Orient were to be judged, and found 
lacking (Lopez 1998: 7). Lamaism was the most degenerate and inauthentic of all. 
This sentiment is clearly reflected in Waddell's work, which is characterised by modes 
of stereotyping and essentialism and representational strategies of gaze, classification, 
debasement, negation, moralisation, and self-affirmation. In contrast, the `Tibetan 
book of the dead', the second cultural site I examine, is marked by modes of 
15 Though Tibet is mainly associated with a variant of Buddhism or `Lamaism', there were 
quite a few practising Muslims living in Lhasa (mostly and elsewhere. In most of the studies on 
Tibetan culture, the contribution of Tibetan Muslims is largely ignored. For exceptions, see 
Sheikh 1991; Siddiqui 1991; The Tibet Journal 1995. 
16 A common theme in many early travel writings is comments on the similarity between 
Tibetan Buddhism and Roman Catholicism. For instance, for the British traveller Thomas 
Manning, the marshy land next to the Potala reminded of `Pope, Rome, and what I had read of 
the Pontine Marshes' (Markham 1876: 255). Upon meeting Italian travellers Giuseppe Tucci 
and Fosco Maraini and being aware of tenets of Catholicism, Lama Nawang exclaims `Bravo, 
bravo, then you're like us, you're a civilized people too! ' (Maraini 1952: 170). For many 
British Protestants, this made Tibet open to some sort of `Reformation'. As O'Connor writes, 
`All that now remains is for a Tibetan Luther to appear upon the scene' (in Sharma and Sharma 
1996: 194). 
17 Western emphasis on the centrality of religion to Tibetan civilisation is also reflected in 
Tibetan self-perceptions. For instance, when charting an outline of Tibet's future, the Dalai 
Lama says, `because religion constitutes the source of Tibet's national identity, and spiritual 
values lie at the very heart of Tibet's rich culture, it would be the special duty of the 
Government of Tibet to safeguard and develop its practice' (His Holiness 1988). 
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stereotyping, essentialism, and exoticism along with the strategies of differentiation, 
idealisation, affirmation, gerontification, and self-criticism. 
5B. i. Waddell and the study of `degenerate' `Buddhism of Tibet or Lamaism' 
Waddell, the foremost `expert' on Tibetan Buddhism at the turn of the twentieth 
century, bolstered widespread negative images of Tibet ostensibly based on `scientific' 
and `ethnographic' foundations. He had the `right' credentials to be an expert: he had 
learnt the Tibetan language, he sought to study the religion systematically and 
scientifically, '8 and most importantly, he was a European man. 
Waddell's accounts of his journey into Tibetan religion (The Buddhism of Tibet or 
Lamaism 1895/1972) as well as into the Tibetan landscape (Lhasa and its mysteries 
1905) is filled with references to a degenerate form of Buddhism, an exploitative 
priesthood, and a superstitious peasantry. He writes, `the bulk of the Lamaist cults 
comprise much deep-rooted devil-worship and sorcery. . . 
for Lamaism is only thinly 
and imperfectly varnished over with Buddhist symbolism, beneath which the sinister 
growth of poly-demonist superstition darkly appears' (1972: xi). In Tibet, the impure 
form of Buddhism became `a disastrous parasitic disease which fastened on to the 
vitals of the land ... a cloak to the worst 
form of oppressive devil-worship' (1905: 25). 
At the same time, `lamaism' is not all bad as `it preserves for us much of the old-world 
lore and petrified beliefs of our Aryan ancestors' (1972: 4). In a typical blind 
imperialist un-selfreflexivity, Waddell finds the Tibetan Regent `hopelessly biased' 
about the religion of the British (1905: 408), while viewing his own biases about the 
religion of the Tibetans as objectivity. 
Waddell was a member of Younghusband's expedition to Lhasa. Writing about the 
journey inside Tibet, he says that the enigma has been solved for the 
fairy Prince of `Civilisation' has roused her from her slumbers, her closed doors are 
broken down, her dark veil of mystery is lifted up, and the long-sealed shrine, with its 
grotesque cults and its idolised Grand Lama, shorn of his sham nimbus, have yielded 
up their secrets, and lie disenchanted before our Western eyes. Thus, alas! Inevitably, 
do our cherished romances of old pagan world crumble at the touch of our modern 
hands! (1905: 2) 
18 Waddell even purchased a `Lamaist temple with its fittings; and prevailed on the officiating 
priests to explain ... 
in full detail the symbolism and the rites as they proceeded' (1972: viii). 
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The account is filled with contradictions. While the text is replete with criticism of the 
`vampire priests', `parasitic priesthood', and `sheer barbarians', it also expresses 
nostalgia for the enigma which was supposedly lost with the invasion and considers 
Tibet to have `charming land and interesting people' (1905: 448). When visiting 
Yamdok Lake, Waddell mentions his pleasure at leaving warlike surroundings and 
entering `again the world of dreams and magic which may be said to be ever with us in 
the mystic Land of the Lamas' (1905: 292-3). Again, upon approaching Lhasa, he 
compares the excitement and anticipation to `the emotions felt by the Crusaders of old 
on arriving within sight of Jerusalem, after their long march through Europe' (1905: 
326) and exclaims: `Here at last was the object of our dreams! - the long-sought, 
mysterious Hermit City, the Rome of Central Asia, with the residence of its famous 
priest-god - and it didn't disappoint us! ' (1905: 330) 
Taking a dig at the theosophist imagination of Tibet as the land of the mahatmas, he 
writes, `Thus we are told that, amidst the solitude of this "Land of the Supernatural" 
repose the spirits of "The Masters, " the Mahatmas, whose astral bodies slumber in 
unbroken peace, save when they condescend to work some petty miracle in the world 
below' (1972: 3). In contrast, he mentions that Tibetans were entirely ignorant of any 
`Mahatmas' living in Tibet, nor had they heard of any secrets of the ancient world 
being preserved in Tibet (1905: 409-10). Though many commentators disclaim the 
theosophist idealisation of Tibet and deploy the trope of debasement and negation on 
the lines of Waddell, over the course of the twentieth century, it is the idealisation of 
Tibetan religion that gained wider currency during the middle and later half of the 
twentieth century. 
5B. ii. `The Tibetan book of the dead' 
The Tibetan book of the dead has significantly contributed to the valorisation of 
Tibetan religion and to the Western imagination of Tibet as a land of spirituality. It is 
the most widely read `Tibetan' text. It was allegedly written in the eighth or the ninth 
century and `discovered' in the fourteenth. It organises the experiences of the bar-do , 
the `in-between' - usually referring to the state between death and rebirth. It was 
introduced to the West by Walter Evans-Wentz in 1927 and 
[f]rom its first incarnation in English in 1927, the work has taken on a life of its own 
as something of a timeless world spiritual classic. It has been made to serve wide- 
ranging agendas in various fields of use, agendas that have far more to do with the 
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twentieth-century cultural fashions of Europe and America than with how the text has 
been used over the centuries of its history in Tibet (Lopez 1998: 47). 
The most idealised version comes with Robert Thurman who seeks to represent 
Tibetan Buddhism as scientific rather than religious. He dedicates the book 
to the brave and gentle people of Tibet, who have suffered and are suffering one of the 
great tragedies of our time ... [and prays that] ... May the Tibetan people soon regain the sovereign freedom they have enjoyed since the dawn of history! And may the 
sunlight of Tibetan Spiritual Science once again shine brightly upon a freshened 
world! (1998) 
In discussing the virtue of pacifism, Thurman argues that during the reign of the Fifth 
Dalai Lama (1617-1682), a unique form of government was created that was almost 
completely demilitarized and gave priority to nonviolence (9). He represents Tibet as a 
spiritual civilisation and says 
[i]n Western culture, the last frontier of our material conquest is the universe of outer 
space. Our astronauts are our ultimate heroes and heroines. Tibetans, however, are 
more concerned about the spiritual conquest of the inner universe, whose frontiers are 
in the realms of death, the between, and contemplative ecstasies. So, the Tibetan 
lamas... [who are spiritually adept, the] `psychonauts' are the Tibetans' ultimate 
heroes and heroines (10). 
Drawing upon the themes of Western materialism and Eastern spirituality, Thurman 
points out that the unique psychological character complex that corresponds to the 
modern Tibetan society is `inner modernity' as opposed to the Western psychological 
character complex, which can be described as `outer modernity'. `The modern Tibetan 
character complex shares the modern traits of individualism, openness and flexibility 
of identity, reflectiveness, and rationality ... 
[While] Western and Tibetan 
personalities share the complex of modernity of consciousness, they are diametrically 
opposed in outlook, one focused on matter and the other on mind' (11). This 
difference of personality underlies the difference between the Western (American for 
Thurman) and Tibetan civilisations: `While the American national purpose is ever 
greater material productivity, the Tibetan national purpose is ever greater spiritual 
productivity' (11). 
Thus, the idealisation of Tibetan spirituality often goes beyond everyday religious 
practice, concerning itself with realms beyond religion. As Tibetophile Hollywood 
actor Steven Segal says, `[m]y agenda has no politics. It has no economy. You see. It 
goes even beyond religion which is also big business and goes into simple human 
kindness and the way we're supposed to treat each other as human beings' (Frontline 
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1998c). A figure that has been integral to the Western imagination of Tibet as an 
abode of spirituality is the lama. 
5C. The lama 
`The Andes llama, he's a beast/The Tibet lama, he's a priest' (Holte 1991). 
Younghusband, at the end of his time in Lhasa, writes about the Ti Rimpoche, the 
Ganden Abbot: he was a `benevolent, kindly old gentleman, who would not hurt a fly 
if he could have avoided it' and `more nearly approached Kipling's Lama in "Kim" 
than any other Tibetan" he had met (Younghusband 1910: 310,325). Here we see how 
images of the represented shaped the encounters of the representer with her/his 
subject. Kipling's lama provided an image of the Tibetan lama according to which the 
British during the early twentieth century judged actual lamas. With Younghusband 
begins the tradition of looking for the `Teshoo lama' figure - elderly yet childlike, 
respected yet loved, spiritually wise yet with little knowledge of, or interest in, the 
secular world. The significance of Kipling' Kim in introducing the figure of a benign 
lama into the Western imagination cannot be overemphasised. This facet of Exotica 
Tibet draws upon various modes and strategies of representation that we discussed in 
the previous chapter - stereotyping, exoticism, essentialism, idealisation, affirmation, 
chronopolitics, infantilisation, and gerontification. 
5C. i. `Kim' and the Teshoo lama 
Kipling's Kim (1976/1901) belongs to the genre of the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century novel, which presents the `Oriental' world for the visual and 
material consumption of the West. At once a spy thriller, a picaresque adventure 
narrative, a maturation story, and a quest for romance, Kim's complexity comes, in 
part, from his curious stacking up of multiple genres. Simply put, the novel is about 
the `adventures' of Kim -a white orphan boy who has grown up amongst Indians, 
easily passing himself off as one of them. He takes to the road as a chela (disciple, 
companion) of a Tibetan Lama and discovers the diversity of north Indian life while 
`becoming a man'. Initially, accompanying the lama on his search for the `fountain of 
wisdom', he is then picked up by the British and groomed for working in the British 
secret service. 
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Though the depiction of individual `Oriental' characters such as the Teshoo Lama is 
positive, it in no way disrupts the cumulative picture and the certainties of 
Orientalism. `For the general category... offers the specific instance a limited terrain 
in which to operate: no matter how deep the specific exception, no matter how much a 
single Oriental can escape the fences around him, he is first an Oriental, second a 
human being, and last again an Oriental' (Said 1993: 112). 
In Kim, it is the Europeans who provide the Orientals with the first accurate 
descriptions and proper explanations of their history, religion, and culture. This is 
evident in the confrontation of the lama with the British curator of Lahore museum 
(the Fountain of Wisdom). The curator, a `white-bearded Englishman', speaks to the 
lama, who is trembling with excitement upon the sight of Buddhist images: `Welcome, 
then, 0 lama from Tibet. Here be the images, and I am here ... to gather 
knowledge' 
(1976: 13). The lama then tells of his monastery, where he was the abbot. In reply, the 
curator brings out a huge book of photos and showed him that very place, suitably 
impressing the lama who exclaims, `And thou- the English know of these things? ' 
(14). Yet, the lama is not totally convinced about British control over knowledge, for 
he says that there are still things that Western scholars do not know, have not sought 
for - things relating to spiritual wisdom. Later, the lama introduces Kim to new art 
forms and chuckles: `The Sahibs have not all this world's wisdom' (209, emphasis in 
original). The attitude of the curator and lama expresses well the tension and polarity 
within Exotica Tibet - science, technology and power (possession of the West) versus 
spiritual wisdom and mystery (possession of the East in general, and Tibet in 
particular) (Bishop 1989: 190). 19 
Throughout the book, Tibet lingers on the border almost beyond the reach of those in 
India. When the lama enters the story he says to the boys that he is `a hillman from 
hills thou' lt never see' (Kipling 1976: 12) coming from hills where `the air and water 
are fresh and cool' (11). On their journey he tells stories of `enduring snows, landslips, 
blocked passes, the remote cliffs where men find sapphires and turquoise, and the 
19 On the issue of Western technology versus Eastern spirituality, ironically, while in 1939, 
Carl Gustav Jung wrote in his Psychological commentary on The Tibetan Book of the Great 
Liberation: `yoga in Mayfair or Fifth Avenue, or in any other place which is on the telephone, 
is a spiritual fake', in 1921, in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan government, 
Lhasa 
was connected to the telegraph and by 1940 Lhasa had its 
first telephone (Bishop n. d). 
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wonderful upland road that leads at last into Great China itself (48). Later, on the 
second leg of their journey 
he told stories, tracing with a finger in the dust, of the immense and sumptuous ritual 
of avalanche-guarded cathedrals; of processions and devil-dances; of the changing of 
monks and nuns into swine; of holy cities fifteen thousand feet in the air; of intrigue 
between monastery and monastery; of voices among the hills, and of that mysterious 
mirage that dances on dry snow. He spoke even of Lhassa and of the Dalai Lama, 
whom he had seen and adored (232). 
One dominant representational strategy operating within the text is infantilisation. On 
the one hand, young Kim is contrasted to the old lama. But a closer reading shows 
Kim to be the real guardian and caretaker as he is practically wise and the lama is 
child-like in worldly matters. The lama writes in `clumsy, childish print' (13) and 
follows Kim's instructions obediently and `simply as a child' (20). Kim asserts his 
own importance for the lama when he says to him: `Was there ever such a disciple as 
I? 
... 
All earth would have picked thy bones within ten mile of Lahore city if I had not 
guarded thee' (71). Yet, when it came to crisis points such as when Kim is caught by 
two British regimental priests, the lama shows awareness of worldly matters in 
volunteering to act as Kim's financial guardian while he is schooled. 
The lama's wisdom in spiritual matters was of course unparalleled and compared 
favourably with Indian priests of all sorts. He spoke like a `scholar removed from 
vanity, as a Seeker walking in humility, as an old man, wise and temperate, 
illuminating knowledge with brilliant insight' (232). Ultimately, the lama finds his 
`fountain of wisdom' (the `river of the arrow') in his affection for Kim and `saves' 
Kim from his illness through his meditation. He says `Son of my Soul, I have 
wrenched my Soul back from the Threshold of Freedom to free thee from all sin - as I 
am free, and sinless! ' (313). Tibet comes to the aid of the West to rejuvenate it 
spiritually. 
The benign figure of the lama, the one with a `loving old soul' (207), does not 
preclude Kipling from expressing the general disagreement with Tibetan religion that 
was prevalent amongst Europeans during the turn of the twentieth century. Kipling's 
lama figure expresses his anguish that the `Old law' - primitive Buddhism - `was not 
well followed; being overlaid... with devildom, charms, and idolatry' (15). 
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Even though some might find in the figure of Teshoo lama a charitable depiction of an 
`Oriental' (see Hopkirk 1997), yet even he, the most sympathetic of holy men, is seen 
as childish, unthinking and incapable - to the point of self-destruction - of existence in 
the real world. This portrayal of the lama results from strategies of simplified 
idealisation and ambivalence. From his early function as a father figure for Kim, he 
gradually reveals his practical inadequacies, as his childlike dependence on Kim 
grows more explicit. Later in the novel, as compared to the Western father figures of 
Colonel Creighton and Father Victor - the men combining power and `worldly' 
knowledge - the lama's virtue and behaviour increasingly appear gendered as 
feminine and thus ineffectual. In contrast to the lama's (maternal) attachment, love, 
and delight in Kim and in contrast to the lama's unreserved love, his new fathers 
initiate a regime of discipline (Sullivan 1993: 160-1). Throughout the novel Kipling 
shows that the lama, while a wise and good man, needs Kim's youth, his guidance, his 
wits; the lama even explicitly acknowledges his absolute, religious need for Kim. In 
spite of its yearnings for all that the lama represents, the rhetoric and the logic of novel 
finally draw Kim away from the margins and returns him to the centre of imperial 
surveillance and power as a spy. And the lama, as the ultimately idealised Other who 
exemplifies uncorrupted goodness, innocence and nature, must finally be stereotyped, 
feminised and mystified as the eternally deferred and static object of colonial desire 
(Ibid.: 26). Thus, Kim's search for identity as well as his love for the lama is both 
mediated by the ruling structures of power. 
Angus Wilson surmises why Kipling used the character of a Tibetan lama and not any 
other religious figure: it was essential to the spiritual relation that was to develop 
between the lama and Kim that, for Kim, his master be an exotic novelty, for the boy's 
curiosity about everything new is what marks him out as someone who is likely to 
learn from life (Wilson 1987: 53). The lama provides exactly this. His simplicity and 
novelty allowed Kim to claim that `the lama was his trove, and he proposed to take 
possession' (Kipling 1976: 19). And then, it was also necessary that the master should 
be entirely dependent upon Kim for guidance in the real world. The Tibetan lama 
symbolised radical 'otherworldliness'. 
5C. ii. The Dalai Lama 
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Over the century, the Tibetan lama figure has come to be crystallised in the figure of 
the Grand Lama, the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lamas have been invested not only with 
the desires of their Tibetan followers, but also with those of Westerners. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century, the Dalai Lama was an enigma. The 
Younghusband expedition presented the British public with the idea of the Dalai Lama 
as the `mysterious god-king of Tibet, embodying a line of spiritual predecessors 
vaguely envisaged as stretching back into the mists of history' (Richardson 1998: 
382). The fact that during the Lhasa invasion the Dalai Lama fled Tibet and was 
therefore beyond the control of the British added to the enigma. 20 
As the twentieth century has drawn to a close, the Western version of the Dalai Lama 
as a personification of Tibet has taken a literal form. `Real Tibet dream comes when 
you meet his Holiness because then - it's actualized' (Gere, in Frontline 1998b). 
Journalistic accounts of meeting with him tend to find elements of Tibetanness in his 
body or attire or laugh. `The Dalai Lama embodies Tibetan culture and Tibetan cause; 
he provides the refugees with a concrete example of how to live by the abstract values 
of their culture' (Forbes 1989: 160). 2' 
That Sino-Tibetan conflict has come to revolve around the interpretation of the Dalai 
Lama as an individual is evident from Bill Clinton's statement in Beijing: `I have 
spent time with the Dalai Lama, I believe him to be an honest man, and I believe that 
if he had a conversation with President Jiang Zemin, they would like each other very 
20 When the thirteenth Dalai Lama was interviewed for the first time in 1911 by William Ellis 
for The Continent, a Presbyterian paper, the interviewer was not deeply impressed. `His face is 
thoroughly pock-marked', he wrote, `and his ears, which are large and pointed at the top, are 
his most noticeable feature. His moustache is waxed horizontally, while his head, in a lesser 
personage, would be called bullet-shaped'. Of the things the Lama had to talk about, the item 
that pleased his interviewer most was a statement that, upon returning to Tibet at the end of his 
long exile consequent upon the invasion of his land by the Younghusband expedition, he 
intended to send young Tibetan men to America for a Western education. There is not much 
hint of mysticism here but there is a reference to `strategic' location of Tibet (`Tibet's living 
deity' 1911). 
21 Though Zizek does not conflate the Dalai Lama with Tibet, his criticism of the Dalai Lama's 
reception in the West reflects a similar ignorance of the cultural specificity of the figure of the 
Dalai Lama. His critique of `postmodern times' deploys the Dalai Lama's `spiritualism' 
crudely in order to compare it unfavourably with the figure of the Pope. 
One can now understand why the Dalai Lama is much more appropriate for our 
postmodern permissive times: he presents us with a vague feel-good spiritualism 
without any specific obligations: anyone, even the most decadent Hollywood star, can 
follow him while continuing his or her money-grabbing promiscuous lifestyle... The 
Pope, in contrast, reminds us that there is a price to pay for a proper ethical attitude 
(Zizek 2001 a: 181). 
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much' (`Clinton urges China' 1998). On the other hand, cynics like Rupert Murdoch 
support the Chinese occupation by attacking him: `I have heard cynics who say he's a 
very political old monk shuffling around in Gucci shoes.. . 
It [old Tibetan society] was 
a pretty terrible old autocratic society out of the Middle Ages' ('Murdoch brands Dalai 
Lama' 1999). These representations fail to convey through their imagery a sense of the 
process by which the Dalai Lama comes to represent his constituency, or that the Tibet 
he represents is a `political Tibet with a defined territory and customs, or a highly 
complex society in transition with a wide range of sectors and interests, and a rapidly 
changing social environment' (Barnett 2001: 300-1). Without denying the centrality of 
the figure of the Dalai Lama to the Tibetan civilisation, it can be argued that the 
current literalisation of the Dalai Lama as Tibet is intimately linked to the Western 
imagination and Western desires. 
5D. Temporal and spiritual journeying to the `rooftop of the world' 
`I wonder what lies beyond [the Himalayas]? 
... Mystery' 
(Dr Roland's answer to the narrator, Geddie 1882: 9). 
The Lonely planet travel guide to Tibet opens with a typical statement: `Shangri-La, 
the Land of Snows, the Roof of the World; for centuries the mysterious Buddhist 
kingdom, locked away in its mountain fastness of the Himalayas, exercised a unique 
hold on the imagination of the West' (Taylor 1986: 9). Adventure and spirituality are 
integral parts of journeys into Tibet. Western travelogues highlight a sense of 
adventure, surprise, and an encounter with spirituality in travels into Tibet, particularly 
in journeys to Lhasa. Throughout the twentieth century, the notion of `Tibet' has 
conjured images of access to its spiritual life as forbidding as any attempt to cross its 
earthly frontiers. 22 One experiences here a sense of a peculiar `mixture of wild, 
scarcely tamed passion and exquisitely detached refinement' (Batchelor 1987: 13). 
After examining the enchantment with Tibet in terms of its geographical location, 
`closed' and `forbidden' nature, and the reputation of Lhasa and its Potala palace, I 
shall look at two illustrations of travel writing and pick out elements of temporal and 
spiritual adventure. Apart from exoticism and stereotyping, the main representational 
22 Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Tibetans had prohibited foreigners' 
access to Tibet, particularly to Lhasa. 
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strategies at work include gaze, naturalisation, spiritual i sation, self-affirmation, and 
self-criticism. 
One factor that explains the magnetic power of Tibet is its extreme remoteness from 
the West. When F. Spencer Chapman entered Tibet, he found it to be a `world of 
immense distances' (1992: 32). It offers the opportunity to imagine a land of cherished 
ideals or a wasteland. For instance, the US War Department in 1947 could envisage 
only two possible `uses for Tibet: `as a country offering great waste areas in which 
rockets could be tested, or as a final retreat (Shangri-la) to which peace-loving people 
could flee when atomic war breaks, for Tibet is too remote to be of significance in any 
war' (quoted in Knaus 1999: 26). 23 
Tibet's geographical features provide it with a uniquely `fantastic' landscape. `It has 
all the physical features of a true wonderland ... No description can convey the least 
idea of the solemn majesty, the serene beauty, the awe-inspiring wildness, the 
entrancing charm of the finest Tibetan scenes' (David-Neel 1936: 262). Docteur A. De 
Arsonval writes: 
for many Westerners Tibet is wrapped in an atmosphere of mystery. The `Land of 
Snows' is for them the country of the unknown, the fantastic and the impossible. What 
superhuman powers have not been ascribed to the various kinds of lamas, magicians, 
sorcerers, necromancers and practitioners of the occult who inhabit those high 
tablelands, and whom both nature and their own deliberate purpose have so splendidly 
isolated from the rest of the world? And how readily are the strangest legends about 
them accepted as indisputable truths! In that country plants, animals and human 
beings seem to divert to their own purposes the best established laws of physics, 
chemistry, physiology and even plain common sense (in David-Neel 1936: v-vi). 
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the fact that it was `closed' to 
Europeans added to the mystery of Lhasa and Tibet. The epithets of `the Forbidden 
City' and the `forbidden land' merely served to enhance the desire of individual 
Western travellers to defy the authorities. The `race for Lhasa'24 reached its peak at the 
23 John Kenneth Knaus further points out that the Americans naively operated with a frontier 
mentality, assuming the Tibetan situation to be the theatrical scene of a `frontier drama with the 
good guys trying to get rid of bad guys' (1999: 61). According to him, `The CIA men viewed 
their Tibetan pupils as Oriental versions of self-reliant, straight-shooting American 
frontiersmen who were under attack and seeking only the means to fight for their own way of 
life' (216). Ironically, this sentiment ignored that while in the American case, frontiersmen 
were the invaders, in the Tibetan case the `Oriental frontiersmen' were the ones who suffered 
from Chinese invasion. 
24 Of course one had to be European/American to count in the quest for Lhasa. In this vein, 
Hopkirk argues that the Japanese monk Kawaguchi cannot be counted in the race for Lhasa as 
`it had been from the start a rivalry between Westerners, starting with Nikolai Prejevalsky. 
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turn of the twentieth century, culminating in the British invasion in 1903-04. The 
closing of Tibet was `an immediate challenge to adventurous explorers, intelligence 
officers and missionaries' most of whom made their entry surreptitiously, often in 
disguise, through some remote, thinly populated area of frontier. Amazingly, between 
1792 and 1904 only one foreign explorer was killed and that was in a region beyond 
the control of Lhasa authorities (Richardson 1998: 416). Tibetans showed forbearance 
toward those foreigners who repeatedly tried to gatecrash their sacred places. Writing 
about A. Campbell (the Superintendent of Police of Darjeeling who tried to enter Tibet 
with Joseph Hooker, a naturalist), Alistair Lamb say he was `badly smitten by what 
amounted to an occupational disease among British officials along the Tibet frontier, a 
burning desire to see for himself that mysterious and forbidden land whose tantalizing 
proximity to British territory was a continual challenge... ' (1960: 94). 
The opening of Tibet did not follow the British invasion: travel to Lhasa was severely 
restricted both by the Lhasa authority and the British Indian government. In fact, 
having been deported by Charles Bell after her illicit journey into Tibet around 1915, 
French traveller Alexandra David-Neel later wrote: `What right had they to erect 
barriers around a country which was not even lawfully theirs? ' (1991: xii). The cliche 
of forbidden Tibet can be seen even in one of the few commercial films made inside 
Tibet (the location is unclear) - Tibet: Land of Isolation (US, 1934) by James 
Fitzpatrick. This travelogue, which provides a commentary on everyday life, is 
essentially a catalogue of Western myths about Tibet. Its closing narrative is typical: 
`And so life goes on among the people of Tibet where the progress of civilization is at 
the mercy of priestcraft and the destinies of men are eternally limited by impregnable 
boundaries of superstition, ignorance and fear. And it is with this thought that we say 
farewell to Tibet, land of isolation' (Hansen 2001: 96). 
The `forbidden' character of Tibet was etched even deeper in Western imagination 
when China occupied Tibet and long periods of effective and coercive isolation began. 
Though Tibet has been opened to travellers in limited numbers since the 1980s, severe 
Without belittling their achievements, it has to be said that it was easier for the Asiatics and 
therefore the race was among the Europeans' (Hopkirk 1983: 157). This sentiment ignores that 
`Asiatics' faced more dangers of being treated far more severely than the Europeans. `Women, 
non-Europeans, lower classes (e. g. Cossacks with Prejevalsky), amateurs, eccentrics, mystics 
and younger people have all been dismissed at some time, in one way or another' (Bishop 
1993: 36). 
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travel restrictions remain. Dodging Chinese authorities and encounters with `real' 
Tibetans (as opposed to `Sinicised' Tibetans) have become staples of most 
contemporary travel writing (see Magnusson 2002) 
In most such writings, it is common to come across detailed description of the first 
sight of Lhasa in the form of the Potala Palace. The descriptions are usually 
exclamatory. For critics, `the Potala unconsciously symbolizes the vast erection of 
power and pride which separates the priestly caste of Tibet from the real truths of the 
religion they have prostituted' (Landon quoted in Chapman 1992: 181) while for 
admirers, `the Potala represents the very essence of the Tibetan people. It has a certain 
untamed dignity in perfect harmony with the surrounding rugged country; a quality of 
stolid unchangeableness - it seems to say: "Here I have been for hundreds years, and 
here I intend to stay for ever"' (Chapman 1992: 7). 
With the Chinese occupation and exile of its main inhabitant, the Dalai Lama, the 
Potala has come to be a symbol of old Tibet: while the monumental solidity of the 
exteriors represents the resistance and persistence of Tibetan culture, the interior 
symbolises the absence of the Dalai Lama and hence its loss of sacred purpose 
(Bishop 1997: 67). It is a common observation of many Western travellers that the 
Potala seems `empty, lifeless... Despite the confusion, the plethora of objects, the 
Potala is a strangely empty place: it has no heart, the life has gone out of it. It is an 
eerie silent museum' (Hadfield and Hadfield 1988: 48-9). The Potala has `become a 
place for tourists, a museum, a mausoleum' (Bass 1993: 106). This emptying of 
Potala's interior does not challenge its role as a symbol of resistance to the Chinese 
occupation. Sorrel Wilby's comments on Potala reflect the cliche: it rose `from the 
Chinese ghettos like a victorious, battle-scarred star. Shining, literally beaming with 
Tibetanness. I had made it to Lhasa. Lhasa at last! ' (1988: 16) 
5D. i. David-Neel's `Journey to Lhasa' 
Alexandra David-Neel was the first Western woman to be granted an audience with 
the Dalai Lama in Kalimpong. 25 She was the first to enter Lhasa when she went with a 
Sikkimese Lama (Yongden) whom she adopted as her son and brought to live in 
25 For a critical take on David-Neel's travel writing, see Mills 1991. 
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France. She set off in the winter of 1923 disguised as a Tibetan pilgrim, maps hidden 
in her boots, revolver in her peasant dress; she outwitted officials and bandits, 
enduring days without food and nights without shelter, restoring energy with a granule 
of strychnine. She willed heat into her body by thumo reskiang, the mental discipline 
practised by Tibetan ascetics, and, `hypnotised by the will to succeed', finally reached 
her destination. Her account of her journey to Lhasa is replete with various themes 
common to Exotica Tibet. Though it is a travel account, it is also a journey into 
spiritual realms. As Peter Hopkirk writes in the introduction to her book, `her 
explorations were of the Tibetan mind rather than of the terrain' (David-Neel 1991: 
xv). 
The book starts with her rationale for taking the adventurous but dangerous trip. The 
British prohibited her from travelling in the Himalayan region and this increased her 
determination. Once when she was stopped from proceeding into Tibet, 
I took an oath that in spite of all obstacles I would reach Lhasa and show what the will 
of a woman could achieve! But I did not think only of avenging my own defeats. I 
wanted the right to exhort others to pull down the antiquated barriers which surround, 
in the center of Asia ... if `heaven is the Lord's', the earth is the inheritance of man, 
and ... consequently any honest traveller has the right to walk as he chooses, all over 
the globe which is his (xxv). 
Her criticisms are also directed against the central Tibetan authority based in Lhasa. It 
was a period when Tibetans had been successful in pushing out the Chinese army, and 
controlled large parts of the ethnically Tibetan area. According to her, the Tibetans 
lost much in parting with China for their `sham independence profits only a clique of 
court officials. Most of those who rebelled against the far-off and relaxed Chinese rule 
regret it nowadays, when taxes, statute labour, and the arrogant plundering of the 
national soldiery greatly exceed the extortions of their former masters' (256). 
Her account is filled with stereotypical remarks about the `Orientals' in general and 
Tibetans in particular. She makes pejorative remarks about Tibetans including her own 
adopted son, `the obstinate fellow': `Yongden thought only of his thirst' (14). 
David-Neel's exoticism is more about the Tibetan landscape and less about the 
Tibetan people. While she finds most Tibetans very superstitious, she admires the 
physical landscape: `But is not everything a fairy tale in this extraordinary country, 
even to the name it gives itself, that of Khang Yul, "the land of snows"? ' (277). She 
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derives spirituality not from Tibetan religion but from the geographical and natural 
landscape. After living the life of a Tibetan mystic, she felt that natural edifices like 
mountains and valleys conveyed a mysterious message: `What I heard was the 
thousand-year old echo of thoughts which are re-thought over and over again in the 
East, and which, nowadays, appear to have fixed their stronghold in the majestic 
heights of Thibet' (24). She considered the fantastic to be an everyday occurrence in 
Tibet. Mystics and mysticism are ever present in the account. Speaking of the mystics' 
retreat in parts of Tibet, she writes `this world of the Thibetan mystics is a mystery in 
the mystery of Thibet, a strange wonder in a wonderful country' (198). 
David-Neel is conscious of her gender and the extra significance it has for her trip. 
When she finally succeeds in her goal, she writes `all sights, all things which are 
Lhasa's own beauty and peculiarity, would have to be seen by the lone woman 
explorer who had had the nerve to come to them from afar, the first of her sex' (259). 
She concludes `the first white woman had entered forbidden Lhasa and shown the 
way. May others follow and open with loving hearts the gates of the wonderland' 
(310). 
Although David-Neel's journey into the wonderland of Tibet was a spiritual 
adventure, the dominant feeling one gets is of a travel adventure. In contrast, accounts 
such as The Snow Leopard are primarily about spiritual journey. Physical adventure 
comes to symbolise spiritual quest. 
5D. ii. Matthiessen's search for `The snow leopard' 
The Snow leopard (1995) is about the search in the Himalayas for the elusive 
eponymous cat. It is also a celebrated account of the bond between human beings and 
nature. Written out of Peter Matthiessen's interest in Zen, The Snow Leopard recounts 
his trip to the remotest parts of Nepal with the naturalist George Schaller in search of 
the Himalayan blue sheep and the rarely seen snow leopard. In bittersweet 
remembrance following the death of his wife, Matthiessen confronts the beauty, 
mysteries and often-violent world of the Himalayas and his own equally strange and 
difficult feelings about life and death. Not surprisingly, the one book he carries with 
him is The Tibetan book of the dead. 
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Matthiessen expresses his anxiety about the loss under Chinese occupation of Tibetan 
culture from the map of the cultural world. He quotes Lama Angarika Govinda to the 
effect that Tibetan culture was the last citadel of `all that present-day humanity is 
longing for, either because it has been lost or not yet been realized or because it is in 
danger of disappearing from human sight: the stability of a tradition, which has its 
roots not only in a historical or cultural past, but within the innermost being of man... ' 
(13-14). 
The author exoticises natives throughout the novel. Praising sherpas for their 
primitivism, he writes, `the generous and open outlook of the sherpas, a kind of merry 
defencelessness, is by no means common, even among sophisticated peoples; I have 
never encountered it before except among the Eskimos' (40). His companion calls 
sherpas `childish people' (109). The author is ashamed of himself when he witnesses 
the `happy go lucky spirit', the `acceptance which is not fatalism but a deep trust in 
life' exhibited by the sherpa companions (149). 
Unlike David-Neel, who had the specific goal of reaching Lhasa, Matthiessen has no 
aim. `I would like to reach the Crystal Monastery, I would like to see a snow leopard, 
but if I do not, that is all right, too' (93). When all he gets to see are the marks of the 
snow leopard, he writes `I am disappointed, and also, I am not disappointed. That the 
snow leopard is, that it is here, that its frosty eyes watch us from the mountain - that is 
enough' (221). In response to a question: `Have you seen the snow leopard? ', he 
replies `No! Isn't that wonderful? ' (225). When asked why he took the journey, he 
replies: `I wished to penetrate (sic) the secrets of the mountains in search of something 
still unknown that, like the yeti, might well be missed for the very fact of searching' 
(121-2). 
The Snow leopard in its spiritual quest also becomes a means through which the 
Western Self is critiqued. The author writes `my head has cleared in these weeks free 
of intrusions - mail, telephones, people and their needs - and I respond to things 
spontaneously, without defensive or self-conscious screens' (112). The account ends 
with despair as `I am still beset with the same old lusts and ego and emotions. . .1 look 
forward to nothing' (272). The elusive snow leopard stands here for the mystical 
elusiveness of Tibetan culture, for the elusiveness of renouncing Western desires. 
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5E. Land of mysticism and fantasy 
`We Tibetans believe that everyone before the Fall of Man had the ability to 
travel in astral, see by clairvoyance, telepathize and levitate. Our version of 
that Fall is that Man abused the occult powers and used them for self-interest instead of for the development of mankind as a whole' (Rampa 143). 
An integral theme of Exotica Tibet has been the imagination of Tibet as a land of 
mysticism and fantasy where most events are romantic, extraordinary and absolutely 
different from anything in the West. In fact, often I find in the bookshops that the 
books on Tibet are mostly classified as part of spiritualism, occult or mysticism even 
when they have little to do with any of these topics. Tibet is seen as a `bewitching 
region' where mysticism is a part of daily experience and the fantastic is an everyday 
occurrence. It is considered `a magical, delicate country' (Seymour in Chang-ching 
and Seymour 1998: xi). Contrasting this image with the West's self-portrait, Jamyang 
Norbu writes, `Tibet is seen as the "antithesis" of the West not so much in the sense of 
a "darker" civilization, but rather in the matter of corporeality. The West, whatever its 
failings, is real; Tibet, however wonderful, is a dream; whether of a long-lost golden 
age or millenarian fantasy, it is still merely a dream' (2001: 375). This representation 
(as imaginative practice) is common in `ethnographic' as well as `fantasy' literature. 
In her account of life in the border region of Tibet in With mystics and magicians in 
Tibet (1936/1931), David-Neel writes `though, wonderful as this entrance house of 
Tibet proved to be, I know that I am far from having obtained a glimpse of all the 
strange mystic doctrines and practices which are hidden from the profane in the 
hermitages of the "Land of Snow"' (1936: 88). While praising the mysticism of 
spiritual adepts, she is critical of what she calls the `repugnant mysticism' of the 
`superstitious' masses that concerns itself with ghosts and demons. She mentions 
having met three lung-gom-pas runners - those who take extraordinarily long tramps 
with amazing rapidity by combining mental concentration with breathing gymnastics. 
She also refers to her own ability to practice the art of warming oneself without fire up 
in the snows and the capacity to send messages `on the wind' (telepathy) that was a 
privilege of a small minority of adepts (210-20). 
Mysticism is not a dominant theme only in ethnographic/autobiographical works such 
as David-Neel's. A very prominent mixture of fantasy and mysticism is found in 
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fictional fantasy literature. The most (in)famous example is the trilogy written by 
Lobsang Rampa, who, although an ordinary Englishman, claimed the trilogy to be the 
autobiography of a Tibetan lama. His works reflect the centrality of stereotyping, 
essentialism, exoticism, idealisation, affirmation, gerontification, naturalisation and 
criticism of the West as some of the dominant tropes in Western representations of 
Tibet. 
5E. i. `The third eye' of Rampa the mystifier 
Tuesday Lobsang Rampa (alias Cyril Hoskin) was a mystifier, in two senses of the 
modern meaning of the term. First, he mystified Tibet, embellishing its various 
realities with his own mystical fancies, and second, he mystified his readers, playing 
on the credulity of the reading public (Lopez 1998: 86). Initially he did not disclose 
his identity and later, when detective investigation revealed that he was an English 
plumber who had never been to Tibet, he claimed to have been possessed by a Tibetan 
lama and over the course of seven years to have become a Tibetan, not just in his dress 
but in his molecules. The trilogy consists of The third eye: the autobiography of a 
Tibetan lama (1956), Doctor from Lhasa (1959), and The Rampa story (1960). The 
most prominent of these is The third eye, published in 1956 by Secker and Warburg 
despite opposition from experts on Tibet. The publishers defend their decision by 
asserting in the preface that it is 
in its essence an authentic account of the upbringing and training of a Tibetan boy in 
his family and in a lamasery. Anyone who differs from us will, we believe, at least 
agree that the author is endowed to an exceptional degree with narrative skills and the 
power to evoke scenes and characters of absorbing and unique interest (Rampa 1956: 
6). 
It became an immediate best seller. Though the community of European experts on 
Tibet was outraged, most reviews were positive. 26 Despite the disclosure of his identity 
as an unemployed plumber in February 1958, the book continued to sell. 
Rampa opens the book with statements (that are unlikely to come from a Tibetan): `I 
am a Tibetan. One of the few who have reached this strange Western world' (Rampa 
1956: 9). This autobiography of a young Tibetan lama, his life in Tibet, his training as 
26 Though most experts are scathing in their criticism of the fraudulent Rampa, Donald Lopez 
Jr. praises his books as having `brought the plight of Tibet to an otherwise indifferent audience 
of hundreds of thousands of Westerners, who would remain unconcerned were it not for the 
trappings of astral travel, spiritualism, and the hope of human evolution to a new age' (Lopez 
1998: 107). 
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priest-surgeon, his spiritual and fantastic adventures, and finally his departure from 
Tibet, is replete with stereotypes and cliches about Tibet that were prevalent in the mid 
twentieth century. 
Rampa defends Tibetan society's exclusiveness and resistance to progress. He writes, 
`Tibet was a theocratic country. We had no desire for the "progress" of the outside 
world. We only wanted to be able to meditate and to overcome the limitations of the 
flesh' (14). Contrary to the view that Tibet was a feudal society, he writes that it was 
the character of the person and not the rank of the birth that was the basis of a 
meritocratic system. After all `the Law is hard on the rich to teach them understanding 
and equity. The Law is gentle with the poor to show them compassion' (20). Even 
animals are treated with dignity: `Tibetan animals are not pets, nor are they slaves, 
they are beings with a useful purpose to serve, beings with rights just as human beings 
have rights' (33). 
Tibet is not only rich in mysticism, but also rich in material wealth. Rampa invokes 
the gold that was a crucial part of the imagination of Tibet in the early twentieth 
century. 27 `There are hundreds of tons of gold in Tibet, we regard it as sacred 
metal... Tibet could be one of the greatest storehouses of the world if mankind would 
work together in peace instead of so much useless striving for power' (206). In the 
Chang Tang highlands, lumps of gold `could be picked up as easily as could the 
pebbles' (221). 
The fantastic never leaves the description. After some time in the medical-school cum 
monastery, Rampa's third eye is opened through surgery. He can ascertain people's 
health and moods from their emanation (101-2). He is also given a crystal used as an 
instrument to penetrate the subconscious. Later, Rampa sees records of `the Chariots 
of the Gods' (Unidentified Flying Objects? ) and argues that some lamas had 
established telepathic communication with these `aliens' (140). He mentions that 
27 Fascination with gold has been a part of Western imagination of Tibet since ancient times 
when the Greeks wrote of gold-digging ants. In the early twentieth century, the British Foreign 
Office wrote: 
Even though gold is not produced much in early 20`h century, it has little bearing over 
future possibilities. Holdich sums up sentiment: `Tibet is not only rich [in gold] in the 
ordinary acceptance of the term; she must be enormously rich - possibly richer than 
any country in the world. For thousands of years gold has been washed out of her 
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levitation is possible but astral travelling is easier and surer. He describes his trip to a 
secret volcanic territory in the north with tropical vegetation where he sees a few yetis. 
(If) Western Man had his way, our poor old yetis would be captured, dissected, and 
preserved in spirit ... I am prepared, when the Communists are chased out of Tibet, to 
accompany an expedition of sceptics and show them the yetis in the Highlands. They 
can use oxygen and bearers, I will use my old monk's robe. Cameras will prove the 
truth. We had no photographic equipment in Tibet in those days (220). 
The audience (the West) is never absent from the narrative. The `autobiography' 
indulges in the representational strategy of self-criticism when Tibet is compared 
favourably to the West. The Dalai Lama warns Rampa that, while one could discuss 
the `Greater Realities' in Tibet and China, in the West one had to be extra careful 
because Westerners `worship commerce and gold' - `they ask for "proof' while 
uncaring that their negative attitude of suspicion kills any chance of their obtaining 
that proof (112). 
Yeti, time travel, hypnotism, telepathy, levitation, astral-travel, clairvoyance, 
invisibility - Tibet is a land of possibilities! It combines mysticism and fantasy, being 
both a lost horizon and a future utopia. 
5F. Tibet as Shangri-la 
`I really can't see why you should jump at everything just because you're in 
Tibet' (Mallinson's statement to Conway, Hilton 1933: 259) 
Integral to the Western imagination of Tibet, beginning in the late nineteenth century 
with theosophists and taken to its extreme in James Hilton's Lost horizon, has been a 
notion of utopia - Tibet as a sanctuary from the materialism and violence of modem 
times, a sanctuary for those disaffected with modernity and seeking peace and 
wisdom. Matthias Hermanns, an ethnologist in Amdo during the 1930s and 1940s, 
made use of this concept, which soon gained wider currency: `Tibet as a repository of 
archaic forms of biological and-more important-social life. Tibet as a sanctuary' 
(Kvaerne 2001: 54). This sanctuary is placeless (lacking definitive physical location) 
and yet placed (located) in Tibet. 
surface soil by the very crudest of all processes... From every river which has its 
source in the Tibetan plateau, gold is washed (1920: 61). 
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The myth of Shangri-1a28 -- that there exists a secret utopian place somewhere in Tibet 
- has been integral to Western representations of Tibet throughout the twentieth 
century. Describing the imagination of Tibet as a Shangri-la as `Rampaism', 
Agehananda Bharati summarises this attitude: 
there is, somewhere hidden in the Himalayas (invariably mis-stressed on the 
penultimate `a'), a powerful, mystical, initiate brotherhood of lamas or similar guru 
adepts, who not only know all the mysteries of the world and the superworld, who not 
only incorporate and transcend the teachings of Buddhism, Hinduism, and 
Christianity, but who also master all the occult arts - they fly through the air at 
enormous speeds, they run 400 miles at a stretch without break, they appear here and 
there, and they are arch-and-core advisors to the wise and the great who hide these 
ultimate links to supreme wisdom and control (1974: 1) 
Reflecting his own vision of Shangri-la, Amaury De Riencourt writes: 
Locked up in countless secret libraries in some out of the way lamaseries, there are a 
great many treatises of which foreigners have never heard, worn out by centuries and 
by thousands of studious lamas who try hard to get easy access to the mysterious 
beyond... [these are] Tibetan laboratories where occult forces are tested and 
manipulated (1950: 264). 
The origin of the Shangri-la myth can be traced to two different sources - the 
indigenous Tibetan mythology of a hidden kingdom of Shambhala and the theosophist 
construction of `Mahatmas' living in the Himalayan region of Tibet. According to the 
theosophists, they were heirs to ancient divine wisdom, which - long ago lost to 
ordinary people - had secretly been preserved by a benevolent brotherhood residing in 
Tibet. 29 
Central to the `Shangri-la myth' is the secret valley hidden somewhere in the vast 
region of Tibet. This utopia is neither completely placeless nor completely moored in 
physical space. `Shangri-La marks the final movement of Tibet from a geographically 
grounded sacred place to a placeless utopia' (Bishop 1989: ix). It is a repository -a 
repository of mental peace, spiritual wisdom, `high' culture, and physical wealth. It is 
28 Shangri-la is the mythical name given by Hilton in Lost horizon to the lamasery in a secret 
valley somewhere in the Himalayan region which combines Western physical comfort and 
Western classical cultural relics with Eastern wisdom. 
29 Although Madame Helena Blavatsky's books like Isis Unveiled had little mention of Tibet, 
her lodge in New York was fondly referred to by her followers as `the Lamasery', a clear 
attempt to link Theosophy with Tibetan mysticism (Korom 2001: 171). Thus, `Tibet and 
Tibetans were, in the Theosophical teaching, purely imaginary objects' (Penderson 2001: 157). 
In a similar vein, the British New Age proponent Alice Bailey in 1934 began to write down 
messages she received telepathically from a spirit known simply as `the Tibetan'. The 
Tibetan's first communique revealed to Bailey `a millenarian vision of the coming of the new 
age during the cosmic transition from Pisces to Aquarius, at which time the problems of 
mankind would be collaboratively solved by a group of highly evolved spirits and their earthly 
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a repository of desires - Western desires which leave little room for cultural and 
historical specificity of Tibet. Western travellers' search for the `real Tibet' often takes 
them beyond actual Tibetans: 
the real Tibet I was searching for was not out in the open. It was not in the 
magnificent temples and palaces, in the colorful bazaars, in the happy and carefree life 
of its farmers or in the entrancing charm of Lhasa's social life. Real Tibet transcends 
politics and economics; it is invisible, beyond sense-perception, beyond intellect. It is 
the mysterious land of the psyche, of what lies beyond death, a universe to which 
some Tibetans have the key and which their subtle soul seems to have explored as 
thoroughly as Western scientists have explored our physical universe (Riencourt 
1950: 262). 
Connected to the myth of Shangri-la is a fear of loss - either a loss that is inevitable 
because Tibetan civilisation is endangered by modernisation or communism or a loss 
that has already occurred. The latter is a nostalgia for a Tibet that exists mainly in the 
Western imagination -a pristine, virgin territory giving way to forces of progress; a 
sacred place trampled by the onslaught of modern forces, first the British and then the 
Chinese. In the twentieth century, there is a strong sense of `time running out' in 
Western accounts of Tibet. `Unlike the previous Tibets, which had a timeless 
permanence about them, in the twentieth century an all-pervading sense of loss was 
the leitmotiv of Western imagining. While the fin-de-siecle Tibet was edged with 
impermanence, now such fears were central' (Bishop 1989: 202; emphases in 
original). At the beginning of the twenty-first century, this fear has been realised. 
Tibet is seen as being condemned to almost certain death. `The final fate of Tibet 
hangs in the balance of choice between those who favour political pragmatism and 
those who favour spiritual values. The experience of history, if it is to be taken as a 
guide, is that Tibet is condemned to certain death. Unless, of course, there is that last- 
minute miracle' (Patterson 1990: 226). Here we see obituaries already being written 
even before the death. `Time is running out for Tibet -a nation that has refused to 
hold the world to ransom by hijacking planes, kidnapping, perpetrating senseless 
violence on innocent victims -a nation that for 1-2000 years has lived in peace and 
wants no more than to be free and to continue to live in peace' (Kewley 1990: 381-2). 
5F. i. The `Lost horizon'/the last horizon 
agents' (Korom 2001: 169). Out of her 24 books, Bailey claimed that 19 were written by her 
`Tibetan Master', DK (Djwhal Khul). 
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Hilton's Lost horizon, which introduced the term `Shangri-la', was made into a film by 
Frank Capra in 1937, and appeared as the world's first paperback soon after. `Shangri' 
has no meaning in Tibetan; `la' means `mountain pass'. The name is apparently a 
garbling of `Shambhala', a mythical Buddhist kingdom in the Himalayas according to 
Tibetan legends (see Bernbaum 2001; LePage 1996; Trungpa ). Partly due to Hilton's 
novel, but mostly due to the uncertainties of the late 1930s, Shangri-la quickly came 
into common usage as a place where all that is good and true is preserved. After the 
American planes bombed Japan in the 1942 `Doolittle' Raid - immortalised in the film 
Thirty Seconds over Tokyo - news reporters asked President Roosevelt where the 
planes had taken off from. He replied, 'Shangri-La'. Roosevelt later authorised that the 
presidential retreat in Maryland be named Shangri-la. On the President's first official 
visit, July 5,1942, he wrote in his `log book': 'U. S. S. Shangri La -- Launched at 
Catoctin, July 5,1942' (Shangri-La n. d. ). This retreat is now named Camp David, 
after President Eisenhower's grandson. Today Shangri-la is the name of a chain of 
resort hotels. " 
At the end of the twentieth century, Shangri-la has come to be synonymous with Tibet, 
a Tibet that has been lost, a Tibet that may be lost, or a Tibet that still may have hope. 
Shangri-la's geography is one of hope and despair: a search for both personal 
experience and salvation for an entire civilisation (see Bishop 1989: 210-11). The 
myth is a resolution of the dreams of frustrated Western explorers and adventurers 
because instead of being forbidden, instead of turning Westerners back, it wanted the 
best of them. 
Lost horizon offers Occidentals the perfect fantasy blend of East and West: the 
spiritual ecumenism of Madame Blavatsky and Alexandra David-Neel raised to the 
nth power; a potpourri of Buddhism merged with Christianity, the crepitations of 
traditional Tibetan horns leavened with harpsichord music by Rameau, a melange of 
Buddhist sutras in Tibetan and `the world's best literature' in every European 
language- in short, a Buddhist Shambhala with a Western humanistic sensibility set in 
a magic valley ruled by a benevolent Catholic missionary gone native who now 
wishes to pass his benign monastic mantle on to an erudite ex-Oxford sage (Schell 
2000: 244-5). 
The novel is not a literary masterpiece, but Hilton succeeds in catching the mood of 
the times, reflecting the fear of his generation, and offering an escape from the harsh 
realities of the Western world (Allen 1999: 39). The main character is a British Indian 
30 Shangri-La hotels advertise that although mythical in origin, their name epitomises `the 
serenity and highly personalised service' for which it is renowned. (Shangri-La Media Centre 
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official, Robert Conway, who, along with the younger official, Charles Mallinson, a 
missionary, Miss Roberta Brinklow, and an American businessman, Henry Barnard, is 
hijacked and taken to an unknown mountainous region somewhere in Tibet. They are 
transported to a hidden valley of the blue moon. The valley has a lamasery named 
Shangri-la that combines the best of Western technology with Eastern luxury. The 
head priest, who is several hundred years old, wants Conway to take over his position. 
Conway is told that the valley affords a very long life to selected people and the main 
purpose of the establishment is to act as a sanctuary when the outside world is in 
chaos. Conway falls in love with a quiet Chinese lady, Lo-Tsen, without knowing that 
she and Mallinson were becoming lovers. While Barnard and Miss Brinklow agree to 
stay in the valley (the former to help in gold mining and the latter to convert Tibetans 
into Christianity), the impatient Mallinson persuades Conway to accompany him and 
Lo-Tsen to safety outside the valley. Conway departs in despair, all his hope lost as he 
realises that he is a wanderer between two worlds and must forever wander: `he was 
doomed, like millions, to flee from wisdom and be a hero' (Hilton 1933: 264). 
Though Hilton's Shangri-la has come to be associated with Tibet, in the book itself, 
apart from its probable geographical location, there was hardly anything Tibetan about 
the place. According to Conway, the atmosphere was Chinese, rather than specifically 
Tibetan (1967: 52). Tibetans were the inhabitants of the lower valley who sang in 
`lilting barbaric tunes' (1967: 46), worked in the fields, provided entertainment, and 
lived a subaltern life. The inhabitants of the valley were a blend of Chinese and 
Tibetan and were cleaner and handsomer than the average of either race (1933: 129). 
The high lama is a Luxembourger and most inhabitants of the lamasery are Europeans. 
In order to keep the lamasery populated, outsiders were acquired. Father Perrault, the 
high lama, explains that they once had a Japanese who was not a fine acquisition; 
`Tibetans are much less sensitive than outside races and die sooner, even though they 
are charming'; Chinese are slightly better; the `best subjects, undoubtedly, are the 
Nordic and Latin races of Europe' (1967: 110). 
Hilton's Shangri-la had central heating and combined the mechanics of Western 
hygiene with much else that was `Eastern' and 'traditional'. For instance, after his 
arrival Conway enjoyed a bath in a porcelain tub from Ohio, while a native attended to 
2001). 
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him in a Chinese fashion (1967: 51). Shangri-la was always tranquil, yet always a hive 
of `unpursuing occupations'; `the lamas lived as if indeed they had time on their 
hands, but time that was scarcely a featherweight' (1967: 139). Inhabitants of the 
lamasery indulged in various intellectual pursuits - writing manuscripts, doing pure 
mathematics, coordinating Gibbon and Spengler into a vast thesis on the history of 
European civilisation, formulating new theories about Wuthering heights, and so on. 
This was in line with the principal rationale for the existence of Shangri-la: to act as a 
sanctuary. The purpose of Shangri-la was to be a `war refuge' for preserving the best 
of modern civilisations (1933: 191-2). 
Thus, Lost horizon creates a utopia placed somewhere in Tibet. The (dis)placing of 
Shangri-la to Tibet allows Westerners to transfer their desire for utopia onto Tibet. 
This utopia, though it may have scavenged upon the indigenous Tibetan conception of 
Shambhala, is exclusively a Western construct. This is not surprising as in the Western 
imagination, Tibet's role has been salvific, one of a `service society' both critiquing 
and assuaging the West's self-conception. 
5G. The West's playground 
`Tibet's importance for our time, and for the future survival of Earth itself, is 
more critical than ever. Being our most vibrant link to the ancient wisdom 
traditions, Tibet, and the sanity she represents, must not be allowed to 
disappear' (Richard Gere in Rhie and Thurman 1991: 8). 
Exotica Tibet is a product of the Western imagination. It therefore comes as no 
surprise to see Tibet operating as a physical and imaginative playground for 
Westerners and their desires. For instance, the media coverage of Tibetan uprisings in 
Lhasa during the 1980s and 1990s focused disproportionately on the minimal mishaps 
and daring of Westerners. Representational strategies of self-affirmation and self- 
criticism are as integral to the Western imagination of Tibet today as they were in the 
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past. 3' Tibetans are treated as objects in stories of heroic achievement by outsiders, or 
as victims of abuse who are incapable of agency. 32 
Tibet still 
operates as a constituent of a romanticism in which the Orient is not debased but 
exalted as a surrogate self endowed with all that the West wants. It is Tibet that will 
regenerate the West by showing us, prophetically, what we can be by showing us what it had been. It is Tibet that can save the world, cynical and materialist, from itself. 
Tibet is seen as a cure for an ever-dissolving Western civilization, restoring its spirit. An internal absence is thus perceived as existing outside, and it is outside, let it be 
found in the most remote, the most inaccessible, the most mysterious part of the world 
(Lopez 1998: 202-3). 
Tibet is seen as offering essential spiritual services to humanity. Its survival is thus 
considered more important than that of many other postcolonial national groups. 33 This 
reflects the stranglehold of the myth of Shangri-la. This Shangri-la fantasy has 
primarily to do with the psychological needs of certain people in the West and Tibet 
and its culture serves as a backdrop to the predominantly white protagonists in films 
and books (Norbu 2001: 374). 
The fantasy about Tibet often belongs to the world of National Geographic and global 
adventure tourism, and not necessarily to `Shangri-la' or spiritual wisdom. 34 `Elusive 
31 Thurman writes with approval that Tibetan society `is one of the world's most relaxed and 
flexible societies about social hierarchy, sexuality, marriage arrangements' (Rhie and Thurman 
1991: 9). It is ironic to watch how Western evaluation of the same characteristic of Tibetan 
society has changed so drastically over last century - this flexibility was seen as morally 
corrupt by Victorian and Edwardian British. 
32 Exasperated with this scenario, Tibetan intellectual Jamyang Norbu writes: `However 
hopeless their cause ... 
Tibetans are better off living their own reality than being typecast in 
ethereal roles in the fantasies of the West' (2001: 378). 
33 Richard Gere uses the analogy of David and Goliath to offer hope to the Tibetans and 
reminds them, `You must maintain that sense of uniqueness and that genuine cultural 
commitment to nonviolence. If you pick up arms and become like the Palestinians, you'll lose 
your special status' (quoted in Schell 2000: 56). 
4 The role of Tibet as a mere playground for Westerners' adventure is more clearly visible in 
Davidson's The rose of Tibet (1995/1962). It is a fictional story about Charles Houston, an 
Englishman, who went inside Tibet, encountered the `she-devil', the abbess of Yamdring 
monastery, had sexual escapades with her but failed to `possess' her, tried to rescue her (and 
some emeralds) from the Chinese, and ended up with half a share in the emerald. It is a typical 
adventure story with little evidence of Tibet's association with spiritualism. Its most defining 
feature is abundance of sexual motifs. Here we come across priestesses who are not allowed to 
have sex, but they still do it `like rattlesnakes', often with outsiders as there are only a hundred 
monks to `take care' of them (1995: 336). We encounter the she-devil who was `not old, and 
she was not cold; and she was far from being a virgin' (399); instead, she was `delicious and 
delectable and always unknowable' (407). And she possessed `green tears' - emeralds' - half 
of which she later gives to Houston as a sign of her love. Houston not only makes love to her, 
but also insists on her being monogamous. He fails in this as she indulges in `particularly, 
vilely horrible' custom of having sex with the main abbot. On his doubts that the she-devil 
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glimpses and serendipitous associations have been integral to Western fantasies about 
Tibet, positioned, as it has been, just beyond the very edge of imperial control for 
much of the past two hundred years' (Bishop 2001: 203). Tibet provides a set for the 
`drama of white people' (Norbu 1998: 20). The role of Tibet as transformative as well 
as a colourful set is clear in Seven years in Tibet - both the book and the Hollywood 
movie. 
5G. i. Harrer's `Seven years in Tibet' 
Seven years in Tibet (1956) is an account of an Austrian, Heinrich Harrer, in Tibet. 
With the outbreak of the Second World War, the British in India interned him. After 
some unsuccessful attempts, he escaped in 1944 and, along with Peter Aufschnaiter, 
crossed the Himalayas into Tibet. After dodging officials, they managed to reach 
Lhasa in early 1946. Instead of being turned back, they were accepted by the 
authorities in Lhasa. Harrer's account of his stay in Tibet covers a crucial time in 
Tibetan history, its last years as an independent state. He also became an official paid 
by the Tibetans, and tutored the young Dalai Lama before he was forced to leave 
Lhasa in 1951 when the Chinese took control. 
It is interesting to note that Harrer and his companion set out for Lhasa just after the 
war was over. So, it was not the escape from the British but the `lure of the Forbidden 
City' that encouraged them (86-7). In the tradition of previous travellers to Lhasa, he 
describes his first site of the golden roofs of Potala: `this moment compensated us for 
much. We felt inclined to go down on our knees like the pilgrims and touch the ground 
with our forehead' (113). 
Though the trope of idealisation and self-criticism is dominant, Harrer's attitude is full 
of ambiguity. He writes of his infuriation with the `fatalistic resignation' (145) with 
which Tibetans lent themselves to backbreaking toil (they did not use the wheel) and 
should be having sex with an old man, he is told that `our women have rather better 
constitutions than most'. Houston was fine as long as the she-devil was with him. Now, 
[h]e did'nt know this country or these people, and he didn't think he ever would.. . He 
had been infatuated with her and with an image he had constructed of her: of a pale 
china rose, nurtured in shade, something immensely precious and immensely fragile. 
But he saw her now as an object lovely but diseased, a rank thing growing unhealthily 
on top of a dunghill. He didn't want the rank thing or the dunghill. He wanted very 
much to get away from both (441). 
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is scathing of the Tibetan government's attitude towards modem medicine, hygiene 
and sanitation. He writes disparagingly of the prevalence of venereal disease and 
homosexuality (186). Yet, he `did not miss the appliances of Western civilization. 
Europe with its life of turmoil seemed far away' (156). While pondering if progress in 
the form of a motor road to India would be good or not, he thinks `One should not 
force a people to introduce inventions which are far ahead of their stage of 
evolution... Tibetan culture and way of life more than compensates for the advantages 
of modern techniques' (185; emphasis added). The admirable aspect of Tibetan 
culture, for Harrer, included the `perfect courtesy of the people' and `cultivated and 
elegant' upper class women. 
In its film version, Seven years in Tibet (1997) loses almost all its ambiguity. It 
becomes a story of Harrer, a self-centred and individualistic Westerner, who gets 
transformed in Tibet. He, `a flawed European, consumed by selfishness and ambition, 
would be saved by the innocence and ancient wisdom of Tibet' (Buruma 2001). 
Superlatives become abundant in describing Tibet - `roof of the world', `highest 
country on earth', `most isolated', `medieval stone fortress towering in the centre of 
Asia', and so on. In Seven Years in Tibet the people of Lhasa `casually offer pearls of 
wisdom about the harmony of Tibet in comparison to the West' (Hansen 2001: 105): 
one Tibetan says `We admire a man who abandons his ego, unlike you, who admire 
those who reach the top'. 
5H. China and Exotica Tibet 
`[Lhasa was not] forbidden like the forbidden city of China, Beijing, which 
had a violence attached to it ... 
But in Tibet you had a sense of something 
peaceful and something magical and spiritual' (Martin Scorsese, Frontline 
1998a). 
China has always loomed large in the Western imagination of Tibet. During the 
eighteenth century, one of Bogle's aims while travelling to Tibet was to 
`investigate 
the relations between Tibet and China with an eye to the possibility of the 
influence of 
the former country being used to bring about an improvement in English trade and 
diplomacy with the latter country' (Lamb 1960: 9). Either China is compared 
favourably, as we saw in our previous discussion of David-Neel, or it is considered a 
spiritual vacuum. Western stereotypes of China and 
Tibet are often connected. A 
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positive evaluation of Tibetans is accompanied by a negative attitude toward the 
Chinese, and vice versa. Taylor writes, `Tibetans are among the easiest people to get 
along with in Asia. The smiles are infectious and it is rare for major cultural 
differences to get in the way of communication', though many Tibetans in business 
and administration have picked up from the Chinese habits of `rudeness, overcharging 
and obstructionism' (1986: 40). 
The exoticised and positive imagery of Tibet during the twentieth century stands in 
contrast to the Chinese representations of Tibet. Ironically, the Chinese representation 
of Old Tibet as `feudal hell' is similar to early British writings. Li Tieh-Tseng writes 
that the Tibetans lack a sense of history as understood by other peoples, and hence the 
only reliable source of history of Sino-Tibetan relations is Chinese (1954). Chinese 
communist rhetoric includes an image of Tibetan backwardness and a juxtaposition of 
the `superior' Han to the `backward' Tibetan. Minority policy in China is founded on 
the idea of stages of social forms, where the minority nationalities (minzu shaoshu) 
represent less advanced stages in an evolutionary system (Kolas 1998: 70). The Han 
Chinese working in Tibet do not see themselves as an occupying force, but as 
idealistic missionaries of progress, as performing a service. 
The attitude towards Tibetans is linked to minority discourse prevalent in China. The 
common perception among the Han Chinese is that minorities are `stupid, lazy, dirty, 
and backward'. Studies like that of Barry Sautman and Yan Hairong (2000) have 
shown that while most minorities are looked at as positive primitives, Tibetans are 
considered barbarians. In all areas examined by the survey - intelligence level, 
cultural attainments, interest in education, political capabilities, or appearance - 
Tibetans rank the worst (Ibid. ). Tibetans, like other minorities are not only degraded, 
but also exoticised and eroticised. In the 1990s young, urban Chinese often looked 
toward Tibetan culture for expression. Artists, for instance, paint and sculpt the 
`ethereal' Tibetans, as Tibetans are seen as more spiritual than the materialistic 
Chinese (Lee 1996: 202). Chinese writer Ma Lihua authors sentimental Chinese prose 
about the simple Tibetans and their quaint ways (Lafitte 2001). 
51. Conclusion 
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This brief sketch of the contours of the Western imagination of Tibet during the 
twentieth century shows a rich imaginal diversity. The emphasis in this chapter, as in 
this section as a whole, has been on the poetics of Western representations of Tibet - 
how Tibet has been represented in the West. Now, we need to move on to analyse 
what effect these representations have on those represented, the Tibetans. The next 
chapter is about the role of `symbolic geography' in Tibetan cultural identity discourse 
in the diaspora. It looks at the issues of representation and identity and forms a bridge 
between my ongoing discussion of poetics of Exotica Tibet with chapter 7 that deals 
explicitly with politics of Exotica Tibet. My analysis will consider the impact of 
representational practices on identity discourses. The argument is that the connotation 
of `Tibetan' and `Tibetanness' is shaped by Western representations both culturally 
and politically. 
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Chapter 6: The politics of Exotica Tibet: Tibetan (trans-) 
national identity' 
`The epistemological model that offers us a pregiven subject or agent is one that refuses to acknowledge that agency is always and only a political 
prerogative' (Butler 1992: 13, emphasis in original). 
Until the last decades of the twentieth century, the preoccupation with religion and 
history contributed to a relative neglect of the issues of contemporary Tibetan identity 
within social and political studies. The prevalence of missionary, diplomatic, 
journalistic, and traveller's views2 within Western popular culture had an impact on 
the academic study of Tibet: the essentially political question of what it means to be a 
Tibetan was ignored. The signifier `Tibetan' is usually seen in terms of an ontological 
essentialism. ' This often leads to a papering over of the socially constructed and 
politically contested nature of Tibetan cultural and political identity, or `Tibetanness' 
as it may conveniently be called. 4 The next two chapters examine the articulations of 
Tibetanness in political and cultural spheres, argue for new ways of theorising these 
identities, and interrogate the constitutive role played by Western representations in 
these identity discourses. 
While acknowledging that the distinction between the cultural and the political may be 
construed as de-politicising culture and un-culturing politics, I look at cultural and 
political identities separately for analytical purposes. At the same time, the close inter- 
linkages between the two will be highlighted. The study of cultural identity must be a 
concern of IR and not relegated to anthropology or cultural studies for two at least 
reasons. First, the distinction between cultural and political identity is blurred and at 
'A version of this chapter has been published in Contemporary South Asia (Anand 2000). I 
thank Carfax Publishing (http: //www. tandf. co. uk) for giving me the permission to use it. 
2 This borrows from Tsering Shakya's discussion of five major views held within Tibetan 
studies- the four mentioned here along with a social scientific approach. See Shakya 1996: 1- 
14. 
3 This approach is exemplified in Robert Ekvall's (1960) pioneering work in which he 
identified five common cultural traits through which Tibetans define themselves: religion, 
folkways, language, race (human lineage), and land. 
4 There are exceptions. Margaret Nowak (1984) points out that innovative ideological strategies 
are deployed by Tibetan refugee youth while expressing their identity. P. Christiaan Klieger, in 
an analysis of past as well as present Tibetan history, argues that the `patron/client dyad is a 
warp and weft upon which ideas of Tibetan identity are woven' (1994: 22). 
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best problematic. Second, for Tibetans living under occupation and in displacement, 
every expression of a distinct culture is a political act. 
For the purpose of studying the cultural and political facets of Tibetanness, I shall 
experiment with two approaches. In this chapter, I will bring out the various dynamics, 
including interaction with the West, that constitute Tibetanness as a national identity. 
In the next chapter, I will examine the cultural expressions of diasporic Tibetans, 
highlight the role of Exotica Tibet, and offer a new and innovative way of theorising 
Tibetanness with an emphasis on postcolonial symbolic geography and cultural 
identity discourses. 
Identity is not an essence, but a performance, an articulation, a discourse. Tibetanness 
is as much a process as it is a product - it is a productive process. The performance of 
Tibetan identity does not take place in a vacuum, but in a power-laden international 
political and cultural context. This international context, in turn, is marked by 
asymmetries of structural and representational power in which the West remains 
dominant. Tibetanness has to be articulated within this asymmetrical context and 
hence Western representational practices play a crucial role. This role is not merely an 
embellishment; rather it is constitutive. At the same time, however, instead of looking 
at Tibetanness as merely a product of Western representations (Exotica Tibet) and 
Tibetans thus as `prisoners of Shangri-la', we ought to acknowledge Tibetan collective 
agency. This agency is not in opposition to, and autonomous from, representational 
discourses, but very much a part of them. At the same time, agency is not exhausted 
by any one particular representational discourse, but is produced out of creative 
negotiations with various discourses and interstitial spaces shared by them. 
There are creative tensions both within Tibetan identity articulations and between 
these and Exotica Tibet. How has Exotica Tibet affected Tibetanness? What 
is the 
politics of Western representations of Tibet in terms of its impact on 
Tibetan cultural 
and political identity? I will raise these questions and attempt to provide provisional 
answers to them in chapters 6 and 7. While the emphasis will 
be on the various facets 
of contemporary identity articulations, the poetics of representation - 
Exotica Tibet as 
outlined in the previous chapter - will always be present, sometimes 
lurking in the 
background, sometimes coming to the forefront. Exotica Tibet is not confined to the 
cultural sphere. It influences and is in turn influenced 
by wider local and global 
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political processes. For instance, the accounts of British Indian officials like Charles 
Bell and Hugh Richardson show that their `more prosaic view did not destroy this 
exotic representation but tacitly encouraged it' (McKay 1997: 207). They too used 
metaphors of remote space, isolation and timelessness to maintain the implicit sense 
that Tibet was exotic. In a similar vein, CIA operations during the 1960s and 1970s 
were also influenced by romanticism, with Tibet designated a `final retreat (Shangri- 
la) to which peace-loving people could flee when atomic war breaks, for Tibet is too 
remote to be of significance in any war' (quoted in Knaus 1999: 26). Prevalent 
attitudes toward Tibet often reflected contemporary political preoccupations. During 
the Younghusband invasion most British writings depicted a despicable state of affairs 
within Tibet. With the American rapprochement with China in the 1970s, little was 
heard about the destruction of traditional life within Tibet, which peaked during the 
Cultural Revolution. But a lot of attention was paid to the Tibet question when other 
communist regimes fell in Eastern Europe and the discourse of human rights emerged 
on the international plane once again. This linkage of the Tibet question with the 
West's political interests may be unsurprising, but if we are to address the Tibet 
question effectively, we need to move beyond conventional international politics with 
its emphasis on realpolitik and narrowly defined national interest. Dominant traditions 
of realism offer little space for marginalised communities such as the Tibetans. 
Two qualifying and clarifying points need to be made before I move on. First, I do not 
intend to cover all aspects of Tibetanness as articulated by Tibetans everywhere. In 
fact, my focus is on identity discourses circulating mainly within the Tibetan diaspora. 
These comprise a very small percentage of the total Tibetan population as most 
Tibetans still live inside Tibet. The rationale for choosing to study the diaspora is 
primarily practical: there are limitations on researching in Tibet and due to Chinese 
control, we have severely limited access to developments within Tibet. Within the 
diaspora, there is a deliberate focus on the elite discourses as it is largely the elite that 
shapes how Tibetanness is articulated both within Tibetan communities and for the 
outside world. This is symptomatic of most `national' groups, but the predominance of 
the figure of the Dalai Lama makes it even more so in the Tibetan case. This does not 
mean that popular articulations are mere copies of the elite discourses, or that the 
Tibetans living within Tibet imitate discourses prevalent in the diaspora. As I argue, 
while Tibetanness is a project of creating sameness, it is in fact difference, dynamism 
and disjuncture that characterise it most. 
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Second, a clarification with regard to semantics is necessary. Why use the term 
`diaspora'5 when the terms `exile' or `refugee' have wider currency amongst Tibetans 
and analysts? Within the international legal regime, most of the Tibetans living in 
South Asia and Western countries are refugees, and Tibetans often perceive 
themselves to be political refugees. Within the Tibetan governmental and intellectual 
community, exile is a more favoured term. While these terms continue to be popular, 
Tibetanists as well as the Tibetan elite themselves are increasingly adopting `diaspora' 
to make sense of Tibetan identity. The term `diaspora' indicates the adoption of new 
ways of approaching and understanding questions of identity politics. Diasporic 
subjects are seen not as some anomaly to the norm, but as distinct versions of a 
modern, transnational, intercultural experience. 
The diaspora experience ... is defined, not by essence or purity, but by the recognition 
of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity; by a conception of `identity' which lives 
with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity. Diaspora identities are those 
which are constantly producing and reproducing themselves anew, through 
transformation and difference (Hall 1990: 235). 
The adoption of the term also reflects the keenness of the Tibetan intellectuals to 
appropriate any vocabulary that provides them an opportunity to express their identity 
to the external world. It enables us to theorise Tibetan diasporic identity in terms of 
contradictions and possibilities, a task that is undertaken in this chapter. These 
contradictions not only constrain and contain the possibilities for self-expression that 
are available, but, more importantly, are productive of the very identities in question. 
This approach also challenges the `victimisation paradigm" so familiar in analyses of 
Tibetan identity. 
6A. The political discourse of Tibetanness 
Since 1959 the Chinese, the Tibetan elite in exile, and their Western supporters and 
detractors, have competed to legitimise their own representations of Tibetan history 
and current events. This `confrontation of "representations"' (Goldstein 1997: 56) is 
5 John Armstrong defined a diaspora as `any ethnic collectivity which lacks a territorial base 
within a given polity' (in Kolsto 1999: 607). 
6 While most of the commentators consider Tibetans to be victims of forces of modernisation 
and Chinese oppression, scholars like Donald Lopez (1998) considers them victims of the 
Western perception of Tibetans as inherently religious, peaceful and spiritual. In contrast, this 
chapter recognises the need to consider Tibetans as agents in their own right. Interestingly, 
Brett Neilson even argues that the Shangri-la myth itself is significant for facilitating `a critical 
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about history and political status; at the same time it is intimately connected to cultural 
representations and identity discourses. It is not possible to speak of Tibet or Tibetans 
without taking into account the constitution of these categories within representational 
practices and identity discourses. The Tibet question is as much a political issue as it is 
connected to cultural politics of modern world. The very idea of Tibet and what it 
means to be Tibetan is constructed and contested within the matrix of identity and 
representation discourses, thus making it an integral part of the Tibet question. 
The placing of the West within, rather than outside of, the discourses on the Tibet 
question can be examined by looking at the theme of Tibetan (trans)national identity 
and its interface with Western representations of Tibet. It could be argued that the 
Tibetan elite, especially in the diaspora, has adopted a Western representation of what 
Tibetans are supposed to be like as their own self-image. While I focus here on 
Tibetanness as defined in discourses circulating within the Tibetan diaspora, these 
representational practices play a significant role for Tibetans living within Tibet as 
well. As we shall see later, various studies of cultural and religious `revival' (see 
Goldstein and Kapstein 1998), Lhasa protest movements (see Barnett and Akiner 
1996; Mills 2001; Schwartz 1996), and identity articulations by Lhasa-Tibetans (see 
Adams 1996,1998) have argued that political and cultural expressions by Tibetans 
inside Tibet negotiate with the dominant vocabulary offered by both Western and 
Chinese representations. 
Within the fields of political and social studies, a diaspora is widely conceived as any 
segment of a people living outside their homeland. For instance, emphasising the need 
to look at the triadic networks of homeland (or trans-state organisation), host country 
and ethnic diaspora, Gabriel Sheffer says, `Modern diasporas are ethnic minority 
groups of migrant origins residing and acting in host countries but maintaining a 
strong sentimental and material link with their countries of origin- their homeland' 
(1986: 3). The recognition of diasporas as important international actors is a big step 
forward in the field of international politics (otherwise dominated by studies of nation- 
states), even though we have to avoid taking basic terms such as homeland, identity, 
and hostland as unproblematic. This allows us to take into consideration the crucial 
role played by the Tibetan diaspora in highlighting the case of Tibet as a problem of 
utopianism that allows a reassessment of the Tibetan question outside the politics of territory' 
(2000: 95). 
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international politics. Though this has had little impact on the conduct of states vis-a- 
vis China - not surprising, given that the international community is precisely a 
community of recognised nation-states, a status denied to Tibet) - the Dalai Lama-led 
Tibetan diaspora is considered the legitimate speaker for the entire Tibetan population 
in the international arena. The story of the creation of the Tibetan community in exile 
illustrates the successful strategies of the Dalai Lama-led Tibetan government to foster 
and maintain a distinctive Tibetan national identity with a mix of religious, cultural 
and political elements. In this chapter, I focus on various embodied and embedded 
narratives shaping Tibetan political identity today, especially among diasporic 
Tibetans. 
A noteworthy point may be made here. Diaspora is less a sub-category of the migrant 
community and more a subjective understanding of the experience of migration. Often 
in the current discourses on diaspora, the hybridity and liminality of the migrant 
position is celebrated. As scholarly discourse on population dispersion has shifted to 
`diaspora', there has been a proliferation and valorisation of meanings of the term. The 
pain and suffering resulting from diaspora as forced migration/exile is sometimes 
ignored. For instance, there is a significant difference between the Tibetan diaspora in 
South Asia, and elsewhere in the West, and the South Asian diasporas in the West. 
While a sense of displacement underpins the experiences of both the categories, 
migration from south Asia to the West is largely a result of the pursuit of a better life. 
For Tibetans, the immediate causal factor has been the occupation of their `homeland' 
by China and the desire to return to that homeland seems to be very strong. Thus, in 
the case of Tibetans, `diaspora' denotes processes of flight, forced migration, identity 
fragmentation and reconstruction, transnationalism, and the persistent desire to return 
to the homeland. Following Steve Vertovec (1997), when I talk of Tibetan diaspora, I 
consider diaspora to be a particular social form, a type of consciousness, and a mode 
of cultural production. 
Rather than take political identity as something given, we should see it as socially and 
politically constructed. In the words of Lisa Malkki: `Identity is always mobile and 
processual, partly self-construction, partly categorisation by others ... (it) 
is a creolized 
aggregate composed through bricolage' (1992: 37). `Tibet', in this sense is an 
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`imagining community'. ' A unified Tibetan nation currently exists only through the 
anticipated (re)construction of its parts: occupied country, dispersed communities, and 
a globally networked politico-cultural support system of Tibet support groups 
(Venturino 1997: 103). At the same time, the contingency of identity does not 
preclude the vital importance of affirmations of essential subjectivity in the forging of 
national identity. Given the structure of the imagined community of nations dominated 
by Western ideas of governance and political expression, it is vital for the Tibetans to 
espouse their cause in terms of an essentialist notion of nationalism. Thus Tibetan 
national imagination is a product/process of strategic essentialism oriented towards the 
goal of reclaiming their homeland. This chapter takes into account both hybridity and 
claims to essentiality, which lie at the core of claims to Tibetanness. Part of this 
project will be to consider how Western representations, and this dominant expression 
in the form of Exotica Tibet, has affected what it means to be `Tibetan' at the political 
level. 
6B. Tibet as an imagining nation 
The issue of Tibetan national identity inevitably involves the question of whether 
Tibet is/was a nation. While Tibetans argue that theirs was a historical nation, China 
denies this. This rhetoric ignores that the need to present one's own community as a 
nation is a modern phenomenon. Tibet, which as a political entity operated with other 
external powers (especially Mongols and Hans) on principles such as patron-client 
relations and chos srid gnyis Idan (politics-religion combined), has become yet 
another victim of modern ideas such as territorial sovereignty and the separation of 
religion and the state. Before the twentieth century, politically, Tibet did not exist as a 
territorially bounded community operating on the principle of exclusive sovereignty. ' 
The political control of the Dalai Lamas hardly exceeded beyond Central Tibet/U- 
Tsang (now Tibet Autonomous Region, TAR), while Kham and Amdo (now part of 
the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Sichuan, Gangsu and Yunan) were ruled by various 
small principalities with often overlapping influence (see Fig. II). It was only under 
7 Benedict Anderson's categorisation of nations as imagined community (1983) does not fully 
convey the sense of continuous imagination which goes into the making and existence of a 
nation, so, I prefer to use imagining. In the next chapter, I retheorise this as `re-imag(in)ing 
community'. 
8 For an account of the attempts within Tibet to assert independence and bring about reforms 
between 1911 and 1949, see Goldstein 1989; Shakya 1999. 
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the thirteenth Dalai Lama that attempts were made to convert the `Lamaist state' into a 
modern state. However, this self-conscious and often ambiguous process toward 
integration into the world order was cut short by the Chinese occupation beginning in 
1950. Tibet has been brought into the international system but the agent of change is 
China, denying the right of self-determination to the Tibetans. 
Both Tibetans and Chinese administrators realise that change was/is inevitable. What 
they struggle over is the question of agency. As James Mayall (1990) points out, 
nationalism has become structurally embedded as the basis of the modern state 
everywhere. Nationalism is on the one hand an ideological movement toward the 
construction of a nation. On the other hand it is a product of heightened consciousness 
of national identity among a people. 
[T]he appeals to nationalism are always politically important - nationalism is still 
regarded as a (if not `the') prime driver of and legitimator for political, government 
and state policy and action, both internal and external. Moreover, in that the 
distribution of power within political, social and economic structures, including global 
structures, tends to ensure that these structures are reproduced, political legitimacy 
and loyalty (i. e. nationalism) has a fundamental role in this process (Tooze 1996 xvii). 
Given this scenario, it is hardly surprising that Tibetans have had to appropriate the 
language of nationalism in order to deal with both Chinese occupation and modernity. 
Tibetans claim that they have the right to determine the course of action that Tibet as a 
body politic, as a nation, should take. While the Tibetan issue is often discussed in 
terms of the preservation of a culture, the most important question concerns the right 
of people to self-determination. The Dalai Lama-led government in exile claims to 
speak for this right of all Tibetan people. 
The whole of Tibet known as Cholka-Sum (U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo) should 
become a self-governing democratic political entity founded on law by agreement of 
the people for the common good and the protection of themselves and their 
environment, in association with the People's Republic of China (His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama 1988). 
This statement reflects a desire to project Tibet as `one' political unit, something that 
did not exist historically, at least during the modem period. This raises the question of 
the relevance of the European model of the nation state for many parts of the non- 
Western world. ' Present-day international politics ensures that claims to independence 
9 Here it is sufficient to mention a few opinions on this. `[I]t is an error to fancy Thibet as a 
homogeneous whole under a central government. Local tribes do not have same respect for 
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are afforded more recognition when stated in terms of the nineteenth-century 
European ideal of the nation-state under a nationally representative government 
(Samuel 1993: 143). This makes the task of the Tibetans more difficult as it was never 
a centralised nation-state. The Anglo-Tibetan encounter forced the Tibetans to 
confront the differing perceptions of nation and state identity held by traditional and 
modern societies. And therefore, there were conscious attempts by the Tibetan 
government to model itself on a nation-state line. How far this project was successful 
is debatable. Sympathetic British Indian officials supported it in 1920s and 1930s. `We 
do not want to encourage the Tibetans to become once more a warlike nation; but in 
these days a country must be able to defend itself, and it has always been our policy to 
assist Tibet to maintain her position as an independent autonomous State under the 
nominal suzerainty of China' (Chapman 1992: 110). 
Interestingly, the Tibetan establishment in Dharamsala makes claims not only over 
Central Tibet, but also over Amdo and Kham. The claim is not based on historical 
evidence of political control, but on the existence of certain cultural and religious 
commonalities. " Bell's distinction between `political' and `ethnographic' Tibet is 
new Lhasa masters who lack the prestige of the Chinese literati' (David-Neel 1991: 173). 
Geoffrey Samuel (1993) argues that the misconceptions during the turn of the century 
regarding the dominance of the Lhasa state is because most of the observers were based in 
Lhasa and there they interacted with the elite who desired to assert the power and 
independence of the Lhasa government in relation to the Chinese government during the early 
twentieth century. This desire was seen as reflecting reality. 
10 So, should the claim of the Tibetan government in exile to represent Tibetans of all three 
provinces be seen as a case of historical fraud? Certainly this is not necessarily the case. This 
distinction between `political' and `ethnographic' Tibet made by commentators including Bell, 
while relevant in certain sense, suffers from ethnocentrism. Concepts and categories used in the 
West are automatically considered to be transparently transferable and universally applicable. 
The Tibetan body politic is often read in such terms. While the close connection between 
politics, religion, and culture in the case of Tibet is recognised, analyses often fail to transcend 
the belief in the separation of the sacral and the temporal which lies at the base of 
Enlightenment thinking and informs most scholarly endeavours. In the case of Tibet, however, 
politics, culture, and religion are intrinsically interconnected. This can be seen in the concept of 
chos srid gnyis Idan (dual religious and secular system of government) which is said to have 
characterised the Tibetan polity before 1959 (for details, see Kolas 1996). The Dalai Lama 
combined both strands at the top of the `religious' and `secular' hierarchies. Despite the 
existence of local deities, rituals and practices, Lhasa acted as a nerve centre of religious 
practices. Not only was it the destination of many pilgrimage routes, it also had big 
monasteries (gonpa) of various prominent sects of Tibetan Buddhism. It was a centre for 
learning and for trade. Thus, the limited temporal authority of the so-called `Lamaist state' (or 
the Lhasa government) did not affect the significant influence Lhasa exercised over the entire 
region inhabited by Tibetans. Since the Dalai Lama-led government in exile claims to 
be a 
continuation of the Lhasa government from 1959, it is within its right to speak for all Tibetans, 
especially in the long drawn situation of crises in which the historical markers of Tibetan 
identity are under the threat of erasure. This use of `Tibet' as a political device is legitimised by 
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helpful here. While political Tibet was U-tsang, the boundary of ethnographic Tibet 
extended to include Amdo and Kham. What bound the people in the regions was not 
allegiance to one temporal authority, but elements of common culture and religion. 
These elements may be seen as forming the basis of a Tibetan ethnie or ethnic 
community. As Anthony Smith argues, ethnie includes a collective proper name, a 
myth of common ancestry, shared memory of a rich `ethnohistory' (especially of a 
golden age), differentiating elements of common culture; association with specific 
homeland, and, lastly, a sense of solidarity for significant sectors of population (1991: 
21). All these features were present in varying degrees in the history of Tibetans. 
More often than not the proponents of nationalism take a primordialist view. Such a 
view has been rightly contested in the academic discourse on nationalism" and it has 
been argued that `invented traditions' (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992) are used to create 
`imagined communities' (Anderson 1983). Nationalism is seen as a theory of 
legitimacy, `a political principle that holds that the political and national unit should 
be congruent' (Gellner 1983: 1). According to their critics, instrumentalist scholars of 
nationalism often over-emphasise the capacity of nationalism as an ideology to 
engender nations. Smith argues how modem nationalism crucially depends on its 
primordial ethnic past (1991; see also 1996). However, I retain scepticism about the 
primordiality of the past and, instead of trying to situate myself somewhere `in- 
between' in the Instrumentalist-Primordialist debate, I adopt a discursive approach 
(see Balakrishnan 1996; Bhabha 1990; Chatterjee 1986,1993) striving for a more 
diversified and inclusive understanding of nationalism which highlights its cross- 
cultural variants. While the centrality of a process of imagination in constituting a 
nation is noteworthy, the existence of an archive from which this process draws 
resources is also undeniable. While this archive shapes the imagining community, the 
process of imagination not only draws upon an existing archive, but in the process 
recreates it. 
several instances of similar historical practices. Indeed, modern nation involves the binding of 
community into a territory as, in the words of Tony Bennett, `occupants of a territory that has 
been historicized and subjects of a history that has been territorialized' (1995: 141). 
11 None of the prominent experts on nationalism speak about Tibet, except Eric Hobsbawm, 
who mentions Tibet only in passing as a possible exception to his theory: `It is difficult to 
judge how far purely divine authority may have nation-making possibilities. The question must 
be left to the experts in the history of Mongols and Tibetans' (Hobsbawm 1990: 72). 
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In the case of Tibet, this archive may be seen in terms of what Hobsbawm calls `proto- 
nationalism': `variants of feeling of collective belonging which already existed and 
which could operate, as it were, potentially on a macro-political scale which could fit 
in with modem states and nations' (1990: 46). George Dreyfus (1994) has applied this 
idea of proto-nationalism to the Tibetan case. He argues that a sense of belonging to a 
unique community that is political, despite the lack of any institutional expression, can 
be found in various aspects of Tibetan life even before 1959. `Treasures' (gter ma), a 
type of religious literature with a strong sense of nostalgia more popular among 
common people, such as Mani bka'-bum, often had distinct political messages. The 
paradigms defined by such gter in figures such as Avalokitesvara and virtuous king 
like Strong-btsan-sgam-po still define the contemporary Tibetan identity. 
Even if we recognise that significant elements of Tibetan `national' identity preceded 
twentieth century, it is the interaction with modernity and colonialism that gave 
specific meanings to elements of a common identity. Tibetanness is a product of 
processes of modernisation, colonialism and displacement. Before moving into a 
detailed discussion of diasporic Tibetanness, let me make a brief observation on the 
discourse of Tibetan national identity as circulating within Tibet. 
6C. Discourse of Tibetanness as articulated within Tibet 
Discussion of Tibetanness as being processed and produced in diaspora should not 
ignore Tibetan identity as articulated within Tibet. Limitations of space allow me to 
make only a few sweeping statements about the situation inside Tibet where the bulk 
of the Tibetan population lives. After suffering severe repression during the period of 
Cultural Revolution, Tibet has witnessed `economic liberalisation' followed by some 
relaxation on religious practices. This, in turn, has lead to a revival of cultural and 
religious identity. While there is little doubt that some cultural elements were 
encouraged by Chinese-Tibetan authorities in a typical modernist pattern of 
museumising 'exotic'/minority cultures, active support of the local people has been 
more important in this revival. However, as contributors to Goldstein and Kapstein 
(1998) point out, `revival' is a problematic term for what is happening in Tibet both 
because it fails to appreciate changes and because its meaning is often conflated with 
restoration. Despite attempts to objectify culture, the latter is always is 
flux. In the 
case of Tibet, some individual traits are common with the past, some 
have changed in 
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appearance and some in the importance attached to them, and some are now extinct. 
Moreover, one should realise that what passes as revival is deeply informed by 
contemporary politics. The key issue affecting the revival is the Tibet question - the 
conflict over the political status of Tibet vis-a-vis China (Goldstein in Goldstein and 
Kapstein 1998: 14). 
As frequent demonstrations, especially in Lhasa, indicate, religion still plays an 
important role in the assertion of national identity by the Tibetans. Most 
demonstrations start at the initiative of monks and nuns, 12 and most centre around the 
Jokhang temple in the Barkhor area of Lhasa. However, something basic has changed. 
While earlier revolts broke out for explicitly religious purposes, now a more 
instrumentalist and activist view of religion is taken (see Schwartz 1996). Use is made 
of the official policy of religious tolerance to make political demands. The priority of 
many monks and nuns who participate in the demonstrations, often at high costs 
(including arrest, torture, expulsion from institution, and in extreme cases, execution), 
seems to be the political struggle for independence (see Barnett and Akiner 1996). 13 
They are willing to risk the religious freedom granted to them for their political 
demands. Even in the name of religion what is emphasised is not aspects of Buddhism 
(which is limiting for any nationalist aspiration on account of its universalistic 
pretensions), but specifically Tibetan elements of the religion. 
The religious/cultural revival, as well as instances of political protests, inside Tibet 
exemplifies a rich mixture of traditional and innovative strategies in Tibet's struggle 
for survival against an authoritarian state system. The Chinese official rhetoric of a 
`multinational' state has offered the opportunity to Tibetans to reclaim, in part, a 
heterodox vision of history14 in which separateness and Tibetanness are highlighted 
and valorised. Often, the target of sporadic protests in Lhasa and elsewhere are the 
Western tourists who are considered potential supporters for the Tibetan cause. The 
12 Their role may be seen as that of disgruntled traditional intelligentsia described by Ernest 
Gellner (1983: 14). 
13 Though some observers such as Tom Grunfeld (1988) are of the opinion that `Independence 
is an abstract notion which most Tibetans do not seem to think about very much' (quoted in 
Sperling 1996), others have provided a convincing rebuttal of such views (see Schwartz 1996; 
see also Barnett and Akiner 1996). 
14 This challenges the Chinese official history (Information Office 1992) that seeks to argue 
that Tibet has been in a dependent relationship to China since seventh century. 
177 
main factor influencing the political protests and assertion of national identity in Tibet, 
therefore, is not religion per se or its suppression, but Chinese political occupation. 
In all these struggles over national identity, the key symbol for Tibetans has, not 
surprisingly, been the Dalai Lama. The Chinese realised the potential subversiveness 
of allowing Tibetans the religious freedom to worship his figure. They have thus tried 
to ban his worship and `encourage' other Tibetan lamas to denounce him as a 
`splittist' (one who is trying to split Tibet from its motherland, China). The Dalai 
Lama's dual role as the head of religious and political systems has indeed been 
important. However, a significant innovation can be seen in this regard. The political 
side of chos srid gnyis Idan is identified with democracy, and young Tibetans look 
upon the Dalai Lama as a world leader and as a symbol of democracy and human 
rights (Schwartz 1996). As with former imperial powers, such as the British in India, 
the nationalists to a large extent have taken the discourses of the dominant power and 
used it against them. China's claim that it is modernising Tibet is questioned by those 
who have developed an alternative vocabulary (and alternative meanings) on the basis 
of a continuing flow of information and ideas from China as well as outside world on 
democracy, human rights and national struggles (see Sperling 1996). Observers of 
Tibet are increasingly recognising this resilience among the Tibetans and various 
innovative uses to which traditions have been put in the service of national identity. " 
Such critical endeavours are certainly a way forward as compared to the idea and 
practice of Exotica Tibet, of a `lost horizon', a Shangri-la lost forever to the world, as 
espoused in most popular literature in the West. 
6D. (Dis)placed Tibetans: nationalism in exile 
A repressive state regime is not the only limitation upon articulations of national 
identity within Tibet. Lack of organised opposition to China may also be attributed to 
the fact that significant numbers of religious and lay elite of traditional Tibet (along 
with the Dalai Lama) fled across the border to India. Since 1959 more than a hundred 
thousand Tibetans have become refugees. Most of them live in various settlements in 
India and Nepal. Others have dispersed to several countries, including Australia, 
Switzerland, Canada and the US. The nerve centre of the refugee community, 
15 The best place to find an analyses of observations made on protests and other nationalist 
articulations inside Tibet are Barnett and Akiner 1996, Mills 2001, and 
Schwartz 1996. 
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however, is Dharamsala, which is the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile. The 
Dalai Lama's government has since the beginning sought to project itself as a 
continuation of the pre-1959 Lhasa government. Though this government is not 
recognised by any state in the international community, for all practical purposes the 
Tibetans living in the diaspora, and many inside Tibet, consider it the rightful 
authority. Continuity is stressed. The authoritarian state apparatus in Chinese-occupied 
Tibet, combined with censorship of information, ensures that Tibetan nationalism is 
far more developed in the diasporic community. The discourses of international 
human rights, democracy, decolonisation, and self-determination have allowed 
sophisticated articulations of national identity among the Tibetans in exile. The idea in 
the world media of what constitutes Tibetanness often comes from the words and 
actions of the exile community. 
Tibetanness, as many observers of Tibetan diasporic communities realise, is a highly 
contested and pluralistic identity. Tibetanness is articulated, in theory and in praxis, at 
several hierarchical as well as overlapping levels. It is a discursive product of many 
complementary and contesting dynamics such as policy pronouncements of 
Dharamsala, the politics of more radical elements, gendered and generational 
practices, Exotica Tibet, and so on. Several factors influence and shape it, some of 
these directly related to the politics of representation. These include refugee status, 16 
space-time projections of homeland, " the personality of the Dalai Lama, '8 the 
16 Tibetans have been successful in avoiding assimilation with the host society by following a 
policy of limited acculturation. In Nepal and in parts of north India, Tibetans contribute 
substantially to the tourism industry, especially in the regions in which they live. Elsewhere, 
they concentrate more on specialised craft industries (see Methfessel 1997). Rather than 
competing with local Indians or Nepalese over scarce resources, they have established new 
enterprises, which also benefit locals with their spill-over effects. This does not mean that the 
relationship between refugees and locals is totally harmonious. As 1999 riots against Tibetans 
in Manali (India) shows, there are potential troublespots that need to be addressed by the 
community leaders as well as the Indian establishment. Since isolation is hardly a viable choice 
for most migrant communities (and individuals) when faced with problem of adjusting in the 
host society, the Tibetan establishment opted for a policy of limited acculturation as opposed to 
assimilation. While influences of popular Indian cultures including Bollywood are marked 
among the lay Tibetans, a sense of separate and distinct identity is prevalent. Both in rhetoric 
as well as in practice, the Tibetan refugee community has largely avoided the assimilative 
process of sanskritisation that effects most minority groups in India. 
1F A particular space-time projection of `homeland' is another constitutive factor in fostering 
Tibetan identity in the diaspora. Diasporic longing for the homeland is reflected in material as 
well as artistic production among exile communities. Images of Tibet, such as the Potala 
Palace, are favourite motifs. This nostalgia for space is complemented by nostalgia for time. It 
is not contemporary Tibet but pre-1959 Tibet, frozen in time, which defines the longing. As 
Clare Harris points out, many Tibetan refugee craftspeople and artists are involved in `a 
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overriding need for the preservation of culture, Western audiences with preconceived 
notions about Tibet and Tibetans (Exotica Tibet), self-perception, and most 
importantly, the desire to project a sense of continuity in a changing external 
environment. In order to understand what the category `Tibetan' means, it is important 
to look at these factors. Discussion of Exotica Tibet as one of these factor foregrounds 
the productive role played by representational practices. 
6D. i. Interaction with Western audiences: Exotica Tibet 
A very important dynamic shaping Tibetan political identity has been interaction with 
Western audiences. The role of the West can be examined as within rather than outside 
of the Tibet question by looking at the theme of Western representations of Tibet and 
its interface with Tibetan (trans)national identity. Scholars like Lopez (1998) show 
that Tibetans are `prisoners of Shangri-la' - constrained by their image as a religious, 
peaceful, exotic and idyllic community. " The dominant representation of Tibetans in 
the West, as discussed in chapter 5, presents them as peaceful, non-violent, religious, 
nostalgic recreation of temps perdus; an inevitable process of conscious archaism' (1993: 112). 
In the diaspora, the role of memory is central to imagining Tibet as a nation since recreating 
and preserving the memories of Tibet is crucial for maintaining the vision of `Free Tibet' as a 
common cause. These memories also provide the tools of expression, the language and the 
idioms of Tibetan unity and identity. 
18 The Dalai Lama acts as a unifying symbol for matters of religion and politics. We may take 
the celebration of anniversaries in Dharamsala, particularly the March 10 Uprising Day and 
Monlam festival, as illustrating this. Taken together these two represent paradigm of chos srid 
gnyis Idan (religion and politics combined) with the Dalai Lama on the top. On the Uprising 
Day the secular government renews its worldly claims for national independence, using 
metaphors which are in currency in the international community. Mon-lam on the other hand 
attempts to ground the refugee society in the changelessness of the Buddhist doctrine, and the 
priesthood which embodies it. Both represent the dynamic of change and continuity, the nation 
and religion. The unifying symbol bridging both events is the Dalai Lama, the king and the 
god, the active agent between this world and the next. He presents contradictory images: a 
`simple Buddhist monk'/ head of Tibetan Buddhism; human and god; world-renouncing/world- 
encompassing (Klieger 1994: 67). Personal loyalty to the Dalai Lama plays a key role in the 
government-in-exile's efforts to strengthen the sense of a unified Tibetan identity. In the words 
of Frank Korom, `... faith in Buddhism and in Dalai Lama's office has provided cohesion 
necessary for maintaining a form of "proto-nationalism" within a broadly dispersed world 
society' (1997a: 3). 
The Dalai Lama is also the chief symbol of Tibetan cause in the international arena. 
The unique role of the Dalai Lama, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, is 
perhaps the major reason for Tibet's international exposure. His spiritual, nonviolent 
approach and frequent travels around the world not only generate much interest in 
Tibetan Buddhism but also serve to maintain attention to the status of Tibetans and 
Chinese practices in the region (Gun and Khosla 2001: 280-1). 
19 Lopez argues that the current emphasis on Buddhist universalism in the teachings of the 
Dalai Lama as well as neo-Orientalist Western representations of Tibetans may be ultimately 
antithetical to the political case for an autonomous Tibet (1998: 206-7). 
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spiritual, compassionate, and close to nature. 20 A corollary to this representation is the 
idea that the inherently good-natured Tibetans are victims of forced modernisation 
brought about by Chinese rule. The emphasis is both on the uniqueness of the Tibetan 
culture and on its universal relevance. 21 
Exotica Tibet, presenting Tibetans as victims, has helped mobilise many non-Tibetans 
for the `Save Tibet' cause. 22 The Tibet movement, a term referring to transnational 
efforts made on the part of Tibetans and non-Tibetan supporters to demand the right of 
self-determination for the Tibetan people, has gained some high profile support, 
including Hollywood stars, US Congress members, and European members of 
parliament. The world-wide network of Tibet Support Groups (TSG) is unique in this 
respect. They include organisations focusing on a wide range of themes - Tibetan 
Buddhism, human rights, spreading awareness about the situation in Tibet, and 
demand for independence (rangzen is the term used for this). The presence of support 
for Tibet is particularly significant in the virtual world where most of the Internet sites 
related to Tibet are pro-Tibetan. In fact, there is an increasing realisation within the 
Tibetan diaspora of the possibilities offered by the Internet as a means for 
disseminating information and mobilising support. Though the motives of participants 
in the Tibet movement vary, 23 what seems to unite them is a broadly defined Tibet 
cause. When the Tibetans went in exile they found that `Tibet' already existed in the 
Western imagination, and given their limited options, they conformed to that image in 
order to gain support (see Lopez 1998). Tibetans, Tibetophiles, and Tibetologists all 
have contributed to the romance of Tibet - to Exotica Tibet - which, as we shall 
discuss in greater detail later in the chapter, paradoxically renders problematic the 
20 In his submission to the 1993 Non Governmental Organisations at the `United Nations world 
Conference on Human Rights', marking a significant departure from several Asian leaders who 
were arguing for `Asian values' and `Asian way', the Dalai Lama writes: `It is natural and just 
for nations, peoples and individuals to demand respect for their rights and freedoms and to 
struggle to end oppression, racism, economic exploitation, military occupation, and various 
forms of colonialism and alien domination' (His Holiness the Dalai Lama 1993). 
21 Clifford Bob (2002) writes how some post-colonial groups (he singles out the Tibetans) have 
pzined global limelight while others have been unsuccessful. 
Peter Bishop (2000) argues that the Tibetan appeals for understanding and assistance have 
also become contextualised alongside other forms of promotional media discourse, including 
commercial advertisements and rock concerts. 
23 `The Tibet cause has attracted an exceptionally diverse group of people, some of whom see 
their activities on behalf of the cause as connected with Buddhist belief and practice, while 
others are concerned with human rights, opposing communism, and a range of other 
motivations' (Powers 2000: 3). Among these `range of other motivations', New Age 
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struggle for independence from Chinese occupation. This support is often based on the 
supposed cultural uniqueness of Tibetans rather than on the recognition of the political 
right to self-determination. As Vanessa Baird recognises in The New Internationalist 
issue on Tibet, the romantic image has hampered Tibetan struggle for self- 
determination: `If Tibetans are presented as a dreamy, unrealistic people, obsessed 
with religion, their struggle is unlikely to be taken seriously by a world driven by more 
secular values. Their demand for independence will be seen as pie-in-the-sky and their 
ability to rule themselves will be open to question' (`Tibet: a cause for courage' 1995: 
1). 
However, rather than paint Tibetans as victims, we can view the Shangri-la image in a 
different light. Exotica Tibet is not only restrictive of options, but is also `a soft power 
resource that can be manipulated to get attention and to get some access to the stages 
of world politics' (Magnusson 2002: 211). For instance, Klieger (1997) argues that 
Tibetans have been active in the creation and presentation of their own identity. 24 Not 
only have they participated in portraying an image of themselves to outsiders, their 
self-perception too has been a result of this self-reflexivity. Calling this conscious and 
selective presentation of Self `Tibetan hyperreality', he writes: 
Tibetan hyperreality is created from a conscious and selective presentation of self to 
an audience with highly conditioned expectations. Tibetan culture as currently 
presented in most Tibetan cultural centres in the West is idealized, homogenated and 
pasteurized. It has... remarkably allowed the perpetuation of Tibetan identity despite 
the vicissitudes of exile (Ibid.: 67). 
In the process of strategically deploying their culture to the Western audience for 
mobilising political support, Tibetans have redefined and reconstructed Tibetan 
culture and identity. The Dalai Lama-led government-in-exile self-consciously makes 
representations of reflexive, politicised notions of culture and identity which are 
dependent upon the globalised production of institutions and the flow of cultural 
resources made possible through the onslaught of modernity (see Huber 2001; 
McLagan 1997; see also Shakya 2001). Not only have they embraced modern 
Orientalism is prominent. Though often New Age and Western Buddhism are conflated, mostly 
by their critics, they are quite distinct (see Vishvapani 1994). 
24 Klieger further argues that diasporic Tibetan identity formation is a result of ideological 
convergence between Western Shangri-la image and self-perception of Tibetans: `[a] collision 
has occurred between the Occidental paradigm of an Eastern paradise, Shangri-La, and an 
indigenous utopia which constructs a distanced, sacred Tibetan homeland upon the established 
Shambhala, Mt. Meru, Mt. Potala and divine rule mythology' (1997: 61). 
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technologies such as the Internet (see McLagan 1996) to promote their cause. 25 but 
they have also projected their culture as being compatible with universalising 
discourses such as environmentalism, (world) peace, and non-violence. 
Representations, politicised culture, and an interaction with a Western audience affect 
the `domestic' and `international' politics followed by the Tibetan elite in the diaspora. 
In their search for outside support, the Tibetan elite has been learning the language of 
international politics dominated by the Western powers (see Kolas 1996). 
`We live in a nationalised world' and we tend to see the world with a `nationalising 
eye' (Cubitt 1998: 1). Recognising the dominance of nationalism as a source of 
legitimacy in contemporary international politics, for example, the Tibetan 
government-in-exile has moulded its expositions on Tibetan identity accordingly. 
Though `Old Tibet' had elements of natio (Lopez 1998), 26 Hobsbawm's proto- 
nationalism (Dreyfus 1994), and what Smith calls ethnie (Anand 2000: 273-4), a 
modern sense of nationhood27 was absent (Ekvall 1960: 382). Tibet as a nation is not a 
historical reality but a product of post-exilic imagination. 28 The Western influence can 
also be seen in the evolving political structure of the government-in-exile. In fact, the 
Dharamsala establishment has been moving towards democratisation for gaining 
25 Though the odds are stacked against the Tibetans in the real world, in the virtual world it is a 
radically different situation. An overwhelming number of websites on Tibet are pro-Tibetan. 
Upon doing a search in Netscape on google. com using the word Tibet, out of first 100 links, 
only three were not connected to the Tibet movement (Dated 15 February 2001). To a certain 
extent, Tibet online, which claims to serve as a virtual community space for the Tibet 
movement, succeeds in its aim of levelling the playing field by leveraging the Internet's ability 
to harness grassroots support for Tibet's survival (Tibet Online 2001). Though there is a 
substantial gap between success in the virtual world and success in real world, with virtual 
world increasingly governing the real, maybe there is a glimmer of hope for the Tibetan cause. 
26 Lopez points out that Tibet was a natio, `a community or condition of belonging, rather than 
a nation-state in the modern sense of the term, with its attendant secular state and polity, 
notions of citizenship, a global capitalist economy, membership in an international system of 
states... ' (1998: 197-8). 
27 There is a vast literature exploring the different meanings attached to nation, nationalism, 
nationhood, and national identity. See Anderson 1983; Balakrishnan 1996; Bhabha 1990; Billig 
1995; Chatterjee 1986; Eley and Suny 1996; Enloe 1989; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; 
Hobsbawm and Ranger 1992; Smith 1991,1996; Yuval-Davis 1997. 
28 This is not to deny that elements of modern nationalism had started to emerge inside Tibet as 
early as 1913 when the thirteenth Dalai Lama's proclamation upon his return from exile in 
1913 showed a clear `awareness of Tibet as a distinct country, defined by its culture and 
history' (Dreyfus 2002: 40). Further, popular movements against the Chinese during the 1950s, 
including the `Four Rivers, Six Ranges' (chu bzhi gang drug) asserted distinct nationalism 
defined in opposition to Chinese occupation (see Shakya 1999). As Georges Dreyfus argues, 
the peculiarity of the nationalism that emerged in the 1950s is that it deploys traditional 
religious themes and values such as compassion, karma and the bond between 
Tibetans and 
Avalokitesvara, to define the nation (2002: 42). 
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legitimacy in the West. These developments may be explained in terms of an image- 
building exercise, steps taken towards keeping up with the times, response to pressures 
from within the refugee community, and finally, the Dalai Lama's personal initiative. 
In complying with dominant representational regimes, Tibetans are following tactics 
common to many groups who try to counter their relative powerlessness by 
negotiating within the dominant representational regimes and selectively appropriating 
favourable aspects. While Tibet is an extreme case, `due to relative powerlessness, 
anti-imperialist struggles often are compelled to utilise Western media in order to 
mobilise crucial world support' (Bishop 2000: 645). All third world resistance groups 
have to `negotiate both the post-cold war refraining of global politics and the lingering 
traces of Western post-colonial fantasies about their country and culture' (Bishop 
1998: 123). Mahatma Gandhi's adoption of the Orientalist trope of spiritualist Indians, 
feeding it into a wider political struggle against British imperialism as well as social 
evils within the Indian society, is a good example. 
At the same time, these presentations should not be seen only in terms of a response to 
Orientalist representations, for often there are elements within the traditional society 
that facilitate this appropriation. The Dalai Lama speaks about spirituality and the 
peaceful nature of Tibetans. His Strasbourg Proposal of 15 June 1988 is an example: 
`My country's unique history and profound spiritual heritage render it ideally suited 
for fulfilling the role of a sanctuary of peace at the heart of Asia' (His Holiness the 
Dalai Lama 1988). Though some historians may argue that there is a strong tradition 
of warriors29 among groups of Tibetans, this does not undermine the Dalai Lama's 
claim about a `profound spiritual heritage' for elements of compassion and the 
principle of non-violence were present within traditional Tibetan society. Such 
strategies are more about the selective appropriation of historical narratives for 
contemporary purposes than about specific historical truths. The specificity of these 
strategies is shaped by the contemporary vocabulary available for expression. The 
vocabularies of nationalism and transnationalism are two such discourses that the 
Tibetans have adopted to make their case. 
6D. ii. Transnationalism in the service of nationalism 
29 Jamyang Norbu's Warriors of Tibet (1986) reveals how when faced with incursion, 
`peaceful' Khampas did not hesitate to take up arms to defend their way of life 
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My analysis of Exotica Tibet thus shows that the West is not an `outside' element in 
the Tibet question. Quite often, diasporas are considered to exist in opposition to 
nation-states, with diaspora consciousness correspondingly incommensurate with 
nationalism. James Clifford, for example, argues that diasporas can never be 
exclusively nationalist because they imply multiple attachments (1997: 135-6). 
However, in the case of the Tibetans, nationalist discourse is a product of the diaspora. 
Imagining Tibet as a nation is to a large extent a post-exilic phenomenon. The most 
sophisticated articulation of Tibetan national identity thus comes from the more 
radical sections of the Tibetan diaspora. Western representations and diaspora 
conditions have also contributed to a shift in emphasis from ethnicity (Tibetans as 
tsampa eaters) to religion (a `modern' version of Tibetan Buddhism) as the basis of 
Tibetanness (Lopez 1998: 198). 
At the same time, transnationalism, engendered substantially by the transnational 
Tibet movement, has been an integral part of Tibetan diasporic identity. This is not 
surprising given that `the Tibet movement represents an emergent form of 
transnational, intercultural political activism, one that is dependent upon the complex 
production and circulation of representations of "Tibetanness" in various arenas that 
cross cultural and national boundaries' (McLagan 1997: 69; emphasis in original). 
Tibetan identity has strong constructive elements of transnationalism3° including those 
that emphasise environment, 31 peace, spiritualism, international human rights, 
universal compassion, and eclectic beliefs. As pointed out earlier, these are distinctly 
connected to Exotica Tibet. The constituency of Tibetan supporters often overlaps 
with other transnational social movements. Economically and politically, as well as 
symbolically, transnational connections feed into the Tibetan diaspora's nationalism. 
While recognising the essentially modern aspect of the nationalist and transnationalist 
discourses prevalent among the Tibet diaspora, it cannot be denied that the traditional 
Tibetan principles of operating with the external powers have also facilitated this. 
Working within the framework of a patron-client relationship, Tibetans have managed 
to construct and reinforce a national identity by drawing upon the patronage of 
30 Amy Mountcastle argues that on the whole `Tibetan identity', as a public identity, is a 
product of global processes. See Mountcastle 1997. 
3i For a critical discussion on the construction of a green Tibetan identity, see Huber 1997. 
185 
transnational networks and connections. Klieger's analysis of Tibetan nationalism as a 
modern manifestation of the `patron-client dyad' argues that the Tibetans living in 
diaspora have been able to retain their status by converting the entire exile community 
into the client category (1994: 84-120). This is not to argue that a coherent ideology of 
nationalism accepted by the entire Tibetan diaspora has emerged. The idea of Tibet as 
a nation is a political construct that involves the manufacturing of unity out of 
tremendous difference and diversity. 
Soliciting international support has been one of the main strategies of the Tibetan 
diaspora elite. The Dalai Lama's well-publicised and frequent trips to various 
countries are a significant part of this strategy of raising the profile of the Tibetan 
cause in the international media and mobilising public opinion in the Western states. 
Conspicuous avoidance of the Tibet question in the conventional fora of international 
relations, such as the lack of recognition of Tibetan statehood by any existing state, 
has forced the Tibetans to seek support through non-conventional means - cultural 
politics is a part of this. The ultimate goal behind the transnational mobilisation 
remains the assertion of the right to self-determination. Tibetanness thus is a 
transnational phenomenon, a political practice that transgresses national boundaries 
but does not question the spatial logic through which these boundaries have come to 
constitute and frame the conduct of international relations. In a poem of dedication at 
the beginning of his book, Palden Gyatso (1997) reflects a sentiment common to most 
Tibetans, a hope that international support might help them realise their goal of 
independence: `... And to all of you who inhabit the world who also believe in the 
virtues of truth, justice and decency. . . Help to deliver us. Help us to be free, to be 
independent, to be able to do what we choose - in our own country'. 
The imaginative hold and consequent impact of Exotica Tibet is evident in the 
activities of various Tibet support groups. As I pointed out earlier, the support in the 
form of `Free Tibet' movement is often based on the image of `Tibet as defenseless 
underdog, a spiritual society that was minding its own business only to get crushed 
under the jackboot of an aggressive, materialist overlord' (Schell 2000: 206). 
However, even the cultivation of this victimisation paradigm reflects the agency of 
Tibetans. Though Tibetan global publicity campaigns consciously portray Tibetans as 
victims of Chinese oppression, this does not deny them their subjectivity. Instead, they 
have made conscious and extensive use of Western discourses - whether psychology, 
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philosophy, physics, personal growth, or holistic health - in their attempts both to 
communicate with Westerners and to reconstitute themselves in conditions of exile 
(Bishop 1997: 67). Tibetans have colluded with, as well as contested, various Western 
images of Tibet. 
Though many Westerners may like to overrate their own importance in nurturing 
Tibetan resistance to China, 32 resistance to domination always exists in all societies 
(Bass 1990: 218), and Tibet is no exception. 33 Dominant (in this case Western and 
Chinese) cultural and political ideas influence the precise forms that the resistance 
takes. In the diaspora, it is the preservation of the traditional culture and nationalism 
that are the main dynamic behind the politics of resistance. Within Tibet, it ranges 
from the protest movements demanding independence to forces demanding 
accommodation of special rights within the Chinese state structure. In either case, this 
reveals their political agency. 
The extent to which the awareness-raising campaigns of the Tibet support groups in 
the West translate into substantive political support and activism is open to question. 
In fact, the existing support for the Tibetan cause is based on Exotica Tibet, particular 
representations of Tibetans as inherently spiritual and peaceful people. This restricts 
the alternatives available to those Tibetans (see Lazar 1998; Shakya 1991) who might 
be disillusioned with the Dalai Lama's insistence on non-violence and his renunciation 
of the demand for independence. Instead of deriving satisfaction solely from the high 
profile support for Tibet based on particularised images, many Tibetans are frustrated 
with the limitations imposed by this on their political struggle. Lhasang Tsering 
expresses this sentiment very clearly when he says that, `... as for our friends and 
32 P. Christiaan Klieger expresses this sentiment clearly when he writes, that quite a few injis 
(i. e. Western foreigners) `as quixotic would-be heros and heroines for the cause of Tibet, may 
think of martyrdom of their Western selves, becoming "knights of Shangri-La" to serve the 
timeless utopian dream. In dogged pursuit of the Other, however, Shangri-La exists only as a 
moment lived' (2002: x). 
33 Contrary to the commonly held assumption on all sides, even in theocratic, conservative, and 
`feudal' society of `Old Tibet' resistance to authority was never completely absent. For 
instance, Bell recalled theatre performances in Lhasa in which actors did not hesitate to ridicule 
certain aspects of their religion, and even less so of their officials (OIOC: 11). He further 
mentions a `Sun body' play by Kyor-mo Lung-nga troupe in which there was an explicit anti- 
Chinese political allusion, with `a kick for the Emperor of China' (Ibid.: 18- 19). Going back 
even earlier, Michael Aris talks of an eighteenth century writing by a Tibetan in which a 
positive sympathy can be detected for the undefeated Marathas and their long stand against 
both the Mughals and the British (Anis 1994: 12). All this challenges the image of a passive 
Tibetan society. 
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supporters, while we greatly appreciate their sympathy and support, it is not for them 
to determine what the goal should be' (1998: 43). Exotica Tibet, especially in the 
second half of the twentieth century, has disproportionately emphasised Tibetan 
Buddhism. This has led to the side-tracking of the political question of status of Tibet 
and the Tibetans' right to self-determination. Western state leaders who meet the Dalai 
Lama (for instance, American President Bush in May 2001; see `Dalai Lama and 
Bush' 2001), go to great lengths to explain that it is a private meeting with a religious 
leader. The Dalai Lama, as a political leader, has a smaller audience in the West. And 
even when the political aspect of Tibet is raised in the international fora, it is 
considered a matter of human rights, not a question of self-determination. As Robbie 
Barnett (2001) points out, the adoption of a human rights model by Tibetan exile elite 
has severe limitations. First, it is ideologically indistinct as everyone pays lip service 
to it and, as a moral strategy, it lends itself to the blurring of distinctions between 
words and deeds. Second, the success of the human rights model appears to have been 
at the expense of concerns much more central for the Tibetans, such as the question of 
Tibet's political status. In the West, this model `offered a language that could be used 
ambiguously so that the domestic audience would be seen as criticizing China while 
Chinese officials might be persuaded that the criticisms were sufficiently mild so as 
not to be threatening to fundamental concerns' (Barnett 2001: 291). 
Thus, while moulding their identity discourses according to Western exoticised 
imagery (Exotica Tibet) has helped Tibetans in gaining substantial popular support, 
there is a strong realisation among many that this is not an end in itself. As Shakya 
points out, unlike other international political problems such as the Palestinian one, the 
Tibetan issue is seen in terms of sentimentality. `If the Tibetan issue is to be taken 
seriously, Tibet must be liberated from both the Western imagination and the myth of 
Shangri-la' (Shakya 1991: 23). It therefore comes as no big surprise that while the 
international support for Palestinians often comes from other third world countries, 
Tibet support groups are more common in the civil society of the first world. 34 This 
34 There is another explanation to this difference in support base between the Palestinian and 
the Tibetan cause. The former is looked at as a case of European imperialism and settler 
colonialism on the part of Israel (see Beit-Hallahmi 1993; Finkelstein 1995; Lilienthal 1978). 
Therefore, decolonisation demands the recognition of Palestinian statehood. On the other hand, 
as the `coloniser' in the case of Tibet is another postcolonial state, the matter is looked at as an 
internal issue of a minority nationality, a problem that raises uncomfortable questions within 
many postcolonial states. This discomfort also reveals the refusal of international community 
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has partly to do with the limited success of Tibetan government-in-exile in 
establishing networks in the third world. The Tibetan exiles turned for support to 
former colonisers rather than to the formerly colonised and chose public relations 
rather than political alliance as its form of politics (Barnett 2001: 279). 
6E. Tibetan national identity: tensions within 
Arguments such as Avtar Brah's that `the political process of proclaiming a specific 
collective identity entails the creation of a collective identity out of the myriad 
collage-like fragments of the mind' (1996: 124; emphasis in original) enable us to read 
Tibetan political identity discursively. For the Tibetan exiles, the very act of 
presenting oneself as displaced member of a bounded territory of Tibet is a highly 
political act. For Tibet is an imagining entity in all senses of the word since people 
identifying themselves as Tibetan come from the Greater Tibet region which includes 
areas which have never been under the temporal control of the Lhasa government of 
U-Tsang (Central Tibet). However, the Tibetan government-in-exile claims to be a 
representative of all the Tibetans. 
What bound the people in the regions was not allegiance to one temporal authority, but 
certain commonalties in religion and culture. The legitimacy of the Dharamsala 
establishment's temporal claims on behalf of all Tibetans is drawn from these cultural 
similarities. The structure of the government-in-exile as well as the map of Tibet that 
is in circulation in the diaspora reflects post-exile politics rather than some historical 
marker. Similarly, a pan-Tibetan marker of identity - nangpa (Buddhist `insiders') 
subsumes all pre-exilic sectarian and regional identities. Unlike in the past when 
individuals identified their home with a specific village or locality, now Tibet in its 
entirety is imagined as the homeland to which all Tibetans desire to return. As Steven 
Venturino argues, in the Tibetan diaspora, the notion of a heterogeneous group putting 
aside its differences and `pulling together' is an important part of the struggle for 
independence and the maintenance of national identity (1997: 114-5). The institutional 
as well as the symbolic practices of the Dalai Lama-led Dharamsala establishment 
to follow the logic of decolonisation to allow the right of self-determination to all the peoples, 
not only those under European imperialism. 
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encourage people to act socially and cohesively as Tibetans in an 'alien' 
environment. 35 
The emphasis on constructing a unity does not mean an elision of differences within 
the community. Like any other vibrant society, one can find here differences based on 
generation, socialisation, gender, religiosity, region, sect, period of departure from 
Tibet, class, and political opinions (for instance, see Diehl 1998). The popular 
tendency within the media, many Tibet Support Groups, and many Tibetans 
themselves, is to represent the Tibetan diaspora community as united under the 
leadership of the Dalai Lama. However, significant differences can be seen within the 
diaspora between the Tibetans coming from the U-Tsang region and the Khampas and 
Amdowas. It is definitely witnessed in religious matters, as in the Shugden affair36 or 
Rumtek monastery controversy, 37 or for that matter in less publicised differences 
within the monasteries in South Asia between the old arrivals and the new comers (see 
Strom 1997: 39-42). Significant generational differences are also found within the 
diaspora on matters such as the role of religion in society (is it an end it itself or a 
cultural resource? ); out migration from South Asia (whether to stay in the region close 
to the community or move out to the Western countries for improvement in individual 
standard of living? ); influence of popular Indian and Western culture (should one 
assimilate with the dominant culture or retain separation? ); and political priorities 
35 The connection between the symbolism implicit in Tibetan government-in-exile structure 
and the homeland of Tibet is evident in the evolving democratic system with a National 
Assembly at the top. Here, a quota system operates according to which there are an equal 
number of representatives for three principal regions of Tibet, same number of representatives 
from each of five major religious sects, a few representatives from outside South Asia, and 
finally a few nominated members. The Tibetans in diaspora therefore vote to make a symbolic 
claim to Tibet rather than represent their own interests. 
36 Dorje Shugden is an important protector deity of the Gelugpas, the politically dominant 
Tibetan sect headed by the Dalai Lama. The fierce Shugden protects the purity of the Gelug 
way, especially against contamination by the sometimes rival Nyingma sect. Early this century, 
a charismatic `revival' movement grew up around Shugden, strongly influencing later 
generations of Gelug monks and increasing tension with the Nyingma. But in 1976, on the 
advice of the Nechung oracle, the Dalai Lama banned the worship of Shugden, sparking a 
controversy that has lately become quite bitter and occasionally violent. This controversy 
received significant publicity in the international media. Though some media accounts paint 
Shugden supporters as fundamentalists clinging to Tibet's shamanic past, Lopez (1998) argues 
that the struggle may actually represent a desire to reassert regional and specifically Tibetan 
culture. In contrast, the Dalai Lama, in order to constitute Tibet as a unified nation and avoid 
sectarian tensions, is focusing on universalistic Buddhism. 
37 The Kagyupa sect has its headquarters-in-exile at Sikkim's Rumtek Dharma Chakra Centre. 
The Rumtek monastery has been wrecked by controversy - ever since its founder, the 16th 
Gyalwa Karmapa died in 1991 - over who is his `real incarnate'. 
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(whether to emphasise preservation of traditional Tibetan culture or focus primarily on 
the explicitly political demands? ). " 
In political matters too the diaspora is divided. Study of the statements by the Tibetan 
government-in-exile reveals an ambiguity in their primary political demands (at 
http: //www. tibet. com). While the right of Tibetans to self-determination is asserted, 
often it is argued in terms of significant and real autonomy within China, sometimes 
on the model of `One Country, Two Systems' as has been followed in the case of 
Hong Kong. On the other hand, there are more radical intellectuals within the Tibetan 
diaspora who make a strong and unambiguous case for struggling towards complete 
independence (see Lazar 1998; Norbu 1999b). 39 There are several other opinions on 
this matter. A middle ground is expressed in the Hear Tibet! Campaign calling for a 
United Nations-backed referendum within Tibet allowing the Tibetan people 
themselves to choose their own political future (see Hear Tibet! 2001). 
Thus, a unified Tibetan-in-exile identity espoused on behalf of the Tibetan diaspora is 
a rhetorical device and imaginary construct. At the same time, it would be naive to 
dismiss considerations of the identity question on this ground only for all the identities 
are in the last instance a product of the imagination. Following Judith Butler: 
To take the construction of the subject as a political problematic is not the same as 
doing away with the subject; to deconstruct the subject is not the same as doing away 
the concept; on the contrary, deconstruction implies not only that we suspend all 
commitments to that to which the term `subject', refers, and that we consider the 
linguistic functions it serves in the consolidation and concealment of authority. To 
deconstruct is not to negate or to dismiss, but to call into question and, perhaps most 
importantly, to open up a term, like the subject, to a reusage or redeployment that 
previously has not been authorized (1992: 15). 
Though Tibetanness is an imagined and contested construct, it has its own truth effects 
on those who consider themselves Tibetans. Recognition of Tibetans as an `imagining 
community' problematises simplistic interrogations of Tibetanness. It does not 
undermine the quest of a people for self-determination. 
38 Magazines including Tibetan Review often provide space for the dissenting voices of 
younger generations. An interesting difference is seen when it comes to assessing the 
assimilative influence of dominant culture on Tibetan life - while the new refugees' 
`Sinicisation' is ridiculed and considered as unpatriotic, elements of `Indianisation' and 
`Westernisation' are often tolerated. 
39 Tibetan intellectuals while demanding independence, also reveal an awareness of the need to 
learn from historical experiences of decolonisation. For instance, Tsarong (1997) suggests 
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6F. Conclusion 
To conclude, Tibetan national identity both inside and outside Tibet is a product of 
constant negotiation and renegotiation. Personal experience mediates national identity. 
The `transnational' element is as significant a part of Tibetan nationalism, as is the 
`indigenous' element. Tibetanness among those living in exile is as much a discursive 
product of displacement (conditions of diaspora) as of sense of belonging (to a 
`distinctive nation'). It is a productive process of creative negotiation with Western 
representations, with Exotica Tibet. My discussion of poetics and politics of Exotica 
Tibet seeks to blur the distinctions between the cultural and the political and to 
underline the constitutive relations between identity and representation within world 
politics in the post-colonial world. In order to carry on a postcolonial examination of 
the politics of Exotica Tibet, we have to move beyond the conventional sense of the 
term `political' and challenge the boundaries between the political and the cultural. 
This is what I do in the next chapter, where I offer new ways of theorising Tibetanness 
through postcoloniality-inspired symbolic geography and a discursive approach that 
foregrounds the constitutive and performative role played by representation in identity. 
This should be seen as underlining a postcolonial analytical approach that will help 
provide a critical reading of world politics, taking into account the centrality of 
representation. 
possible ways in which the Tibetan struggle may learn from decolonisation that took place in 
most of Asia and Africa during the twentieth century. 
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Chapter 7: Re-Imag(in)ing Tibetanness: Postcolonial symbolic 
geography, culture, and the politics of Exotica Tibet' 
`We have to learn to think differently - in order at last, perhaps very late on, 
to attain more: to feel differently' (Nietzsche quoted in Connolly 1993: xiv). 
Tibetanness, or Tibetan identity, is a contingent product of negotiations among several 
complementary and contradictory processes. These processes may be looked at in 
terms of different pairs of contrastive dynamics. Some of these are: the imperatives of 
a culture-in-displacement and the need to present an overarching stable identity; 
interaction with host societies and an avoidance of cultural assimilation into 
hegemonic cultural formations there; emphasis upon tradition as the defining 
characteristic and the need to present exiled Tibetans as 'modem'; the desire to present 
Tibetan culture as unique while at the same time highlighting its universal features; 
interaction with a sympathetic Western audience and emphasising difference from 
Western cultures; and finally, the desire to project a sense of continuity with the past 
while distancing oneself from oppressive elements of history. These dynamics impact 
upon the theory and praxis of Tibetanness at several overlapping and hierarchical 
levels. ' In this chapter, by putting the symbolism of Dharamsala/dharmashala/ 
dharamshala (please note the difference in the placing of `a' highlighting different 
pronunciations) under a postcolonial critical scrutiny, I offer a deconstructive reading 
of Tibetan identity problematic that, instead of jettisoning Tibetan agency, affirms it. 
1 This chapter is based on my field trip to Dharamsala that was funded by a travel grant from 
the British Academy Society for South Asian Studies. At Dharamsala, I gained a lot from 
conversations with Topden Tsering and Thupten Samphel at the government-in-exile's 
Department of Information and International Relations. However, the responsibility for all the 
comments made here are solely mine. My special thanks to Christiaan Klieger and many others 
at the International Association for Tibetan Studies conference (2000) for their encouragement 
and useful comments. A version of this has been published (Anand 2002a) by Brill Academic 
Publishers, Leiden. 
2 My contention is that drawing upon critical social and cultural theories and deploying them 
contextually is a better approach than shying away from them out of a fear of theoretical 
imperialism. Often well-intentioned scholars avoid using Western theoretical ideas in the case 
of the non-West in general and Tibet in particular since history is replete with examples of 
similar moves to the detriment of local people. However, moving towards a purely empirical 
study is not the right solution since this idea of pure empiricism is the most hegemonic of 
Western paradigms. It is complicit with dominant regimes of patriarchal and racialised power. 
So, in my opinion, it is better to adopt the critical theory inspired idea of theorising everything 
since it reveals all practices as political, and therefore contestable. Even though these themes 
have originated in the West, they question the assumption of superiority of the West and thus 
leave room for alliances with `progressive' ideas from the non-Western world. Approaches that 
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The politics of Exotica Tibet - this politics is about the effect of representations on the 
represented and questions the arbitrary boundary between the cultural and the political 
- is evident both in the symbolic geography of Dharamsala and in Tibetanness. In the 
course of this inquiry, I highlight the symbolism of Dharamsala/dharmashala/ 
dharamshala as contested, put forward the dominant story of Tibetanness before 
offering alternative reading, and finally, offer a new way of theorising Tibetanness as 
discursively constituted both by roots and routes. 
Before moving further, let me elaborate on Dharamsala/dharmashala/ dharamshala. 
Dharamsala is a place in north India (see Fig. III) which is currently the residence of 
the Dalai Lama and the seat of the Tibetan government-in-exile. The place name 
Dharamsala comes from the Sanskrit word dharmashala comprised of two parts - 
dharma ('religion') and shala (house). So, dharmashala means the `abode of the god' 
and `house of religion'. But in everyday Hindi language, often pronounced as 
dharamshala, it means a `temporary station', a `guest house', lying usually on routes 
of pilgrimage. An important feature of dharamshala is that it provides free or 
sometimes very inexpensive temporary accommodation to travellers. So Dharamsala 
is the place, dharmashala means `house of religion', and dharamshala stands for 
'guesthouse'. 
I examine the symbolic geography of Dharamsala. 3 Why Dharamsala and not any 
other, even bigger, Tibetan refugee settlement elsewhere? Why symbolic geography 
and not cultural geography? A focus on Dharamsala does not deny the important role 
played by several other places inhabited by the Tibetan diaspora. However, I chose 
Dharamsala since it plays a very crucial role as a symbolic nerve centre from which 
articulations of Tibetanness emerge. These articulations affect the perception of the 
deny a role to theory often operate on unconscious theoretical assumptions that are left 
uninterrogated. 
3 Dharamsala is the seat of Tibetan government-in-exile. Though the `government' is not 
recognised by any state in the international community, for Tibetan people themselves, 
especially those living in diaspora, it is a legitimate representative. The place name is spelt 
either Dharamsala or Dharamshala, but the government-in-exile, following Indian government 
surveys, uses the former spelling. 
Dharamsala is a common name used for Dharamsala proper (the Kotwali Bazaar area) or the 
Lower Dharamsala, McLeod Gunj (also spelt Mcleodganj and McLeod Ganj) or the Upper 
Dharamsala, and Gangchen Kyishong (the complex of Central Tibetan Administration). Lower 
Dharamsala is a predominantly Indian area. While many Tibetan establishments are located 
here, there are many more in the vicinity of Dharamsala (for instance the Norbulingka 
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international media. But even more importantly, they are reabsorbed into the exile 
community's self-perception. Thus, instead of representations as merely reflective of 
identity, they are constitutive of the very entity they seek to represent. 
A focus on Dharamsala as a place will be complemented by an interrogation of the 
root words dharmashala/dharamshala in order to tease out the various possible 
alternative narratives of Tibetanness. My contention is that the symbolic geography of 
the place, along with a particular implication of the words dharmashala and 
dharamshala, supports the dominant story preferred by the exile elite and their non- 
Tibetan supporters. This story is consonant with Exotica Tibet, which has the effect of 
fostering a `salvage mentality', a strong preservation ethos. Here the emphasis is on 
the projection of Dharamsala as the `Little Lhasa in India', ' a temporary home 
preserving a historical culture in its pure form before an inevitable return to the 
original homeland. 
However, an alternative reading of Dharamsalaldharmashalaldharamshala provides a 
different story, one that affords a theoretically sophisticated conceptualisation of 
Tibetanness and therefore challenges the dominant story. Such a reading not only 
looks at identity as always already in process, but also affirms the diaspora experience 
as something more than a temporary aberration. The two different narratives of 
diasporic Tibetan identity I posit are not strictly contradictory since they can be 
retheorised together productively, through postcolonial IR theory, by combining a 
`deconstructive attitude' with an `agential politics of identity', which, as Rajagopalan 
Radhakrishnan points out, `makes it possible for movements to commit themselves 
simultaneously to the task of affirming concrete projects of identity on behalf of the 
dominated and subjugated knowledges and to the utopian or long-term project of 
interrogating identity-as-such' (1996: xxiii). 
Institute). Dharamsala is used as a generic name for all of these. Location wise, it can be 
characterised as a hill station in the north Indian state of Himachal Pradesh. 
4 There is a further issue of temporality in the projection as `Little Lhasa'. Though the `Little 
Lhasa' was put on the map of global tourism mostly after the mid 1980s, the name had come to 
be associated with McLeod Gunj from the sixties itself (see the passing reference to it in 
Avendon 1984: 103). 
195 
As I discussed in chapter 4, to subject the notion of identity to a deconstructive 
critique is not to negate or refuse it. Instead the deconstruction of terms such as 
identity means, 
to continue to use them, to repeat them, to repeat them subversively, and to displace 
them from the contexts in which they have been deployed as instruments of 
oppressive power ... If a deconstruction of the materiality of bodies suspends and 
problematizes the traditional ontological referent of the term, it does not freeze, banish, render useless, or deplete of meaning the usage of the term; on the contrary, it 
provides the conditions to mobilize the signifier in the service of an alternative 
production (Butler 1992: 17). 
Within this approach, my alternative reading highlights several things within 
discourses of Tibetanness at once - the politics of place and the place of politics; the 
social construction of space and the spatialised social relations; and the rhetoric of 
essentialism and the practice of strategic essentialism. 
7A. Symbolism of Dharamsala: a contested terrain 
Conventionally, identity was seen as primordial and natural, culture as organically 
rooted in a particular geographical space, and place as an inert space over which 
history is enacted. Place was seen as providing `an inert, fixed, isotropic back-drop to 
the real stuff of politics and history' (Keith and Pile 1997: 4). On this view, 
Dharamsala is only a static stage for the theatrics of Tibetan diasporic culture and 
politics. However, this notion of fixity hides the fact that the geography of Dharamsala 
has had a changing symbolic role for the Tibetan diaspora. A movement from a poor 
refugee settlement to one of the most popular tourist destinations in India, a change 
from a small-dilapidated village to a cosmopolitan small town - these are indicative as 
well as constitutive of changes within the Tibetan exile community. The questioning 
of the edifice of the conventional geographical imagination by a `cultural turn' within 
the field influenced by poststructuralism and postcolonialism makes it to possible to 
study Dharamsala's symbolic geography. For place and space are now seen in social 
terms - not only do they shape social relations, but more importantly, they themselves 
are discursively constituted by social forces. 
Spatialities, a term that recognises the social construction of space and place, can be 
invoked to study how landscapes themselves are laden with multiple meanings. 
`Spatialities have always produced landscapes that are loaded with ethical, 
epistemological and aestheticized meanings' (Keith and Pile 1993: 26). That 
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Dharamsala has come to acquire multiple layers of not always harmonious meaning is 
therefore not surprising. While for some (the Tibetan refugees) it is a place of refuge 
from oppression, for others (the Chinese government) it is a centre of seditious 
activities. For some (local Indians) it is a vital opportunity for material advancement, 
for others (many Western tourists) it is a spiritual refuge from the crass materialism of 
modern Western societies. For some (the Tibetans as well as non-Tibetan Buddhists) it 
is a centre of pilgrimage, for others (many Indian tourists) it is merely a site of 
curiosity. All these ascribed meanings, some complementary and some contradictory, 
problematise any simplistic and holistic reading of the symbolic geography of 
Dharamsala. Rather than treating such tensions and contradictions as regrettable, they 
should be seen as productive of the wider Tibetan diasporic identity-in-process. 
Postcolonial criticality stresses the importance of recognising the complexly 
intertwined and mutually constitutive relationship between imaginary and material 
geography. `Imaginary and material geographies are not incommensurate, nor is one 
simply the product, a disempowered surplus, of the other' (Jacobs 1996: 158). Instead 
of treating the symbolic in opposition to the material, a richer conceptualisation 
recognises that there is no `actual' which can be accessed independently of inter- 
subjectivity, that there is no category of the `natural' which is not mediated through 
culture. This would facilitate an understanding of the spatialised politics of identity as 
well as the identity politics of space. The former might include a consideration of how 
particular imaginings of a unified homeland of Tibet shape the discourses of 
Tibetanness. A discussion of the identity politics of space might, on the other hand, 
consider how different groups, including the Tibetan government-in-exile, ordinary 
Tibetan refugees, Tibetans inside Tibet, the Chinese government, the Western 
sympathisers, and the local Himachalis, ascribe their own meanings to the place of 
Dharamsala. 
Recognition that all geographies have acquired contested meanings through 
continuous processes of individual and collective imagination does not preclude a 
consideration of the physical and structural factors at work. For instance, though the 
residence of the Dalai Lama and the existence of a government-in-exile are among the 
more important factors, the physical location of Dharamsala in the hills of the Indian 
state of Himachal Pradesh has also facilitated its projection and promotion as a `Little 
Lhasa'. Given the reputation of Lhasa as lying on the `roof of the world', it is difficult 
197 
to imagine a place in the plains (rather than hills) of India being promoted in the same 
way. Travel writings that emphasise the relative inaccessibility of Dharamsala5 are 
quite common. This resonates with the reputation of Lhasa as the `Forbidden City' at 
the `roof of the world'. In a certain sense, Dharamsala acts as an accessible substitute 
for those travellers (often white and Western)' whose imaginations have been 
influenced by the earlier writing of Imperialist adventurers, `the trespassers on the roof 
of the world' (to evoke the title of Peter Hopkirk's book, 1983). Thus, the 
mountainous terrain of McLeod Gunj and its distance from any big city contributes to 
the symbolic geography of Dharamsala. 
The most important structural factor shaping the symbolic geography of Dharamsala is 
the imperative of refugee status. The locations of Tibetan settlements have been 
decided entirely by Indian central and state governments. For instance, The Dalai 
Lama shifted from Mussorie to Dharamsala on Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru's advice in 1960. An abandoned British hill station, McLeod Gunj was offered 
as a suitable quiet place for the Dalai Lama. ' The transfer of the Central Tibetan 
Administration (the government-in-exile) followed soon after. Unlike in Lhasa where 
the three big monasteries of the Gelugpa order were close to the Dalai Lama's seat, in 
India these monasteries have been re-established in far off places, due to the 
limitations of land available for settlement. The refugee status of Tibetans in South 
Asia prohibits them from owning immovable property unless offered by the host 
government. So, any consideration of the symbolic geography of Dharamsala needs to 
keep these physical and structural factors in mind. 
Before dwelling more on Dharamsala and the politics of identity, it should be pointed 
out that the place that is commonly designated as the `Little Lhasa' is actually 
McLeod Gunj. As the Himachal Pradesh Tourism Department board reads: `Welcome 
5 As compared to most other hill-stations in India, Dharamsala has no direct railway connection 
to any major city. The nearest railhead is 85 kilometers away. 
6 There seems to be a difference of motive for travelling to Dharamsala between (white) 
Westerners and others. The influence of Exotica Tibet is less noticeable in the case of Japanese 
and Korean visitors (for whom Dharamsala is often only one part of a Buddhist pilgrimage 
circuit in India) or Indian tourists (for whom it is a replacement for crowded hill stations like 
Simla). This is not to say that all the Westerners who come here are affected by the Shangri-la 
myth (since many come here for the same reasons as they visit Kullu, Manali, or Goa - the 
`hippy trail') or that all non-Western tourists are free from it. 
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to Mcleodganj, the little Lhasa in India'. The multilayered meanings in this name 
(McLeod Gunj) may be explored further (something not feasible within the space of 
this chapter) - British imperialism, 8 development of hill stations as places of refuge for 
the imperial class, the indigenisation of names, and so on. It can be read as indicating 
the important role played by British Imperial practices in framing the various aspects 
of Tibetan question. The distinction between Lower and Upper Dharamsala also 
reflects a gap between the local population and the refugees. While Tibetans here have 
generally managed to create their own niche in the wider society, the assertion of 
difference also leaves the potential open for conflict if the locals perceive the refugees 
to be a source of problems. ' The government-in-exile promotes the name Dharamsala, 
and not McLeod Gunj, as the `Little Lhasa'. This may be because Tibetan institutions 
and establishments are spread throughout the vicinity of Dharamsala. But how far the 
name Dharamsala itself may have inspired it is an open question for the literal 
meaning of Dharmashala - `the house of god/religion/dharma' - resonates well with 
the location of the Dalai Lama's residence and several religious institutions here. 
Indirectly, the choice of name with its association with spiritualism and faith makes it 
more appealing to Western tourists too. 
7B. Dharamsala as a temporary home: the dominant story 
What are the specific ways in which the politics of place as embodied in Dharamsala 
inform the discourses of Tibetan identity? By drawing upon the usage of the word 
dharmashala/dharamshala, we can theorise Tibetan identity discourse in broadly two 
ways - one offering the dominant story and the other allowing an alternative reading 
(discussed in section 7D). Dharamshala in popular Hindi usage refers to a `temporary 
home', a `guest house'. The dominant theorisation, which has a wide currency among 
the Tibetan Government and nationalists as well as non-Tibetan supporters of the 
Tibetan cause, interprets the experience of diaspora as a temporary and regrettable 
7 The crucial role played by the Nowrojee family (the biggest proprietor here) in encouraging 
the development of `Little Lhasa' needs to be kept in mind. The Nowrojee store's pivotal 
location at the McLeod Gunj bus stop stands as a silent symbol of this role. 
8 The place is named after Sir Donald Friel McLeod, lieutenant governor of Punjab in mid 
nineteenth century. 
9 Though it is rare for such tensions between Tibetans and local Indians to burst out in full- 
fledged rioting, the resentment of the locals against Tibetans, who are perceived as wealthier, is 
evident. I say this from my personal experience of talking to many Indian taxi drivers and 
shopkeepers. Since for them I was an insider (with Indian nationality), they often expressed 
their anxiety about the Tibetan 'others'. 
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phenomenon. And indeed, the place Dharamsala is seen as a temporary home with the 
final destination being the original homeland of Tibet. The exile is seen as a break in 
the evolution of an ancient civilisation in Tibet, a time when it is vital to preserve a 
pure form of this civilisation since it is under erasure in the original home. As my 
discussion of Exotica Tibet has shown, in journalistic and travel writings, one often 
comes across eulogies to a lost Shangri-la in Tibet (particularly Lhasa) and 
observations on how the forces of modernisation infused under the Chinese rule have 
spelt doom for the Tibetan culture. Such observations stand in contrast to those about 
the Tibetan communities living in South Asia, particularly in the area surrounding 
Dharamsala. In this case, though the cosmopolitan and eclectic cultural scene of 
McLeod Gunj is recognised, often the emphasis is on the success story of Tibetans in 
preserving their culture. `Working hard to rebuild their lives and preserve their 
distinctive and timeless culture and lifestyle, these people, from difficult beginnings, 
have become arguably the most successful refugee community in the world whilst 
continuing the non violent struggle for Tibet's freedom in exile' (Barker 1999). The 
maintenance of Tibetan identity is seen as a functional expression of this culture. 
If we are to identify one crucial theme running through the collective discourses and 
practices of the Tibetan diaspora, it is the preservation of tradition and culture. When 
some Tibetans, following the Dalai Lama in 1959, left their country as refugees, a 
need to preserve the traditional religion and culture in the diaspora was felt. This 
became particularly acute as markers of Tibetan life came under attack during the 
Cultural Revolution in China and then, since the 1980s, the Chinese authorities sought 
to follow a dual policy of political repression and economic liberalisation. 1° The acute 
fear that Tibetan culture would become extinct in its homeland underlines the 
predominance of a `salvage mentality', a preservation ethos in the Tibetan diaspora. 
This also provides legitimacy to the diaspora's claim to be a true representative of 
Tibet, the custodian of an endangered culture. 
It is thus not surprising that Dharamsala is projected as the `Little Lhasa' in India and 
several dynamics support such a depiction. Not only is this the residence of the Dalai 
10 Chinese policies have not remained constant. Cultural revival that initially took place in the 
Tibetan regions often led to political protests. As a result, since the early nineties, there has 
been a reassertion of political control. For analyses of this `cultural revival' see Goldstein and 
Kapstein 1998. For discussion on the rich symbolic and political content of the protests see 
Barnett and Akiner 1996, and Schwartz 1996. 
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Lama and (therefore) a place of pilgrimage for many Tibetans and non-Tibetan 
Buddhists, but it is also the focus for the individual, communal and institutional 
practices of Tibetan culture. Earlier pilgrims used to visit Lhasa, which for them was a 
source of refuge from the everydayness of life with hope of good in the next life. Now 
refugee status is itself often seen as a sort of pilgrimage during which a darshan 
('sight') of the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala provides compensation for hardship. As a 
result, new refugees are first stationed in Dharamsala, helped to meet the Dalai Lama, 
and only then sent to resettlement camps. 
This projection also provides legitimacy to the claims that the Central Tibetan 
Administration is a government-in-exile, a continuation of the pre-1959 Lhasa 
government, and therefore the rightful representative of all Tibetan people. It provides 
added validation to the political struggle for self-determination in Tibet. Dharamsala is 
perceived as the temporary capital of the entire Tibetan world and the Tibet 
movement'. Conscious efforts have been made to recapture what has been called the 
spirit of `Old Tibet' by recreating in Dharamsala, for instance, Tsuglakhang ('Central 
cathedral') as an equivalent of Lhasa's Jokhang temple. 
The symbolic representation of Dharamsala as Little Lhasa, as Thupten Samphel of 
the government-in-exile's Department for Information and International Relations 
(DIIR) pointed out, is to convey that what has been destroyed is being recreated 
(Personal Interview, January 2000). This idea of the recreation of a civilisation and the 
preservation of culture is the single most important strand of Tibetan identity 
problematic and is conspicuously evident in Dharamsala's geography. 
The institutionalised expression of this theme of the preservation of culture is best 
found at the Norbulingka Institute, dedicated explicitly to the preservation of Tibetan 
culture in both literary and artistic forms. Activities and publications of the Institute 
expressly represent a unique ancient culture that needs to be preserved from possible 
extinction. For instance, in the Norbulingka's Centre for Arts, the skills preserved and 
passed on through training and apprenticeship include statue making, thangka 
painting, applique and tailoring, woodcarving, carpentry and metal craft. It is 
emphasised that the practice of making traditional works of art such as religious 
statues and thangkas only in response to the customer's order is a continuation of 
earlier practices where patrons would personally commission artists to do such work. 
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Norbulingka is keen `to preserve the relationship between patron and artist free from 
the taint of commercialisation' (Norbulingka Institute, 2000). 
Even the Dalai Lama considers preservation to be the single most important 
achievement of the exile community. He points out that the pure form of culture is 
now found outside rather than inside Tibet (Powell 1992: 384). The idea that Tibetan 
culture in diaspora is more authentic than the one prevalent in Chinese-controlled 
Tibet is supported by a few factors. One of them is the passing down of cultural 
authority though the practice of reincarnation. A significant part of Tibetan culture and 
religion has been embodied within reincarnate lamas, the most important being the 
Dalai Lama himself. And many of them left Tibet to become a part of the diaspora. 
The struggle between the Dalai Lama and Beijing over the reincarnation of the 
Panchen Lama" reinforces the Dharamsala establishment's desire to prevent this 
process from getting into the wrong and `inauthentic' hands. While outside (read 
Chinese) influence is resisted, there have been instances where the practice has been 
deployed to incorporate ethnically non-Tibetan individuals as nang-pa (the Buddhist 
`insider' V2 
The idea of true cultural authority as existing in exile rather than within Tibet is also 
supported by the presence of some great mastercraftsmen13 who had been trained in 
their art in the `Old Tibet' and then moved to exile. These artists are regarded as 
`precious' since they are seen as having direct experience of `authentic Old Tibet'. " 
Moreover, because of Exotica Tibet and a desire to gain Western support, the exile 
elite has tended to favour certain strands of Tibetan culture as more authentic and 
therefore worthy of patronage. For instance, cultural aspects highlighting sectarian 
11 The Panchen Lama's importance within Tibetan Buddhism is next only to the Dalai Lama. 
To undermine the child, who was recognised as the reincarnation of the Panchen Lama (and 
therefore the Xith in the line) by the Dalai Lama, Chinese government imprisoned him and has 
recognised another child as the true reincarnation. For an account over this struggle, see Hilton 
(2000). 
12 The most (in)famous instance of this is the recognition by Penor Rinpoche of the Hollywood 
actor Steven Segal as a reincarnation of the seventeenth century hidden treasure revealer 
Chungdrag Dorje of Palyul Monastery. 
13 The emphasis in `craftsmen' is deliberate in order to highlight the gendered character of 
traditional cultural practices and their reinforcement by preservation ethos. For instance, in the 
Norbulingka I was told that statue-making is not meant for women. Not surprisingly, most 
women were concentrated in sections such as tailoring. But I also came across women artists in 
other areas including painting. 
14 One such artist is Penpa Dorje, confirmed as a `master statue maker' in 1973 by the Dalai 
Lama. 
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differences are often under-emphasised in favour of pan-Tibetan identity markers. 
Here, the ultimate cultural authority has come to be associated with the Dalai Lama 
himself. 's 
An interrelated thematic aspect of the symbolic geography of Dharamsala is the role of 
memory in housing a distinct Tibetan identity. Exotica Tibet has directly influenced 
how Tibetans have constructed their memories of a lost homeland. The names of many 
establishments in Dharamsala - not only of Tibetan governmental and non- 
governmental institutions, but also the commercial establishments - resonate with 
specifically Tibetan idioms. For instance, if one walks up the Jogibara Road from the 
Amnye Machen Institute to the right and Gaden Choeling Nunnery to the left, one 
finds names such as Amdo Cha-Chung Restaurant, Lhasa Tailors, Cafe Shambhala, 
Tsongkha Restaurant, Drepung Loseling Guest House, Tibet Lhoka Cafe, etc. 
Similarly, on the Bhagsu Road starting from the bus stop, one comes across Potala 
Tours & Travels, Dhompatsang Boutique and Handicraft, Rangzen Cafe, Tara Cafe, 
and Tashi Kangsar Travel Lodge, to mention just a few. Other names, more directly 
influenced by Exotica Tibet, specifically deploy the ideas of loss and longing, such as 
the Tibet Memory Restaurant, Lhasa Tailors, Lhasa Hotel, and Hotel Tibet (the hotel 
belongs to the government-in-exile). It may be possible that an important factor 
influencing the naming practice could be the nostalgia for Tibet and the desire to 
create familiarity in strange places. If you don't find Tibetan names in the Little 
Lhasa, where else can you expect to find them? 
7C. Culture and the politics of place: some conceptual problems with the 
dominant story 
However, this dominant story of `Little Lhasa' as a temporary station where Tibetan 
culture is being preserved is highly problematic, both practically and theoretically. 
While in practical terms, this simple story is complicated by the experiences of living 
as refugees, it is also open to serious theoretical challenges because of the 
unproblematic acceptance of a stylised understanding of the basic concepts of identity 
and culture. 
15 For a discussion of how Dharamsala assumes a canonical role in religious art, see Harris 
1999. 
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Let us first take the theme of the preservation of Tibetan culture. Though the 
predominant emphasis remains on preserving tradition, the impact of drastic change in 
the context of cultural production is evident even in the traditional areas. Unlike in 
Tibet where the monastic institutions were the sole custodian of religion, in the 
diaspora the task of preserving the culture is shared by modern institutions established 
by the exile administration (see Kolas 1996). The institutions of culture such as 
museums, libraries and institutes established by the government-in-exile are 
considered repositories of authentic Tibetan culture. These are modelled on Western 
ideas of cultural preservation. The `culture of Tibet' is in a sense being constructed 
and objectified through the new institutions and through the ideas of `culture' itself. 
Particular ideas of Tibet, influenced by Exotica Tibet, are created and embedded in the 
exhibitionary forms of a range of cultural practices and institutions. A relatively fluid 
mixture of traditions is being bounded, fixed and recorded much more efficiently than 
ever before. Maintaining and recreating a Tibetan identity in exile involves a self- 
conscious display of Tibetan Buddhist religion and an organised construction of 
Tibetan culture. As Kolas argues, `contained within secular institutions, religious 
expressions have become the objects of Tibetan culture, which represent Tibetan 
identity to the outside world' (Ibid.: 58-59). This attempt to preserve traditional 
culture in the modern world has inevitably led to a secularisation and objectification of 
it. 16 Capturing the spirit of `Old Tibet', after all, involves a selective construction of 
traditions. For instance, when discussing the various styles of Tibetan painting, Clare 
Harris points out that the dominant style is new Menri whose purity is at best `a series 
of re-inventions' (1999: 69). The traditional cultural practices are often laden with 
contemporary political meanings. " 
16 As Rinzin Thargyal (1997) points out, this process of secularisation, which is an 
epiphenomenon of societal forces, should not be confused with secularism, which is an 
ideology. He argues that Tibetan Buddhism (chos) has potent democratic principles, which is 
leading to secularisation and therefore any simplistic reading of this process, as indicative of 
separation of religion and politics is wrong. While one can appreciate his anxiety to legitimise 
changes towards democracy in terms of traditional religion, it does not stand very comfortably 
with frequent statements of Dalai Lama himself that he wishes to retire from political life once 
Tibetans get to exercise their right of self-determination. 
17 As Margaret Nowak pointed out, the Tibetan youths in diaspora use three types of 
ideological strategies: a less devotional, more politically motivated reconsideration of Buddhist 
traditions; a neopuritanical concern for maintaining the purity of essential Tibetan symbolic 
forms; and, a sometimes conventional, sometimes extended interpretation of the metaphorical 
concept of rangzen (translated roughly as self-power, independence) (1984: 139). 
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Without belittling these attempts at maintaining distinctive traditions of creative and 
artistic expression, at a theoretical level, this over-emphasis on preservation should 
also be seen as being conceptually problematic because it takes a sanitised view of 
what culture means. Culture is seen as a thing out there that can be identified, mapped, 
practised, and preserved. Such a conceptualisation of culture essentialises and 
naturalises what is socially and politically constructed and contested. It ignores the 
fact that culture is a `dynamic mix of symbols, beliefs, languages and practices which 
people create, not a fixed thing or entity governing humans' (Anderson and Gale 
1992: 3). Cultural identities, far from being eternally fixed in some essentialised past, 
are actually subject to the continuous play of history, culture and power. Tibetan 
culture is as much a process as it is a product of particular historical processes. An 
explicit recognition of this would certainly challenge the dominant tendency to make 
exilic `Tibet' fit Exotica Tibet. This Shangri-la paradigm is something that could lead 
to the Tibetan culture remaining on `a life-support system in perpetuity' without much 
chance of self-regeneration (Harris 1999: 197). 
The effect of commodification and tourism on particular expressions of `authentic' 
Tibetan culture is also important. As Robert E. Wood argues, tourism affects not only 
the ways in which ethnic identities are asserted, but also which ethnic markers are 
chosen to symbolise group membership and culture (1998: 222). '8 The desire to attract 
tourists has played a significant role in the depiction of Dharamsala as the `Little 
Lhasa'. 
Even the names of most establishments in McLeod Gunj, particularly the commercial 
ones, highlight the importance of tourism and the desire to appeal to outsiders' idea of 
Tibet as a Shangri-la. For instance, on the Jogibara Road this is exemplified in names 
such as Yak Restaurant, Snow Land Restaurants, Hotel Shangri-la, Snow Lion 
complex (hotel, restaurant, and medical store), and Travel Tibet Tailoring Shop. The 
fact that many of such establishments are owned by local Indians goes on to show that 
a primary motive for such naming practices is to appeal to tourists. In fact, this 
dynamic is also underlined by the presence of other shops with names that are 
unabashedly orientalist, such as Dreaming Oriental Carpet Cottage Handicrafts, Royal 
18 Further, Dean MacCannell writes, `tourism is a primary ground for the production of new 
cultural forms on a global base... [it] is not just an aggregate of merely commerical activities; it 
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Asia Art, Heaven Art, and Rising Horizon Cafe. It is hard to imagine the old city of 
Lhasa having place names such as Shangri-la, Dreaming Oriental, or Yeti before its 
incorporation into the international tourism networks. My hypothesis is that while 
Tibetan names such as Amnye Machen Institute, Gangchen Kyishong and lhagyal-ri 
reflect a desire to recreate a familiar environment, other more orientalist names such 
as Shangri-la and Travel Tibet pander to exoticised representations of Tibet. This is 
supported by the fact that while the former are predominantly used in Tibetan 
governmental and nongovernmental institutions, the latter are found exclusively in 
commercial establishments. 
The preservation ethos is not hegemonic in the Tibetan diaspora. Counter hegemonic 
spaces are available in Dharamsala for innovative and more contemporary practices of 
culture. Even these practitioners are not in opposition to traditional culture but 
complementary to it. For instance, though the catalogues and brochures of 
Norbulingka `forget' to mention this, they have a section where young artists work on 
contemporary themes. Moreover, even the traditional cultural practices are often laden 
with contemporary political meanings. The Namgyalma Stupa19 in the centre of 
McLeod Gunj, erected during the sixties as a memorial to the Tibetans who lost their 
lives fighting against the Chinese, is a good example of this combination of traditional 
religion with modern politics. Similarly, the dolls made in the traditional style at 
Norbulingka carry Free Tibet badges. The political context of occupation and coercion 
is always present even in the space provided for traditional art and crafts. Despite the 
dominance of preservation ethos, the focus of identification has now shifted from local 
contexts to a national one- instead of individual localities and regions, all of Tibet is 
collectively imagined as the homeland to which the refugees hope one day to return. 
Rather than seeing culture as informing politics and vice versa, the entire category of 
culture has to be understood as political. For instance, both the desire and the attempts 
of preserving a culture under threat is an act of resistance both to dominant forces of 
modernisation and to the Chinese occupation. Therefore, we must consider not only 
the way in which politics affects the works of art, but in what sense an artwork may 
itself constitute a political act or statement, rather than being conceived merely as the 
is also an ideological framing of history, nature, and tradition; a framing that has the power to 
reshape culture and nature to its own needs' (1992: 1). 
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result of a political intention (Millon and Nochlin 1978). It is difficult to miss the 
centrality of the Tibetan political cause in McLeod Gunj's landscape as `Free Tibet', 
`Boycott Chinese Goods', and similar stickers and posters are glaringly visible. The 
symbolic geography of Dharamsala in this sense is a geography of resistance as much 
as it is a geography of regeneration. In other words, the cultural is political. 
An integral part of Dharamsala's geography is the festivals and various other events 
occurring throughout the year. Rather than seeing the festivals as merely reflecting 
religious beliefs or political rituals, they may be studied to reveal the techniques and 
dynamics through which the narratives, symbolic spaces and the collective fantasies of 
communal identities are reproduced and regulated among the Tibetans and their 
supporters. One recalls here Hugh Richardson's observations on the great ceremonies 
of Lhasa - although full of colour and spectacle, they were not mere pageantry but 
were essential rites for the well-being of the church (sic) and the state (Richardson 
1993). Examples of such festivals that are replete with multiple meanings are Losar 
(February 12), Tibetan Uprising Day (March 10), the Dalai Lama's birthday (July 6), 
Democracy Day of Tibet (September 2), the commemoration of the awarding of Nobel 
Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama (December 10). Paul Connerton's observation that `the 
ritual performances and commemorative ceremonies are important in building up 
collective memory, which in turn is crucial for the development of a sense of home' 
(Kong and Yeoh 1997: 217) is also applicable in the case of the Tibetan diaspora. 
Though the focus is on the preservation of culture, a visible feature of the symbolic 
geography of Dharamsala is hybridity. In their everyday life, Tibetan refugees in 
Dharamsala and elsewhere in South Asia negotiate with the popular culture of India; it 
should come as no surprise, then, that Bollywood has a very significant influence on 
the identity of many Tibetans. Everywhere I went, I found a striking similarity 
between Tibetan songs and songs from both popular Hindi films, and Western pop 
music. 
However, such observations, while complicating the notion of preservation of a `pure' 
culture, do not militate against a more sophisticated conception of Tibetan culture. 
This new generation may not practice `authentic' versions of culture, but, as evidenced 
19 This Buddhist stupa ('monument') is surrounded by prayer wheels and has a statue of 
Sakyamuni Buddha enshrined in a small chamber. 
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from the activities of the Tibet Youth Congress, their creative negotiations with 
dominant cultures around them do not hamper their politicisation. On the contrary, the 
ability simultaneously to negotiate and resist varied cultural practices makes the 
diasporic Tibetans well placed to carry forward their political movement in a rapidly 
changing world. This simultaneous negotiation, appropriation and resistance is a key 
feature of postcoloniality. 
7D. Challenging the dominant paradigm: Reading cultural identity in terms of 
roots and routes 
What does a postcolonial reading strategy look like? How can it seek to contextualise 
a politics of place and identity which takes into account the politics of representation? 
Here I wish to make six interrelated points relating to Tibetan identity - roots and 
routes of culture are complementary, identity is discursively produced, Exotica Tibet 
plays a productive role, the Dalai Lama's role is vital, an image of the `homeland' is 
crucial, and finally, Tibet is a re-imag(in)ing construct. 
First, the space for a different reading is afforded by the word dharamshala itself. As 
pointed out earlier, the word indicates a temporary home and this temporariness has 
been a central motif in Tibetan diasporic identity discourses. Tibet, the original 
homeland, is foregrounded as the final destination in these discourses and it also 
permeates the material as well as the performative cultural expressions of the Tibetans 
in diaspora. While focusing on the starting and finishing stations, such a reading 
ignores the crucial element of the travel itself. Dharamshala is not only a temporary 
home, but also a temporary stop on the way to somewhere else. It is a house offering 
temporary hospitality to travellers on their way. One does not travel from home to 
dharamshala to return back to the home. Travel is transformative and constitutive. 
Rather, dharamshala is a temporary shelter to facilitate travel from one place to some 
other place. If instead of focusing solely on the theme of return, we look at the process 
and experience of journey itself, we may be better placed to appreciate the conundrum 
of Tibetan identity politics. 
As James Clifford points in a different context, `practices of displacement might 
emerge as constitutive of cultural meanings rather than as their simple transfer or 
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extension' (1997: 3). 20 Instead of concentrating solely on the essence, the roots of 
Tibetan identity, we should look at the processes that constitute the routes travelled, 
including the creation of a pan-Tibetan exilic identity. Adoption of such a view allows 
us to appreciate the ambiguities involved in the project of cultural preservation as well 
as the changes that come about in the life of a community of people. While 
understanding the need to espouse one's cause in terms of an essential identity, the 
contingency of such claims is not papered over - and herein lies the strength of the 
alternative theorisation. Therefore, instead of framing an artificial opposition between 
the roots of culture and the routes of culture, we may look at them as complementary. 
For this false dichotomy is sustained only by the conventional view of culture as 
rooted in a particular place. If we look, on the other hand, at the roots as contingent 
foundations that are always already contested, we can begin to appreciate the 
complementarity. This is similar to what Bhabha has to say about culture as 
transnational and translational. 
Culture as a strategy of survival is both transnational and translational. It is 
transnational because contemporary political discourses are rooted in specific histories 
of cultural displacement ... 
Culture is translational because such spatial histories of 
displacement 
... make the question of how culture signifies, or what is signified by 
culture, a rather complex issue (Bhabha 1994: 172; emphasis in original). 
Second, recognition of the contingent nature of identity does not delegitimise identity 
claims marshalled by Tibetans for their cause. It simply draws attention to the strategic 
nature of such claims. This position is possible if one adopts a discursive approach to 
identity which sees identification not as an artefact or an outcome but as a 
construction, as something always in process. Though not without its determinate 
conditions of existence, including the material and symbolic resources required to 
sustain it, identification is in the end conditional, inevitably lodged in contingency. 
`Identification is, then, a process of articulation, a suturing, an over-determination not 
a subsumption' (Hall 1996: 3). We need to recognise that its popular usage 
notwithstanding, the concept does not signal a stable core of self, unfolding from 
beginning to end through all the vicissitudes of history without any substantial change. 
On the contrary, we should accept that identities are always and already fragmented 
20 Cf. Nevzat Soguk and Geoffrey Whitehall who argue that `[p]eoples and cultures are always 
(sometimes, in spite of themselves) "wanderingly grounded" in transversal spaces'. 
Transversality, following from Edouard Glissant, refers to `a historical process which has 
always been contingent, always refusing "sovereign territory", sovereign powers to contain 
peoples and places, and sovereign voice to convince people that it is the sovereign space and 
territory, permanently there, in existence, inescapable and necessary' (1999: 683,697). 
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and fractured; they are never singular but multiply constructed across different, often 
intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices and positions. Modifying Judith 
Butler's reading of gender to talk about identity in general, it should be clarified that 
if 
... [identity] is constructed, it is not necessarily constructed by an `I' or a `we' who 
stands before that construction in any spatial or temporal sense of `before'. Indeed, it is unclear that there can be an `I' or a `we' who has not been submitted, subjected to 
... [identity], where ... [identification] is, among other things, the differentiating 
relations by which speaking subjects come into being. Subjected to ... [identity], but subjectivated by ... [identity], the `I' neither preceded nor follows the process of this 
... [identification], but emerges only within and as the matrix of ... [process of identification] (1993: 7). 
Indeed, Butler's idea of performativity is helpful here. As she succinctly puts it, 
`Identity is performatively constituted by the very "expressions" that are said to be its 
results' (1990: 25). 21 She uses performativity in the context of sex and gender, 
persuasively arguing that `the anticipation conjures its object'. Performativity is not 
`the act by which a subject brings into being what she/he names, but, rather, as that 
reiterative power of discourse to produce the phenomena that it regulates and 
constrains'; production of the (gendered) subject is not a singular or deliberate `act', 
but, rather, the `reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the 
effects that it names' (Butler 1993: 2). Challenging the notion that nature is to culture 
as sex is to gender, Butler retheorises gender as `the discursive/cultural means by 
which "sexed nature" or a "natural sex" is produced and established as 
"prediscursive", prior to culture, a politically neutral space on which culture acts' 
(Butler 1999: 11; emphasis in original). 
[Gender] operates as an interior essence that might be disclosed, an expectation that 
ends up producing the very phenomenon that it anticipates. In the first instance, then, 
the performativity of gender revolves around this metalepsis, the way in which the 
anticipation of a gendered essence produces that which it posits as outside itself. 
Secondly, performativity is not a singular act, but a repetition and a ritual, which 
achieves its effects through its naturalization in the context of a body, understood, in 
part, as a culturally sustained temporal duration (Ibid.: xiv-xv; emphases added). 
Further, performativity shifts the attention away from `construction' to `a process of 
materialization that stabilizes over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and 
surface we call matter' (Butler 1993: 9). 
Applying this idea to the Tibetan case, we may see Tibetan identity as constituted by 
particular processes and practices, and not as some universal, timeless fixed thing. 
21 Performativity is not to be confused with performance. As Butler clarifies, performative act 
`is not primarily theatrical; indeed, its apparent theatricality is produced to the extent that its 
historicity remains dissimulated... ' (1993: 12). 
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Tibetan nationalism is conjured up by the anticipation of an essential Tibetanness, and 
to be effective, it needs to be repeated again and again; it is a process not a product. It 
is this `anticipation' of the essence of Tibet, an essential Tibetanness, which is 
constitutively linked up with Exotica Tibet and Tibetanness. 
Rather than seeing the identity question as a matter of simple historical investigation, 
we can deal with it in terms of the deployment of resources of history, language and 
culture in the process of becoming rather than being. The idea of symbolic geography 
encapsulates such a discursive approach since instead of considering the ideas of 
locality and community as naturally given, it focuses on social and political processes 
of place-making in Dharamsala. A discursive approach does not deny any act of 
communal political activism. It only reveals it as contingent, as strategic rather than as 
something unambiguously natural. The Tibetan claims to `an essential identity, while 
demonstrably imaginary, constructed, and teleological, are no less essential in that 
they serve as foundational claims that operate politically, socially, and, for many, 
spiritually' (Venturino 1997: 108; emphasis added). 
Third, connected to the issue of a discursive approach to identity questions is an 
explicit recognition of the constitutive role played by Exotica Tibet. Representations, 
especially the Western ones, have had a significant impact on the symbolic geography 
of Dharamsala and Tibetan identity discourses. The desire to secure patronage from 
sympathetic outsiders, elicit support for the Tibetan political cause, and make a living 
through commercial processes - all these forces have contributed to a self-reflexive 
adoption of Western representations of Tibetans as a part of Tibetanness. Image has 
been translated into identity. The representation of Tibetans as inherently religious and 
spiritual has certainly contributed to the mushrooming of Yoga classes, Retreat 
Centres, and Meditation Schools in Dharamsala. At the same time, we must keep in 
mind the fact that the Tibetan exiles are not unique in that Western representations 
have a major effect on identity practices. As Toni Huber (2001) argues, recent 
reflexive notions of Tibetan culture and identity witnessed in exile should be 
understood as products of a complex transnational politics of identity within which 
populations such as the Tibetan exiles are increasingly representing themselves and 
being represented by others. One such identity discourse, which Huber highlights, is 
connected to environmentalism. The presence within Dharamsala of Green Hotel and 
Green Cyber Cafe, Vegetarian Health Food, and the like may be understood as a 
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conscious desire to appropriate this particular discourse as a part of identity formation. 
The symbolic geography of `Little Lhasa' questions the premise that Tibetans are 
innocent victims-'prisoners of Shangri-la'. Instead, even while recognising the 
unequal power relations, one must recognise that the Tibetan exiles possess agency 
and subjectivity. 22 That this `agency is always and only a political prerogative' and 
that `the constituted character of the subject is the very precondition of its agency... [it 
is a] loss of epistemological certainty, but this loss of certainty does not necessarily 
entail political nihilism as its result' (Butler 1992: 13,12,17; emphasis in original). 
Fourth, an integral part of Dharamsala as well as Tibetan diasporic identity is the 
crucial role played by the personality as well as the figure of the Dalai Lama. His 
smiling face adorns almost every establishment here, including the shops owned by 
non-Tibetans. 23 More than anything else, it is his residence here that contributes to the 
transformation of Dharamsala into `Little Lhasa'. He has a central position as the 
symbol of Tibet among Tibetan refugees and in the international media. Within 
discourses of Tibetanness, the Dalai Lama is `neither wholly transcendent (and 
thereby out of this world) nor wholly immanent (enmeshed in temporalities like the 
rest of us), but an ambiguous symbol imbued with the qualities of both' (Nowak 1984: 
30). The XIVth Dalai Lama has come to acquire an unprecedented position. He 
combines the role of the supreme leader of the entire Tibetan Buddhist community 
with the role of the chief spokesperson of Buddhist Modernism. He is as much a world 
spiritual leader as the undisputed leader of the Tibetan political cause (Lopez 1998: 
181-207). This mix of uniqueness with universalism and of a national cause with 
transnationalism is also underlined within Dharamsala's symbolic geography. 
Fifth, though for the Tibetans the memory, the ideal and the image of the land from 
which they have been exiled have been a vital force in the struggle for national 
recognition, the notion of return to the homeland is problematic. This problematisation 
should not be seen in terms of a pessimistic scenario in which original Tibet has been 
destroyed and can never be retrieved. Instead, it guards against any naive imagination 
of a particularised space-time projection of Tibet as a timeless construct. Of course, 
this theme of return to the homeland is common to many exiled communities. The 
22 This is something that has been done effectively by the contributors to Klieger 2002, Korom 
1997a and 1997b. 
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Palestinians are a good comparative example. In both cases one sees how the longing 
for home has changed over time from return to specific villages and particular 
dwellings to an emphasis on a collective national return to `the homeland' conceived 
more abstractly. Writing specifically about the Palestinians, George Bisharat (1997) 
points out that in exile there occurs a displacement of a community, once understood 
as being rooted in particular localities, to the level of the nation. Homeland is 
conceived as a moral as well as a geographical location. 
Lastly, the adoption of a different reading strategy also foregrounds the idea of Tibet 
as a re-imag(in)ing construct. Following Benedict Anderson's theory of nations as 
imagined communities (Anderson 1983), Tibet can be seen as an imagined construct. 
However, the use of the form imagining rather than imagined indicates that the 
process of imagination is a continuous one. And then, since the Dharamsala 
establishment plays a crucial role in shaping this imagining process according to some 
particular images and representations, I put the `in' within parenthesis. The process is 
as much one of imaging as it is of imagining. The prefix `re' is to counter any sense of 
simplistic linearity associated with the process of imagining Tibet as a nation. 
However, this theorisation of Tibet as a discursive re-imag(in)ing does not deny the 
real desires and feelings of the people towards it. Instead, it promotes a historicisation 
and politicisation of such desires and feelings. It calls for special attention to be given 
to the ways spaces and places are made, imagined, contested, enforced, and 
reimagined. One needs to accept that given the limited vocabulary available to 
Tibetans to espouse their cause in the international arena, use of the somewhat old- 
fashioned concept of nationalism is perfectly understandable. As Gaim Kibreab points 
out, in a world where rights such as equal treatment, access to sources of livelihoods, 
rights of freedom of movement and residence, and the like are apportioned on the 
basis of territorially anchored identities, the identity people gain from their association 
with a particular place is an indispensable instrument to a socially and economically 
fulfilling life (2000: 384-428). Though a re-imag(in)ing construct, Tibet has a real 
impact on the lives of many people, and this itself provides legitimacy to those 
struggling for the self-determination of Tibetans. My discursive theorisation does not 
render this struggle problematic. At the theoretical level it calls for a 
23 Apart from Indian Banks, the only exception to prevalence of the Dalai Lama's picture that I 
came across was a shop selling Desi Sharaab ('country alcohol') on the Jogibara Road. 
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reconceptualisation of basic themes involved in the articulation of a Tibetan 
identification process as encapsulated within Dharamsala's symbolic geography. And 
at the level of political praxis, it simply warns against any naive ideas about 
nationalism, return to homeland, and the like. 
7E. Conclusion: affirming Tibetanness through its problematisation 
By way of a conclusion, I would like to clarify that this postcolonial reading based on 
a different understanding of the words dharamshala/dharmashala should not be seen 
as an alternative to the more common story discussed earlier in the chapter. For the 
political practices embedded within Dharamsala's symbolic geography defy any clear 
categorisation in either of the two conceptual frameworks. My approach appreciates 
the practical need for espousing Tibetan identity as a strategic essentialism. At the 
same time, it highlights the need to recognise at a theoretical level the contingent 
character of these claims. A sophisticated postcolonial theorisation of Tibetanness in 
terms of symbolic geography facilitates such a two pronged approach, while at the 
same time recognising the arbitrariness involved in any distinction between theory and 
practice or between cultural and political identity discourses. Apart from other things, 
it also recognises the politics of Exotica Tibet - the constitutive relation between 
Western representations and Tibetan identity discourses, that is, between Exotica Tibet 
and Tibetanness. 
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Chapter 8: Concluding remarks on world politics, representation, 
identity 
`[T]his book has no straightforward thesis or conclusion' (Walker 1993: 21). 
`The reason I can do English stuff or even sometimes French stuff is not my 
personal acumen. It's the history of postcolonial peoples. Our access into 
universality was to learn Western discourses. I call us the wild anthropologists' 
(Spivak in Sharpe 1992). 
To avoid incorporation by mainstream IR, my attempt is to `forget IR theory' (Bleiker 
1997) by `doing innovative analyses of international political questions that are not 
addressed to some disciplinary mainstream of IR' (Weber 1999: 116). This act of 
forgetting does not mean ignoring IR completely, for any such attempt will leave intact a 
disciplinary endeavour that has significant purchase on the understanding and construction 
of world politics. Rather, this `forgetting', at least for me, involves unprivileging the 
dominant modes of analysis of world politics and learning to `think differently'. From an 
IR perspective, the learning process within this thesis has involved journeying into the 
exotic thoughtscape of social theory, postcolonialism, diaspora studies, cultural theory, 
colonial discourse analysis, Tibetology, and so on. The journey has involved shedding old 
baggage and picking up new; it has temporary halts, but only an arbitrary beginning and 
an even more contingent end. The thesis is, in this sense, a journal of my theoretical and 
empirical journey. 
My analyses has involved three `de-'s (deparochialising, deconstructive analysis and 
description) and three `re-'s (representation, reimagining and retheorising). After 
introducing the Tibet question, I set up the argument for a postcolonial IR that seeks to 
reveal ethnocentrism (and a lack of concern for the issues central to the lives of peoples in 
non-West) of mainstream (and sometimes even critical) IR and deparochialise them. The 
rest of my endeavour does not always `use' insights from postcolonialism and IR theory, 
but is inspired by postcoloniality (a postcolonial critical attitude). This is because, 
following Sylvester (2002), we can sight, cite as well as site criticality and dissent in 
postcoloniality. The examination of the theme of representation within JR and social, 
cultural and postcolonial theory in chapter 3 foregrounds my theoretical beliefs in a social 
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constructionist approach to representation and the discursive constitution of reality. 
Representation, especially the Western representation of the non-West, is central to the 
study of IR as it is a crucial dynamic of world politics, often supporting the dominant truth 
regimes and structures of power. While critical IR has focused mainly on the constitutive 
function of representation in generating and sustaining particular foreign policy regimes 
and on the identity politics of the representer. What about the impact of Western 
representations on the represented? By ignoring this, critical IR leaves itself open to the 
charge of West-centrism. My thesis rectifies this bias and through the empirical study of 
Western representations of Tibet (Exotica Tibet) highlights its productive and restrictive 
effects on the non-West. Exotica Tibet is theorised in terms of its poetics and politics. 
Chapters 4 and 5 explicate the poetics of Exotica Tibet - how Tibet has been represented 
in the twentieth century, while chapters 6 and 7 expound the politics of Exotica Tibet - the 
effects of representations on Tibetan political and cultural identity discourses. Chapter 4 
offers a deconstructive analysis of Western representational practices by studying some 
common rhetorical tropes, modes, and strategies of representation. Chapter 5 shows how 
the `truth' about Tibet was produced out of specific processes of imageries and 
imaginaries throughout the twentieth century. It is a description how Western interaction, 
seen as imperial encounter, has constitutive relation with the imagination of Tibet (Exotica 
Tibet). Finally, the next two chapters retheorise Tibetanness and argue that Tibet is a `re- 
imag(in)ing' construct. Chapter 6 brings out various dynamics, including interaction with 
the West and Exotica Tibet that constitute Tibetanness as a national identity. Chapter 7 
examines the cultural expressions of diasporic Tibetans, highlights the role of Exotica 
Tibet, and offers a new way of theorising Tibetanness with emphasis on postcoloniality- 
inspired symbolic geography and cultural identity discourses. Thus, a postcolonial 
analysis of the poetics and the politics of Exotica Tibet underlines the importance of 
critically studying Western representations of the non-West within a deparochialised IR. 
The effort here has been to challenge the geographical parochialism of both the 
mainstream and critical IR endeavours. `Tibet' here stands not only for those who identify 
with it (the Tibetans), but also as a challenge to critical endeavours in IR as well as to 
postcolonial theorising. It challenges critical IR to look at the productive impact of 
Western representations of the non-West on the latter. It challenges it to move the focus 
216 
from the representer to the represented. Similarly, it exposes the limits of postcolonial 
theorising which has ignored `colonisation' within the `post-colonial' states. My attempt 
has been not only to promote a dialogue between postcolonial theory and IR theory, but, 
more importantly, to adopt a postcolonial critical attitude - that is postcoloniality - to 
offer new, innovative ways of doing IR analyses. Here I am aware that I am deploying 
`Tibet' to critique certain ways of thinking, in a manner somewhat similar to orientalists 
for whom `Tibet' has served only as a category to be used, to be deployed. My 
Orientalising gesture reflects partly my failure to break out of the pernicious mode of 
thought set up by the dominant West, and partly a failure of postcolonial thinking that is 
forced to respond to the West and its knowledge in its own language, on terms set by it. ' 
Where my use is different is in my self-consciousness and reflexivity about it, in a 
strategic deployment that seeks to write back at dominant modes of analyses and 
challenge the provincialism-in-the-guise-of-universalism characterising these modes. An 
awareness of ethnocentrism leads to greater self-reflexivity, sensitivity for the Other, and 
an openness to alternative theoretical perspectives. My own position as a non-Tibetan 
`interested' observer should be acknowledged. 
The thesis is a call for a postcolonial IR theoretical approach, the space for which has been 
cleared by the post-positivist debates. It challenges the commonplace ignorance of the 
history of imperialism and colonialism in analysis of supposedly `intractable' political 
problems in the postcolonial world. It highlights the centrality of the concept of 
representation to the Western enterprise of knowledge production about its Others. It bares 
the `real' impact of rhetorical utterances and practices. It explores asymmetrical power 
relations in the discursive production of `Tibet' as a specific site of West-nonWest 
encounter' in the twentieth century. It emphasises the (re)productive relation between 
I have made no conscious attempt to disguise my politics - for me not only `the personal is 
political', `the political is personal', `the international is personal', and `the personal is 
international' (see Enloe 2000), but crucially, `the international is political' and `the political is 
international'. 
2 West's encounter with the Other can be defined appropriately by the metaphor of what Ziauddin 
Sardar calls `vampirization'. The relationship is analogous to that of a vampire and its victims. 
The villain is... a tragic but all-powerful figure. He has an insatiable desire for blood 
(conquest, invasion) and can survive only by a never-ending supply of victims (social 
Darwinism). He can mesmerize his victims and make them willing participants in their 
victimization (development, modernity). The act of conquest begins with the enticement 
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representation and identity. It performs a deconstructive cultural analysis of Western 
images of Tibet by looking at the poetics of representation. This entails recognition of the 
contingency of identity without giving up the notion of agency. It theorises Tibetan 
identity discourses as constitutively and performatively produced in relation to Western 
imaginaries and imageries, the politics of representation. Though Orientalism finds itself 
`constantly appropriated, re-worked, and re-accentuated in the utterances of others' (Ha 
2000: xii), asymmetrical operation and effect of the power-knowledge nexus remains its 
main characteristic 
Postcolonial IR, as I have argued, offers an effective understanding of the political and 
productive effect of Western representational practices, especially on non-Western people. 
The poetics (the `how' question) and politics ('what impact' question) of Western 
representations are legitimate and vital areas of enquiry for IR because these support 
particular foreign policy regimes and have a productive effect on the identities of political 
actors. In this thesis, I have focused on the latter. Postcolonial IR appreciates the 
importance of popular culture for our understanding of world politics. A social 
constructionist theory of representation inspired primarily, though not exclusively, by 
Michel Foucault's discursive approach along with Edward Said's orientalism critique 
allows us to consider the poetics and the politics of Western representational practices and 
contributes toward debates within IR that seek to deparochialise it. It alerts us to the fact 
that `what we take to be "real", what we invoke as the naturalized knoweldge ... 
is, in 
fact, a changeable and revisable reality ... Although this insight does not in itself 
constitute a political revolution, no political revolution is possible without a radical shift in 
one's notion of the possible and the real' (Butler 1999: xxiii). 
Thus, the poetics and politics of Exotica Tibet mark a new way of enculturing political 
analysis and politicising cultural criticism. This seeks to open up the endeavour of IR to 
new vistas. Hybrid endeavours such as postcolonial international relations theory will 
of an innocent buxom maiden (noble savage) and ends with the penetration of teeth in the 
neck (rape and possession). Once possessed, the victims become physically (colonization) 
and mentally (postmodernism) a subject of vampire; drained of all humanity, the victim 
now personifies evil in the emptiest form of sheer Otherness (savage beast) into which any 
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certainly contribute to changing IR from being a `discourse of limits'3 to what I would like 
to call a discourse of empowering criticality. 
kind of cultural, social, and intellectual content can be poured at will (orientalism, 
anthropology, fundamentalism, terrorism) (1992: 515-6). 
3 Rob Walker calls IR `discourse of limits' in the sense that it allows only certain questions to be 
asked and a general silence prevails over key concepts. It marks the extremity of the political space 
that the political theorists and their derivatives can take for granted (1995: 34). 
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Glossary of non-English words 
Chinese 
Han term used within Chinese state discourse for ethnic Chinese in 
order to distinguish them from non-ethnic Chinese (such as 
Tibetans) 
Shaoshu Minzu minority nationality 
Xizang `Western treasure house' - Chinese term for Tibet that refers only 
to the area now covered by the TAR (Tibetan Autonomous 
Region - Xizang zizhiqu) 
Zang term for the Tibetan race 
Hindi 
Dharamshala temporary house/ guest house, established for charity and 
religious purposes usually on pilgrimage routes 
Sanskrit 
Dharmashala abode of dharma (`religion'/ the principle or law that order the 
universe/ the nature of reality). Dharma is also used as a synonym 
for Buddhism or Buddhist teaching. Tibetan equivalent of it is 
chos 
pundit scholar; during the British rule, often used for Indian scholars, 
agents and cartographers sent clandestinely into Tibet by the 
British authorities in India to collect information in the late 
nineteenth century 
Tibetan 
amban resident/ political commissioner of the Manchu emperor of China 
in Lhasa. The post was created in 1727 and disbanded by the 
thirteenth Dalai Lama in 1913 
Amdo One of the three regions/ provinces of Tibet. Tibetans from Amdo 
are called Amdowas 
268 
avalokitesvara a boddhisatva who is personified in the body of the Dalai Lama. 
Bodhisattava (sanskrit) is a person s parson who has the 'mind of 
Enlightenment' and who is set to become a Buddha. The Dalai 
Lama personifies two forms of Buddha or enlightened being, 
including Jampeyang (Manjushri) and Chenrezig 
(Avalokitesvara) 
bardo the stage `in-between' death and next life 
bod pa `people living in the bod region' 
bod Tibet as it was traditionally called amongst Tibetans 
Cholka-sum all Tibetan-inhabited area ('ethnic' Tibet in Fig. II) 
Chos see Dharma 
chos srid gnyis Idan politics-religion combined (characteristic of traditional Tibetan 
life) 
Chu-zhi Gang-drung `the `Four Rivers, Six Ranges', pan-Khampa resistance 
movement against the Chinese occupation founded in 1957 
dobdob deviant `fighting' monks 
Gelugpa dominant school of Tibetan Buddhism, sometimes called the 
`Yellow Hat' school. The Dalai Lamas and the Panchen Lamas 
belong to it 
Gonpa monastery 
gter ma `treasure' -a type of religious literature that is `discovered', that 
emerges as a result of `re-revelation' 
inji foreigners (Westerners) 
Jokhang most sacred temple in Tibet; also referred to as Tsuglakhang 
Kagyupa the `Red Hat' school of Tibetan Buddhism led by the Karmapa 
Kham Eastern province of Tibet as traditionally conceived. Tibetans 
from the area are called Khampas. 
khang yul the land of snows 
kob yul `barbarian' land (sometimes used 
by Tibetans for Tibet) 
lung-gom-pas Tibetan runners who proceed at extraordinary speeds over 
extraordinary distances 
mchod-yon Buddhist notion of patron-priest relation 
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Monlam `prayer'; short forms of Monlam Chenmo, the Great Prayer 
Festival, held traditionally during the third week of the Tibetan 
New Year 
nangpa Buddhist `insiders' 
Strong-btsan-sgam-po (Songtsen Gampo) the strong Tibetan king of seventh century 
Thangka religious painting depicting Buddhist deity, usually hung as a 
scroll on canvas with silk backing 
tsampa roasted barley flour - marker of Tibetan ethnicity as the staple 
food in Tibet 
tulku `manifestation body'/ an incarnate lama. Non-Tibetans translate it 
as `living Buddha' 
U-Tsang traditional name for the two areas of Central Tibet, including 
Lhasa and Shigatse 
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